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Albert Salomon (1891-1966) was an eminent German-Jewish 
sociologist. He studied art history, religious history, and philosophy 
at Humboldt University in Berlin; philosophy at the University of 
Freiburg; and sociology at the University of Heidelberg. At Heidelberg, 
he studied under Max Weber, Georg Lukács, and Karl Mannheim. His 
fellow students included, among other great social thinkers, Hannah 
Arendt and Hans Speier. After obtaining his doctorate in sociology 
under Mannheim, he taught at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik,
but lost his job there when the Nazis came to power in January 1933.
He received an offer from Alvin Johnson to teach at the University 
in Exile at the New School for Social Research and, with his family, 
migrated to New York City in early 1935.
Over the years, Salomon taught many courses in the Graduate Faculty 
of Political and Social Science at the New School, including seminars 
on Weber, Durkheim, the history of social thought, and Balzac as a 
sociologist. His students revered him for his breadth and depth of 
learning and his exacting standards. Later scholars, including the 
editors of From Albert Salomon: Essays on Social Thinkers, regard 
him as one of the most important interpreters of Western thought
and as an exemplar of the great Jewish intellectual tradition.
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Albert Salomon wastes no time in introducing his essay, “Louis Duc 
de Saint-Simon: Class Consciousness of the Defeated.” By the end 
of five short paragraphs, the reader has good reason to believe that 
Saint-Simon is a thinker worth careful consideration and that Salo-
mon will be a worthy guide.
Salomon immediately identifies Saint-Simon as unique, first 
observing that Saint-Simon’s Mémoires defy historical, cultural, 
and stylistic categorization, then calling attention to Saint-Simon’s 
oxymoronic and evocative description of his own work as “contem-
porary history.” Salomon then identifies Saint-Simon’s work as “a 
model of analysis.” For the kicker, Salomon ties Saint-Simon’s work 
to an issue that is urgent in the time and place Salomon is writing—
mid-twentieth-century America—and that is bedrock for sociology: 
class consciousness.
The introduction reveals certain of Salomon’s own special virtues. 
To place Saint-Simon in historical and literary context as precisely 
and elegantly as Salomon does requires erudition. To recognize the 
humanity, common and rarefied, encompassed in Saint-Simon’s 
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term, contemporary history, as Salomon does, requires compassion 
and a cultured mind. To convey so much information so efficiently 
requires artfulness. 
And so, in the introduction to Salomon’s essay on Saint-Simon, 
as in the essay as a whole, and as in all of Salomon’s essays, the 
reader experiences a double thrill. The reader moves from darkness 
into light, coming into a new understanding of an important social 
thinker or a remarkable episode of social thought, with all the new 
collateral awareness that comes with it. The reader marvels, too, at 
Salomon’s critical faculties.
✴    ✴    ✴
Saint-Simon’s Mémoires depict social life in the royal court 
through the last twenty-five years of the rule of the Sun King, Louis 
XIV, from 1690 to 1715, and the whole of the Régence of Philippe 
II d’Orléans, from 1715 to 1723. Salomon notes the diligence with 
which Saint-Simon, himself a courtier, collected his materials. 
For over twenty years he took notes; every night he wrote 
in his diaries what he had observed and learned about 
persons, situations, and events. He exploited the knowl-
edge of his friends in the ministry and in the military. 
He carefully listened to his wife, questioned his brothers 
and sisters-in-law, and was on the best terms with the 
king’s physicians and chief valet. He was highly appreci-
ated as a confidant by many ladies at the court, whose 
stories were a valuable source of information about love, 
sex, and business at Versailles.
Salomon argues that such recollections have “a greater claim to a 
rendering of historical reality than the academic constructions of 
fictitious historical reality.” He explained:
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Men of affairs have . . . an advantage over the professors 
in that they understand how human beings act in their 
everyday lives. . . . They know, far better than most aca-
demicians, the underlying reality beneath the ostensibly 
harmonious picture most of us have of our world; being 
informed by their spies and agents about the nature of 
their opponents, they are able to learn in the most con-
crete fashion the inner workings of their social milieu.
Salomon notes both Saint-Simon’s recognition of the crucial 
importance of social roles in people’s lives and his conviction of 
“the uniqueness and identity of individual human beings . . . under 
the pressure of constantly changing circumstances”—that is, the 
requirements of their social interactions. Salomon extracts Saint-
Simon’s insight into the provisional character of social behavior: 
Social relationships disclose the precariousness and 
ambiguity in human action, men living with, for, and 
against one another. Men pretend and parade, betray and 
reveal themselves; they ‘seem’ and ‘sham,’ ‘simulate’ and 
‘dissimulate’; they ‘play’ public roles and are different in 
their private lives; their behavior is esoteric and exoteric, 
overt and closed, according to the requirements of the 
situation and their own purposes and goals.
In particular, Salomon appreciates Saint-Simon’s “portraits.” 
These incomparably rich descriptions of the men and women of the 
royal court recreate an entire social world. Indeed, Salomon argues 
that Saint-Simon’s “dramatic presentation of human and social situ-
ations, whether tragic or comic, and the depth of his imagination 
make him the Shakespeare of prose.” A Saint-Simon portrait differs 
from a Weberian ideal type—that is, a coherent and logical fictive 
construct that satisfies some specific scientific concern. Instead, a 
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portrait resembles an Impressionist painting. It usually begins with 
an account of the subject’s physical qualities and proceeds to note his 
or her acquired qualities: modes of “speaking, moving, and other 
bodily gestures,” poise or lack of it, politeness or rudeness, and self- 
discipline. Salomon perceives Saint-Simon’s fascination with how the 
“training and education of the young noblemen produced human 
beings whose bodies and minds were taught to represent a specific 
way of life, to embody specific social roles every moment of their 
lives” and how “[t]he educated and cultured classes of the bourgeois 
patricians had been brought up in the appreciation of graceful con-
duct rather than mere behavior, in the goods of the cultura animi 
rather than in the virtues of aristocratic conversation[.]” Salomon sees 
that the portraits stress the power of recollections and the strength 
of traditions in forming human beings. Salomon singles out Saint-
Simon’s images of Louis XIV, Mme de Maintenon, Louis Duc de 
Bourgogne, Mme de Montespan, the Duc d’Orleans, and of the Abbé 
François Fénelon, Archbishop of Cambrai. Salomon’s summary of 
the portrait of Fénelon is especially arresting: 
The description of Fénelon’s physical being is unfor-
gettable: a tall, slim man with a long white face, an 
aquiline nose, and eyes the flames and spirit of which 
overwhelmed one like a torrent. This face, while reveal-
ing the most contrasting traits, did not disturb the inner 
harmony and integrity of his mind, but expressed a unity 
of gravity and charm, of seriousness and joyfulness. It 
manifested the scholar, the bishop, and the grandsei-
gneur. All these diverse elements and aspects were 
united and merged into the open stream of a continu-
ously growing personality; it contributed to his greatness 
and to the halo of saintliness that had taken the blows 
of destiny and of the intrigues of his enemies. He was 
A  D I S C E R N I N G  A N D  G E N E R O U S  S C H O L A R 5
superior to his fate, however, because he had affirmed it 
with humility and the creative spirit of spiritual libera-
tion. His greatness was visible even at the surface of his 
conduct, combining a delicate politeness with genuine 
depth and integrity, nobility with a radiant mind, and 
spirituality with the deepest concern for the life of man 
in the world. Saint-Simon was convinced that this human 
being embodied the greatest range of human possibili-
ties that he had discovered and presented in the single 
images of his ‘portraits.’
Salomon also emphasized the relationship between Saint-Simon 
and his master, Cornelius Tacitus. Salomon makes clear that Saint-
Simon’s Mémoires emulate Tacitus’s Annales in structure and style, 
but finds a deeper connection: Saint-Simon was a moralist, as was 
Tacitus, and Saint-Simon perceived that he and Tacitus occupied 
a parallel moral vantage point. Salomon also specifies that Tacitus 
helped Saint-Simon understand the transformation of Saint-Simon’s 
world. 
[Saint-Simon] deeply appreciated the Roman’s stand 
against imperial despotism and the absolute majesty of 
the ruler. He well understood the megalomania of the 
rulers as the result of prostration and flattery by their 
courtiers, ministers, and senators. He found the same 
characteristics in his own society and constantly com-
pared the two patterns of tyranny, finding the same pat-
tern of decadence in both the res publica and the French 
monarchy. . . . Throughout the Mémoires, Saint-Simon 
recalls the former conditions of the [French] nobles: their 
indispensable service to the king, the symbolic function 
of crowning the king at Rheims, their role in government 
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during the feudal monarchy, their political activities as 
compared to the grandees of Spain. But all this was gone: 
the French feudal elite, the dukes and peers, were in the 
same situation that the Roman aristocrats were in when 
the military tyrants overthrew the senatorial patricians.
Salomon distills the crucial and poignant emotional and intel-
lectual implications of this realization for his subject. Saint-Simon 
felt that Louis XIV’s outright alliance with the new rising bourgeoi-
sie, men of commerce and finance, led directly to the decay of the 
old feudal monarchy and, with it, “the decline of the feudal nobility, 
politically, socially, and economically.” Upon such reflections, Saint-
Simon saw his own class as defeated. All that remained to his van-
quished class was the “old way of life in its manners, mannerisms, 
and patterns of behavior.” This, in turn, led the old feudal nobility 
and Saint-Simon himself to become obsessed with the rights and 
privileges of social etiquette that distinguished them from the new 
classes. Thus, he led the fight against the aspirations of the bourgeois 
ministers to wear the suits of noblemen at court instead of their pre-
scribed Parliament robes; he cherished the monarch’s kisses, a privi-
lege reserved to dukes and duchesses; he insisted on the privilege 
of duchesses at court to sit on taborets—armless, backless stools; he 
guarded the right of dukes to be seated in proper hierarchical order 
at official dinner parties; and he considered the ducal rights to speak 
in Parliament while wearing their bonnets and to be addressed there 
by bareheaded officials a supremely important matter. 
Saint-Simon, for all his awareness, cannot fully distance himself 
from his situation. Salomon is in a position to put the matter in con-
text—and he does so pithily. 
All politically defeated classes tend to maintain their 
manners, their mannerisms, their attitudes, discipline, 
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and ways of life as something they cannot and will not 
be deprived of. . . . This is precisely the sociological sig-
nificance of the ardent fights by the dukes and peers 
against the new wave of the bourgeois. It is a historical 
and human phenomenon, tragic and comic, bearing at 
once the depth of human grandeur and misery. The loy-
alty and allegiance to our traditions, to the training by 
our ancestors, and to the teaching of our fathers remain 
a lasting good for those who follow this way of life.
This is the bottom line of Salomon’s essay.
Social etiquette gave the court of Louis XIV an appearance of 
regimented harmony. But, as Salomon notes, Saint-Simon saw that 
“this harmonious totality was sheer deception, as fictitious as a car-
nival. Only on the surface was it gay and superior to the routine of 
everyday life; underneath was a complex of unleashed greed, fear, 
and combat, merged and united by the demonic pressure of sex.” 
Further, Salomon argues:
Saint-Simon pointed out in a radical way that the court 
was in fact the central institution for the production and 
distribution of power. . . . [It] is a competitive society in 
which different associations, called machines, struggle 
with one another for the monopoly of power. The social 
process is mechanical because it is subject to the law of 
attraction and repulsion, men moving and being moved. 
They gather together for realizing their purposes under 
the pressure of competing machines. The reality of this 
game is tough and disillusioning as its appearance is aes-
thetically perfect in a complete, though fictitious, har-
mony. The courtiers and mistresses, the confessors and 
generals, the dukes and physicians of the king are the 
engineers and puppets of the show that seems to be con-
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trolled by the great magician, but is, in reality, directed 
by the king’s associates and agents.
There were three main “machines.” First, there were the friends, 
generals, nobles, and princes who surrounded Monseigneur, Le 
Grand Dauphin, Louis of France, heir to the throne. This crowd 
lusted for Monseigneur’s ascension to the throne in order to “share 
in the spoils.” Second, there was the machine centered on Françoise 
d’Aubigné, Madam de Maintenon, the second wife of Louis XIV. A 
confidant of the king, she controlled the king’s ministers by dispens-
ing offices and promotions. Third, there was the crowd of notables 
who “gambled on a better future.” Here, the leaders were François 
Fénelon; Paul de Beauvilliers, Duke of Saint-Aignan; Charles Hon-
oré d’Albert, Duke of Chevreuse; and Saint-Simon himself. Together, 
they supported the young and remarkable Louis, Duc de Burgogne, 
Le Petit Dauphin, who, they hoped, would lead a monarchy that was 
both less absolute and less centralized. 
Salomon underscores Saint-Simon’s observation that “men never 
act as individuals, but as members of a clan.” He argues that “it is 
probably necessary to reconsider many histories and stress neither 
the importance of individuals nor of collective trends, but of the ar-
ticulate power of the great families.” Certainly, such clan unity was 
crucial for survival in the court of Louis XIV, “the ideal place for 
intrigues, conspiracies, and pressure groups [that] formed the social 
jungle where everyone fought for vested interests.” In that world,
there [was] no human relationship that was not used or 
abused for social advancement, political power, or eco-
nomic gain. Almost all social interaction was reduced 
to ‘business,’ in a competitive struggle for superiority. 
Some advanced on the social ladder because the king 
liked them as champions at billiards; others used their 
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charm and wits in the drawing rooms of Mme de Main-
tenon, in order to gain careers in the army or in the civil 
service; still others tried to push their way up through 
love affairs with princesses or mistresses of princes. Hus-
bands became the procurers for their wives in order to 
achieve great careers.
Only kin loyalty could protect one in such a milieu.
Salomon observes that Saint-Simon made sure also to portray 
men and women who chose different paths in the social jungle of the 
court—such as “the ascetic princes of the Church, men of true dedi-
cation to God and their parishes, living in the Imitation of Christ” 
and “great soldiers who do not seek glory for themselves, but cher-
ish victory for the king and perfection in their commands”—and to 
mention those “nobles and successful courtiers, ministers, gentle-
men, ladies, and princesses, men and women who had gained pres-
tigious reputations in politics and love, who suddenly departed the 
scene of their triumphs and devoted themselves to God in penitent 
orders, often the Carmelites.” Salomon makes the point to honor 
Saint-Simon’s integrity.
Salomon concludes by considering Saint-Simon’s preoccupation 
with the restoration of the political influence of dukes and peers in 
the face of the “urban and bourgeois advance”—a lost cause and an 
effort contrary to Saint-Simon’s deeper knowledge. Salomon notes 
aptly that it made Saint-Simon, like the subjects of his portraits, 
“tragic and comic alike.” But Salomon sees more still: 
[T]here is greatness in the man whose sensitivity and 
imagination, whose penetrating and illuminating eyes, 
made him conceive of the historical world and of its 
social patterns as the comédie humaine. In his ultimate 
glory, he is not the historian, sociologist, or psychologist, 
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but the great poet who magically resurrected a world of 
dead men and transformed them into loving and hating 
people, conspiring with, for, and against one another in 
their lust, their aspirations for power and recognition by 
others, and the problem of being themselves. Here was a 
man whose work was an inspiration to the great French 
novelists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as it 
is even now to psychologists, sociologists, and philoso-
phers. It stands today as a major source of aesthetic sug-
gestion and scientific challenge.
II
Across his career, Albert Salomon analyzes the work of an astonish-
ing array of European social thinkers. These include Theophrastus 
(d. 287 BC), Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC), Lucius Annaeus 
Seneca (4 BC–65 AD), Epictetus (55–135), Cornelius Tacitus (56–120), 
Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536), Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527), 
Martin Luther (1483–1546), Ignatius of Loyola (1491–1556), Michel 
de Montaigne (1533–1592), Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Francis 
de Sales (1567–1622), Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), Thomas Hobbes 
(1588–1679), René Descartes (1596–1650), Baltasar Gracián (1601–
1658), François de La Rochefoucauld (1613–1680), Molière (1622–
1673), Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694), 
Richard Cumberland (1632–1718), Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), 
Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677), John Locke (1632–1704), Jean 
de  La Bruyère (1645–1696), Pierre Bayle (1647–1706), Bernard Le 
Bovier de Fontenelle (1657–1757), Bernard Mandeville (1670–1733), 
Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), Louis 
de Rouvroy, duc de Saint-Simon (1675–1755), Charles-Louis de Sec-
ondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu (1689–1755), Voltaire 
(François-Marie Arouet 1694–1778), Francis Hutcheson (1694–
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1746), David Hume (1711–1776), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), 
Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714–1780), Paul-Henry Thiry, Baron 
d’Holbach (1723–1789), Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), Adam Smith 
(1723–1790), Edmund Burke (1729–1797), John Millar (1735–1801), 
Nicolas de Condorcet (1743–1794), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
(1749–1832), Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon 
(1760–1825), Georg Hegel (1770–1831), Auguste Comte (1798–1857), 
Honoré de Balzac (1799–1850), Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859), 
Karl Marx (1818–1883), Jacob Burckhardt (1818–1897), Herbert 
Spencer (1820–1903), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), Lucien Lévy-
Bruhl (1857–1939), Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), Georg Simmel 
(1858–1918), Henri Bergson (1859–1941), Max Weber (1864–1920), 
Max Scheler (1874–1928), Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), Maurice 
Halbwachs (1877–1945), Alfred Weber (1868–1958), Marcel Mauss 
(1872–1950), Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936), Karl Mannheim 
(1893–1947), Charles Pierre Péguy (1873–1914), Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1908–1961), Georges Gurvitch (1894–1965), and Jacob Taubes 
(1923–1987). To all of these thinkers and their ideas, Salomon brings 
the habits of mind exhibited in “Louis Duc de Saint-Simon: Class 
Consciousness of the Defeated.” These are empathy, humility, and 
appreciation for the unique and the subversive. 
Salomon puts these habits of mind in service to an ambitious 
goal: the reinterpretation of his subjects and their work, to maintain 
“the heritage of the Western past” as “a living possession, not a pile 
of dead material,” that is, “to preserve the perpetual presence of the 
living spirit.” For Salomon, to make the meaning of social thought 
of the past our own is vital, a duty owed not only to past thinkers but 
also to ourselves and to future generations, to further efforts toward 
human progress, however discouraging and forbidding experience 
may be, and to resist forces working to dissolve human community. 
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In any given instance, to achieve his end, Salomon first positions 
himself in the place of the social thinker at hand. He inhabits the 
mind, the character, and social and historical milieu of his subject 
and sees with his subject’s eyes. He sets aside, as best he can, his own 
historical limitations. He resists the temptations to second-guess or 
censor his subject, misrepresent his subject’s thought for his own 
ends, or assert his own superiority.
Salomon’s empathy is not an afterthought or a function of his 
conclusions, but a precondition to passing judgment and incorporat-
ing his subject’s thought into a broader historical and intellectual 
continuum. It is a matter of principle, a form of fairness to the sub-
ject and to the reader. 
Salomon faithfully articulates his subjects’ ideas, even when he 
disagrees. For instance, his essay “Henri de Saint-Simon, Auguste 
Comte, and the Origins of Sociology” provides and clarifies his sub-
jects’ messianic conception of a wholly planned society under the 
aegis of the religion of scientific progress, even as Salomon points 
out the implicit totalitarianism of their vision—an insight that even 
Émile Durkheim, who was deeply influenced by the Saint-Simonians, 
misses.
Salomon’s capacity to empathize even encompasses the ethno-
graphic ability to enter into religious belief systems wholly different 
from his own and to grasp their meaning to those invested in them. 
He is also able to trace the inevitable migration and transforma-
tion of religious beliefs. He has keen insights both into Erasmus’s 
project of Res Christiana and the international social movement by 
Erasmians that it produced to hold secular rulers accountable. His 
reflections on Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises evince his typi-
cal ability to identify with his subject and, at the same time, place his 
subject’s thought in specific historical context.
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Ignatius . . . and the modern Quietism contributed to 
creating new psychological insights. Loyola discovered 
the usefulness of mystical techniques for establishing 
complete control over Self and others by manipulating 
students who were striving for religious perfection. His 
technique should enable them to recognize their sins, to 
confess them, to begin a new life. His Spiritual Exercises 
were the first modern rule and regimentation of psychic 
training. In contrast to medieval usage, they required 
a relation between student and trainer, between soldier 
and officer. The military metaphors are valid because 
students were never informed about the sequence of the 
procedure or about the handbook of the Spiritual Exer-
cises. No modern psychologist who wishes to train as 
elite has neglected to study the book and its new theory 
of asceticism, which neglects the physical asceticism of 
the past in favor of humiliating the mind and training 
total obedience. 
In reviewing Jacob Taubes’s Abendländische Eschatologie, Salo-
mon concludes: “This work demonstrates anew that in all fields of 
history of ideas and of philosophy the quality of the author counts. 
There will never be an outstanding historian or philosopher who is 
not, in the sense of William James, capable of the varieties of human 
experience.” Here, as always, the critic’s judgment of his subject illu-
minates the ambition, capacity, and quality of the critic himself.
Salomon does not hesitate to pass judgment, but he measures his 
judgments with care. His judiciousness is partly a function of his 
empathy, but also results from a genuine humility, an awareness of 
the myriad challenges to accomplishing serious social thought. Salo-
mon had the discipline and the temperament to see the greatness in 
his subjects’ ideas. Even in his most forceful judgments, he is never 
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smug. He does not exercise the power he has to elevate himself above 
his subjects. He does not use his subjects to grind an axe.
Salomon is humble, too, in considering the past. His essays reflect 
an awareness that current thinking is not inherently superior to past 
thinking and that the contemporary world is not necessarily supe-
rior to past societies, cultures, eras.
In the mid-twentieth century, when sociology enjoys a certain 
cachet, Salomon displays professional modesty, acknowledging the 
limitations of his field. He notes, for example, that both the origins 
and the aims of sociology, contrary to its core claims, are hardly sci-
entific and rational.  Further, Salomon regards sociology’s estimation 
of religious experience—as just another commodity for analysis—as 
foolish.  He courageously asserts that religious experience, far more 
than sociology and the scientific worldview in which it cloaks itself, 
best enables one to understand the social world.1
Salomon’s writing style also expresses his humility. He tends not 
to remind the reader of his role as mediator and expert. His essays 
place the thinkers and their ideas in the foreground. They typically 
feature long passages in which Salomon’s presence is invisible.
The exception is virtually Salomon’s signature: in nearly every 
one of his essays, Salomon identifies and underscores the particular 
unique and subversive quality of his subject’s mind and ideas. So, 
for example, one reason to choose Fontenelle as the “genuine image 
of the Enlightenment” is that Fontenelle “was a writer who dared to 
popularize philosophical texts in order to stimulate critical thought 
and a reexamination of traditional ideas about God, the universe, 
and the place of man in nature.” Salomon finds another in a com-
ment by Nietzche—that Fontenelle was “the last aristocratic thinker 
who knew that esoteric writing is indispensable in a world of total 
conformism.” Similarly, Salomon sees that
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[n]o one fought more passionately than Max Weber for 
rational knowledge as opposed to all those kinds of sen-
timental, moralistic, and intellectualistic knowledge that 
served merely to secure peace of mind and were provi-
sional in character. The best road to genuine knowledge 
was by way of radical doubt.
To cite one more example: In the poet Charles Péguy, Salomon offers 
an image of spiritual heroism to the post-Second World War world. 
“In Péguy’s own highly unique way he participated in the vigorous 
combat that William James and Henri Bergson were waging against 
the determinism and materialism of their times and for the re-estab-
lishment of the character of the actual as dynamic, free, and cre-
ative.”
Salomon perceives the commitment and bravery of, and the risks 
taken by, his subjects. Ultimately, his emphasis on the special, radi-
cal quality of his subjects and their ideas is an appreciation of moral 
courage, which Salomon makes explicit in his essay on Alfred Weber. 
[T]he scientific heroism of [Alfred Weber’s] approach 
must be emphasized. Weber had the moral courage to 
finish this book [Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie], 
knowing very well its weaknesses and imperfections. He 
is an impressive example of the fact that there are situa-
tions in scientific thinking in which the work of pioneers 
is more fruitful than specialized perfection. As pioneers 
open the woods and break through the wilderness, so 
Weber pushes through the tangled mysteries of history 
with his sociological concepts, finding new perspectives 
on the intricacies of social causations and conditions.
     This moral quality of the book is especially signifi-
cant in an epoch of growing intellectual mechanization. 
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And equally worthy of example is the discrimination 
that enables Weber to know the borders of empirical 
analysis and the starting point of ontological problems. 
Although throughout the book he does not leave the 
empirical method, he knows very well that the mechani-
cal responses represented by social actions are never able 
to explain the complexity of social dynamics. He is aware 
that his own empirical analysis is based upon and con-
stantly recurs to a metaphysical position. His concept of 
immanent transcendence itself reveals his work to be the 
sociological and historical aspect of a philosophy of life 
and existence, and hence his work has to be correlated 
with this type of philosophy. Because he is so excellent 
a scholar he reaches the intellectual discipline and mod-
esty that are the characteristics of outstanding thinkers.
Salomon’s ability to recognize and convey moral courage is the 
habit of mind that makes his work—about such potentially static 
subject matter as thinkers and thought—so unexpectedly dramatic. 
Yet, in a sense, Salomon’s appreciation of subversiveness is unsur-
prising. All great thinking is original, and all original thinking is 
subversive. And Salomon devotes himself only to great thinkers. 
III
Albert Salomon was born in Berlin in 1891. He studied at the Univer-
sity of Berlin, Freiburg University, and the University of Heidelberg. 
He launched his sociological career with a paper on Max Weber. He 
immigrated to the United States in 1935.
Salomon was famously demanding as a professor at the Graduate 
Faculty of Political and Social Science at the New School for Social 
Research in New York City. He taught rigorous courses on Weber, 
Durkheim, Simmel, Tocqueville, Montaigne, Intellectuals, Political 
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Sociology, Revolutions, the Renascence of Stoicism, German Sociol-
ogy, Social Roles, and Wilhelm Dilthey,2 among others, including a 
1958 course on the Sociology of Emotions. He also taught an excep-
tional course called “Balzac as Sociologist.”3 Salomon’s student, the 
sociologist Peter L. Berger,4 describes his experience in that course: 
I could only afford one course during my first semester—
the first course I ever took in Sociology. Taught by Albert 
Salomon, it was called ‘Balzac as a Sociologist.’ The idea 
was brilliant, and Salomon was a brilliant lecturer. It was 
also a very plausible pedagogical idea: Balzac had intend-
ed for his collection of novels, The Human Comedy, to 
provide a comprehensive picture of French society in the 
nineteenth century, from the aristocracy to the criminal 
underworld. And indeed the novels provide a detailed 
panorama of the many layers of this society. What Salo-
mon did in his course was to use Balzac’s opus to intro-
duce students to the major categories of sociology—class, 
power, religion, social control, social mobility, marginal-
ity, [and] crime. I must have read at least ten of Balzac’s 
novels during the semester. . . . At the end of the semester 
I had become quite familiar with nineteenth-century 
French society. I knew as little about twentieth-century 
American society as I had known before my Balzacian 
adventure. But I had acquired a sense of the excitement of 
a sociological perspective, which Salomon passionately 
expounded.5
In the best tradition of scholarly work, Salomon’s teaching both 
fueled his own writings and inspired his students to undertake their 
own creative work.  
Returning to Salomon’s essay on Alfred Weber: Salomon asserts 
that situations of “crisis and transformation” put human potentiali-
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ties at risk, but also provide an opportunity, through creative intel-
ligence, for new thinking that reconciles conflicting experience and 
knowledge. Given the instability, crisis, and transformations of social 
experience of the early twenty-first century, as well as the steady 
passing of generations, the upheaval and uncertainty of Salomon’s 
era tends to fade from view. But Salomon lived and worked in a time 
of world wars, the rise of totalitarian states, genocide, the advent of 
nuclear weapons, normalization of bureaucracy, ongoing compart-
mentalization of knowledge and expertise, alienation, and anomie. 
Salomon’s essay on Alfred Weber reads both as a joyful celebration 
of individual creativity in “a shaken world of modern crisis” and as 
a cri de coeur. Again, the critic’s assessment redounds to the critic: 
Salomon’s work on social thinkers and social thought is an act of 
moral courage, an act of integration in response to a disintegrating 
world.
A  D I S C E R N I N G  A N D  G E N E R O U S  S C H O L A R 19
Notes
1. See A. Salomon, “The Study of Man: Prophets, Priests, and Social 
Scientists,” Commentary, June 1949, 594–600.
2. Salomon’s students, headed by Lester Emery, put together in 1964 
a collection of their notes of Salomon’s lectures on Dilthey, entitled 
simply: Wilhelm Dilthey. That collection is housed in the Archives of 
the New School for Social Research in New York City.
3. See Syllabus, “An Introduction to Sociology for Students of the 
Social Sciences and of the Humanities: Balzac as Sociologist,” in this 
volume.
4. Other notable students of Salomon included Thomas Luckmann, 
Richard Grathoff, and Bernard Rosenberg.
5. Adventures of an Accidental Sociologist: How to Explain the World 
Without Becoming a Bore (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 
2011), 12. 

That I may improve myself, and once I have done so, 
give away as soon as possible. 
–Heraclitus
Although I must be thankful for great luck, much beauty, and several 
insights, I have often asked myself if bravery, perseverance, and love, 
which one needs in order to develop resistance to the world and the 
challenges of life, are worth the trouble. Obviously, I have decided to 
accept such efforts and to say yes to life in defiance of every catas-
trophe. In great modesty, I would like to adopt what Goethe set as a 
motto before Dichtung und Wahrheit: “The unoppressed person will 
not be educated.”1
I have had the luck to encounter many wonderful and distin-
guished people, to make some friendships, to accept others’ harsh 
criticism and to experience self-contradictions. I have never finished 
working on myself; thus, I remain a perennial student. With grati-
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tude, I recognize what my children and students have done for my 
education.
I am writing these memories down not because I believe that my 
person or my negligible work justifies an autobiography. It is instead 
an essay of gratitude for being allowed to live open-mindedly in a 
time of great teachers and an abundance of new and revolutionary 
ideas and phenomena. It is an essay of gratitude for the experience 
of suffering, death and catastrophes, the only way to measure the 
human ability to transform defeats into victories. The result of such a 
life is minor. What counts are bravery, integrity, and loyalty, holding 
onto that which one thinks is right. 
It is a story of human beings, in which being a Jew and a German 
was a continual reason for thought, for constant reorientation, and 
which caused increased sensibility and emotional tensions. Early on, 
I tried to understand Montesquieu’s idea of maladie éternelle as a 
disciplinary guideline to transform self-glorification and self-hatred 
as a Jew and a German into a conception of neo-classical humanity.
Born on December 8, 1891, I am proud to come from the nine-
teenth century and to have experienced 22 years of life before the 
First World War. I deliberately write “22 years” because for me, bad 
luck began with the Panther’s Leap of the Kaiser: Germany’s response 
to France’s challenge to German interests through its interference in 
the problem of Morocco.2 Looking back, I remember revering Tal-
leyrand, one of the greatest European statesmen, who disdainfully 
looked down on the young diplomats of Europe at the 1815 Wie-
ner Congress, who found everything so wonderful. He had only one 
sentence as commentary: “Whoever hasn’t lived before 1789 doesn’t 
know the sweetness of life.” I cited the sentence to my American stu-
dents and used 1914 for 1789.
The sweetness of life was no time for epicurean desire; it existed 
much more in an unlimited desire to learn and to expand one’s hori-
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zon because one cannot understand the spirit of people, classes, and 
nations without understanding theology, philosophy, languages, 
and literature. My parents were more than generous by adopting a 
hands-off attitude with me. I shall always remain in debt to them 
because they made it possible for me to acquire something like a 
comprehensive education.
I always had mixed feelings while living in my native city of Ber-
lin, although I recognized the humor and sharp self-irony of Berlin-
ers as a lively spirit. When Otto Suhr, then mayor of Berlin, was in 
New York after 1945 and visited the New School, I was the only Ber-
liner and was asked to say a few words. I lauded the qualities of Ber-
liners, which had helped us in the difficult years and afterward: irony 
and humor, not taking themselves or life so seriously. Out of a very 
pessimistic outlook on life as a whole, we Berliners still had vitality 
and the rationality to say yes to life. Berliners were, without know-
ing it, always in the position to transform their defeats into victories 
through wit and irony. I remember an example of this humor. At the 
wedding of the Crown Prince, on the sign of one of the refreshment 
booths in the middle of Unter den Linden, was written: “Our Crown 
Prince’s Cäcilie now belongs to the family.” From the city itself, only 
Wannsee, the burial site of Heinrich von Kleist, and the Pfaueninsel 
(Peacock Island) are beloved and valuable in memory to me. But oth-
erwise, a cold parvenu determined the climate, and the few patrician 
streets and private streets, the Tiergarten, and Lützowufer were the 
only oases in a military business city. 
My family had been based in Berlin since 1765. Nobody knew 
why they moved from Holland to Pomerania and from there to 
Berlin, but it was probably following business. My grandmother, 
Anna Salomon, was a born Potocki-Nelken from Breslau. I would 
like to assume that the Nelkens were Protected Jews of Potocki, who 
belonged to the Polish nobility. My mother was a born Bunzel from 
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Hamburg, but my grandfather, Leopold Bunzel, came from a highly 
distinguished family in Prague and as a young man went to Ham-
burg in order to build his own business and life. He became one of 
the most distinguished and honored coffee importers and members 
of the coffee market. My grandmother Bunzel was also from Prague, 
from the celebrated Frankl family. She died in 1896, and I have little 
memory of her.3
My first day at school proceeded without tears, but I came home 
crying and wanted to have the same religion as my Kaiser. After 
that, I was considered a genius. Unfortunately, I didn’t live up to my 
family’s illusions. That is to say, soon after that, I was cast away by 
the boys of the village school because of my Jewish appearance and 
was exposed to all possible humiliations. I have never forgotten this 
shock.
Director Zernecke, a classical scholar, who lived enthusiastically 
in the world of the ancient Greeks, led the Charlottenburg Reform 
School at Savignyplatz (Reformgymnasium Charlottenburg am 
Savignyplatz). I met him twice more during the First World War; he 
was an infantry captain. Among the teachers, the role of the reserve 
officers competed with academic education. Nobody has explored 
the effect of the social prestige of the reserve officers, this invention 
of the last Kaiser. Our rabbis were named Kroner and Galiner. Kro-
ner received the 4th class Order of the Red Eagle (Babel und Bibel). 
Among his classmates were both Jews and Christians. After gradua-
tion in 1910, there was a collision in Homburg between Jewish Youth 
and the Kaiser.4
Berlin University is unforgettable to me. From seven to eight o’clock 
in the morning, I attended the lectures of Adolf von Harnack—this 
Protestant abbé, with whom Friedrich the Great himself socialized—
who brought forth an encyclopedic and syncretistic theology to a 
nontheological auditorium with elegant rhetoric. Heinrich Wölfflin 
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from Basel taught on Saturdays in the Baracken Auditorium in Kas-
tanienwäldchen. He became breathless when he interpreted pictures 
that were dear to him—above all, the early Italian Renaissance. Max 
and Helene Hermann as well as Georg Simmel were an experience. 
Later, I came to know Siegbert Elkuß and the Gräfin Schulenburg 
through Erich Lichtenstein. They opened the door for me to the 
world of Wilhelm Dilthey. In 1957, I met Dr. Zucker from Zurich in 
Sils-Baselgia; he was the last assistant in Dilthey’s seminar and spoke 
about the teacher and the father and grandson Graf Yorck with love 
and warmth.5 It always depressed me so much that I could do noth-
ing for Lichtenstein in the United States; he was a likable person and 
had a very sincere courtesy to him that was entirely unmodern. Sim-
mel became a constitutive element of my life, in both a positive and a 
negative way. He was a true philosophical spirit; his last book is a big 
book of human wisdom and philosophical rigorousness in the face 
of impending death. Martin Heidegger spoke in conversation with 
Hans-Georg Gadamer about the meaning of this book.
One important experience was also the theater: Reinhardt, 
Brahms, Barnowski. Max Reinhardt’s impressionistic performances 
inspired me and their musical conception fascinated me. His stage 
directions were scores, his rehearsals of Oedipus: “That must sound 
like fanfare!” He could chase us for hours through the Circus (der 
Zirkus); other directors never had that effect on us. Some things are 
unforgettable: the second part of Faust, Nestroy’s political satire 
Freedom in Podunk (Krähwinkel), Shaw’s Comedies, Don Carlos, The 
Prince of Homburg, Paul Wegener and Tilla Durieux in the Ibsen-
Zyklus . . . the deep meaning for me, the deep disappointment when 
I see the same pieces in the United States forty years later. When 
it comes to music, I remember Joseph Joachim and his quartet, the 
Singakademie, the Philharmonic, Arthur Nikisch and mixed feel-
ings about Ochs’s interpretation of Bach. My first opera in the royal 
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opera house was Mignon, one of Geraldine Farrar’s first roles, which 
I remember with some gratitude and appreciation. When I read in 
the New York Times a few years ago that she had celebrated her sev-
entieth birthday, I wrote to her how deeply her beauty and grace in 
the role of Mignon had inspired me and that I wanted to express to 
her a lifelong gratitude. Naturally, I forgot I had written this letter 
and suddenly received a handwritten note from the old woman from 
her house in Connecticut.
At Freiburg University I attended the lectures of Heinrich Rick-
ert. If that even is philosophy. . . .6 
As for Heidelberg, I think first about Sascha and Ernst Kantoro-
wicz, Friedrich Gundolf, the Jahrbücher für die geistige Bewegung, 
my love for Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Rudolf Borchardt’s critique of 
Stefan George’s The Seventh Ring and, of course, Dostoevsky. I took 
all of this very seriously.
I hoped that Friedrich Gundolf, whose Shakespeare and the Ger-
man Spirit was released in 1911, wouldn’t deny me his friendship if 
I explained to him why I could not agree with Stefan George. But 
he dismissed me as a sterile, barren spirit, who was only capable of 
negative criticism. It made me unhappy since I had a great personal 
admiration for him. Friedrich Sieburg began his brilliant career 
with an imposture. He came to Heidelberg, beautiful and poor, and 
searched for patrons who were financially generous. He gained entry 
to the exclusive Stefan George-Kreis (George Circle), made little 
poems without difficulty—as was common there—and found every-
thing that he sought. In order to improve his success, he committed 
a colossal mistake. He forged George’s handwriting in a dedication 
to Sieburg in one of his poetry volumes. George’s recognition prob-
ably should have provided Sieburg with access to George’s well-off 
friends from the Circle. But naturally, it was much too crude and was 
detected with great consequences: shame and scandal. He was more 
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careful after that: from the Frankfurter Zeitung in Paris to Mister 
Abetz and back to the Frankfurter Zeitung after 1945—the Germans 
are a wise and understanding people with a bad memory. 
Through Sunday afternoons in Ziegelhäuser Landstraße 17, I 
experienced Max Weber. There was something tragic and grand 
about him that at the same time had something of the greatness, wis-
dom, and politeness of Don Quixote, if the latter were not possessed 
by his idée fixe. Weber’s vision of resolving conflicts by rationaliza-
tion (bureaucratization) and his notion of charisma are typical con-
structions found in extreme situations. His ideas about the plebiscite 
vote for the president of the Reich in Weimar made the election of 
Hindenburg and Hitler possible. He was less wise than Tocqueville. 
In 1926, when Marianne Weber’s book about her husband was 
released, I wrote a short essay about Max Weber, in which I charac-
terized him as a bourgeois Marxist. I was very sorry that Mrs. Weber 
was so indignant. I have always lived in the shadows of Weber’s and 
Tocqueville’s work. The unpublished lectures, “Social Theory of Rev-
olutions,” were supposed to be a sign of gratitude; it was supposed to 
be a draft of the chapter that Weber could no longer write.7
Through the Webers, I met Emy and Emil Lederer, with whom 
I should have established the closest friendship.8 Emil holds my 
permanent gratitude in faithful remembrance. I would perhaps 
never have been in America without his belief in my worth. I also 
maintained years of intimate contact with Georg Lukács. He also 
holds my unforgotten gratitude, but also sorrow about the decline 
of such a great genius: sacrificio del intellecto is never a source of La 
Vita Nuova.9 For a short time, Ernst Bloch fascinated me. His first 
wife, Else von Stritzky, was unforgettable: she embodied the spirit 
of utopia. Emil Lask and Erich Frank were true philosophers. Lask 
was a new, prolific Plato, with a new idea of a philosophia perennis. 
Frank engaged himself with the philosophy of the Romantics, as well 
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as with Kierkegaard, Plato, and Pythagoreans, with the problems of 
knowledge and beliefs.
With the Webers at Ziegelhäuser Landstraße 17, I also came to 
know the Jaspers. They invited me to their home. It was very uncom-
fortable. I always had the feeling that I was a patient with a psychia-
trist whom I had not invited to examine me. I spoke enthusiastically 
about the meaning of Dostoevsky’s work for my intellectual and 
emotional world. Karl Jaspers posed questions about this or some 
other figure or situation and my interpretation and reacted only 
with the comment that my answers were interesting. He closed with 
a sentence that opened my case history of illness. My father used 
to say: I don’t like that sick stuff. Indeed, later, Jaspers’s Psychologie 
der Weltanschauungen (1919) had a great effect on me. That led to a 
philosophy of existence and coupled itself with my slowly growing 
fascination with such a philosophy through Max Scheler’s first edi-
tion of Zur Phänomonologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und 
von Liebe und Haß (1913) and Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die 
materiale Wertethik (1913–1916). Jaspers then transferred to the phi-
losophy department. His first seminar was advertised as the philoso-
phy of religion. When he distributed the syllabus, he began to give 
a lecture on Jesus’s epilepsy, Isaiah’s schizophrenia, and the mental 
illnesses of other religious founders and prophets. There I became 
impudent and said that he invited us to work over the philosophy of 
religion, but what he encouraged was the pathology of religion. He 
responded, in his most scathing tone, that I actually claimed to be 
a student of Max Weber, who always emphasized that nothing was 
too small or irrelevant for analysis; everything always has a place 
in the whole. That made me very angry and I said, verbatim, “Yes, 
Weber said that in his books, but in practice he didn’t busy himself 
with anything minor like the appearance of the capitalistic spirit and 
what one could do against Marx’s critique of capitalism and this his-
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torical determinism.” That was the end of my relationship with Jas-
pers. I am completely persuaded that he proved no use to his friend 
Weber when he turned himself into a philosopher. Weber himself 
would have negated that. But Jaspers made his ice-cold philosophy 
from the sullen despair and heroic victories against all of the defeats 
that represent Weber’s greatness. Nevertheless, I was very impressed 
when the small book Vernunf und Existenz (1935) was released. What 
must be said is that Jaspers never acknowledged that he was guided 
to Kierkegaard through Erich Frank. This was a turning point in 
his life, and loyalty to my dead friend and moral taste compel me to 
assert this. Maybe Mr. Jaspers has something to say to this.
It was an honor to be invited by Ernst Robert Curtius to read Plato 
with him. He lived in Schlossberg 3 with two likable old women, who 
were named Reiffel and were motherly aunts by nature. They treated 
their tenants like their own children. Herr Dr. Curtius kept himself 
very busy, but he enjoyed it. One day, he finally traveled to Straßburg; 
his grandmother (the widow of an important historian, I think) had 
died. I knew that he had been very attached to this woman, and I sent 
him a sign of remembrance. I received it back immediately, with the 
informative note that I was not entitled to seem so close to him. It 
hurt, but he was probably right. 
In 1912 (or 1913), the Lederers, Lukács, Gustav Radbruch, and I 
had the adventurous idea to do something for the aesthetic future 
of film and to regularly release critiques in the Heidelberger Tages-
presse. The meetings that we had with the owners of movie theaters 
and newspapers were themselves film comedies. Back then, there 
were still no German films. I remember American, French, and Ital-
ian films, especially an Italian one, Quo Vadis, which seemed entirely 
weird in its staginess; only the yawning and the honeysuckle-colored 
tails of lions were cinematically surprising. But there were also the 
countless sequels to French detective and murder dramas, so that 
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one could always plan a visit to the movie theater. I believe that our 
weekly critiques, which were the product of our collective discus-
sions, were unwelcome to the owners of the movie theaters and 
newspapers. After six months, they overcame their timidity toward 
university folk and lessened the number of free tickets we received. 
Back then, I already earnestly believed in the great potential of movie 
theaters to represent the pathos of daily life, the small things that 
actually define the meaning of life, more clearly than the big things. 
A flower without ‘cause,’ the concealment of some songs, inviting a 
wife or mother to dinner—there are so many possibilities for demon-
strating one’s shy love for friends and close ones through the heart’s 
imagination. The great achievements of the movie theaters stand out 
against the traditions of dramas, tragedy, and also intimate plays and 
novels. The word is no longer the medium of literary works, but the 
carnal reality of people, their art, to stand by themselves, their walk-
ing, swimming, marching, their speaking, tone, melody, the rhythm 
of a dialog can be punished by false physical expression. Sensual 
expression as appearance, reality, and symbol can create new oppor-
tunities for experiencing humankind’s place in the cosmos and in 
the natural animal kingdom. 
Miss Mina Tobler, a Swiss musician, always influenced me most 
deeply, although I never got to know her. But she had a bit of Wölf-
flin’s integrity and spontaneous beauty about her. She helped Weber 
with his musical work. I remember the noble Herr von Bubnow well. 
He was a Russian language and literature administrator, a man of 
great sensitivity and courtesy, and Willi Salomon-Calvi, my father’s 
uncle, a geologist with a Goethe-esque view of the world of stones 
in a river, a kind and somewhat naive person, who had fallen in love 
with a mayor’s daughter during a research project in Bergamo and 
married her. She must have been very beautiful once and was always 
a very interesting and artistic woman. I was close to his youngest 
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son, Otto, who, if I remember correctly, joined a religious order 
in Italy. They were, naturally, Catholic. My boyhood friend, Gert 
Lütkens, also remains in my loyal memory, no different from Max 
Freiherr from Waldberg, my lifesaver; he guided me to become a 
sociologist or philosopher, since he would not allow me to work for 
him. The cult of friendship (a methodical problem of sentimental-
ity) is a topic that still moves me today and that I will never be able 
to resolve further. There are two ways in Catholic countries: that 
of Erasmus and François de Sales, amare magis quam scire [to love 
more than to know—Eds.]; and that of Loyola, gratia lacrimarum 
[gift of tears—Eds.]. However, I don’t see the source for puritanical 
sensibility. There are aesthetic traces in Lord Shaftesbury’s work on 
moral taste that led toward the work on moral sentiment by Francis 
Hutcheson and Adam Smith.
Alone as I was, I had seen the academic world behind the scenes 
for so many years that I had no illusions about the human qualities of 
a university community, which felt like the elite and the navel of the 
German world. It took itself dead seriously—and there was so much 
pretension, and emphasis on appearance, and adultery, and divorce, 
and, quite simply, vulgarity there. When I went into the war [in the 
Cavalry Medical Corps—Eds.], I was determined not to return to 
the academic world. It was no better than the worlds of theater, the 
opera, or of performed music: it was filled with vanity, narcissism, 
the quest for prestige, and a spirit of competition.
I spent the last night before we positioned ourselves in troops 
with Gert Lütkens. When I said goodbye to Lukács and Block in 
Häberlein, they made fun of me; I said, “One cannot bar oneself 
from a suffering community!” In August 1914 I moved with Reserv-
ezug Abt 3 in Spandau. From October until December 1914, I served 
in the Reservefeldlazarett 73. The doctors were both Jews and Chris-
tians, but antisemitism prevailed, especially against Hasidic Jews. 
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On January 8, 1919, I came to the Gardekavallerie-Schützendivision, 
where I met Fritz Solmitz, who would later be killed by the Nazis. An 
observation that I made in 1919 at a get-together was to note the rush 
of all of the many kinds of Jews into civil service careers: Zionists, 
Orthodox, agnostics, and liberals. Maybe it would have been benefi-
cial to our strength of character and the integrity of our existence to 
continue to live in the Ghetto and then we would not have endorsed 
the illusion that something could have improved our social position.
After the impoverishment of the war and inflation, I had to come 
to the rapid end of my studies. In May 1921 I was awarded a doctor-
ate in Heidelberg by Lederer, Eberhard Gothein, Gerhard Anschütz, 
and Rickert. I do not even know now what I provided as my work. 
Mannheim cited my work as the friendship cult of humanism. This 
was actually a short introductory chapter. What I really wanted to 
write was a sociological analysis of changing emotional attitudes 
and how they functioned. Take an aesthetic and snobbish group in 
an aristocratic society of Gentlemen and examine the group’s moral 
taste as Shaftesbury did. And examine in contrast the intensity of 
personal love and friendship during a time of revolutionary chal-
lenges to all values, an intensity that is only newly experienced and 
interpreted in mutual relationships. This is a new Sturm und Drang 
emotionality: against static aesthetic, for self-reflection in mutual 
commitment. This is perceived as the highest value: love as a creative 
act. This new attitude streamed in the Romantic as a constitutive ele-
ment of knowledge and fantasy. From the Schlegels and Brentanos, 
a direct intention guides us to Scheler’s conception of the cognitive 
values of love, to the modalities of sympathy, and the metaphysical 
value of enthusiasm. I hope that my students will absorb some of my 
ideas and suggestions. 
I cannot express how much I owe my graduation to Karl and Julie 
Mannheim. Both gave me warmth and geniality, kindness and love. 
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They always had time for me. It was a great difficulty of my life that 
we had entirely different opinions about the task of sociology. Károly 
was as unhappy about my theoretical-contemplative attitude as I 
was about his pragmatic-political. But here I would like to say clearly 
and explicitly for the reader, and for Mr. and Mrs. Paul Kecskemeti 
as well, that I remember with sadness and pain the great love that 
Julicka and Károly gave me so generously, even though they worried 
about me. In London, he forced Alvin Johnson to accept me for the 
University in Exile and waived New York for himself. 
The years after my doctorate exams were marked with inflation 
and deflation. Those were years of uncertain feelings that I had to 
devote to commercial work in order to earn money. I always say to 
my students that one cannot learn sociology from a book, but instead 
one must have walked through many social worlds in order to see 
with astonishment how differently people behave to each other, how 
different they are in their views of sexuality, what they consider good 
in the world and how they come to that opinion, what earns pres-
tige for them and what earns scorn. It was thus good to have served 
as a common soldier and to have seen with surprise how small and 
abstract the world of intellectual society was, with its worries and 
cares. This experience ultimately turned me into a sociologist, if I 
can even be called one. 
I continued to learn such practical sociology when I was a simple 
accountant for Lipmann Wulf, one of the finest private banks—in 
the house of the Frankfurter Zeitung in Berlin, Potsdamer Straße. 
When one reads what Simmel writes about inflation in the Philoso-
phie des Geldes, we know that we underwent inflation and that one 
cannot just learn about such phenomena from books. We worked 
in the last days of every week to 2:00 a.m. or 3:00 a.m., in order to 
assess the weekly compound interest of our customers, trying at 
least to build a dam against the flood of daily currency devaluation. 
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We received pay weekly; the girls immediately bought consumer 
vouchers, which were often worth no more than two tickets for the 
electric train. It was ruinous for the largest part of the middle class, 
who had no property or foreign exchange permit. They were spooky 
times; I also do not know how long I was there, as the bank house 
was one of the first victims of deflation. It hit a man who had done 
what other colleagues also practiced, namely using customers’ secu-
rities as cover for his own purchases. He had heard nothing about 
the upcoming conversion, and he shot himself in his office. I was in 
the next room[.]10
In one of the inflation years, I was on my way to Rügen and had 
to spend the night because the boat only went once a day, and I 
had to ask a woman who was on her own if I could eat at her table. 
We started to converse. She had lived with her husband in Brazil 
for a long time, and she explained interesting things about his job. 
He was an engineer, and she had accompanied him on his trips. I 
excused myself after the meal and packed my bag again. The boat 
was delayed. So, I went into the nearest cafe to pass the time. It was 
empty there, and the woman was the only guest; it would have been 
foolish of me not to sit at her table. We chatted, and, finally, the cafe 
filled with travelers from Berlin, who also wanted to take one boat or 
another. Among them was a small, ugly woman, who was bedecked 
with jewels and other jewelry. At first glance, she could have been 
Jewish, or, at least, how Germans imagine Jews. Finally, my friend 
said, “Look, this horrible Jewess!” I held myself for a second and then 
said, “You’re completely right: the woman is ugly and without taste 
or tact. One should not walk around so much like a decorated ox. I 
only wanted to make you aware that I am also a Jew.” The woman 
replied, “You choose to joke!” At that, I said, “I am not in the mood 
for jokes, and I would recommend that you don’t judge all Jews based 
on unpleasant examples! I also don’t paint a picture of all Germans 
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based on color-bearing drunk students in the gutters. I should take 
my leave.” All minorities are exposed to the images that the majori-
ties or other minorities have of them. These are usually negative 
images that do not stem from personal experiences, but instead from 
a background of prejudice, to which we are all exposed from our 
upbringings in our family, school, church, academic connection, the 
army, the club, and one’s profession.
Back then I was also in Davos for a short time. There I met a 
charming and cultured brother of the Society of Jesus. We moved 
our deck chairs together and could talk well with each other, above 
all in evenings after dinner, when nobody else came to the solar-
ium. We often talked about the consequences that strictly political 
or military events had on spiritual life and on religious customs. I 
told him how much I was convinced that Luther’s real Augustinian 
experience of German rulers had been misused, in order to achieve 
the immense gain in power of the state through the secularization 
of church property and of the property of the order and of the mon-
astery. He was persuaded that German bad luck had already started 
with the victory of Arminius in Teutoburgerwald.11 A Roman Ger-
many would have become much better Christianized in the spirit of 
the Church and of its rights. As it happened, a lot of dark paganism 
remained in the northern Germans. I often had Catholic students 
who had been raised in Jesuit schools. They were always surprised 
by my interpretation of Loyola’s Exercitia spiritualia (1548), that the 
members of the order practiced for two weeks, while they as lay- 
people only practiced for a week and a half.12 I still believe that Loyola 
was one of the greatest Christians, and that he—although he himself 
spoke very negatively of Erasmus—was a post-Luther Erasmus, who 
wanted to make this bad luck absolutely reversible. 
After my apprenticeship in the bank, my father reluctantly took 
me into his shop. It could have been very interesting, but I obviously 
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did not want to be a businessman. My father was a lambskin importer 
for glove manufacture. I remember the Meyer Brothers from Guben 
well, who are now in Gloversville, and Otto Jahn from Brandenburg. 
My father bought goods in Spain, Algeria, Serbia, and Bulgaria. He 
was once in Nischnij-Nowgorod, as it was called back then. For a 
large part of the year, he was traveling, and he was a language genius, 
through which he revolutionized the business of purchasing. He 
purchased directly from the slaughterers and, by doing so, did not 
need to pay the profits to the large trading houses. His competitors 
tried to imitate him. He was constantly surrounded by observers 
who informed his competitors of his departures, who then traveled 
after him and tried to beat him to the draw. During the first war, he 
was somehow a civilian plenipotentiary in Romania or Bulgaria and 
was naturally invited to a Christmas party by local commanders. 
This is memorable to me because the officers’ toast impressed me so 
much: “Our Lord Jesus Christ, hurrah, hurrah, hurrah!”
I was with my father in Spain where there were slaughterers who 
countersigned contracts with crosses. They were as true as gold! 
When competitors came twenty-four hours earlier and offered 8–10 
percent more, they were dismissed. I did not see Madrid, but I did 
visit Pamplona, Burgos, Valladolid, Zaragoza, Barcelona, and Sala-
manca—an intact medieval city with a bridge whose supports dated 
back to Roman times. There was a plaza where Cisneros taught and 
Loyola studied and wondered about the spirit of Erasmus. Before 
Luther’s victory and the destruction of the unified Christian world, 
many Spanish theologians were followers of Erasmus. They had 
coined a particular word for that: Erasmista and Erasmismo. 
Reflecting back onto my own actions, I would say that I would 
have been able to serve, but I valued my independence. I had cour-
age, was capable of enthusiasm, dedication, and tenacity, but I had 
no economic, social, or academic ambition, and no goals. With my 
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naïveté,  it borders on the magical that I emerged so lucky without 
such aspirations, not because I had earned it, but because I had 
friends.
I didn’t make the effort to become a salesman. I used the eve-
nings to work for myself: studying Weber and reading, with emo-
tion, Marianne Weber’s book, which was released in 1926. I believed 
that I understood the intention of Weber’s spirit: his liveliness, his 
wonder that there are people who seek to understand the unspeak-
able and to turn it into concepts and declarations. His ability always 
to understand new developments, the stream of consciousness, the 
concreteness of humanity in history, humanity’s for-with-against-
each-other ness—all of this fascinated me. Although I knew that this 
called for an aesthetic lifestyle and poverty, I believed that I could not 
do anything else. I worked for a long time on my “Weber,” which was 
released in Rudolf Hilferding’s 1926 journal Die Gesellschaft. That 
journal was entirely destroyed in Germany in 1933. [See Salomon’s 
essays on Weber in this volume.—Eds.]
When Marianne Weber’s book was released, Lederer, who was 
in Berlin then, asked me what I thought of her presentation of Max 
Weber. I said, “I find it sublime that she let the philological, skilled 
reader feel that Max Weber loved another woman.” Lederer became 
entirely pale and told me the story, about which I had no idea. It is 
good as a sociologist to also be a philologist. My belief in this has only 
strengthened over the next forty years. Language—communication: 
the word alone establishes social cohesion. Human reality means 
intellectual participation. Animals have the pragmatic rationality of 
their instinct, wiser and more clever than the mechanisms of human 
vitality. But as strongly as the ruse of our own reason corrupts our 
vital tendencies, and as much as we degrade the animal kingdom, we 
can also transcend it. Against all idealism, I still believe that there 
is a transcendency in total immanence. The great possibilities of a 
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philosophy of existence, which transcend themselves in self interpre-
tation, seem irrefutable to me.
When my essay about Max Weber was published, Hans Simons 
was the director of the Hochschule für Politik. He was of the opinion 
that I could become an academic. So he gave my life direction and 
opened the way for me to a job that seemed meaningful to me. I 
taught from 1926 to 1931 at this Hochschule, which sought political 
education for the Weimar Republic and believed in lively debate with 
opponents from the left and the right. That life brought me together 
with Simons and his wife Eva, and I enjoyed their friendship—
including their hard criticism, which should happen with friends—
for many years. I have always regarded and shall always regard our 
friendship as great luck. His genius was not without tragedy; his 
ambition and his imagination of complete performance led to a last-
ing dissatisfaction with his real successes. I still hope that he will 
one time write about his overflowing, rich thoughts on global poli-
tics, the problem of diplomacy in the era of the United Nations, the 
philosophy of help for the undeveloped parts of the world. I cannot 
describe what Eva Simons had been with her human warmth and her 
musical intuition through all those years. She made me happy when 
she trained my son for the New School’s concerts and won his love.
I remember how President Nicholas Murray Butler of Colum-
bia University visited the Hochschule. We had all been introduced 
and told each other about our fields of work. I said to him that I 
taught American democracy through Tocqueville. My relationship 
to Theodor Heuss was very warm; his wife was a good friend of Alice 
Salomon. I did not feel entirely comfortable with Friedrich Nau-
mann, but I always adored Heuss’s liberal humanity. The spirit of the 
Lutheran Paulskirche in Frankfurt am Main radiated in his person. 
I was happy that he remembered me well when he served as Bundes-
präsident from 1949 to 1959.
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I got to know Simons through Rudolf Hilferding. I had been a 
member of the Social Democratic Party since the murder of Walter 
Rathenau in 1922. I believed then and still believe what I wrote to 
presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson in 1952: “We have to be lib-
eral in order to be conservative.” I no longer remember what I did in 
the party. My relationship to Rudi Hilferding was a deep and painful 
friendship. He was a Hamlet-like character. On the one hand, he had 
spirit, wit, and sensibility. We had unforgettable conversations in the 
Tiergarten about the gracelessness of Wagner’s music, which tried 
to spiritualize the lasciviousness and nastiness of Teutonic wicked-
ness: deceit, greed, treason, dishonesty. On the other hand, there was 
Hilferding’s laziness and contempt for most of the other members of 
the Reichstagsfraktion of the Reichstag. He was neither a statesman 
nor a fat cat of the party. He was a great thinker, not a scholar. I was 
sick of his blind confidence and his belief in the dependability of the 
men in the Finance Ministry or of his friend Heinrich Brüning. He 
introduced me to Léon Blum one time. But by 1931, I was already 
so disillusioned by the politics of both German and French social 
democracy that I only spoke with Blum about Stendhal, to whom he 
had dedicated a book. The party bureaucrats were furious.
When Hilferding was the Finance Minister in Müller’s last Cabi-
net in 1928/29, he asked me to edit Die Gesellschaft, the scientific 
organ of the party. Although I still worked in the Hochschule, I dedi-
cated my time and enthusiasm to this project, without hope, because 
I was fully disillusioned about the innermost weakness of a bloated 
party bureaucracy, which lived on Marx’s Kapital, and about Hilfer-
ding’s friendship with Brüning and his belief in tactics where every-
thing came down to strategy. Against all outside circumstances, I 
wanted to rally an elite of radicals among young people that could 
show all parties that the spirit of Marx was not with the Marxists. It 
was an inner satisfaction to find such radical thinkers outside of the 
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party and to discover and to publish people who went on to great 
careers from there: above all Herbert Marcuse, Eckart Kehr, Walter 
Benjamin, Hans Speier, Hajo Holborn, and Hannah Arendt. I was 
happy about the help that I received from Ernst Fränkel and Franz 
Neumann. I was proud to demonstrate to the Conservatives that 
we had just as little respect for Emil Ludwig as they had, or to pub-
lish a collection of essays against the weakening of radical thought 
through Mannheim’s Ideologie und Utopie. Someone said to me that 
our journal won the respect and the greatest attention of the profes-
sors and students of the university—not only in Berlin. Otto Bauer 
once said to Hilferding in my presence that he should have let me 
continue editing Die Gesellschaft. That was the only time that I saw 
Rudi truly angry: What was wrong with his editorship? I agreed that 
I would not have been better than him. 
In 1931, Hans Staudinger, an old friend from Heidelberg, a states-
man and administrator of great style, who had flawlessly driven the 
socialization of the Prussian electricity works, and now was the state 
secretary in the Prussian Department of Commerce, invited me to 
a conference. He planned a university Hochshule for teachers at the 
vocational schools, which were under his jurisdiction. Such educa-
tional institutes should convey to technically specialized teachers a 
broader view of the universal and historical problems of the world, 
and with that give them implicitly critical tools against National 
Socialism. He wanted to send me as a sociologist to Cologne, where 
one of these schools was planned. But I was not to teach theory 
primarily, but instead, political sociology, class theory, and so on. 
I welcomed the idea for various reasons. It was time for me to leave 
my parents’ home and to set up my own. Although from my own 
experience, I was not optimistic that a teacher could make much 
headway against radical student elements; I was nonetheless ready 
to go.
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My predictions were pretty accurate. Among the faculty and 
students there were several open Nazis, though most remained 
undercover. There were only a few older men who earnestly adhered 
to the Republic. It was entirely impressive that some of the best stu-
dents were radical Nazis, and we had animated discussions about 
the nation, socialism, radical democracy, and the great effort of the 
Republic and Social Democracy for Germany’s rebuilding. But it was 
entirely unimportant if one was successful and convinced them for 
a moment. They were dogmatically determined and unwilling to 
argue, only to convince. But they liked me, and when I recovered 
from polio, they came in their brown Sturmabteilung uniforms after 
their exercises in Stadtwald to drink tea with me. Robert Heiss, a 
brave, fearless anti-Nazi, became my friend in Cologne. He ended 
our relationship because he could not understand that after the 
deaths of my mother and brother, whom I could not rescue, I felt no 
desire to return to Germany. These were the good Germans.13
When I was at home during Christmas in 1931, I saw Hilferding. 
I explained to him how many intelligent and sophisticated young 
Nazis I had among my students. I said to him that we could still take 
the wind out of their sails if we explained to them what the party 
had done for the lower middle class and how difficult and brave it 
was to really be nationalistic without rhetoric. I cannot forget his 
response. He said, “That is music.” I replied, “If we don’t make music, 
the masses will follow military music.” I saw him once more in Janu-
ary 1933. He visited us, held a political meeting, and wrote after his 
return to Berlin: “This crisis is over and all will go well for you now.” 
His death in 1941 and the horrific circumstances that surrounded 
it are still an open wound in my life. The end was not necessary; his 
inactivity and the disastrous influence of Rudolf Breitscheid para-
lyzed him. He had four passports; the French prefecture was very 
benevolent. Despite everything, he could not make himself flee. I 
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later saw Rose Hilferding and with bitter sadness said to her, “If you 
had cared less for the blonde and blue-eyed Germans in Paris and 
had instilled Rudi with your hard will for life and had simply cared 
for him, he would still be alive.” I never saw her again.
In 1932, I married Dr. Anna Lobbenberg in Cologne, who gave 
me a new life in body and in spirit. Since I don’t have the words to 
express what this new life meant to me, I do not want to say more 
about my wife.
Like all non-Aryan officials, I was let go into early retirement 
with a small pension on April 1, 1933. Leopold von Wiese paid a 
condolence visit to me, as he did when officials of the wrong race 
were dismissed. It was a friendly, indeed brave, gesture under the 
circumstances. He ruined it, however, when he said that we must be 
objective and acknowledge that Hitler had only meant to block Bol-
shevism. I could only respond: Wouldn’t that be a blunder of formal 
sociology?
I do not want to pride myself on the fact that I had foreseen the 
future in the way that it actually happened. I believed that my wife, 
at the Jewish hospital, and I, with my pension, would have been able 
to live modestly. But on the same day, a woman friend came with the 
news that I could receive an invitation to New York through Emil 
Lederer.
I went to London in July 1933 to meet with Lederer and Dr. Alvin 
Johnson. It was truly awful. I was speechless and thus fully self-con-
scious. I did not believe that he would employ me. I would not have 
done so were I in his place. But after a few weeks, Dr. Johnson sent 
me the contract. I never learned which friends, who believed in me, 
had persuaded Dr. Johnson. It was probably both Mannheim and 
Lederer. I later attended conferences and debates, in which we would 
choose European scholars to bring to the United States, with dread 
and trepidation. There were multiple good candidates available for 
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every position and summum ius was always summa inuria. I was 
naturally exposed to harsh criticism that I owed my place only to 
friends while better and more competent scholars would otherwise 
have earned the position. It was certainly true, and I never knew if I 
fulfilled the expectations of my friends and Dr. Johnson.
It was like a miracle, and I was terribly frightened. English was 
entirely beyond my speaking knowledge and ability. I spoke French 
like it was German, and my love for the French spirit, philosophy, 
and literature led me to believe that I had only been raised in Ger-
many by accident. In the house of Frederick Augustus Voigt, who 
back then was working for the Manchester Guardian in Berlin and 
was together with an American author, Margaret Goldsmith (Nine-
teenth Century and After), I met Pierre Viénot, who spent a while 
with one of the Reparations Commissions in Berlin and wrote a far-
sighted book about the German future: Incertitudes Allemandes. He 
was married to one of the liveliest, most spirited, and most inde-
pendent young women. She was the daughter of Luxembourg’s steel 
king and died in a terrible car accident. I went to Paris because I 
had to ask Pierre Viénot if there were any opportunities for me to 
come to France and be accepted there. He said to me something I 
will never forget: Naturally, we will allow you to hold lectures under 
the given circumstances. But you will never become a full professor, 
and probably never a citizen either. And the war will come and we 
will lose. Go to New York. It was February in 1934. Luckily, Viénot 
never learned how true his predictions were. He died beforehand. In 
1934, I also saw Walter Benjamin for the last time.
We went to New York on the Europa on January 18, 1935. I have 
never looked back since I crossed the bridge to the ship. At the New 
School, I engaged in a shy love affair with the American language.14 
I devoted myself to teaching instead of writing books. I prepared 
abstracts, which, I hoped, would stimulate some of my students to 
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record their own thoughts. Among these abstracts, there was the 
contribution on Weber, mentioned earlier. Weber had wanted to 
write on the social theory of revolution; I worked on this piece for 
one or two decades. There were also abstracts for the history of soci-
ology, comprehensive studies of the Foundations of Sociology and 
Social Psychology, which begin with Erasmus, Pascal, and Loyola, 
and which lead to the Scottish philosophy of the 1800s, which were 
partly published. [See also “Origins of Sociology and Social Psychol-
ogy (1947)” in this volume.—Eds.] In 1955, I published the book The 
Tyranny of Progress: Reflections on the Origins of Sociology.
I remember my American friends in loving gratitude and sad-
ness: Milton Steinberg, Chaim Greenberg, Shlomo Grodzensky, 
Elaine and Arthur Cohen, Ludwig and Renate Edelstein, Alfred 
Schütz, and Kurt Goldstein.
My gratitude also goes to the dead, whose stormy lives shaped 
me from my youth: Goethe, Kleist, Hofmannsthal, the religious 
reflections of Erasmus, Pascal, Loyola, Hermann Cohen, and Franz 
Rosenzweig, the profanity of Montaigne, the historical reflections of 
Burckhardt and Tocqueville, the natural ones of Lukrez, Montaigne, 
Simmel, and Scheler. I lived with them more closely and intimately 
than with most of my contemporaries.
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Notes
1. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, “From my life. Dichtung und Wah-
rheit. Erster Teil,” in Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Werke, Ham-
burger Ausgabe, Bd. 9: Autobiographische Schriften 1, Textkritisch 
durchgesehen und kommentiert von Erich Trunz (München: C. 
H. Beck 1998), S. 7–216, hier S. 7; Erich Trunz, “Anmerkungen,” in 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe, Bd. 9: 
Autobiographische Schriften 1, Textkritisch durchgesehen und kom-
mentiert von Erich Trunz (München: C. H. Beck 1998), S. 640–840, 
hier S. 641.
2. [Kaiser Wilhelm sent the gunboat SMS Panther to the Moroc-
can port of Agadir in response to France’s deployment of troops in 
Morocco in April 1911.—Eds.]
3. However, here I wish to start a detailed portrait of Leopold Bunzel 
and his world. I want to write about the parents and siblings of my 
parents in a different location. [Not attached.]
4. [Despite an extensive search, the editors are unable to find the 
incident that Salomon refers to here.—Eds.]
5. [The reference is to Count Hans Ludwig Paul Yorck (1835–1897), 
a close friend and collaborator with Wilhelm Dilthey, and to his 
grandson, Peter Graf Yorck von Wartenburg (1904–1944), a dis-
tinguished German jurist and a leading conspirator in the failed 
attempt to assassinate Hitler in 1944.—Eds.]
6. [Heinrich John Rickert (1863–1936) was a leading Neo-Kantian, 
who greatly influenced the sociologist Max Weber and the philosopher 
Martin Heidegger. Salomon’s skepticism about Rickert’s work suggests 
his attitude toward the work of those influenced by Rickert.—Eds.]
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7. [We could not discover any papers or lecture notes in Salomon’s 
scattered Nachlass with the title of “Social Theory of Revolutions.” 
But see his essay “Henri de Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, and the 
Origins of Sociology” in this volume.—Eds.]
8. Portraits of both and their mother: Frau Seidler from Budapest 
[sic]. [Not attached.]
9. My paper about L is attached. [Not attached.]
10. [Unreadable]
11. [The battle of the Teutoburg Forest took place in 9 A.D. on Kalkri-
ese hill in Osnabrück  County in Lower Saxony. An anti-Roman 
alliance of Germanic tribes led by Arminius, who had won Roman 
citizenship and received a Roman military education, defeated and 
destroyed three Roman legions and six auxiliary (noncitizen) troops, 
led by Publius Quinctilius Varus. The great Roman historian, The-
odor Mommsen (1817–1903), considered the Battle of the Teutoburg 
forest to be a turning point in world history.—Eds.]
12. [Salomon is mistaken in saying that members of the Society of 
Jesus did Loyola’s Spiritual Exercises for two weeks. Until relatively 
recently, all Jesuits did the Exercises for a full month shortly after 
their entry into the Society’s Novitiate. This was called the Long 
Retreat. Then, after fifteen years of study, and ordination, they under-
took another Long Retreat in their last year of formation known as 
Tertianship. In the intervening years, Jesuits typically did one or two 
eight-day retreats each year.—Eds.]
13. [Frank Salomon, Albert Salomon’s son, recalls that his father had 
contracted polio in Germany and was told that he would never walk 
again. But with great persistence and the unfailing support of his 
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wife, Anna Lobbenberg Salomon, one of the first female physicians 
in Germany, Salomon became able to walk again, though with dif-
ficulty. He had to use a cane. He usually came to concerts quite early. 
He would put his coat and hat on his seat and then stand in the lobby, 
stretching his legs, until a few minutes before concert time. Because 
of the angular shape of his head and his slightly curved back, he was 
often mistaken for the composer, Igor Stravinsky. Salomon visited 
his son in Vermont at the Marlboro Music Festival one summer 
weekend when the Festival was performing a work by Aaron Cop-
land. Frank relates that, as usual, his father was waiting in the lobby 
for the concert to begin when a patron approached and said, “Excuse 
me, sir, aren’t you Aaron Copland?” Albert Salomon replied that he 
was sorry, but that was not the case. Thinking that the famous com-
poser just did not want to be bothered, the patron insisted: “But I 
know that you are Aaron Copland.” To which my father responded: 
“No, I’m Igor Stravinsky.”—Eds.]
14. [Frank Salomon also recalls this father saying that he was not 
worried about life after death because his first year in the United 
States was pure hell, trying to teach graduate courses in a language 






In his address at the 200th convocation of the University of Chicago, 
June 11, 1940, President Robert Maynard Hutchins [1899–1977] invited 
American youth to reexamine the principles that make life worth 
living. This enterprise is most urgently necessary in removing the 
intellectual unpreparedness of the nation. Far worse than the mili-
tary and economic deficiencies in equipment and armament, are 
the spiritual dissensions among the various groups of our time. In 
the universal conflict, those nations will prevail whose unity results 
from spontaneous and free devotion to values that are recognized 
as worth living and dying for. We can reintegrate the nation, when 
we succeed in breaking the continuous secularization that, parallel 
to the rapid industrialization after the Civil War, is undermining 
the ethos of American life. The ethos that made this commonwealth 
great was the fighting spirit of enlightenment. The backbone of the 
political principles of the Constitution is the spirit of the Christian 
Law of Nature; that means political freedom as the fulfillment of the 
rules of the Almighty. This unity between the three spheres: nature, 
man, and God was discarded by the process of secularization. The 
 Crisis, History,  
and the Image of Man 
Published originally in a slightly different form in The Review of Politics 2 
(October 1940), 415–37. Copyright © The University of Notre Dame, published by 
Cambridge University Press, reproduced with permission.
Man is explicable by nothing less than all his history.
—Emerson
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ethics of enlightenment shifted to the demand for universal comfort 
and for good living. The attitude of a boundless optimism prevailed 
that considered history an unending process of perfection. It was 
thought that this state of continuous improvement would result from 
the scientific organization of social and political institutions; their 
progress would eliminate eventually what the less scientific past had 
ascribed to the finiteness and sinfulness of man. Thus, scientifism 
was the dogmatism of secularized times. It is defined as the belief 
that man is completely determined by environment. It was thought 
that scientific analysis would make possible the thorough construc-
tion and planning of the institutional world according to the scien-
tific principles that disclosed the conditions most favorable to human 
adjustment. This optimism has destroyed the image of man inherent 
in the minds of the founders of the commonwealth. It has suffocated 
the idea of a being capable of human freedom, a freedom to achieve 
the rules and commands of God. These optimists are proud of hav-
ing discovered human persons functioning like precise instruments.
Such an idea of history and man causes much confusion. Is 
not a tremendous success still the sign of justification even for the 
most secularized Puritan? Are not some of the opinion that, after 
all, Hitler represents progress, while Great Britain is the reactionary 
party in this war? And does not Hitler point out that he masters and 
controls that scientific idea of man? For this reason, it is worthwhile 
to reconsider the idea of history and the image of man. This recon-
sideration implies a discussion of optimism and pessimism as fun-
damental attitudes of man in action, a discussion that might support 
a real understanding of American life in the very moment when the 
destiny of man is at stake.
The victor always writes history to justify his successes. That is 
the reason why the advancement of liberal society has emphasized 
the growth of philosophies of progress, evolution, and secularized 
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eschatology. It is the privilege of intellectuals in times of crisis to 
glance at the broken structure of social relations, human standards, 
and spiritual values to be aware of all aspects of life and its com-
pleteness, even though it appears in scattered fragments. They are 
not biased by subjective prejudices and by stabilized conventions, for 
everything becomes problematic in a crisis.
Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the opti-
mistic philosophers of progress and evolution flourished side by side 
with philosophies that held just an opposite view of the historical 
process and man’s destiny. From Vico and Goethe on, there was a 
never -interrupted chain of interpretations of man in history. This 
school of interpreters challenged the dynamism of the philosophies 
of progress that regarded man as instrumental to the general prin-
ciple of history. They made transparent the wisdom of conservative 
thinking and contributed in a manner to the knowledge of future 
trends. The very reason for this positive achievement is that these 
men are primarily concerned with the completeness of human 
existence and the range of its potentialities in a specific situation. 
They see clearly the destructive and leveling tendencies in new con-
ditions that unchain individuals and deprive them of the restrict-
ing, but nevertheless protecting, frame of social limits. The radical 
reformer abstracts and isolates one single element from the complete 
unity of life. He does not imagine its complex context and trusts his 
principle of salvation like magic. He thinks as a utopian. The con-
servative liberal or liberal conservative is realistic. He has a vision 
of man’s completeness. Edmund Burke [1729–1797], Juan Donoso 
Cortés [1809–1853], Joseph von Görres [1776–1848], Friedrich von 
Gentz [1764–1832], Johann Adam Müller [1769–1832], Klemens von 
Metternich [1773–1859], and Alexis de Tocqueville [1805–1859] knew 
the dangers of democratic revolutions in their coincidence with the 
industrial revolutions because they had definite ideas of the wealth 
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and strength of human personality. They had realistic pictures of 
the implications of political and social changes for the character and 
standard of man; they were aware of the price mankind was to pay 
for the enlargement of political and social rights. Among these men 
have been scholars and philosophers whose disinterested pursuit of 
truth cannot be explained away as an ideological device through 
psychological explanations that reveal their reactionary character.
I
Almost a century ago, Jacob Burckhardt [1818–1897] visualized the 
forthcoming debacle of European civilization. His experience and 
vision brought into existence a new-old idea of history and of man’s 
place and destiny in it. His analyses of the trends towards decadence, 
and his reflections on man in this crisis, may challenge and support 
the reintegration of man at the present time in which our very exis-
tence is called into question.
Burckhardt was a professor of history and art in his native Basel, 
but he was an unusual type of professor and historian.1 He is known 
to the general public as the author of The Civilization of the Renais-
sance in Italy, but, as a perspicacious reviewer of the American trans-
lation of his book noted in the New York Herald in 1878, labeling 
this book “historical” is somewhat in error. Burckhardt deals with a 
description and analysis of an individual historical situation, but he 
approaches this particular civilization not with historical intention. 
Burckhardt’s interest centers on the varieties of human experience 
and the diverse types of man manifesting the richness and the range 
of human spontaneity. This is certainly not the attitude of the aver-
age historian.
The basic and lasting purpose of Burckhardt’s work is to rein-
vestigate the positive and concrete actuality of man apart from 
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all pseudometaphysical a prioris. It results from his fundamental 
experience of the dynamic course of political and social movements 
that will eventually end in a terrible catastrophe. For this reason, 
all his books—except those devoted to art—are confessions of this 
experience. He himself explicitly stated that his main interest lay in 
epochs of fundamental transformation and crisis. These convey the 
power and strength of human personality at its highest and lowest. 
Simultaneously, they show the continuity of the spirit through all 
revolutions and crises. His Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy 
analyzes the disintegration of the mediaeval civilization and the 
origin of modernity in Renaissance and Humanism. His work on 
Constantine describes the end of ancient civilization and the rise of 
the Christian Roman Middle Ages. The History of Greek Civilization 
is mainly concerned with the forces that destroyed the flowering of 
the finest civilization created by free and completely human citizens 
in Athens.
These parts of a great confession verify and clarify the primary 
experience of his own position in the modern world. They contribute 
to an idea of history that is just opposite to the dynamic theories 
of progress. Burckhardt’s idea of history is tied up with his idea of 
man; history becomes a category of human existence, an ontologi-
cal category. Man is the center of historical reflection, not the mask 
in the play of an impersonal and dehumanized spirit. Burckhardt 
has included the scientific results of his experience and his histori-
cal verifications of it in a book that deals with power, religion, and 
culture, as the constitutive elements of man’s historicity that is his 
necessary connection with a specific place in time. The book’s title 
might well be: On the study of history as determining and determined 
by human existence.2
These books do not contain the whole sum of his experiences. He 
was very careful in his public utterances and hated to express ideas 
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that might hurt or confuse the student or the reader. He still felt that 
scholarship is a moral responsibility and that the thinker who has no 
comfort to offer, but only the destructive and disenchanting analy-
ses of the disintegrating modern world, had better withdraw from 
teaching and educating. For this reason, the volumes that contain his 
correspondence with various friends are an invaluable source for the 
true expression of his experience and for the realism of his terrific 
visions.
A religious experience gave him the first opportunity for disclos-
ing the disintegrating character of the historical period in which he 
lived. Burckhardt was descended from patrician Swiss families that 
for centuries had supplied loyal ministers to the Protestant faith. 
He was supposed to follow this tradition but shifted to the study 
of history when he visualized the discrepancy between his actual 
religious piety and the pseudodogmatism of the Protestant Church. 
This experience was typical among Protestants of his time. His pro-
testation against the Divine character of Christ is based on what he 
perceived to be the fundamental misunderstanding of the Christian 
religion that results from the opposition to the hardening patterns of 
Lutheran and Calvinistic orthodoxies. 
I have voluntarily quitted the Church, because I do not 
know what it is all about. Like many others I do not feel 
tied up with the Church and my conscience works quite 
independently; that’s natural in a period of disintegra-
tion. The spontaneous individual piety beyond the pale 
of the Churches always indicates a period of crisis and 
transition. . . . I shall express what the distinguished 
scholars think, but care to hide: Christianity has entered 
for our historical thought the purely human epochs of 
history. It has brought about the people’s moral maturity 
and finally their intellectual strength and independence 
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which eventually made them bold enough to reconcile 
themselves with their own innermost self without need-
ing the mercy of God. Times will teach what pattern of 
thought Europeans will develop for approaching again a 
personal God. People will gladly believe in His personal-
ity as soon as He will reappear as a human being. . . . As 
God, Christ is incomprehensible to me. . . . [A]s human 
being, He illuminates my soul, because He is the most 
beautiful phenomenon of history. (Letter to Beyschlag, 
January 14, 1844)
This experience was common to other outstanding young Prot-
estant theologians, such as Karl Wilhelm Justi [1767–1846] and 
Wilhelm Dilthey [1833–1911]. It gave rise to attempts to reconsider a 
human world that contains in its very nature the longing of man and 
his participation in a universal spiritual power; spirit and matter, 
phenomenon and mind, which in idealistic doctrines were conceived 
of as constituting the original dualism of the world, are interpreted 
in these new approaches as constitutive elements of human nature. 
All these secularized theologians start with realistic and positivistic 
enmity against metaphysics and theologies. Burckhardt explicitly 
remarks, with irony worthy of his contemporary Søren Kierkeg-
aard [1813–1855], that, unfortunately, we are not familiar with the 
Divine intentions and that all philosophers of history who pretend 
to know something about the destiny of men are subject to errors 
and problematic hypotheses, challenging the work of Georg Hegel 
[1770–1831]. Burckhardt asserts time and again that religion as an 
expression of a fundamental quality and need of the human soul is a 
constitutive element of human nature.
It is the inherent metaphysical need of overcoming the finiteness 
and the fragmentary character of the human person that estab-
lishes the participation in and the protection by a universal spirit. 
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This awareness of a spiritual element in human nature as the lasting 
source of religious acts makes Burckhardt insist on the thesis that 
religion and the quest for the meaning of the world are the roots 
of every civilization. All spontaneous acts of the human mind—
like poetry, philosophy, art—were primarily parts of the religious 
interpretations of man. A new world will come into existence after 
the decline of Europe through a new religion,3 “for we never will 
get rid of the whole militaristic and economic business without a 
transcendental super-worldly orientation.” Granting the eternity of 
religion as a constitutive and an invariable element of the human 
soul, he refuses to admit the eternity of any particular religious 
form, for every religion originates in history and is subject to the 
destiny of historical phenomena to harden in its institutions and 
to lose contact with human reality. For Burckhardt, because reli-
gions are both changing and eternal, the diverse types of religion 
like supernatural-transcendental, mystic-pantheistic, and magic-
ritualistic correspond to different types of human beings. They are 
determined by the social character of the groups that form the elite. 
They are conditioned by the standards of societies that carry on the 
message of a religious genius. Burckhardt’s analysis of the sociologi-
cal implications of Mohammed’s religion discloses his all-embracing 
analytical spirit. This religion is a terrible simplification of Christian 
and Jewish ideas, intended to satisfy the needs of predatory tribes at 
the lowest spiritual level.
Burckhardt carefully distinguishes between the historical rise of 
religion and the origins of higher religions. He does not study the 
historical rise of religion completely because the material knowledge 
will always remain haphazard. Furthermore, a genetic analysis of 
religion from the primitives on will never teach us the nature and 
character of a phenomenon that is evident without this kind of posi-
tivistic genealogy. He lovingly studies the origins of higher religions, 
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for they disclose the spontaneity and the freedom of expanding 
above and beyond the empirical world, either in the patterns of 
asceticism and martyrdom, or in those of wisdom and mystical holi-
ness. The nature of the religious aims is evident in these origins. It is 
the eternal quest for subduing the secular world of power, pride, and 
vanity. This original situation cannot last. The inescapable pressure 
of compromising with this world in order to establish a continuous 
institution will jeopardize the pursuit and the tradition of the origi-
nal messages. In particular, the close relationship or the unification 
with the body politic has never failed to harm and corrupt the integ-
rity of the gospel.
It is not incidental that his first book, The Epoch of Constantine 
the Great, verifies historically this religious experience. He describes 
the process of the waning of Ancient Civilization, the rise of Chris-
tianity and its integration into the Empire. It was a fateful moment 
in the history of the Christian Church. The terrible persecutions 
under Diocletian had the positive effect, according to Burckhardt, 
of having united and organized the various conflicting groups into 
one strong and powerful hierarchical body of the church. It was this 
well-functioning body with its thorough hierarchical organization 
all over the Empire that made it attractive to Constantine, as best 
fitted for taking care of the administration of the Empire. There was 
no actual administration after the unending military revolutions 
and the economic bankruptcy. Burckhardt analyzes this turning 
point in the development of the church from all angles.4 It was first 
the unique opportunity for spreading the gospel and educating the 
barbaric invading tribes; second it was a great chance for proving 
the continuity of ancient civilization in the church; third it was the 
terrible seduction of being involved in and mixed with the institu-
tions of the state and of sharing in its power activities. The change 
of an ascetic and transcendental religion of enthusiastic beliefs into 
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a monopolistic institution, which is spiritual and also political, had 
far-reaching consequences for all spheres of European civilization. 
Burckhardt thought that this interference with political institutions 
logically would jeopardize the tradition and the truth of the mes-
sage. For it would involve the religious institution in the dynamics of 
the blind and stubborn selfishness of power.
Likewise, he analyzed the paradoxical results of the Reformation, 
which strove for the religious inwardness of the individual soul and 
delivered the social and moral existence of man to the political pow-
ers. In terms almost identical to those used by John Neville Figgis 
[1866–1919] and Georges de Lagarde [1898–1967], he pointed out the 
fatal affinity of Martin Luther [1483–1546] with Niccolò Machia-
velli [1469–1527] and his tragic success of having unconsciously 
promoted the universal secularization. Finally, he remarked that, 
sociologically, just those groups that enjoyed the prospect of being 
emancipated from all spiritual ties carried on these movements. In 
sharp contrast to the intentions of the founders, Protestants played a 
vital role in developing the idea of the autonomy of all spheres of life.
He turned his sympathetic understanding to the Catholic Church 
when she was persecuted by Otto von Bismarck [1815–1898]. He 
knew that this was a blow that illuminated the problematic relations 
between power and spirit. He was convinced that a religious rena-
scence would reintegrate the modern world. He insisted, however, 
that only the separation and emancipation from politics and power 
would help reestablish the genuine and integral metaphysical spirit 
of religion. Then again, religion would be a manifestation of freedom.
The analyses of religious developments shed light on the charac-
ter of Burckhardt’s conception of history and of man in history. The 
desire directed toward a superhuman and universal good is a basic 
trend of human action. It is the act by which man unifies his frailty 
and finiteness with a sheltering and protecting whole and meets 
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with a universal order. So far, this trend is a part of man’s eternity. 
The communion with the social institution that realizes this funda-
mental need establishes the very history of the religious forces. The 
existence of a lag between the subjective longings and the objective 
services was in Burckhardt’s mind the sign of waning civilization. 
Man’s estrangement from his institutions shows the disintegration 
and disruption of a rightly ordered world.
II
In his second experience that constitutes a new approach toward his-
tory and man’s place in it, Burckhardt finds, on a larger scale, what 
he found in the field of religion. It was the disrupting movement in 
the relations between state and society and the autonomies assumed 
by both that provoked Burckhardt’s vision of a decaying world. As a 
young scholar he still hoped to contribute to the new liberalism and 
to maintain a true liberal position between the ruthless absolutism of 
Russia and Prussia on the one side and the no-less ruthless radical-
ism of the rising masses on the other. Already in 1845, he was aware 
that his conservative liberalism was doomed to failure. For nowhere 
were human forces visible that could make possible the reconcilia-
tion between political necessities and social demands. Shaken by the 
domestic unrest in Switzerland he writes:
The term liberty sounds beautiful and perfect. Nobody 
however, is allowed to talk about it, who has not faced 
the possible slavery which may be exercised by the pres-
sure of crowds and who has not experienced civil revolts. 
Nothing is more pitiable than a government which is 
subject to the intrigues of so-called liberal clubs of ras-
cals and scoundrels. I know too much history to expect 
anything else from the despotism of the masses than a 
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future domination of violence which will extinguish all 
these liberties. (April 19, 1845)
The destruction of the unity between state and society marks the 
specific character of the modern period originating in the French 
Revolution. There is no society without state; there is no state with-
out society. Both are aspects of the same human constellation that we 
call history. Society is the primary phenomenon of social existence. 
The independent and spontaneous grouping and cooperation aims 
at the realization of ends and values. The state is the very institu-
tion that makes possible the continuity, duration, and security of the 
human enterprise we call society. This content and task is already 
imposed on the state by reason of social existence. If society leaves 
the state, and the state lacks the impact of social obligations and 
principles, both will unleash the demonic forces inherent in human 
vitality when not guided and controlled by the power of reason and 
by the devotion to a spiritual order.
The French Revolution created this situation. It has let loose the 
negatively privileged and disinherited groups without incorporat-
ing them in the structure of society or reestablishing significance 
and function in their work and position. It is the tragic failure of 
the French Revolution to have destroyed the system of an organized 
society without creating a positive principle of social reconstruction. 
The consequence was the lawless competition of isolated individuals 
and the explosive expansion of those groups that, by political, social, 
and economic crises, had lost income, prestige, and social mean-
ing. The tragedy of this revolution lies in opening the gates for the 
demonic forces, both of these uprooted masses, and of the unleashed 
coercive power of the state proper. Burckhardt firmly believed that 
the French Revolution had broken the principle of social unity and 
order and, for this reason, had unchained the instincts and greeds of 
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the masses and the no less greedy forces for domination and control 
inherent in the institutions of the state. This outlook made Burck-
hardt’s liberalism helpless.
I do not expect any thing of the future. Perhaps we will 
still enjoy some tolerable centuries, a kind of Roman 
empire. I am of the opinion that in spite of desperate 
efforts democrats and proletarians will eventually sub-
mit to a severe despotism because this placid century is 
not capable of realizing true democracy. After 1789 it 
will not be possible any longer to reestablish a true social 
order in the waning Europe. (September 17, 1849)
Burckhardt never fails to remember parallel situations in the past, 
and in particular, the Greek and Roman declines. He is aware that 
Athenian democracy was no less resentful and greedy and eager to 
extinguish the minorities of noble and educated groups than are the 
masses of the industrial society. And he visualizes the future regime 
of terrorism in Europe as like the rules of the barrack-emperors 
after the destruction and elimination of the Roman society. In his 
book on Constantine, he describes all patterns and grades of this 
military domination from the worst to the best. Perhaps the military 
domination of the past will return, and a tall man with the talent of 
a noncommissioned officer will rule again. He recommends in this 
context the imperial system of adoptions as worthwhile remember-
ing, for these despotic rulers will not spring from any dynasty what-
soever. In this sense, he writes to a friend on March 23, 1883:
There will be no monarchy in France. History runs dif-
ferently than in the past. I cannot forget my vision of the 
future military domination. The change from democra-
cies does not occur as individual tyranny which could 
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be assaulted by dynamite. The change will take place as 
a military corporation. Perhaps these people will use 
means which even the worst despotism would never have 
dared to apply.
This idea possessed his mind so urgently that it occurs frequently in 
his letters.
For a long time I have been aware that the world is push-
ing forward to the alternative between universal democ-
racy and absolute despotism both without law and right. 
This new tyranny will not be achieved by dynasties which 
are too good hearted, but by military commanders with 
a republican ideology. It is not very pleasant to imagine 
a world the rulers of which will abstract completely from 
law, well-being, economic organization and finance and 
will instead erect a total domination through absolute 
brutality. Europe will be the victim of such new tyrants 
as a consequence of unleashing the masses to compete 
for the key position of control. (April 13, 1882)
It is a remarkable statement by Burckhardt himself that his vision 
is correct because he knows history so well. Actually, history is not 
a collection of dead material but the total presence of mankind in 
his historical consciousness. This historical consciousness is indeed 
absolutely different from all pragmatic ways of historical thinking, 
which are concerned either with justifying the evolution and the 
growth of the victorious cause, or with the romantic transfiguration 
of the defeated. Nothing like that informs Burckhardt’s approach. The 
existence of man, human being proper, is historical at any moment 
because the whole of human kind is present in any moment of this 
process. Burckhardt changes completely the character and nature 
of the philosophic dynamic concepts of history, like those of Hegel, 
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Auguste Comte [1798–1857], and Herbert Spencer [1820–1903], into 
a static or ontological category. We have to deal with this problem 
later on. Here, it is only important to visualize the total presence of 
human history in Burckhardt’s mind in order to appreciate objec-
tively his terrific vision of the converging trends of the social revolu-
tion with the militaristic imperialism of the unleashed state. 
After the French Commune, there remains the latent trend of 
combining the social revolution and the political imperialism. Here 
again, the recurring historical trend is present in his mind. The 
Roman Republic had warded off the imminent social revolution by 
the imperialistic conquest of the Eastern Mediterranean, the exploi-
tation of which suffocated the revolutionary spirit of the Roman 
farmer and soldier. The same phenomenon occurs again with the 
growing social conflicts and the problematic political prestige of the 
ruling powers during the nineteenth century. All European govern-
ments transferred their social conflicts and tensions to the field of 
nationalist conquest, which, for a long time, turned social unrest 
into nationalism.
In the esoteric remarks of Burckhardt’s correspondence, we find 
the most realistic observations on the identical dynamics in the for-
eign policy of Louis-Napoléon [1808–1873] and of Bismarck. Both 
checked revolutions by their military enterprises. Bismarck alone 
succeeded in his wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870 in transferring social 
demands to the field of national imperialism. After the war of 1870 
and the French Commune, Burckhardt has a vision that, in the 
future, the inherent revolutionary tendencies of modern society will 
coincide with the self-preservation of a militaristic imperialism. In 
particular, the German situation provokes strange ideas revealing 
the intense clarity and realism of a thought that makes transpar-
ent the driving forces in history. He writes to a friend, who is a high 
German official:
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     Bismarck has achieved by himself what in the long run 
would have happened without or against him. He was aware 
that the rapid growth of the democratic and social tide 
sometime would create a situation of total violence either 
by the democrats or by the government. For this reason 
he thought: ipse faciam and made the wars of 1866, 1870. 
   But this is only the beginning. All our intellectual 
activities look queer, arbitrary or dilletantic compared 
with the highest efficiency of the Prussian military 
institutions which have been elaborated so carefully 
in all details. This military efficiency will become the 
pattern of life. You will be most interested in watch-
ing how the political and administrative machine will 
be transformed according to the patterns of a military 
efficiency. My interests turn to the changes in education. 
The strangest changes will occur in the conditions of the 
workers. I have an idea which sounds like a silly dream 
but possesses me thoroughly. The militarized state will 
become the monopolistic industrialist. Furthermore, it 
will be impossible in the long run to leave the human 
agglomerations of workers in the large mills to their 
needs and greeds. A certain planning of their misery and 
its overcoming through advancement and military uni-
forms with the sound of drums at the beginning and at 
the end of the working hours will logically develop one 
day or the other. (April 26, 1872)
These observations on the forces driving toward catastrophe spring 
from the primary experience of the vanishing interaction between 
state and society. Society strives for the expansion, the radiation, and 
the growth of independent and spontaneous acts that disclose the 
range of human personality. The state is a function of this society; 
it shelters and preserves its continuity and duration. This stabiliz-
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ing force has the monopoly of coercion for this very purpose. The 
antagonism between spontaneous action and lasting institution 
is an invariable of historical existence. It is the antinomy between 
freedom and order, motion and stagnation. It is the dilemma of all 
power-institutions that, in reality, duration and continuity are likely 
to coincide with a hardening of institutions that prevents the growth 
of human spontaneity.
This type of historical situation, already present in Burckhardt’s 
religious experience, finds its most radical and disastrous manifes-
tation in those recurrent conflicts, when society is either disrupted 
or destroyed, and the unleashed state expands and enjoys its power 
drive for its own sake. Burckhardt defines this very situation with 
the phrase: “Power is evil in itself.” This formula is not a liberal 
resentment or a sentimental moralism. Nobody knew better than 
Burckhardt that freedom and authority, power and spirit, spontane-
ity and obligation are constitutive elements of human and histori-
cal existence, the cooperation of which realizes the development of 
man’s history. For this reason, power by itself deserves no negative 
connotation a priori. Power as potency directed towards meaning-
ful ends is the nature of man’s positive freedom. However, power is 
evil insofar as it is the narrow and selfish explosion of vital forces for 
the sake of enjoying their very lust. It is the unleashing of urges and 
instincts for their own satisfaction, emancipated from the center of 
human reason and the unifying meaning of the universal spirit. It is 
the rise of disintegration in man whose very being is disrupted when 
he separates vital and spiritual forces. The awareness of this possible 
catastrophe in human history leads Burckhardt, an ironic and sober 
writer, to use a pathetic phrase: “The master of world is Satanas!”
In disintegrating times, the selfish and egotistic struggle of insti-
tutions for their own survival points out this principle of evil, the 
pseudomythical unleashing of all demonic forces at its highest. It is 
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this prospect that suggests Burckhardt’s terms: Satanas barbarus for 
the forthcoming decadence. This is the most terrific and fateful devel-
opment of modern times and is based on a fundamental confusion 
regarding the relationship between human logos and human body. 
The integrating principle of man—reason—was made an instrument 
for serving biological needs and drives instead of controlling the 
human animal. Implied in this confusion is the typical modern prin-
ciple of the assumed goodness of human nature as only corrupted by 
social and political institutions. This idea resulted in the paradoxical 
postulate of all modern revolutions: the destruction of authority and 
the dignity of the state, and the enlargement of the volume of politi-
cal tasks and functions, until they extend to the universal control of 
life. For this reason, the terrifying prospect of the unending modern 
revolution is the selfish exercise of power by military bodies, which 
present the single element of unified and integrated power in a dying 
society. This might be a sociological rule. But Burckhardt himself 
has presented the one historical exception to this rule: in the decay 
of Rome, not the army but the Christian Church reintegrated the 
declining Empire. For this reason, Burckhardt insisted on the last-
ing responsibilities of thoughtful men to establish or reestablish time 
and again the unity of life and spirit.
III
Burckhardt’s ideas on the tasks and responsibilities of the scholar 
illuminate his image of man that cannot be separated from his con-
cept of history. In his early letters that contain the farewell to his 
German friends who joined the revolutionary movement of 1848, 
he already expressed, definitely, his choice of the contemplative life. 
This choice is not an escapism, but practical and active work for the 
survival of freedom and human spontaneity.
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In Burckhardt’s mind, this theoretical life is the last refuge of 
intellectual and spiritual freedom. The sentimental intellectuals 
who sincerely believe in fighting for freedom and democracy do not 
realize that they are instruments of the darkest and demonic pow-
ers that lead toward a new slavery. “Today political action means 
being involved in a disrupting and confused world. I will look for 
harmonies.” This sounds like an aesthetic escapism. It is not, as we 
will see later on. Here, we have only to remember that harmony in 
Burckhardt’s conception is first of all a principle of spiritual order, 
the microcosmic reflex of which might be called aesthetic perfection. 
Burckhardt himself would never tolerate aesthetic harmonies that do 
not refer to a universal harmony of the all-pervading spirit. He him-
self explicitly states the moral implication of his decision. Already 
in 1846, he writes to a radical friend that there is no Epicureanism 
in his attitude. On the contrary, it is a moral task and the serious 
responsibility for the continuity of the mind that enforce on him the 
choice of the contemplative life.
You all have not the slightest idea what tyranny will be 
imposed on intellectual freedom with the ideology that 
intellectual culture and education are the secret allies 
of capital which must be destroyed. . . . we all may per-
ish. However, I wish to select the principle for which I 
gladly will die, that is, the intellectual civilization of Old 
Europe. (May 26, 1846)
This is not an arbitrary subjectivism. There is a definite theory of 
loyalties involved in this decision. The loyalties to the spontaneous 
forces of reason and logos are prior to all other norms for the scholar 
in times of revolution. It was Burckhardt’s belief that in the prospec-
tive conflagrations, there ought to be men, who beyond the pale of 
social institutions, take care of the intellectual traditions in order 
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to preserve the continuity of the spirit. It is the task and function 
of these thoughtful intellectuals not to be involved in the clashing 
alignments of the conflicting powers, but to remain true to the com-
mitments of scholars to serve the permanent and lasting values, and 
to protect the actuality of timeless meanings over against the tempo-
ral fashions of thinking. The emphasis of modernity is on material 
well-being and comfort, but the emphasis of the responsible human 
person is on the loyal devotion to the preservation of the standards 
and achievements of the human mind. That the chain of intellectual 
traditions should not be disrupted is a primary interest of life and a 
metaphysical evidence of its duration.
Reason and consciousness make possible, time and again, the 
actualization of the spirit as the lasting transcendence of man over 
his empirical finiteness. This effort is not a formal intellectual-
ism. According to his frequent remarks, nobody despised more the 
detached and sophisticated scholarship of modern professors than 
Burckhardt. He took it for granted that specialization is an inescap-
able destiny of modern pragmatic reason. He suspected, however, 
that most scientists would be completely satisfied with technical 
skillfulness and efficient routine. He clearly foresaw the intellectual 
barbarism of the transformation of the universities into technologi-
cal institutes, where scholars are content with narrow boundaries, 
without referring to a universal context and meaning. His preference 
for dilettantism over specialization is an invitation to remember the 
original term philosophy, and to pursue all scientific investigations 
in a philosophical spirit. It is valueless, according to Burckhardt’s 
idea, to enlarge and extend the fields of detailed research and to clas-
sify documents apart from the efforts toward understanding and 
interpreting the human factors involved. Only these attempts trans-
form knowledge into wisdom. Like Thucydides, he does not aim at 
pragmatic prudence for future use; he strives for permanent wisdom 
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that makes transparent the completeness of man and the eternity 
of man’s spiritual and thinking being. This lasting conviction gave 
Burckhardt strength and power to stand the terrific visions of the 
forthcoming catastrophes. The rapid growth of the industrial sys-
tem, the series of imminent wars, and the social revolutions chal-
lenged the strongest resistance of his spiritual loyalty. He had no 
doubt that only this commitment to the traditions of ancient and 
Christian civilization would make possible the future renascence of 
the spontaneity and freedom of man as indispensable elements of the 
permanent working of the mind and spirit.
This unconditioned devotion to genuine scholarship as a way of 
life pervades his reflections on the relations between politics and 
history.
Man in his concrete situation must intend definite ends, 
as thinker he must remain true to the standards of  
scientific truth. Life of the West is struggle. In his indi-
vidual situation the historian might be compelled to take 
sides and to follow definite purposes. As scholar he ought 
to strive for a complete and thorough interpretation.  
(April 16, 1882)
He once advised a young scholar to refrain from modern prob-
lems that always involve political prejudices and subjective partisan 
approaches determined by our own finite thinking and our interests 
and emotions. He insists on the discipline and disinterested contem-
plation of the historian.
What will be the end of scholarship, if we yield to the 
social pressure of modern society and shift to a branch 
of political journalism or social pragmatism? It is worth-
while insisting on the opposite position. We will defend 
and preserve history, philosophy and the humanities as 
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the very rocks to which the tides of temporality are not 
permitted to rise, because they are the ultimate refuge of 
disinterested pursuit of truth. (November 12, 1876)
Burckhardt calls this approach that of “humanist epigone.”
We humanistic epigoni are destined never to join uncon-
ditionally either of the fighting parties, not even the 
group which is closest to our ideas. The cruelty and bit-
terness of past conflicts, the furor and passion of destroy-
ing enemies makes it impossible for human reflection to 
stick to any partisan viewpoint. For this reason genuine 
historical reflection will definitely eliminate those his-
torians who follow partisan lines and write history as 
a necessary evolution towards a success and victory of 
their cause. (June 8, 1876)
If we take seriously the term humanism, as applied by Burckhardt 
to a self-interpretation of man, we are compelled to ask: What is the 
specific character of this humanism compared with the humanisms 
of the past? It is incompatible with the authoritarian humanism of 
the renaissance that changed from the truth of the religious tradi-
tions to the authorities of the classics. It is likewise far distant from 
the romantic and aesthetic humanism of Johann Joachim Winck-
elmann [1717–1768] and his friends who discovered a perfect world 
in the harmony of noble innocence and serene greatness among 
the Greek works of art. Burckhardt, the man who exploded cruelly 
this idea of a golden past in Greek civilization and described the 
grim reality of Greek passions, ambitions, and resentments, had no 
romantic image of this or any period. Throughout his works, we find 
the idea that there never was, there never will be, a golden age—an 
age that can claim absolute authority and perfection. He even states 
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that there never will be political forms of government that by their 
very structure guarantee the good life. However, there are constitu-
tions that, administered with the true spirit of virtue and righteous-
ness, can bring into existence the highest possible achievements of 
human development in all spheres of freedom.
What then remains for justifying Burckhardt’s self-interpre-
tation as humanist? He is humanistic in his trend toward the sym-
pathetic understanding of the totality of man beyond and above 
the restricted viewpoints of the pragmatic historians. The second 
element that explains the application of the term humanism to 
Burckhardt is in conformity with the use of this word by the pragma-
tist Friedrich Schiller [1759–1805]. Burckhardt’s humanism is, indeed, 
a spiritual pragmatism and anticipates to some extent the work of 
William James [1842–1910] and Ralph Barton Perry [1876–1957]. It is 
a spiritual pragmatism that understands all human manifestations as 
contributing to extend and enlarge the individual into a general and 
universal being. The third element of this humanism marks the com-
plex of the contemplative life. It does not refer to an external power of 
logos. It is the immanent intention of man’s reason to attain through 
knowledge the loving unification with the universe. It is characteris-
tic of Burckhardt’s humanism that in his tendency toward the theo-
retical life, the intellectual eros of Plato coincides with the purifying 
and illuminating love of Christ. They appear not as a transcendental 
grace, but as the inherent radiation of the innermost nature of man. 
This eternity of man in his concrete transcendence of himself, this 
participation in and cooperation with the absolute, makes Burck-
hardt’s humanism into a spiritual humanism that could be called by 
nature Christian.
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IV
This humanistic approach destroys the hybrid intellectualism and 
the subjective political implications of the idealistic and positivis-
tic theories. It eliminates the progressivism and optimism of those 
nineteenth century philosophies that assumed that all epochs passed 
are strides toward the present, that evolution is identical with prog-
ress, and that progress ultimately results in a secular eschatology. In 
contrast to all these theories, Burckhardt conceives every period of 
history as the full expression of concrete humanity in all its aspects. 
Every historical moment, including our own, is existing for itself, for 
the past, for the future. History is not the evolution toward a subjec-
tive intended meaning. It is the life of mankind as a whole; every 
moment has meaning for this whole and for the unity of the human 
world.
The lasting center of historical reflection is the concrete man, act-
ing and being acted upon, striving and suffering, the eternal man 
identical in his changing disguises. However, the diverse and various 
types of man in different situations are not changing costumes of the 
same actor. The ideality of man is not a permanent substance. It is a 
moving constellation of invariables that turns around according to 
the interaction of challenges and responses. History is the eternity of 
the constitutive elements of the human being. In every moment, man 
strives to realize his potentialities that best respond to the changes 
of his world. Burckhardt has conquered the positivistic dualism of 
man and environment. There is no gap between the human world 
and the surrounding world. We ourselves are the wave, the element 
of the universal sea. There is no basic distinction between man and 
environmental world, both are aspects of the world as a whole, shift-
ing and interacting according to the destructive or creative powers 
inherent in any human situation.
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Burckhardt is concerned with the typical and recurrent trends of 
human conduct. The individual and the general, the specific and the 
typical, convey two aspects of human existence that is inseparably 
individual and typical as well. Burckhardt’s realism does not lead 
him toward the positivistic conclusion of radical relativism resulting 
from the eternal change in man’s history. Truth and beauty remain 
absolute values in spite of all changing conditions. 
The true unconditional value is the commitment to a general 
cause, to a sacrifice abolishing all natural egoisms, and to an extinc-
tion of vital selfishness. This moral self-transcendence makes for the 
greatness of an epoch or a cause. In these acts, the empirical indi-
vidual meets with the general and typical tendencies that are human 
property. They show man at his highest because they make it possible 
for every person to realize himself as a whole and complete being.
Frequently, Burckhardt remarks that this achievement is indepen-
dent of intellectual superiority that often is combined with miserable 
vanity and selfishness. The coincidence of the individual with the 
general marks human grandeur as the unification of a determined 
will with a determined mind. Burckhardt’s examples of grandeur 
enrich his image of man. Political grandeur is based on strength 
and harshness of souls that enjoy riding on the wings of the storm 
and that face death and glory. Their limitations, however, are given 
in the specific nature of political action. They must be necessarily 
inconsiderate and selfish and exploit all advantages. The greater and 
rarer human achievement is grandeur of soul. Burckhardt defines 
this attitude as corresponding to a man who is able to resign secular 
advantages in favor of moral principles, a human being capable of 
voluntary restrictions, not because of prudence, but because of inner 
grace and kindness. This grandeur of the soul is possible only where 
the individuals consciously experience their responsibilities and 
their tasks. This was Caesar’s grandeur! “The whole range of human 
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potentialities is perfect if there is still the mercy and clemency of 
character, a lasting contempt of death and again, like Caesar’s, the will 
to gain and to reconcile. A spark of  kindness. . . . A complete soul like 
that of the passionate Alexander!”
The humanistic image of the philosophic historian and the defi-
nition of ontological history converge in this image of human gran-
deur as the highest achievement of human actuality.
V
All these reflections and visions, in spite of their apparent antiphi-
losophical emphasis, disclose a very definite philosophy of history. 
According to Burckhardt, history is the passion of man’s living in 
the world without the sheltering protection of a Divine mercy. This 
human passion reveals the range of man’s potentialities for the high-
est and the lowest, for spirit and despair. If there is no redemption 
and transsubstantiation in his passion, there is, at least, the underly-
ing and recurrent idea that this world of man’s self-realization has 
a definite significance in a universal order. That is the reason why 
evil has a definite function in the “Economy” of this human passion. 
Only real evil makes possible and challenges the radiating growth 
of disinterested righteousness and goodness. This might be called a 
relative pessimism.
It is the grandeur of human nature to transcend the concrete 
empirical individuality in the acts of spiritual, moral, and social 
commitments that are inherent in our very being. Their intentions 
disclose the universality of the human spirit. They contribute to the 
whole of man’s unity with history as determining the standards of 
humankind. The harmony of the universe and its justice and virtue 
depend on these acts that manifest the spiritual responsibilities of 
man.
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This concrete transcendence of self marks the continuity of the 
spirit. History as man’s historicity is determined by the dynamism 
of spirit and matter. They interact and meet with each other. All 
spiritual and intellectual things in all spheres of life have a concrete 
(i.e., historical) aspect. All material empirical data have, likewise, a 
spiritual side by which they participate in eternity. Spirit changes, 
never perishes.
This is relative optimism. It presents a positive response to the 
world of evil. It is optimistic, however, only regarding the being of 
man, not with respect to his success in the evolution of mankind. 
Burckhardt remarks explicitly that it would be trivial to content 
oneself with this idea of the eternity of the spirit. Nobody can ever 
foresee what harm violence, terror, and oppression might do to the 
growth and to the spontaneity of the inner life and to its continuity. 
Sometimes evil rules for a long time, destroys civilizations forever, 
and establishes the rule of the lower over against the higher stan-
dards.
These philosophical remarks are the cornerstone of a philosophy 
of man and make possible the realistic and spiritual interpretation of 
man. The eternity of man as a being capable of general and universal 
longings indicates his cooperative participation in a universal power. 
In hesitant words, Burckhardt points to a “Higher Necessity” and to 
a “Highest Good,” the name of which is lost and unknown. “Perhaps 
the man who aims at the free and spontaneous acts of human culture 
and the man who strives for power, are both blind instruments in the 
service of a third unknown power.”
Burckhardt’s human passion describes the range and the poten-
tialities of man’s grandeur and misery. It is correct to say that this 
passion lacks the Divine Redemption and Mercy. It is, however, 
permissible to remark that in the self-transcendence, which is pos-
sible for man, in the acts of devotion to friends, causes, and values, 
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mercy has given way to the inherent quality of a spontaneous and 
overwhelming love radiating kindness, comfort, and reconciliation.
This philosophy of man has transcended the categories of opti-
mism and pessimism. It goes to the roots of human being. It tries 
to reformulate the eternal wisdom of man’s Fall and Creation in 
secular terms. Finiteness and the demonic forces of human desires 
endanger permanently the growth and the actuality of the spiritual 
elements of man. This reality must be faced. That is no pessimism. 
It is pragmatism. The mastery of this positive reality through the no 
less positive intellectual and spiritual intentions is carried on with 
hope and belief in the potential victories of converging wisdom and 
love. That is no optimism. Hope and faith make that mode of think-
ing a spiritual pragmatism. This is the reconstruction of the image of 
man trying to combine Greek realism and Christian spiritualism; it 
is the message of the souls that could be called by nature Christian.
VI
There is no longer anything mysterious or prophetic about this vision 
of the European crisis. This understanding was accomplished by the 
integrity of contemplative thinking and by the completeness of a lov-
ing soul. It came into existence as a positive interpretation of man. 
This awareness embraces the lasting contacts and conflicts between 
man’s material and spiritual forces in their changing constellations. 
This very interpretation made possible the vision of the European 
decline that is realistic and spiritual as well.
That is the teaching that can meet our requirements: we are aware 
that what is at stake in the present conflict is not an alternative 
between different political institutions. At stake is the image of man. 
The old and eternal image of the finite and spiritual man is opposed 
by the image of man as a predatory animal. We stand for the ele-
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ments of ancient and Christian civilizations that made possible a 
good and perfect life in the freedom that springs from the devotion 
to basic principles of being. What many call the democratic way of 
life is just this fighting ideal of the free citizen devoting his efforts to 
the values of his body politic. It is this ideal of the political pioneer, 
enriched by the experience of the infinite value of an individual soul, 
thirsting for its redemption, that determines our image of man. It 
has created time and again the rise of all possibilities of American 
greatness. In this universal crisis, the serene wisdom of Burckhardt 
supports the effort to rediscover the old truth of the image of man.
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Notes
1. Burckhardt’s collected works appeared in 14 volumes (Basel: Benno 
Schwabe, 1929–1933). Selected letters by Fritz Kaphan (Kroner Leipzig, 
1935). Among many publications dealing with Burckhardt, we men-
tion only two: on the relation of Burckhardt and Nietzsche in Basel, 
Charles Andler, Nietzsche, sa vie et sa pensée, volumes 1 and 2; and 
a philosophical interpretation, Karl Loewith, Jacob Burckhardt, Der 
Mensch inmitten der Geschichte (Lucerne: Vita Nova, 1936). 
2. Strangely enough Burckhardt’s Reflections on Universal History 
are not translated into English.
3. This idea of a new religion is again a typical thought recurring 
among Protestants where the rationalistic and empty dogmatism 
had estranged the pious souls from faith in their churches. Burck-
hardt frequently remarks that all these trends will finally strengthen 
the Catholic Church. Likewise, the philosophical approach toward 
the church as a secular institution is typically Protestant.
4. Not all historians share Burckhardt’s view on Constantine. See, 
e.g., H. A. Vasilieu, History of the Byzantine Empire (Madison: 1928), 
1:61.
2
 Democracy and Religion 
in the Work of Erasmus 
It is taken for granted that religious motives play a decisive role in 
determining the frames of reference in which societies are acting 
and being acted upon. However, it remains an open question what 
specific effects religious elements have in building the horizons that 
condition historical structures. These effects can be constructive, 
preventive, and destructive, as seen from a religious or secular point 
of view. The messianism of the Franciscan Spirituals [Fraticelli] had 
consequences that were disastrous for the Church and precarious 
for the body politic. The intellectuals of the imperial court jubilantly 
took over the Franciscan radicalism as a most effective tool in their 
anti-ecclesiastical policy. Frederic II cynically transformed the spiri-
tual messianism into messianic imperialism as the secular ideology 
of an antipapal international policy. He inaugurated a development 
that was continued by Charles V and finally came to an end in the 
secular messianism of modern political and social revolutions. This 
effect is destructive for church and state alike.
Many religions were strong enough to prevent the growth of 
secular ambitions for some centuries at least. Religious convictions, 
in connection with other causes, prevented the complete expansion 
Published originally in a slightly different form in The Review of Religion XIV 
(March 1950), 227–49. Republished by permission from Frank Salomon.
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of political power into the total state at the beginning of the modern 
era. Religious indoctrination had created habits that prevented the 
rise of industrial capitalism in Asia and the Near East.
In the rise of modern Western civilization, religion became a 
constituent element in the foundations of all political and social 
institutions. However, there was no longer a Christian religion, but 
Christian religions. The teachings of the various churches had differ-
ent effects on the attitudes and patterns of conduct in the respective 
societies. There is no doubt that the German Untertan, with all his 
negative qualifications as citizen and his positive sides as worker, is 
determined by Luther’s social teachings, whatever might have been 
the political and social causes that made up the German concatena-
tion of conditions. In genuine Calvinistic countries, such as Geneva 
and the Netherlands after the Treaty of Dordrecht in 1489, a monop-
olistic aristocracy was the natural form of government.
Perhaps it is a mistake to stress the influence of the churches as 
most important. Their teachings in sermons and schools and their 
strict disciplines had a strong and habit-creating influence. How-
ever, there were many psychological and spiritual escapes available. 
Already prior to the so-called “Reformation,” there was a widespread 
lay piety—independent mystical groups and spiritual communions, 
as well as reform movements—that many monastic orders had 
attacked spontaneously. It is a statistical problem whether these 
movements were quantitatively strong enough to be treated with 
equal attention as the churches. Unfortunately, we cannot answer 
such questions because there are no statistical data available for 
movements that could survive only by hiding their actual beliefs. 
The historian of liberal and democratic ideas, however, will give his 
complete attention to these movements, because they started from 
a spiritual vision that made them antagonistic to the authoritarian 
control of the leading churches.
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Among these movements, Erasmus [1466–1536] and the Erasmian 
movements, for which the Spaniards coined the term Erasmismo, 
have an important contribution to make. This spiritual liberalism, or 
better liberal spiritualism, was centered around the idea of Christian 
liberty. This idea implied the principle of social and political democ-
racy and, in its critical aspect, the grim and disillusioned analysis of 
disintegrating feudalism and rising military despotism.
Erasmus had chosen freedom as the ruling principle of his life. 
He explicitly stated again and again that he could not serve. He pre-
ferred death to intellectual slavery. He refused the offers of popes and 
kings who implored him to take ecclesiastical or secular positions. 
He could not be partisan and had to remain alone in order to preserve 
his intellectual integrity intact. He was keenly aware that his was a 
precarious position between the hostile alignments of Catholicism 
and Lutheranism. He was fighting for the indestructible unity of the 
Church, not for the existing ecclesiastical institutions. He predicted 
that Luther’s revolution would jeopardize spiritual freedom for a 
long time to come. Intellectual and social independence were one 
and indivisible to Erasmus. He had left monastic orders to get rid 
of external pressure by coercive institutions and of inner depression 
caused by his illegitimate birth. He recognized only one passion, the 
desire for freedom from established authorities. His was the Eros of 
liberty for serving Christ and logos independently and freely. He had 
dedicated his life to this service. This voluntary service made him 
free.
He could realize such independence because the new and revo-
lutionary invention of the printing press liberated him from the 
alternative of serving an individual or collective employer or starv-
ing. After some years of the usual misery as tutor to boys of noble 
families, he finally succeeded in winning the friendship of Aldus 
Manutius [1449–1515] in Venice and of Johann Froben [1460–1527] 
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and Johann Amerbach [1440–1513] in Basel. These printer families 
were scholars and businessmen alike and let Erasmus share in the 
profits of his books and editions. In particular, the Basel printers 
had established their prestige and reputation as Erasmus’s publish-
ers and generously shared their wealth with him. They had made 
the poor and insecure tutor a well-to-do and independent scholar 
whose works were fascinating to the world of learning at the time. 
His followers, the Erasmians, said that he had improved them. They 
felt he had given them the courage to be independent beyond the 
pale of established institutions. They stated that he had delivered 
their spiritual spontaneity, which they turned to social and political 
improvements in the interests of their subjects.
Erasmus was not concerned with philosophical and theological 
ideas and conceptions. Nevertheless, his religious anti-intellectual-
ism and his moral intellectualism made him a forerunner of some 
trends in positivistic and pragmatic philosophies. His main concern 
was, as he frequently stated, a practical one. He desired to prepare 
the intellectual tools that enabled human beings to become free as 
Christians by the experience of learning. This principle made his 
work coherent and logical. It pointed toward a world of free Chris-
tian citizens.
He could have formulated his intention in still a different way. 
He aimed at purifying ecclesiastical, and spiritualizing secular, insti-
tutions in a social situation in which all trends indicated the rapid 
growth of independent political and economic organizations. In such 
a moment, Christians had to make a tremendous effort to keep the 
Christian spirit alive against the pressure of unleashed secular pow-
ers. The hierarchical and aristocratic Church that prayed for the lay-
men could not stem the tide. The responsible Christian thinker and 
teacher had to mobilize Christian people and train them as Chris-
tian soldiers. They had to fight the inner enemy of greed and passions 
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and the outer enemy of lust for power with the weapons of Christian 
ethics and its ascetic requirements. Erasmus had escaped monastic 
orders for many subjective reasons. Objectively, in the trend of his 
inner development, he had to leave in order to democratize spiritual 
aristocracy and the religious division of labor as established by the 
medieval Church. Erasmus states frequently—most emphatically 
in his farewell letter to the Abbot of Steyn—that the whole world 
should become a monastery and that all Christians should live as 
canons and monks in the world of everyday institutions. Erasmus 
conceives of the Christian religion as a way of life. It is a universal 
way of life valid and required for all Christian people. It is an inner-
worldly asceticism that permits the control and overcoming of the 
secular world.
In Erasmus’s vision of a spiritual democracy, various trends of 
religious thinking are merged. He turns the eschatological vision 
of the Franciscan Spirituals into the theory of inner-worldly asceti-
cism. This was postulated by the historical situation, the corruption 
of which is admitted by God in order to invite individual souls to 
improving and proceeding on the road of perfection.
Second, Erasmus shifted the mystical experience of Christ as 
all-pervading logos into the moral principle of the philosophy of 
Christ. The philosophy of Christ is the application of Christ’s moral 
teaching to the problems of social conduct as learned experience. It 
was Erasmus’s sincere conviction that we are able to follow Christ’s 
ideals and to imitate Him in truth and spirit if we consciously affirm 
and understand His yoke as easy. According to Erasmus, charity and 
science are no alternatives but are interdependent upon each other. 
Blind love without knowledge is as impotent as science is without 
spiritual Eros. Erasmus transformed the knowledge of mystical expe-
rience into a theory of social and utilitarian piety that is deeply influ-
enced by the moral intellectualism of Socrates and Plutarch.
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Erasmus’s religion was an effort to ban magic from his path and 
to establish a religion of pure logos, thus opening the road for Huld-
rych Zwingli [1484–1531] and Friedrich Schleiermacher [1768–1834]. 
It seemed to Erasmus that the Church had submitted to the tempta-
tions of monopolistic power and had abused the natural inclinations 
for magic and superstition that will always prevail among the igno-
rant. The Church was, for Erasmus, the model case for exemplifying 
his Law of Degeneracy. This states that all social institutions are sub-
ject to the pressure of their organization. For this reason, Erasmus 
invited Christian people to make use of the wonderful invention of 
the printing press to spread and explain the Gospel and the Epistles. 
This, he thought, will make possible the creation of spiritual democ-
racy in which everybody is called upon to be a theologian because 
everybody will be able to read and to understand the basic verities of 
Christian piety.
Erasmus was aware of the sociological and historical conditions 
and possibilities of Christianity as a way of life for his times. He 
understood that Imitatio Christi could not mean the external mime-
sis of the apostolic lives and of the first communion. Under modern 
conditions, it means inward living: to live in the world as if we did 
not live in it and to turn to the Spirit that makes transparent our 
societal relationships and strengthens our acting and suffering for 
peace and reconciliation as the fundamentals of spiritual life. The 
mystical road leads toward the inward, says Novalis [Georg Philipp 
Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg (1772-1801)], in a truly Erasmian 
spirit.
Erasmus was always aware of social and historical conditions 
of religious attitudes. He objected to Luther’s notion that the times 
of Revelation and of listening to the Holy Ghost are gone. What 
remains is slow progress in the evolution of the understanding of 
Christ’s truth. Christ did not want us to know His overwhelming 
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truth at once. We gain more and more of His wisdom by continu-
ous interpretation and reexamination of documents and texts. Rev-
elation is one and eternal; however, men’s organs for listening and 
understanding are subject to error and deception. For this reason, 
we must see to it that the variety of religious experience makes for 
the whole truth that includes the experience and cognition of the 
heretics.
Erasmus was striving for a spiritual pluralism founded on a few 
basic verities taken for granted by the most antagonistic theologians. 
These verities are the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, Creator 
of the Universe, Logos and Holy Ghost, Christ as Incarnation and 
Logos, both transcendent and immanent; they imply human obliga-
tions to participate in and to contribute to the all-pervading spirit 
of which we are parts. The vision of Erasmus is mystical rather than 
theological, panentheistic rather than pantheistic. However, the 
mystical view is not contemplative, but pragmatic and utilitarian. It 
leads toward a piety of social and democratic action that alone makes 
it possible to establish Christian liberty.
Erasmus, not Luther, coined the term Christian liberty. It indi-
cates the goal of the Christian for which the Christian republic is 
the indispensable condition. The goal is the spiritual sovereignty of 
man, control of Self, and overcoming the world by inner superiority. 
Christian perfection is not different from the ideals of the pagans 
as practiced and described by Socrates, Epictetus, Epicurus, and 
Plutarch. For this reason, Erasmus violently rejects Luther’s radical 
condemnation of everything prior to Christ. “Some have been saved 
under the Natural Law, many under the Law of Moses, most under 
the Law of the Gospel: but salvation is properly due not to any law, 
only to God’s pity through Christ.” Throughout his work, Erasmus 
attempts to understand the God of Abraham and the Christ not as 
historical phenomena that split history into two irreconcilable parts. 
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Erasmus could conceive of religion merely as a universal phenom-
enon. Religion is natural, not historical. It is a constituent element 
of nature, mirrored in human thinking and feeling at all times and 
in all places. It creates everywhere the same ideals and patterns of 
perfection that must spring from the same and identical source of 
the all-pervading logos that is God of Creation, God of mercy, and 
Christ of pity. Erasmus was intrigued by the lives and sublime ideas 
of men like Socrates, Cicero, and Epicurus. If they can rightly be 
called saints, they must have enjoyed the mercy of God and the pity 
of Christ, the Redeemer. For this reason, Erasmus dares to transform 
a historical religion into the natural religion of all times and places.
Erasmus radically opposed Luther. Nobody has a monopoly on 
religious truth; none is justified in practicing fanaticism. If we study 
the true art of piety, we will find that all spiritual roads converge to 
the divine mansion that is all embracing peace and everlasting rec-
onciliation in all religions. How else could it happen that all religions 
postulate the same ideal of perfection: gladness of heart, tranquility 
of mind, and peace of conscience?
Erasmian liberalism is irreconcilable with any kind of Christian 
orthodoxy. To Erasmus, it was the very essence of Christianity. He 
could not be a citizen of a national state; he did not want to be a cos-
mopolitan; he was striving for the citizenship of Civitas Caelestis.
From Antibarbari [originally published in manuscript c. 1489, 
print edition 1520—Eds.] to the posthumously published edition 
of Origen [1536—Eds.], Erasmus pursued the idea that the best 
religion comes to its highest perfection and has its greatest effect 
when supported by the best learning. Best learning is to Erasmus 
the humanities, not philosophy, for the humanities deal with God’s 
manifestations as expressed through and as logos; to Erasmus the 
humanities presented the immediate and spontaneous presence of 
the Divine. This is the inner meaning of his philology.
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Erasmus formulated his position most articulately in the 
prefaces to the Fathers whom he edited or translated into Latin. 
His selection is already indicative. He chose those who, like Jerome 
and Origen, assumed that man is a free intelligence, and that the 
Eros toward God and the Good is inherent in the natural moral 
conscience. These Fathers knew that many approaches lead to God; 
they loved their cotheologians in spite of dissenting opinions. They 
were keenly aware that dogmatic formulations were the product of 
a sociological emergency, strengthened by hostile pressure from 
without and by competing sects from within. Erasmus believed it 
possible to find in their writings his own conviction that faith was 
a way of life rather than a conceptual frame. According to Eras-
mus, the Fathers connected faith and learning in order to be the 
educators of the Christian people, who had the task of turning faith 
into living piety of social action. For this purpose, he unified Chris-
tian faith with pagan spiritualism as the true synthesis of the good 
life.
Saint Ambrose [374–397] had established the ideal of the Chris-
tian educator whose conduct and work should bring social peace. 
“Magnum pondus habet morum integritas, magnam habet auctori-
tatem coniuncta mansuetudini constantia. Plurimum valet eloquen-
tiae copulata prudentia.” [He has moral integrity that carries great 
weight and great authority, coupled with consistent gentleness. He 
has as well great eloquence coupled with prudence.—Eds.] This was 
the ideal Erasmus hoped to realize in his life and work.
It is of no avail to investigate whether Erasmus interpreted the 
Fathers correctly. He certainly did not. He understood them as he 
wanted himself to be understood. He wished to connect Christ and 
Epicurus, Socrates and Paul. His concern was to educate free Chris-
tian citizens and to make the elite devoted servants to the realiza-
tion of Christ in the here and now. In this daring enterprise, he 
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stimulated and promoted all trends toward liberal and democratic 
institutions and patterns of conduct.
Erasmus’s religious position implied three postulates. First, he 
was deeply concerned with the social standards of society and, in 
particular, with the lot of the poor and suffering classes. Second, his 
spiritualism makes possible an analysis of the prevailing social insti-
tutions that is as grim and disillusioned as that of Niccolò Machia-
velli [1469–1527]. Third, his social and utilitarian piety recommends 
the transfer of monastic rules to social institutions in order to create 
the conditions under which Christian liberty could be realized.
Erasmus anticipated the theories of political liberalism by rec-
ognizing society as the bearer of social evolution. Society is the 
sum total of the diverse rational activities of man that make pos-
sible security, well-being, and peace. Farmers, burghers, and urban 
citizens in commerce, industry, and crafts work toward these goals. 
The urban societies are the resources from which the professions 
draw their best and strongest forces. Among urban groups arose 
the enthusiasm for the New Learning. In the urban centers, Eras-
mus found the liberal attitudes that required participation in and 
restriction of political power. He had studied experimentally the 
world of patrician and bourgeois societies in London, Antwerp, and 
other cities. He was intimately associated with the scholar-printers 
of Venice and Basel, to whom he was friend and business partner. 
His practical experience enabled him to compare the new economic 
developments in modern industries, such as printing, with past 
economic institutions and to reconsider the relationships between 
economic societies and the state.
It would be as easy as misleading to understand Erasmus’s 
attitudes as determined by his bourgeois interests and his class 
situation. His piety is, indeed, conditioned by his experience grow-
ing up in the lay mysticism of Dutch urban societies. However, his 
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“vested interests” are the growth of spiritual democracy and the 
progress of intellectual liberty, both united in his Socratic and Chris-
tian piety.
In his analyses of various social strata, Erasmus discloses a defi-
nite sympathy for the poor and lower middle classes for two reasons. 
They are the productive classes whose labors produce the wealth of 
society. There he finds a thoroughly urbanized population, many 
small and middle-sized towns that are well and intelligently admin-
istered, because a steady and moderate well-being prevails in all 
strata of society. This can easily be explained. They are the markets 
for the abundant rural products and import just as many goods as 
are necessary for balancing the prices. Erasmus praises the character 
of these classes. Labor, being the center of their lives, has construc-
tive effects on their conduct and mutual relationships. Labor has an 
“influence on discipline of the individual and on the control of his 
passions.” Labor frequently contributes to making man moderate 
and considerate in his relations to his fellow men. Labor is sacred 
because it is the tool for building up the family. It is sacred because 
it maintains the blessing and happiness of a family by the mutual 
cooperation of husband and wife. Labor is an indispensable device 
of inner-worldly Christianity. It is as relevant as frugality and thrift 
for establishing Christian liberty and for avoiding the pitfalls of 
wealth and luxury for spiritual independence.
Erasmus never ceased to praise such character traits as belong-
ing to the modest middle classes. He was not aware of the political 
implications of his analyses. Throughout his work, he describes the 
societal relationships between husband and wife in a family, between 
friends and partners in business, in such a way that all differences 
in authority and status are eliminated by the emphasis on coopera-
tive labor for realizing religious values. Erasmus suggests a social 
democracy that we could easily call Christian Social Democracy.
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He was much concerned about the political and social situation 
of these groups under the control of disintegrating social classes 
and integrating absolutistic institutions. He was familiar with the 
plight of the peasants and of the urban proletariat. His sympathies 
were with the oppressed, although his reasoning was for preserving 
the status quo. He was of the opinion that a conscientious scholar 
could not recommend a revolution that would serve the progress of 
more cruel and oppressive despotism. However, he longed for the 
renascence of the extinct race of Brutus that had its own distinct 
function in epochs of despotism. Erasmus even recognized bravely 
and frankly, against his own preferences, that revolutions might have 
their own legitimacy in situations of despair.
He watched with deep sympathy the uprising of the peasants and 
the proletariat. He was personally attacked by a French Carthusian 
(December 1524) and by the syndic of the Sorbonne, Noël Beda 
(May 1525), and described as the author of the religious and social 
revolutions. According to these critics, he was responsibile for the 
disintegrating society, because he had spread the libertine spirit of 
humanistic philosophy. He serenely rejected the accusations and 
clearly hinted at the social and political motives at the roots of such 
desperate actions. He had rather impeach the rulers than blame the 
people. He suspected all the time that feudal lords and princes would 
welcome the uprisings as an opportunity for strengthening their 
domination and exploitation. He was keenly aware that the German 
feudal class, in its state of decomposition, would gladly make use of 
all possibilities for overthrowing the wealthy elite of urban societies 
and take over their riches. In this connection, as in his analysis of 
Luther, we find remarkable observations on the German character. 
There he asked himself why the Germans are so much better in vio-
lent punishment of evils than in their prudent prevention.
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In contrast to these sympathetic analyses stands Erasmus’s 
extremely critical description of the bourgeois elite, the patrician, the 
honored rich. Though with Aristotle he recognized that perfect hap-
piness requires a material fortune, he criticized those who praised 
Roman law because it established security in business by regulat-
ing commerce and interest rates. He thought that these commercial 
societies combined daring and reason. The new forms of interest 
seemed to him reasonable, and he did not blame the various groups 
of bankers. He admitted that these men could defend their activities 
with a clear conscience. Christ has forbidden, not clever activity, but 
the tyrannical lust for profit. However, he condemned the daring of 
international commerce as practiced by the patricians of Antwerp, 
for he could study in detail the effects of these emancipated eco-
nomic forces on the common people and could observe everywhere 
the ruthless exploitation of the masses by economic monopolies. He 
complained no less of the free competition in new industries, where 
anyone could undertake an enterprise, and where the law failed to 
protect already existing ones and did not question the need for new 
establishments.
His attitude toward the new world was characteristic of a conser-
vative liberal. On the one hand, he recognized the positive and con-
structive elements in the new urban societies, their efforts to control 
nature and to build a better economic and social world. Anticipating 
Thorstein Veblen [1857–1929], he remarked that the new branches of 
financial and commercial speculation are completely independent of 
the economic needs of the common people, and that they gamble on 
the urgently needed goods of life. This is, in Veblen’s terminology, a 
new leisure class; in Erasmus’s language, it is the most wicked and the 
most honored group of wealthy people—honored by the political elite 
because their wealth is needed to stabilize the rising national state.
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Erasmus was struck by the interrelationship of state and society. 
He saw society splitting into the working classes on the one hand, 
and the strata of economic power joined to the political elites and 
the princes, on the other. He was haunted by such visions and spoke 
of the conspiracy between the nobility and the rich to exploit the 
people and establish an absolute state for the destruction of civil 
liberties. He was fully aware that this unholy union of power and 
wealth would have its implications for foreign affairs. There were too 
many warmongers striving for economic gains and exploiting the 
ideology of the Crusades for profit, for example, by manipulation of 
the sugar market. He drew conclusions from these facts, and, in a 
formula as Marxist as that of Thomas More, he stated that the body 
politic was nothing but a tremendous business machine.
But in spite of complete disillusionment on the trend of political 
evolution, he insisted on government interference in economic and 
social affairs, in order to maintain the lowest level of standards, at 
least, for the common people. It was a main concern of his to protect 
consumers from exploitation by tradesmen who manipulated prices 
in a criminal manner. The state must intervene, for purely utilitarian 
reasons, to prevent violent rebellion. Throughout his works, Eras-
mus demanded control of prices, weights and measures, economic 
combines, market procedures, and quality of food. Without such 
regulation, the situation of the common people would be disastrous.
Equally important to him was a general reform of taxation. From 
1517 to the end of his life, he never ceased to draw the attention 
of the rulers to the continuous threat of revolution implicit in the 
unequal distribution of taxes, most of which were paid by the com-
mon people. He suggested four expedients for the intelligent ruler: 
first, limitation of the expenses of crown and court; second, a heavy 
import tax on luxury goods to be borne by the rich; third, a kind of 
excess profit tax to prevent the concentration of wealth in the hands 
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of the few; and fourth, light taxation of necessary commodities, such 
as bread, wine, beer, and clothing because it is the poor who bear the 
heaviest burden from taxation of consumer goods. And the methods 
employed by the framers of tax laws to enrich themselves aggravate 
that burden. Frequently, Erasmus raised his voice against such un-
just practices.
Attacked by his enemies for infringing upon the authority of the 
emperor, he made a distinction between the rights of a ruler and 
the misdeeds of his administration. He bravely maintained that, in 
absolute monarchies, the people are completely broken by disas-
trous taxation, and called attention to the tradition of the Dutch 
Provinces and Burgundy, where the provincial assemblies must give 
their consent to all taxes. He recalled the fact that Charles V and his 
brother, Ferdinand, had never objected to his independent sugges-
tions on tax reform. In his old age, Erasmus extended his ideas of 
reform still further. In discussing the possibility of war against the 
Turks, he warned the rulers to redistribute the tax burden. The poor, 
being completely exhausted already through monopolies and taxes, 
should not be forced again to bear the entire war tax. This would 
only increase the spirit of revolt. The rulers can appease the masses 
only by introducing radical parsimony in their own economy and 
moderate taxation of ecclesiastical wealth.
Erasmus anticipated modern liberalism by limiting the state to 
the function of integrating, unifying, and protecting the different 
groups of society. The state is a necessary aspect of society. Erasmus 
granted its positive function as long as the body politic remained 
instrumental to establishing the conditions for spiritual liberty. He 
was well aware that such postulates derived merely from spiritual 
hypotheses. He was too well versed in the history of the Roman 
Empire (he had been the editor of the Scriptores Historiae Augustae), 
as well as that of the Church, to have any doubt about the collec-
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tive dynamics of institutions of power. As early as the first edition 
of the Enchiridion, he had established the lex degenerandi for all 
social institutions and described how, necessarily, all institutions 
are subject to the laws of expansion and power in order to maintain 
themselves. As in many other observations, Erasmus set the pattern 
for another liberal from Basel, Jacob B. Burckhardt, in his analysis 
of power.1
For this reason, it is not surprising to see Erasmus, like Machia-
velli, following the classical tradition of political philosophy as estab-
lished by Aristotle and carried on by Polybius [c. 200–c. 118 BC] and 
Cicero (in De Legibus), which proclaimed the mixed constitution or 
the monarchical republic the best political constitution.
The fundamental differences and the final affinities between 
Machiavelli and Erasmus are obvious in the perennial ambivalence 
between state and society. The phenomenon of power was the prin-
ciple of evil for Erasmus, the principle of reality for Machiavelli. The 
fundamental difference from Machiavelli led, however, to the politi-
cal ideal of a limited monarchy or of a mixed constitution. Erasmus, 
the councilor of Charles V, had never failed to express frankly his 
deep contempt for the rule of an absolute monarch. From the Adages 
[1500]2 until his old age and the essay on the Turkish War [1530],3 
he openly proclaimed the irrationality and self-centered character 
of monarchs; he ridiculed the so-called heroic kings of Homer and 
complained of the barbaric temper of modern monarchs who never 
enjoyed a careful education for their responsibilities. The feudal 
classes are no better than the kings. Together, both are eager to exploit 
and destroy the wealth produced by the people’s labor. The dynamics 
of power that do not refer to a frame of spiritual meaning lead again 
and again to the pursuit of unleashed desires and insatiable greed. 
For this reason, Erasmus sees the image of the tyrant as the eternal 
possibility of unlimited monarchies. A tyrant will treat his people as 
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property and make himself absolute master. He will inspire fear and 
breed mutual suspicion. This is despotism. According to Erasmus, 
every sort of despotism degrades human beings and destroys human 
dignity. It is, like anarchy, beyond the pale of political institutions. 
Political control is administration, never domination. Almost liter-
ally, Erasmus presents the thesis of a liberal sociologist, Max Weber, 
that control means administration.
His proposals for checking arbitrariness and despotic tenden-
cies are sociological rather than political or legal. Erasmus is nei-
ther a Machiavelli, nor a Montesquieu, because his main concern 
is not the world of secular institutions, but Res Christiana. Social 
alliances, however, might create a balance of power in the state. He 
suggests, first, that the city states should enter an entente cordiale 
with the industrial classes. Such power might enable them to limit 
the tyranny of the feudal and military classes. Second, he thinks it 
indispensable to restrict political authority by constitutional bonds. 
A mixed constitution is the wisest form of government. It is the wis-
est because it takes into consideration the fundamental mutuality of 
societal relationships and the lasting social problem of reconciling 
the individual with collective institutions. He bases the constitution 
on the mutual consensus of ruler and ruled. Princes and peoples 
should respect each other and rely on mutual good will. By introduc-
ing the idea of mutuality and consensus, Erasmus transfers his idea 
of spiritual democracy to the political plane. Authority and liberty 
should be distributed in such a way among the different social strata 
as to secure the harmony of the whole. For this purpose, intermedi-
ary groups should be organized and local self-government should 
perform political functions.
These suggestions follow classical traditions, as mentioned above. 
They are, however, not bookish but realistic, as were his debunking 
analyses of society and political elite. Machiavelli had referred his 
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mixed constitution to the legal institutions of France. Erasmus could 
have illustrated his idea by describing the autonomous constitution 
of the Dutch Provinces within the Habsburg Empire, as an almost 
independent body politic within the Empire. The executive power 
was in the hands of the Chancellor of Burgundy, who was supported 
and elected by the Councils of State that represented the noble fami-
lies. The General Estates represented the people as a whole. They 
were the delegates of the Provincial states and voted the taxes for 
the whole body politic. Such a system of checks and balances will 
prevent anarchy and tyranny. It follows the general pattern of medi-
eval constitutions that are based on the mutual obligations of rulers 
and Estates. The ruler takes the oath to preserve the liberties and 
rights of the Estates, and these promise to defend the common good. 
When the Dutch revolted against Spain, they acted as true Eras-
mians. Philip II had broken his pledges and, thus, had broken the 
constitutional bonds.
There is still another source of Erasmus’s liberalism. It stems 
from the religious sphere, which is constituted by the lasting inter-
dependence and interaction of ecclesiastical authority and Christian 
liberty of the individuals. Both belong together for securing the con-
tinuous growth of the spiritual life. Here, again, a mixed constitution 
of monarchic, aristocratic, and democratic elements in the organiza-
tion of the ecclesia deeply influenced the thought of Erasmus. The 
institution should see to it that the human being has a fence and 
a guide for coming into his own. The individual should watch the 
objective institutions to prevent their becoming ends in themselves. 
The individual, of course, is not an end in itself, but the representative 
of a Divine meaning whose kingdom the person enlarges by estab-
lishing spiritual liberty. Erasmus’s thought is centered around Res 
Christiana, which sets the pattern for all societal relationships and 
social institutions. Mixed constitution means to Erasmus exactly the 
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political establishment that makes possible the freedom of the spiri-
tual person in his devotion to the religious goods.
It is a specific aspect of Erasmus’s spiritual liberalism that he 
requests the political ruler to establish a pattern of ascetic life as 
most appropriate to his secular position. It is appropriate for very 
pragmatic reasons. The common people have lost respect for the pro-
fessional asceticism of the orders. Widespread are the movements 
of mystical lay piety that preach voluntary asceticism to transform 
Christianity into a general way of life. The prince is the highest rep-
resentative of society whose conduct establishes the consensus of the 
people and the unity of the state. He is subject to the same laws that 
bind his subjects. He is more responsible to the moral laws because 
it was his duty to protect and improve the lot of the common peo-
ple. His is a “secular calvary” in the decisions and actions as ruler. 
For this reason, the Christian prince cannot divide his secular and 
spiritual behavior. The truth of Christ appears in our conduct. It is 
the privilege of the prince to set the pattern of the indivisible unity 
of secular and spiritual life in his ascetic conduct. In his letter to 
Francis I, Erasmus uses the symbol of the two swords for describing 
the duties of rulers. However, he applies the term not in the sense of 
legal delegation. Legal thinking is unfamiliar to Erasmus. He turns 
it to an interpretation that indicates subjective and objective aspects 
of participation in Christ. The ruler who carries the blessed sword is 
obliged to promote the objective goods of Christ as peace, concord, 
reconciliation, and to defend such status. The foremost example of 
Christian liberty is the ruler’s total devotion and subjection to the 
obligations of patriarchal care for his people. This is the objective 
aspect of the spiritual theory of politics. 
There remains the subjective side of the Erasmian theory. Eras-
mus interprets the term as indicating the subjective obligation of 
the ruler to follow Christ. The political ruler should live the Imitatio 
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Christi in order to direct and unite the consensus of ruler and people 
to the spiritual meaning of the organized life of society. Against the 
irrationality of human passions that strive to satisfy individual or 
collective selfishness, Erasmus creates a barrier in a social spiritual-
ism. The ruler as saint is an Erasmian postulate that indicates a new 
trend in the relationship between temporal and spiritual spheres. 
This is no longer the tradition of medieval political philosophy, which 
carefully distinguished political and ecclesiastical realms. Erasmus 
inaugurated a new attitude toward the world. His social spiritualism 
closes the dualism of the medieval world between the spiritual and 
secular areas. It indicates the indissoluble unity of the religious and 
temporal as integrated by the practical Christ in all social institu-
tions. Princes, clergy, and the Christian people are one republic, not 
a hierarchy. This world is a republic because Christ is the center of the 
social whole and integrates the varieties of functions into the unity 
of living action of society. All members of the republic should refer 
their tasks to the living spirit of Christ, which is peace, concord, and 
reconciliation. It is Erasmus’s main concern to point out that peace is 
the telos of divine creation because it is the inner meaning of Christ 
and logos alike. Peace is never a social status, but a lasting process, 
a problem that all groups have to solve again and again. Erasmus 
has illuminated the condition for peace on all levels of society. He 
analyses relationships among friends, husband and wife, dissenting 
clergy, rulers and ruled. In all cases, he comes to the conclusion that 
peace can be established when enough prudence and wisdom make 
possible sympathetic understanding. This can be created by that part 
of the relationship that is capable of the stronger educational Eros.
For this reason, Erasmus turned all social and political analyses 
to the problems of war and peace as the fundamental problems of 
individual and collective relationships. He dealt with the problem 
of war and peace in church, state, and social institutions. He rec-
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ognized three valid motives for going to war in an emergency situ-
ation. He protested violently against the charge of having preached 
total pacifism. He never ceased investigating the causes and motives 
that disturb peace and produce wars. In these analyses, he is as 
cautious and disillusioned as in the analyses of social and politi-
cal institutions. He admits a strictly defensive war in order to repel 
invaders. He reluctantly grants the war against the Turks if it serves 
the purpose of protecting the survival of Christian civilization, or 
of spreading the Christian religion. For this reason, he develops a 
third category, which he takes seriously, although he seems to limit it 
to pre-Christian societies. He speaks of the war of civilized nations 
against barbarians as legitimate political action. He refers to pagan 
emperors who fought easy and nonbloody wars and improved the 
social and economic conditions of the conquered. Sometimes their 
clemency reconciled the vanquished and raised their standards.
He mentions the last category mainly in order to remark that 
these three cases did not play any role among the Christian princes 
during the preceding two decades. He classified the actual motives 
leading toward military conflict between states. 
1. There are always personal motives among the 
rulers that still play an important role. Glory and 
prestige of the monarchs, personal superiority and 
pride, inferiority and anger frequently contribute to 
producing war. 
2. There are vested interests among the advisors of 
kings to drive toward war; the military and young 
courtiers who want to make their careers, will 
always favor war. 
3. There are the legal advisors and the learned 
statesmen who reinterpret treaties and alliances 
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again and again. They are possessed by the idea of 
expansion, which is more an expression of fear and 
insecurity than of strength and competition. He 
knows, although he does not formulate it, that these 
men are subject to the logic of the body politic. They 
contend that laws of nature, laws of society, cus-
tom, and usage compel them to repel force by force 
and defend life, and money, too, which is, to some 
persons, as dear as life. Erasmus is willing to grant 
such arguments as valid for pagan statesmen. He 
rejects them for the Christian world. He refuses to 
acknowledge the logic and necessity of expansion. 
This is a never-ending process if taken as neces-
sary. He wishes to reduce the pragma of power to 
psychological motives of fear, anger, and ambition. 
However, he sees very clearly that there are motives 
that cannot be reduced to individual psychology. 
4. The elite wage war for social reasons in order to 
break the unity of society and oppress and exploit it 
without resistance. 
5. Similarly, the establishment of despotism is best 
secured by a victorious war that increases the mate-
rial and moral power of the ruler and of the mili-
tary. These domestic reasons cannot be reduced to 
individual psychology. They are truly sociological 
motives. 
6. Finally, he sees that rich and prosperous adminis-
trations and flourishing societies attract war-loving 
neighbors, as did France twice in twelve years.
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Erasmus derived his critical analysis from a comprehensive obser-
vation of his world. He was well acquainted with rulers and their 
councilors—many Erasmians were in leading positions and gave 
him information about matters of state that he was eager to receive. 
This material made him as disillusioned about the ways of politics as 
the statesmen who have practiced them. Actually, he developed all 
the sociological theories on military expansion that have been elabo-
rated scientifically since the development of separate social sciences.
Erasmus was not a defeatist, in spite of his conviction that the 
autonomous state is evil in itself. He was certainly not an optimistic 
man of the Enlightenment, as he is frequently presented. He was a 
reformer, nevertheless, though he never believed that his political 
and social treatises would have any influence on the princes and 
rulers to whom they were addressed. However, he was well aware 
that his opinions, made public, would strengthen the position and 
action of the learned councilors and civil statesmen to come to a fair 
deal by compromise. The sociologist might remark that one of his 
evolutionary accomplishments was the establishment of a kind of 
public opinion among the learned and educated classes, a remark-
able contribution to democracy. This is conspicuous in his various 
suggestions on avoiding war and establishing firm and permanent 
peace. These ideas range from reconsidering legal and political hab-
its to manipulating public opinion and to elevating the sentiments of 
the common people.
First, he detests the role of jurists in the conduct of foreign 
affairs. They abuse the spirit of law by distorting its letter, and they 
are not afraid of forging documents in making legal claims. They 
have completely submitted to the political rulers. They applied the 
legal formulations of treaties to disguise their true purposes and 
providing for future claims. They rationalize fear and suspicion in 
such documents. For this reason, Erasmus desires the utmost limi-
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tation of treaties and alliances because of their psychological effects 
on mutual feelings of insecurity. Second, he holds one specific type of 
treaty responsible for many wars and condemns political marriages. 
Again and again, these contracts lead to conflict on succession and 
inheritance rights; hence, he wishes them abolished. Third, he would 
like to see the princes surrounded by learned and responsible civil-
ians, who would be able to check the influence of ambitious generals 
and of young courtiers, who are always in favor of war for advancing 
their careers. Such advisors could turn the royal good will toward 
the social and economic problems of the people, the improvement 
of which would have its effect on the economic power of the state. 
Thus, the princes would discover that inner prosperity is preferable 
to outer adventure.
Erasmus’s most serious proposal is the postulate that no war 
should be waged that has not the full and unanimous consent of 
the people. This is most indicative of his political stand that is so 
frequently misinterpreted. Even if “people” does not mean the mod-
ern mass democracy, it means, at least, all political assemblies of the 
Estates, which would be a democratic device for the sixteenth cen-
tury anyway. These suggestions are constructive. They are followed 
by some negative recommendations that imply the positive attitude. 
If war is inescapable, it should be conducted in such a way that the 
severest calamities may fall upon the leader of those who gave the 
occasion. Repeatedly, he states that in war the innocent and peaceful 
suffer most: landholders and tradesmen, manufacturers and hus-
bandmen. People who have vested interests in war, however, such 
as courtiers, kings, bankers, remain in safety and get rich. They are 
eager to forget that one can buy peace if one invests in just causes and 
compromises with an unjust enemy in order to preserve the well-
being and the future progress of the people.
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Erasmus is aroused by the techniques of propaganda that the 
warmongers use to incite the common people and to create hatred 
against enemies. He resents the idol of national glory. He takes it for 
granted that people everywhere accept their habits and mores as nat-
ural and those of the foreigner as funny and strange. But he knows, 
as well, that people do not necessarily draw the conclusion that they 
are superior to others. Common people everywhere know that they 
live in a communion of suffering under the bad will of their rulers. 
Kings and their courtiers invented the phantom of national glory 
that is the identification of their vain ambitions with the destiny of 
peace loving people. Erasmus is too sensitive a scholar of language 
not to be shocked by its manipulation for inflaming the sentiments 
of the common people. He mentions one specific case that antici-
pates Nazi methods against France and England, and was probably 
used by the Spanish-Dutch bureaucracy for breaking the national 
unity of France. These warmongers addressed the civil populations 
of some northwestern French areas and attempted to confuse the 
inhabitants by recalling their historical origins and calling them 
Germans. He despises this kind of warfare and demands its abolish-
ment. He revolts against making peace-loving common people the 
victims of sophisticated official warmongers and propaganda chiefs. 
His formulation leads to contemporary content analysis:
Such is the depravity of their minds that they seek occa-
sions of difference where none is afforded either by nature 
or institution. They would divide France against herself, 
in verbal and nominal distinctions of the inhabitants, a 
country which is not divided by seas or mountains, and 
is one and indivisible, however men endeavor to carve 
divisions into it by distinctions merely nominal. Thus 
some of the French they will denominate Germans, lest 
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the circumstances of identity of name should produce 
that unanimity which they diabolically wish to interrupt.
Finally, Erasmus turns his critical suggestions on Church and 
clergy, whose behavior was the hardest blow to a sincere educa-
tor of mankind, as Erasmus was. Popes and high dignitaries of the 
Church waged war and instigated military conflicts instead of rec-
onciling the adversaries. Young priests, like courtiers, were anx-
ious to become army chaplains in order to be promoted. Without 
legal coercion, they completely submitted to the state and preached 
Christ on either side of the fence. Erasmus explains this perverse 
phenomenon by a sociological analysis. The Church has become 
the victim of its own imperialistic control over the political world 
as a body politic. The clergy could not avoid intercourse with the 
world; it could not escape accumulating and hoarding the goods 
that the world values. In this process, the men of the Church have 
gradually adopted the manners of the world, even in the retreat of 
the monastic orders, where antagonistic “vested interests” clash with 
each other and raise violent conflicts among Christian institutions. 
Erasmus never forgot the experience at Bologna when he saw the tri-
umphant entrance of victorious Julius II [1443–1513], the “Warrior 
Pope,” clad in shining armor. The urgent duty of pope and clergy 
is to relinquish confounding temporal and spiritual values, to work 
continuously for realizing the Christian League, and to offer their 
disinterested services as arbitrators. This suggestion refers to the 
Holy See and the diplomacy of the higher clergy.
Erasmus offered yet two more suggestions that pertain to the 
national clergy in the independent states. He was convinced that 
people and rulers would be deeply shocked and would reconsider 
waging war if the respective clergies would refuse burial in conse-
crated grounds to those slain in battle, instead of blessing their arms. 
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The clergy should see to it that they debunk military romanticism 
and national vanity. They could do it easily if they would refuse reli-
gious blessings to the trophies of war.
Clergy do not hesitate to hang up flags, standards, ban-
ners and other trophies of war, brought from the field of 
carnage as ornaments of churches. . . . These trophies . . . 
all stained and smeared with the blood of men for whom 
Christ shed his blood, are hung in the churches among 
the tombs and images of apostles and martyrs as if in 
future it were to be reckoned a mark of sanctity not to 
suffer martyrdom but to inflict it, not to lay down one’s 
own life for the truth, but to take the lives of others for 
worldly purposes of vanity and avarice. It would be quite 
sufficient if the bloody rags were hung in some corner of 
the Exchange.
These propositions indicate Erasmus’s will to contribute prag-
matically to the fundamental problems of war and peace. He stated 
time and again that his relativistic pacifism was a constituent of his 
political thought and of his spiritual doctrine of man. The question 
of war is primarily a moral and human—not a legal—phenomenon. 
As compared to an unjust peace, the just war is hell, for war is the 
most atrocious of all crimes. It corrupts all moral and religious 
standards among victors and vanquished alike, and it is an eco-
nomic disaster for both. Finally, it is the most terrible calamity for 
the common people, for whom Christ shed his blood as much as 
for the rich and the princes. For this reason, the sublime rulers and 
sympathetic princes should overlook offenses and injuries in order 
not to jeopardize the tranquility and well-being of their subjects. 
They are well aware that, in a Christian world, there is not domina-
tion, but patriarchal administration. Ruler and people are united 
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by mutual confidence and trust, because they live in the orbit of 
Christian liberty to which every human being is called. Spiritual 
democracy is the basis for political democracy.
The analyses of various social strata illuminate his religious con-
cern. According to Erasmus, it is primarily a spiritual responsibility 
of the ruling elite to secure standards of life for the middle classes 
that make it possible to realize the Christian way of life. It must be 
emphasized that Erasmus prescribes as religious duty what medieval 
authors considered political obligations. It is, of course, correct to 
say that all social rules—as they appear in Erasmus—focus on past 
philosophical treatises. However, the frame of reference has changed. 
Erasmus rejects the division of labor between laity and ecclesia. Laity 
will cooperate in establishing Christ’s teaching and image in the here 
and now, and in the routine of everyday life. This implies an organiza-
tion of society in which elements of democracy are inevitable, what-
ever may be the distribution of status and authority.
His analyses of the state of societies and of their political institu-
tions led him to the conclusion that they were rushing toward new 
kinds of coercive organizations. He characterized them as victims 
of the strongest organized power, such as princes wealthy enough to 
hire powerful armies with which to establish a military despotism. 
This will be, he thought, the end of political and civil liberties, of 
the authority of Estates, and of political consensus. This is not any 
longer a body politic, because any kind of despotism is, like anarchy, 
beyond the pale of rational political constitutions. Such a modern 
type of government can only be compared to the Roman principate 
[27 BC–284 AD] and the regime of the barrack emperors.
He summarized his findings on the grim logic of the autonomy 
of social institutions and of collective pressure in a grave statement 
that is totally different from the serene discovery of this sociological 
rule in the Praise of Folly. It is significant that he made this remark 
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in a theological commentary: “Habet et hic mundus ordinem suum 
quam non expedit a nobis perturbari.” [“This world has an order all 
its own, which is not good for us to disturb.”—Eds.]
Erasmus is never mentioned in textbooks on history of political 
and social ideas. This can be justified because his main concern was 
Res Christiana, which meant to him the merging and unifying of 
spiritual and social spheres and the establishment of Christianity as 
a way of life leading toward Christian liberty. This last heroic effort 
of the Christian world was finally defeated in the Puritan Revolution. 
What remained were the elements of political and social thought 
that are the foundations of modern democracy and liberalism.
For this reason, one regrets that modern histories of social ideas 
still remain silent on Erasmus and Social Spiritualism. This is a grave 
omission, for Erasmus makes evident that democratic and indi-
vidual liberties from despotism are constructive merely as freedom 
to serve supreme goods and spiritual ideals. Erasmus knew that all 
social institutions may easily turn to despotic practices when bro-
ken loose from a philosophical or spiritual frame of reference. He 
was imbued with the spirit of social spiritualism. Erasmus’s Social 
Spiritualism was not a pattern of Utopian thinking. Rather was it 
the proposition of reform—quand même! He called upon individual 
souls to change; he did not trust a general transformation of social 
institutions.
Hence, Erasmus was not a political philosopher at all. What, 
then, was his field and contribution? He had refused to be called a 
theologian, and he was not a philosopher. He wanted to be a philolo-
gist and educator. As lover of logos, Erasmus felt himself to be in the 
service of God and Christ, who are all pervading logos. He served 
society by preparing youth for listening to the logos in themselves 
and for taking it as tradition and learning. He explicitly distin-
guished his calling from that of a scholar. The scholar is concerned 
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with establishing truth for the sake of truth among fellow scholars. 
The educator is called upon to spread truth for the sake of its effects 
on our lives. Erasmus considered its improving effects on human 
minds. He did not mean “moral improvement” in a narrow sense. 
As lover of logos, the educator should see to it that his students were 
enlightened on their social obligations and illuminated on their 
spiritual responsibilities. As a Christian Socrates, Erasmus was con-
vinced that understanding these truths meant realizing them in our 
very lives. Moral and spiritual learning as a way of life lead to Chris-
tian liberty, tranquility of mind, and peace of conscience—ideals of 
human perfection on which pagans and Christians agree, Epicurus 
and Christ.
Education opens the avenues to this goal. For this reason, all 
social institutions are to be transformed into institutes of education. 
Church, state, and family are schools on various planes of living that 
should elaborate their respective logoi and stimulate the participa-
tion of all who share in the all-pervading logos. Thus, the content 
of history is the Education of Mankind. From Erasmus, there is a 
straight road that leads to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing [1729–1781].
However, there is no universal law of progress. Progress remains 
a lasting tradition of learning and interpretation. It coexists with 
the lasting lex degenerandi in all social institutions. It has no lasting 
effect in transforming society. Human nature will remain the same: 
never will Pharisee-ism die out; never will the freedom of the Gospel 
not be attacked by ecclesiastics; never will the world stop persecut-
ing the saints to the end of the world; never will pious and sincere 
people be more than a tiny flock.
The world of institutions is evil. Perfection is possible for the 
individual soul dedicated to the imitation of Christ and Socrates, 
through whom he participates in a larger whole. For those souls, 
democratic institutions must exist in church and state in order to 
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open the avenues to Christian people who are not afraid to take 
upon themselves the hardships of learning and the adventures of 
knowing for the sake of realizing Christian liberty.
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3
 Humanistic Contributions  
to Public Health 
As soon as the ruling groups of a society are aware of the epidemic 
character of a disease, they will attempt to prevent its spread in order 
to protect their society. Since 1936, for instance, the United States 
Surgeon General has made great efforts to enlighten the American 
public about the dangers of syphilis.1 The surgeon general’s cam-
paign against the disease led to many practical steps that helped 
check its spread, especially since the Second World War.
The most important points of the surgeon general’s campaign 
were as follows:
1. There should be a public health staff to deal with 
syphilis. 
2. State laws should require (at a minimum) report-
ing of cases, follow-up of victims’ illness, and the 
search for the sexual contacts that led to infection. 
3. Premarital medical certificates should be a legal 
requirement. 
Previously unpublished. Undated manuscript located in file on Albert Salomon, 
Leo Baeck Institute, New York, New York. Published by permission from Leo Baeck 
Institute.
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4. Treatment facilities should be of good quality, 
including providing hospital beds to victims. Every 
pregnant woman who is infected must be treated to 
prevent infected offspring. 
5. This public education program must be persis-
tent, intensive, and aimed especially at the age group 
when syphilis is most frequently acquired.  
Men of the Renaissance postulated all of the regulations—both 
preventive and remedial—contained in the surgeon general’s pro-
gram. This underlines the realistic trend in the Renaissance, a gen-
eral intellectual movement in the Western world. New realism means 
to rely on the minutest observation of man in society, instead of rely-
ing on traditional authorities, ecclesiastical and philosophical alike. 
The famous statement by Niccolò Machiavelli [1469–1527]—that we 
are not interested in knowing what man ought to be, but what he 
actually is—indicates this trend toward realism. The same realism 
is conspicuous among some religious thinkers, like Martin Luther 
[1483–1546] and Desiderius Erasmus [1466–1536], who violently 
criticized the practical policies and administration of the Church as 
irreconcilable with its ideas.
Erasmus was not only a religious thinker. All humanists shared in 
the realistic movement. They all wished to recognize the very nature 
of human behavior and of societal relationships as they developed 
out of human nature, not as postulated by theological and moral phi-
losophies. The medical profession could not remain untouched by 
such general thought. So, it is not strange that we find a lively inter-
est in problems of medicine and public health among the humanists 
of Italy, France, and the countries around the Rhine. One of the chief 
concerns was the problem of a new epidemic—whether it was new 
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or had been latent does not concern us here—that had spread within 
ten years after 1494 all over the world.2
The period in which the new realism came into being was similar 
to our own. It was a time of radical change. Technological inven-
tions (like gunpowder, the printing press, and the discovery of the 
New World), the claims of sovereignty by the national states, and the 
resulting wars and the national revolt against the universal Church 
made possible the state of mind that was critical against all traditions 
and authorities.
The life and work of Erasmus is one of the liveliest images of 
this situation in the Renaissance. Erasmus is known as a humanist 
who dedicated his life to establishing a pattern of Christian piety 
that stressed religion as a way of life. The truth of religion should 
be verified by the conduct of men and their mutual relationships. 
For this reason, Erasmus, who is supposed to have been an ivory-
tower humanist, was deeply concerned to investigate the conditions 
of man in social, political, and economic affairs. Because Erasmus 
was worried about the gap between his ideas of Christian living and 
actual social reality, he was one of the few humanists who attacked 
vigorously the problem of public health in the years in which syphilis 
spread all over Europe. He does not deal with this problem in a sys-
tematic way in his work. But we find over and over again—in Lingua, 
Consultatio de bello Turcico, and in his Colloquia—passages that dis-
close how much he was alarmed by the contagious character of the 
disease and reflections about its causes, effects, and possible modes 
of prevention. In particular, there are many passages about syphilis 
in his Colloquia, principally dialogues that look at the same objects 
from many sides. He used these for teaching Latin to young students 
because he believed that Latin should be a living, not a dead, lan-
guage and that the boys should be able to discuss current problems 
of general interest. 
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It is thought that Erasmus himself suffered from syphilis.3 
According to his description, only peasants are relatively free from 
the disease. The ruling groups, who should be especially careful 
about health concerns, along with the urban population, the mili-
tary, and the clergy, all think it fashionable to be afflicted with this 
disease. Because of his exact knowledge of syphilis, Erasmus con-
cludes that it is worse than all other epidemics. He warns that the 
“pox,” as syphilis came to be called, is more infectious and destruc-
tive than the worst of leprosy. He notes that the disease invades sud-
denly and sometimes has a long incubation, and other times kills 
quickly, while leprosy will allow its victims to live to extreme old age. 
What illness, besides syphilis, sticks so strongly or repulses more 
stubbornly the art and cure of the physicians, Erasmus queries in 
the Lingua in 1525. There, he gives a masterly, drastic description of 
a syphilitic in the tertiary stage: the snub nose, dragging of one leg, 
itchy hands, stinking breath, heavy eyes, running nose and ears. It 
is clear to him that the main cause of spreading this disease is dis-
sipation and sexual intercourse, as he says in the Epicurean: “When 
young men by whoring, as it commonly falls out, get the pox, by 
which they are often brought to death’s door in their lifetime, and 
carry about a dead carcass.”
It is a characteristic feature of Erasmus’s minute observations 
that he understands very well that there are many other ways of get-
ting infected: by kissing, drinking out of the same cup, sleeping in 
the same bed with an afflicted person, using the sheets in which an 
afflicted person has lain, by the touch of the finger, and by using the 
scissors or comb of barbers who have trimmed someone with the 
disease. 
Erasmus is not satisfied to describe the phenomenon but is eager 
to ask for laws to prevent the spreading of the disease. Although the 
passages mentioned demonstrate his keen and provoking observa-
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tions, he indicates that his novel idea is very modest indeed. He sim-
ply suggests applying to syphilis rules widely extant in Europe since 
the epidemics of leprosy and plague in the fourteenth century, some 
of them going back to Leviticus 13:45. He states that the same care 
ought to be taken to prevent so fatal an evil as syphilis, as did the 
Italians in the case of leprosy. “It is an act of piety to take care of the 
public good at the inconvenience of a few.” At the end of the four-
teenth century in the Netherlands, one finds in the Regulae Techni-
cae Contra Pestilentium: “De quibus patet, quod vestes morientium 
non debent subito vendi . . . sic securius esset omnia combuere quam 
vendere, ut saepius fit in Italia in principiis pestilentiae.”4 One also 
finds the Edict of Aberdeen in 1497: “To avoid the infirmity cumm 
out of Franche and foreign parts that all licht weman are ordered to 
desist their vices and sin of venerie, that their houses are closed, that 
they have to work for their living under the pain of being branded 
with a hot iron on their cheeks and banished from the town. . . . 
That diligent inquisition be taken of all infected persons with this 
strange seiknes of Nappilis for the safety of the town and that the 
persons infected therwith be chargit to keip them in their houses 
and out of places from the healthy folks.” Another sanitary ordi-
nance forbids the folks infested with “seikenes of Nappilis to be seen 
at slaughterhouses, butcher-houses, bakeries, breweries, dairies, for 
the safety of the town. The persones infected should stay quietly in 
their houses . . . till they are healed, not to infect their neighbors.” 
Also, the Edinburgh edict of 1497 includes the reference: “. . . as all 
infected persons within the freedom of this burgh brought upon the 
island of Leith and . . . furnished with victuals till God proved they 
were healthy.”5
Erasmus also proposes a constructive program of public health 
initiatives. In spite of his liberal ideas on political constitution, he 
remains medieval in his suggestion to make the state the bearer of 
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a public health administration and accompanying legislation. His 
proposals are perfectly in line with our contemporary thinking. He 
strongly suggests establishing a law that prevents syphilitics from 
marrying. In the event that one has knowingly married a syphilitic, 
he urges both partners to be banished from society. He invites the 
Holy See to annul such marriages that were based on the lie of one 
partner that he or she was in good health. He repeatedly insists that 
states enact such legislation, stating that marriage and procreation 
are not the private affairs of citizens. Health is indeed a public affair 
and the state should take care that children born from a union are 
healthy. He grimly compares the thoughtlessness and carelessness 
of men, in regard to their offspring, with the painstaking trouble 
they take to breed noble horses, dogs, and healthy pigs. Erasmus 
blames and explains such thoughtfulness as deriving from the 
ineradicable greed of men to advance on the social ladder of status 
and prestige regardless of the price their children have to pay. In the 
dialogue, Unequal Marriage, he describes as a typical case the tragic 
lot of a young, beautiful, intelligent girl married to an old, but titled, 
syphilitic.  
Although Erasmus was in the avant-garde on this issue, he was 
not alone in his fight. His fellow humanist, sometime friend and later 
enemy, Ulrich von Hutten [1488–1523]—German scholar, poet, and 
satirist—gave a remarkable description of the symptoms and cure 
of syphilis. Still more remarkable is his analysis of the reasons that 
different contemporary groups give for the outbreak of the disease: 
According to the theologians, God has disseminated 
this malady in anger and in order to punish creatures 
whose vices have outraged His Majesty. The priests have 
preached these doctrines from the pulpit, as though they 
have been revealed to them by the Almighty. . . . The 
conduct of the physicians has been similar to that of the 
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priests and instead of searching for remedies that might 
cure, they have fled from the presence of the people who 
have been stricken with this illness and have restrained 
from touching them. . . . For a long time, the matter of 
occult causation has been discussed by physicians and is 
far from being solved. There is an extreme divergence of 
sentiment and that they are in accord on one point alone 
is easy to understand. Some affirm, in these unfortunate 
times, that the air suddenly charges itself with miasmas 
and that impure wind has corrupted the waters. . . . The 
astrologers, who pretend to explain everything by the 
movements of the stars, trace the epidemic to the con-
junction of Mars and Saturn. . . . These savants, in partic-
ular, who consulted the stars, predicted that the scourge 
would last only seven years, but they made a profound 
mistake. Had they announced that over this period the 
malady would disappear, or at least its symptoms would 
disappear in an individual who had contracted the dis-
ease, they would have been correct. Furthermore, they 
would not have been wrong had they stated that the viru-
lence and contagion of the disease would lose their initial 
intensity. . . . The virus persists, still dangerous, but its 
effects are less rapid. . . . At this moment, no one contracts 
this malady unless exposed to it directly. The disease in 
general is caught by sexual contact with women who have 
venomous poison in their secret places, being very dan-
gerous for those who meddle with them. Sickness got by 
such congress with such infected women is so much the 
more vehement how much they be inwardly infected. 
Children and old people are more rarely infected. 
Hutten also stated, “This disease not longe after its beginning entered 
into Germania, where it wandered more largely than in any other 
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place: Which thynge I do ascribe to our intemperance.” He con-
tinued: “Many physicians advance the theory that the malady was 
engendered by an internal tainted principle, by corrupted humors, 
melancholic dissicatedness, by yellow bile or by phlegm that had 
been burned or salted. . . . Other physicians, without entering into a 
thorough explanation, are contented to tell us that the scourge is an 
infection caused by the corruption of the blood.” So wrote Hutton in 
1519.6 He died of the disease in 1523. 
It is interesting to note that the Italian poet, Girolamo Fracas-
toro [1478–1553], wrote two works about syphilis. His famous epic 
poem, Syphilis sive morbus gallicus [1530], still clings to the tradi-
tions based on the traditions of Hippocrates [460–370 BC], the Ara-
bic physicians, and Galen [Aelius Galenus (129–200)]. Whereas in De 
Contagione et Contagiosis Morbis, Fracastoro saw clearly in 1546 that 
syphilis was contracted by the union of the sexes and that a suckling 
would contract the malady from an infected wet-nurse or that a child 
who happened to have the disease would give it to her. 
William Clowes [1540–1604], a well-known London surgeon, 
attributes part of his knowledge concerning syphilis to Ambroise 
Paré [1510–1590], the royal surgeon for several French kings.7 In his 
Profitable and Necessarie Booke of Obseruations,8 Clowes gives case 
histories of persons who had no signs of syphilis at those parts of the 
body that are the most suspicious and most speedily infected. He 
talks, for instance, about a young girl of twelve years of age with hard 
swellings and ulcers that corrupted her bones. He ponders whether 
she got the sickness from infected parents or whether it was caused 
by sucking the milk of an infected nurse, a correct observation 
mixed with humoral philosophy. Another remarkable observation 
of Clowes: three cases of good and honest midwives infected with the 
disease by bringing abed three infected women. He also reports that 
one infected wet-nurse gave syphilis to a whole family. The husband 
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had granted his most chaste wife’s desire to nurse her newborn child 
on the condition that a nurse should share in her trouble and pains. 
The nurse infected the child, the child the mother, the mother the 
husband, and the two other children whom he had daily at his table 
and bed. 
[Salomon’s essay ends with a reiteration of his original argument 
that humanistic thinkers anticipated the main postulates of the 
much later public campaign (1936) to combat syphilis. We wish to 
note that Salomon’s main point in making his case is his insistence 
that the humanistic thinkers that most concerned him were utterly 
devoted, first and foremost, to immediate social realities as they 
observed them.—Eds.] 
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4
 Hugo Grotius 
and the Social Sciences 
To commemorate a great scholar and his work does not mean to dust 
off a statue in the museum of cultural history. Rather, the student’s 
duty is to see to it that the images of scholarship are reinterpreted 
again and again, in order to preserve the perpetual presence of the 
living spirit. Such reconsideration of the past makes it possible to 
examine the active forces in our own scientific efforts.
The social scientist who wishes to contribute to such a reexami-
nation of the work of Hugo Grotius [1583–1645] and to justify his 
own intrusion into the domain of jurisprudence feels inclined to 
begin with a famous quotation. This old saying goes: “Boys read Ter-
ence one way, Grotius another way.” The social scientist may even 
expand the statement by adding that the readers of Grotius have 
understood him differently in different periods. It is the variety of 
these interpretations that permits the social scientist to add to his 
understanding of the great jurist’s achievement, as a modest contri-
bution to the comprehensive character of Grotius and to the origin 
of the social sciences.
We are accustomed to identifying the name of Grotius with his 
On the Law of War and Peace [De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625)]. Actu-
Published originally in a slightly different form in Political Science Quarterly 62 
(March 1947), 62–81. Republished by permission from Political Science Quarterly.
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ally, the man exercised a much wider influence by his book on Dutch 
jurisprudence (still in use in English law schools), by his theological 
and exegetic writings, and by his religious poetry, which was dear to 
Milton. Nevertheless, the social scientist will necessarily restrict his 
consideration to Grotius’s most famous book, which has exercised a 
powerful influence in the rise of the social sciences.
As a result of this book and of the Thirty Years’ War [1618–1648], 
the Elector of the Palatinate established a chair of Natural Law and 
the Law of Nations at Heidelberg in 1661. He called Samuel von 
Pufendorf [1632–1694] to teach this subject. Pufendorf believed 
himself to be the true successor to Grotius, whom he had called 
“the founder of natural law.” The formula should indicate that 
Grotius had succeeded in separating the study of moral and social 
norms from the religious sphere and in establishing a secular sci-
ence of social behavior. Pufendorf, still close to Grotius’s influence, 
remarkably distorts the meaning of the master’s work. He attributes 
a merit to Grotius that belongs to Thomas Hobbes [1588–1679], 
whose anthropological theories were shared by Pufendorf. This 
misinterpretation, however, had both a positive and negative effect. 
The negative result was the never-ending repetition of Pufendorf ’s 
thesis that Grotius had succeeded in secularizing natural law. The 
positive consequence was that Pufendorf introduced Law of War 
and Peace as a textbook in the classes on natural law. Many rulers 
followed the example set by the ruler of Heidelberg. Chairs of natu-
ral law were established in the Protestant countries, and the pro-
fessors, imitating Pufendorf, introduced Grotius’s book as required 
reading. Thus, it became a stimulus to the rise of liberal and social 
thinking. In the reformed Scottish universities, the treatise had 
suggested the organization of the required courses in moral phi-
losophy as natural theology, natural law, ethics, and politics. Adam 
Smith gratefully recognized his indebtedness to Grotius. In France, 
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Grotius was still a living force to Montesquieu and to some authors 
of the Encyclopédie.
During the nineteenth century, the book was restricted to the law 
schools. It is difficult for us to hear the overtones of deep satisfac-
tion in the statement of the Napoleon of historicism, Hegel, when he 
wrote: “Nobody reads it any more.” In the hands of students of con-
stitutional and international law, the older comprehensive frame of 
reference was slowly vanishing. The specialized and positive jurists 
began to complain of puristic deficiencies, of a relapse as compared 
to Johannes Althusius [1563–1638], and of the ambiguity of Grotius’s 
legal and sociological concepts. In particular, after the end of the 
First World War, the students of international law believed that they 
had found a description of international institutions in the treatise. 
In 1946, after the shock of the Second World War, and equipped 
with more articulate tools—such as formal and interpretive sociolo-
gies, Gestalt psychology, and phenomenology—the social scientist 
reopens the book and reads the title On the Law of War and Peace, 
three books in which the Law of Nature and of Nations and the prin-
ciples of constitutional law are explained. Obviously, Grotius has 
written a book on natural law with the emphasis on the legalization 
of war.
The social scientist is primarily concerned with the aspect of the 
book that was lost in the epoch of historicism—all the more when he 
sees his own task as that of reestablishing natural law with the tools 
of modern science and philosophy. Purposely, he must exclude the 
topics that the jurist and the political scientist will emphasize. He 
has to neglect the theory of sovereignty, the classification of just and 
unjust wars, and the elaborate systematization of the rules of mili-
tary action in their positive legal connotation.
The social scientist will refer to the interpretation that Grotius 
has presented as to the unique character of the book and its meaning 
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for his time. Grotius insists on the novelty and keenness of his enter-
prise. His is not a theoretical, but a practical, concern. He endeavors 
to give a thorough and catholic presentation of the patterns and atti-
tudes of man in society as a handbook for the intelligent ruler and 
statesman. His work is supposed to be a clarification and systemati-
zation of a plurality of legal, moral, and theological ways of dealing 
with human nature. He reproaches the juristic theologians and the 
theological moralists with having confused the different spheres of 
the law and with not having distinguished the sequence and order 
of norms that establish rights and obligations. They have made the 
mistake, according to Grotius, of having used the positive laws of the 
state to establish sweeping generalizations and precarious systems. 
They have failed to see the arbitrary and specific character of most 
laws that are established by the body politic. On the other hand, they 
have neglected the tremendous material that history offers to the 
scholar engaged in the study of the constancy of man in the variety 
of his historical guises. Grotius will use his encyclopedic, historical, 
and juristic knowledge to avoid their mistakes. He will rediscover 
the potential “common sense of mankind” as the enduring sympa-
thetic consciousness of the inner normativity of human nature what-
ever may be the changing conditions in time and space. He will help 
to preserve it by illuminating the minds of rulers and ruled.
For this reason, Grotius regards it as his accomplishment to have 
founded the ars naturalis et perpetuae jurisprudentiae, connecting 
the tradition of moral and spiritual values with the new scientific 
methods. This is a scientific discipline that has detached itself both 
from the theological frame of reference and from the arbitrary laws 
of the state. He calls his enterprise “the most urgent and noble.” It is 
noble because it is a system of universal jurisprudence that will be 
the indispensable instrument to all rulers in their efforts to extend 
progressively the rule of law and to limit the sphere of human inse-
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curity. As such, it will enlighten the statesmen and will help to raise 
the standards of the whole society. He knows that his system is not 
yet perfect. He humbly admits that he has only laid the foundations 
upon which future generations might construct a perfect edifice. He 
has worked out a first draft of a social system for our better under-
standing of the social forces and human motives that make for the 
duration and continuity of society at large on the different planes of 
living. His effort is noble because he offers an intellectual guide to all 
men who wish to understand the constructive and destructive forces 
of human nature and the ability of sympathetic human intelligence 
to know the divine laws and lead men to loftier moral standards and 
a more perfect social order. The work seems to him noble because 
it presents the variety of rational and sympathetic experiences so 
that man may understand that he is still—in spite of the cruelty and 
wickedness in which life involves him—the animal dearest to God.
The book seems to Grotius urgent as a response to the alarm-
ing situation of the times. He does not restrict his complaints to 
the savagery of warfare, although he could already imagine that 
the Great War would compete with those of the past in lawlessness 
and barbarism. He sees a spirit of revolution spreading to all fields 
of thought and action. His is the vision of a basically revolutionary 
period. He had experienced a special variant of the general revolu-
tion as a member of the federal and patrician party in the Nether-
lands that was swept away by the cooperation between the popular 
party and the executive. They had erected a centralized sovereign 
state that was virtually the dictatorship of Prince Moritz of Oranien. 
Grotius had been jailed and, after his escape, exiled. As an exile, he 
visualized the universal state of revolution. As he saw it, the politi-
cal revolution and civil wars were a logical outcome of the religious 
revolutions of the Reformation. Although he belonged to the most 
liberal group of Protestants, he was deeply worried about the final 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N130
result of the destruction of the universal Church. Everywhere, he 
observed a growing irrationalism and an intellectual defeatism. He 
was keenly aware of the growing intellectual, moral, and social inse-
curity and the impact of brute power and coercion that were every-
where undermining the sense of right and justice, in conquerors 
and conquered, in rulers and ruled alike. Might was prior to right. 
Right was a tool of expediency, according to the advantages of the 
respective parties. This element of the Machiavellian raison d’être 
was one aspect of the universal nihilism that threatened to destroy 
civilization at its roots—the roots Grotius held to be classical logos 
and Christian spirit. 
Explicitly, Grotius wrote his treatise against this trend of his 
times. He hoped that it would help to stem the tide of violent and 
irrational lawlessness in thought and action. It was his experience 
that all things become uncertain the moment they depart from law. 
He desired to reawaken the sense of legality and morality by induc-
ing men to reconsider the basic intelligibility of the requirements of 
the social ethos. But he was fully aware that even the most perfect 
state of law is never completely safe. “Human nature exists under 
such conditions that complete security is never guaranteed to us. 
For protection against uncertain fears we must rely on Divine Provi-
dence, and on a wariness free from reproach, not on force.”
Although the book is primarily directed against the negative 
aspects of his times, it is allied to the constructive thinking of the 
period. Like the great liberals of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, Edmund Burke [1729–1797] and Alexis de Tocqueville 
[1805–1859], Grotius strives to go beyond the alternatives of the 
hidebound conservative or progressive. In the tradition of Erasmus’s 
humanism, Grotius remains true to past values and reformulates 
them in terms of modern thinking. He is in agreement with Machia-
velli that nobody has a claim to the Holy Roman Empire of the Mid-
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dle Ages. He accepts the sovereign states as a matter of course, and 
he grimly admits the Machiavellian truth that one has to disguise 
virtues as advantageous in order to sell them to the rulers.
He is too deeply imbued with the moral spiritualism of the 
Arminians not to reject the idea of a monopolistic church as a uni-
versal power. He believes, however, that the destructive effects of the 
various revolutions can be checked. He is firmly convinced that it is 
possible to reestablish the unity of modern civilization. It is possible, 
he thinks, to demonstrate the inner rationality of the social and reli-
gious bonds that hold together human civilization.
Grotius’s whole work is based on an implicit presupposition. In 
times when ecclesiastical institutions are absorbed in the vested 
interests of conflicting churches, the laymen, in particular the 
jurists and the statesmen, have to shoulder the responsibilities for 
the survival of the spirit. They have to see to it that religion remains 
a working principle in everyday life. Thus, it will be possible to 
reestablish justice and peace. As an exiled statesman and a jurist, 
Grotius raised his voice for a reunited mankind. He had passed 
through the Dutch revolution and had observed the revolution-
ary tension in Richelieu’s France, still trembling with the unbroken 
spirit of Protestant and feudal oppositions. This detachment from 
subjective interests enabled him to visualize a Western civiliza-
tion unified by enlightened common sense and a religious spirit of 
solidarity. “Such association binding together the human race is in 
need of law.” Grotius is convinced that this vision can become true 
when established in legal institutions that are in harmony with the 
requirements of common sense and of religion, as manifest in the 
all-pervading natural law.
We cannot fully understand Law of War and Peace without tak-
ing into consideration the living interdependence of law and religion 
in the thinking of Grotius. The book is not an isolated piece of legal 
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and moral systematization, but a scientific instrument designed to 
transform a vision into a reality.
All his theological and exegetic writings serve the same pur-
pose. He intends that they should be instrumental in actualizing 
his vision of a reunified world. They should provide the scientific 
means that would enlighten the conflicting denominations and 
teach the educated laity as to their fundamental unity in truth and 
spirit. In contrast to the philosophy of natural deism of Baron Her-
bert of Cherbury [1583–1648], Grotius’s exegetic books point toward 
a “natural Christianism.” This independent attitude is a pioneer-
ing effort toward preserving the fundamentals of tradition in the 
light of scientific reason. In this, Grotius is much closer to Catholic 
and Socinian [see Faustus Socinus (1539–1604)—Eds.] rationalisms 
than to Calvinistic and Lutheran theories. His scientific spirit—the 
philologist Johann August Ernesti [1707–1781] has called him the 
ancestor of the higher criticism—even forced him to practice a the-
ory of parsimony with regard to verbal inspiration that was critical 
to this central element of the Protestant dogma. This rational and 
critical thought pervades all his theological writings and his under-
standing of the miracles of resurrection and of the cult. He does 
not question their truth because they have been believed by intelli-
gent and educated people, who were never swept away by emotions, 
keeping them always under control of their reason. He comes to the 
conclusion that the fundamental verities of Christianity are intel-
ligible through reason, simple and evident, as is the truth of all basic 
things. These verities can be experienced and practiced everywhere 
by the common people when they are educated to be “common-
sense people.”
This is Grotius’s main concern: the Res Christiana, the devotion 
to the loving God of creation and to the Supreme Judge of our con-
duct in the practice of the spirit of solidarity in Christ. Res Chris-
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tiana is the Gospel as a living force and as a standard to which 
conduct is referred. According to Grotius, the experienced and prac-
ticed religion of the laity is the very power that can reestablish unity, 
peace, and justice in a revolutionary situation. The affinity of this 
attitude to Erasmus’s spiritual pragmatism is conspicuous. It makes 
Grotius seem to be ambivalently poised between a rational theism 
and a Christian spiritualism. In spite of his emphasis on Christ’s 
mandate and on the higher plane of the norms of the Gospel, his 
ideas on the religious requirements of human nature are close to a 
natural theism.
True religion, as common to all ages, rests upon four principles: 
the oneness of God, His transcendence, His concern about men as 
Father and Judge, and His being Creator. These four ideas are born 
with us and brought out by reasoning. They are universal and neces-
sary to the preservation of religion. All other ideas are acquired by 
tradition. Grotius had the courage to formulate his religious position 
as lying athwart the Christian theologies and the deistic dogmatisms.
Grotius’s subjective venture in religion has led to misleading 
interpretations with regard to his fundamental attitude. This is, 
in particular, the case with the passage in which Grotius stated 
the autonomy of natural law, which is valid etsi deus non daretur 
[even if God did not exist—Eds.]. Scholars who knew better, like 
Otto von Gierke [1841–1921] and Wilhelm Dilthey [1833–1911], saw 
in this statement full evidence of Grotius’s secularization of natural 
law. This was to these distinguished scholars an indication of his 
“progressive” and “modern” attitude. This interpretation, however, 
is erroneous. It does not mean the separation of the moral from the 
divine sphere. It is true, indeed, that natural law is intelligible to 
human reason (ab intrinseco ex ratione). We are able to understand 
the social constitution by intelligent reasoning without taking ref-
uge in divine inspiration. However, this autonomy is relative to the 
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universe of divine creation that is intelligible and rational in itself 
and has made right reason in man a reflex of His own intelligence. 
God remains the guarantor of natural law.
There is nothing revolutionary and secular in this statement. It is 
a scholastic commonplace, frequently used in the struggle against the 
radical voluntarism that prevailed among the nominalists. Why does 
Grotius join the scholastics in this matter while, in general, sharing 
in the Protestant resentment against Catholic theological philoso-
phers? He rejects the radical voluntarism as disastrous to the ideas of 
right and justice. He opposes Machiavelli and Luther alike because 
of their antirational attitudes. Yet, this does not mean a romantic 
Catholicism. It expresses the conviction that the very essence of 
God the Creator can only be reason. Hence, justice exists because it 
is an attribute of His very being, not because He has decided so in 
His sovereign will. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz [1646–1716] has best 
formulated Grotius’s position when rejecting Pufendorf ’s nominal-
istic theory of law. “Right is not right because God has willed it, but 
because God is just.”
All the way through, Grotius refers to God as the Supreme Judge 
beyond all legal institutions and sanctions. His eternal presence 
supports and strengthens the obligations of natural law and raises 
them to the higher plane of the norms of the Gospel. All these con-
siderations point out that Grotius’s position is anything but deistic 
or rationalistic. Modern interpreters mistakenly overlook the value 
connotations implied in all scientific conceptions and disregard 
their frame of reference. The physicist Isaac Newton [1643–1727], the 
naturalist Jan Swamerdam [1637–1680], and Grotius were still able to 
speak of science and reason as the wonderful instruments through 
which we participate in God’s creative reason.
It is not accidental that Grotius’s Christian position coincides 
with the Neo-Stoicism that was fashionable in his times. The mod-
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ern Stoicism meant the immanence of divinity as creative reason in 
the world of nature and of society. In most of his fundamental theses, 
Grotius refers to Seneca, to Marcus Aurelius, and to the Cicero of the 
De Officiis and De Legibus. The last recur throughout the book, in 
the general trend of Grotius’s thinking without explicit quotations. 
Grotius is even eager to support the higher values of the Gospel by 
adding references to Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius to make 
clear the fundamental humaneness of mankind when completely 
illuminated and enlightened by the unity of logos and caritas. It is 
possible to label Grotius’s position as Christian Stoicism. There is 
God the Creator, a Divine Reason, but He is real and working in the 
universe of nature and of society. It has been one of the functions of 
Stoicism in the rise of modernity to reconcile the philosophical and 
legal rationalisms of the secular world with the spirit of the Christian 
religion. This was a humanistic device that permitted one to remain 
true to the religious traditions and yet preserve the intellectual integ-
rity of the modern scholar.
Grotius’s religious and philosophical attitudes merge in his legal 
ideals. On the Law of War and Peace contains their synthesis. The 
book analyzes the inner structure of the social universe. Grotius 
was educated in the traditions of Roman law. Roman law was largely 
composed of that jus gentium that jurists had elaborated by a com-
parison of the laws of many states and that they identified with nat-
ural law as the general consent of enlightened and educated man. 
This Roman law was as emancipated from the “written reason” (ratio 
scripta) of the traditional Roman law as was Grotius’s spiritualism 
from the tradition of the Roman and from the authority of the Prot-
estant churches. This renascent Roman law is based on reason, the 
potential rationality of mankind, however, conditioned in time and 
space. As to its philosophical frame of reference, it follows traditions 
of Roman Stoicism, which is essentially the pantheism of reason.
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Still more important for understanding Grotius is that Renaissance 
jurists brought a spirit of “humane interpretation” into the exegesis of 
law, that is, a comprehensive consideration of the circumstances of 
every case. This pattern remained normative for Grotius’s procedure. 
Grotius did rely on the conceptual frame of the Corpus Iuris when he 
elaborated the rules of groups and constructed a natural system of 
social institutions. The Roman jurists conceived of legal relationships 
in terms of relations between individuals. They recognized mutual 
relationships between individuals, either equals or nonequals, as the 
center of societal relationships. The notion of socius, basic in sociol-
ogy, is actually a conception of Roman law. The Romans regarded all 
fundamental concepts as referring to the original reciprocity among 
socii. They did not consider the collective person as a specific concept. 
They could describe it only as a sum total of individual relationships. 
This limitation implied a positive insight that has become highly 
relevant in the rise of formal sociology and of those conceptions of 
interpretive sociology that are very close to formal sociology such 
as Max Weber’s in the first chapter of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 
This insight made it possible to understand societal relationships and 
social institutions in terms of a variety of mutual relationships, of give 
and take, of superiority and subordination, of sympathetic power and 
the need for protection, and of kindness and sternness. Following the 
Roman pattern, the reality of natural law means to Grotius the ratio-
nality of human purposes and the intelligibility of social values as 
evident in social action. Grotius was convinced that the enlightened 
knowledge of natural law as the working of human nature reveals the 
teleology of social existence and clarifies the elements that make for 
the continuity and duration of the basic social constitution.
For this reason, the Law of War and Peace is a comprehensive 
study of natural law that presents a systematization of societal rela-
tionships in the diverse patterns of social action and on the diverse 
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planes of living. Within this frame, international relations and polit-
ical institutions have specific functions that do not admit any kind 
of absolute autonomy of the social spheres as emancipated from the 
common ground of the merging processes of logos and spirit.
Grotius frequently remarks that natural law should not be con-
founded with national customs or with the norms of the divine 
voluntary law. Such customs and norms are established by acts of 
will—human and divine. They are open to arbitrary decisions and 
to specific circumstances. Natural law, however, results from and is 
the manifestation of human nature as innate right reason (qua recta 
ratio insita). This inner rationality appears already as a tendency in 
the need for society. It is the characteristic trait of the human animal. 
Usually, the text of this important passage is not fully quoted. Grotius 
explicitly describes the kind of society for which human beings long. 
Man desires social life “not of any and every sort, but peaceful and 
organized according to the measure of his intelligence, with those 
also of his kind; the Stoics called this trend sociableness.” This is the 
fundamental thesis of Grotius’s book. Human nature instinctively 
points toward peace—its very telos. Grotius has added the limitation 
in order to show that, because of the character of human reason, no 
perfect and absolute peace is possible in human affairs. This should 
not be confused with Augustine’s radical dualism between celestial 
and terrestrial peace. The whole book, in particular the third part, 
points out that men are capable of establishing human peace when 
following the rules of natural law. Peace and tranquility are regula-
tive ideas inherent in human nature. The idea of peace is the core of 
the book. War is a substitute when institutions of law are lacking. 
It is an instrument of legal action for the reestablishment of justice 
among nations.
Mutuality is the primary datum of human life, as life in society. 
Grotius describes this basic societal relationship as composed of two 
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elements: mutual needs and mutual sympathies. Man is an imper-
fect being, in need of cooperation and overflowing with sympathy. 
Grotius refers twice to the bond of spontaneous sympathy as a bent 
of human nature that establishes friendship and communion among 
men and states in the common devotion to social and moral goods. 
Natural sympathy should make it impossible that men misuse the 
lives of other men as means to their own ends, Grotius states in an 
almost Kantian formulation. This original sociability of man must 
be maintained and secured in order to make possible the continu-
ity of society. The maintenance of society (custodia societatis) is the 
one source of law. It springs from the social nature of man and is 
hence called natural law. The principles of natural law are, for Gro-
tius, manifest and clear. Grotius distinguishes between general and 
evident principles and inferences. A general principle is that one 
must live honorably or according to reason. Evident is the principle 
that one is not allowed to seize another’s property. Inferences can 
be evident and nonevident. It is evident that, granted marriage, we 
cannot admit adultery. It is not evident that vengeance is wicked if 
satisfied at the price of another’s pain. Anticipating Spinoza’s famous 
formula, Grotius speaks of these principles as certain and intelligible 
as are mathematical axioms.
Natural law works in man through the antagonistic tendencies of 
his being. Grotius distinguishes between the social and the humane 
branches of natural law. He repeats the classical theory that all ani-
mals strive to preserve their constitution. Men strive for the pres-
ervation of life, self, and property. Natural law, as concerned with 
the needs of the individual in society, is law in the strict sense of 
the term. It refers to the establishment of the security of man in his 
relations to his fellow-socius. It is restrictive law that prescribes not 
to hurt and to abstain from foreign property. It gives the individual 
security in his domain and recognizes the rights of the individual as 
H U G O  G R O T I U S  A N D  T H E  S O C I A L  S C I E N C E S 139
qualities of the moral person that can be enforced by the established 
courts. The reciprocity of right and obligation makes the contract the 
original mode of legal relationships. It implies the central norm of 
the social law that contracts must be kept. Socii realize that mutual 
relations as expressed in a variety of agreements must be based on 
good faith. There cannot be any consensus without good faith. Con-
sensus does presuppose a common purpose, a common affirmation 
of the purpose or end, and the common will to cooperate in its ful-
fillment. It is the foundation of all legal and social relationships. It 
implies good faith, as the will to remain true to the hypotheses of 
social action. Good faith means more than following the rules of 
the game. It implies the connotation that truth is the sine qua non of 
social tranquility and security.
Grotius’s intention to give a comprehensive analysis of the social 
phenomenon becomes evident when he reconsiders social attitudes 
that seem to be at variance with good faith. He examines under what 
conditions pretense and falsehood are compatible with morality 
and justice. Grotius mentions six types of falsehood that are per-
missible because they are morally constructive. For the teacher, it 
is permissible to use fiction and falsehood in order to adjust to the 
limited understanding of his pupils. Irony and esoteric suggestions 
are allowed in a conversation with people familiar with this mode of 
communication. If a third person is deceived, it is no wrong. Physi-
cians are entitled to deceive a sick person in order to comfort him. 
Friends are permitted to lie when they can raise the low spirit of 
friends in despair and depression. The officer can distort facts and 
manipulate news in order to strengthen courage and raise the morale 
of the military and civilian population. We can tell a lie when this is 
the only way to save the lives of innocent persons or prevent a crime. 
Rulers and men of authority can lie when it benefits their subjects or 
is used as device for the discovery of the truth. In this survey, Grotius 
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gives a truly sociopsychological analysis of social conditions under 
which specific attitudes may possess a positive moral justification, 
while in a general system of ethics, they are incompatible with moral 
standards. The description of these patterns of conduct implies a 
relativistic transformation of the absolute system of ethics. What is 
good and moral depends on the requirements of specific structures 
or situations.
Grotius speaks of the role of social consensus in collective bod-
ies as compared with the moral choice of the individual. He distin-
guishes between associations of equals and the subjection of inferiors 
to their superiors. Their agreements of mutuality and subjection 
become the sources of civil law that is historical and individual in 
all cases. The basic types of grouping, however, correspond to natu-
ral requirements. They present patterns that are, according to Gro-
tius, so fundamental that they have their parallel in various types of 
government. Such types of control as the natural relations between 
parents and children, husband and wife, guardian and ward, master 
and servant recur in different types of government. Here we see the 
influence of the study of Roman law upon Grotius’s thinking. All 
legal conceptions refer to the basic types of societal relationships, 
which constitute the social branch of natural law. To Grotius, legal 
and sociological categories are identical. As a branch of natural law, 
social law is restricting and refers to expletive justice. When enforced 
by the state, it becomes a branch of natural law. Rights, however, can 
be established only when they give man something that he recog-
nizes as his own. However, they should never be arbitrary, and those 
who dispense them should be guided by a wise consideration of all 
claims existing in the particular circumstances at issue.
This leads to the second and larger branch of natural law, that 
which refers to the moral and humane requirements of society. It 
deals with the stratification of society and with the norms of justice 
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that give every man what is due to him, what is inherent in every 
man as a potential right. But it is not law in the strict sense because it 
cannot be enforced. This most comprehensive branch of natural law 
varies with the circumstances, and it frequently occurs that our exer-
cise of it must override existing legal rights and bring about a new 
division of power. The interaction of law proper and the dynamic 
right of justice continuously join the moral and humane require-
ments of society with the institutions of statutory law. According to 
Grotius, the tranquility and concord of society rest upon the real-
ity of moral duties that are the ground for legislative interference. 
Grotius devotes much effort to the clarification of the interaction 
between established laws and the moral requirements that are the 
recognized values of peace and concord. According to Grotius, the 
constitution of society is founded on the inseparable unity of moral 
duties and legal norms as inherent in the nature of man. Law is a 
mode of the Good.
Grotius distinguishes carefully between law proper and natural 
law at large. The latter includes a hierarchy of duties having larger 
claims upon us, under certain conditions, than our rights and privi-
leges that are supported by law and custom. Even if we are not hin-
dered from enjoying those privileges, they may deviate from the rule 
of right. Hence, we are called to renounce them in the name of supe-
rior requirements. For the dynamics of natural law comprehends the 
various spheres of law that extend from legality to morality, from 
things permissible to things good and better. There is a law of charity 
in natural law that was the common property of the pagan world as 
manifested in Cicero and Seneca. This humanitarianism of natural 
law, finally, coincides with the norms of the Gospel. Grotius intends 
to show the universality of human sympathies and common sense as 
the rational normative principles of human nature.
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Human nature has such a wide range of potentialities that it is 
capable of value—attitudes so clearly and distinctly moral as to sur-
pass and supersede the strict laws of natural law. Men have a sense 
of shame and modesty indicating a regard for what is more just and 
better than the requirements of law proper. There is a sense of honor, 
springing from spontaneous sympathy that is associated with justice 
in legal matters like bequests in trusts. There are many duties that 
are not in the domain of law proper, but in that of value—attitudes 
that illuminate and make intelligible our obligations on the higher 
plane of existence, but still within the orbit of the natural law. Many 
things are required by kindness, generosity, love of country, kin-
ship with all men (including enemies) that supersede the rules of 
law proper. “The rules of duty extend more widely than the rules of 
law.” The former present a “logic of the heart” as intelligent and intel-
ligible as are the rules of self preservation. In these passages, Grotius 
has implicitly stated that mutuality means two things: reciprocity 
between individuals and membership in a whole. This implicit defi-
nition of mutuality becomes evident when Grotius deals with the 
higher requirements involved in the relations between states.
Although Grotius has demonstrated most emphatically that war 
is only in very rare cases justified, he still considers it more upright 
and just to abandon one’s right for the higher value of the all-
embracing peace. Rulers are like fathers and will not easily decide to 
punish their sons or subjects and neighbors, except by dire necessity 
and in the name of the highest values of justice. Grotius goes so far 
as to assume circumstances that make it obligatory to refrain from 
the exercise of our own right by reason of the love and consideration 
that we owe to all men. He wishes to extend the area of international 
relations. However, he cannot imagine international institutions. He 
can think only of enlightening all nations so that they may become 
aware of the same right reason and of the same intelligent sympa-
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thies in all human beings despite differences in time and space. Such 
knowledge will establish the common sense of mankind that makes 
possible the consensus between states as expressed in international 
law. Because Grotius cannot conceive of international organizations, 
he must apply what he calls his a posteriori method. He collects tre-
mendous historical material from philosophers, historians, jurists, 
poets, and rhetoricians in order to show that, actually, there is a 
universal common sense of educated and thoughtful people regard-
ing the verities of social and human requirements. These verities are 
simple and self-evident.
From his analysis of the potential rationality and intelligent sym-
pathy of the human race, Grotius draws the following conclusions. 
If peace is the telos of social action, life is the primary value involved 
in its realization. Grotius recognizes that God has a higher claim 
on our lives than we have. He frequently states that life is the very 
locus and basis of all temporal and eternal goods that are given to 
us for constructive, not destructive, ends. In emergency cases, he 
values life higher than the liberty of individuals and the state as an 
inexhaustible source of potential goods. This is not moral escapism; 
it is the humane wisdom of a man who has recognized the higher 
value of the whole and yet cannot forget the potential richness of 
every human being. This humanitas Grotiana has become the pre-
vailing opinion that has nurtured the idea of international affairs 
in the Anglo-Saxon countries. It has been one trend in American 
foreign policy since John Jay instructed George Washington in the 
principles of Grotius.
Peace is the telos of social action. War is a general sociological 
category comprehending private and public conflict as suggested by 
Seneca. It is defined as the condition of contending by force. It is per-
missible in situations in which legal administration is not available 
as in the case of surprise attacks by gangsters, thieves, and pirates. 
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In public affairs, war can be admitted as an emergency tool for rees-
tablishing justice, repairing damage, or punishing aggressors. For 
Grotius, war is a marginal institution of justice, indispensable 
because there are no international courts and institutions of arbitra-
tion that could pass judgment on conflicts between states and enforce 
these decisions internationally. For Grotius, war is not the continuity 
of politics with the means of force. Rather, it is a subordinate instru-
ment of justice. Politics means to Grotius the continuously extending 
growth of legal institutions and their creative evolution in harmony 
with the new forces that arise in the social process again and again. 
It is the living spirit of justice in the reexamination of legal establish-
ments and the unending will to abolish wrong and injury done to the 
smallest minority. There is no security or freedom in the state except 
under the rule of law.
Grotius reproached Erasmus with being a utopian pacifist. He 
himself is close to a pacifistic attitude. He wrote to his brother: “But 
if Christian princes listened to my warnings, there would be no 
more war among them; they would prefer to abandon some of their 
rights or to choose upright arbitration.” Grotius’s pacifistic attitude 
is founded on his understanding of the humanitarian and cosmo-
politan aspects of natural law. It proposes, even when questions of 
right and wrong are involved, not to go to war, not to revolt against 
usurpers, and not to make revolutions against unjust rulers. In this 
attitude, rigid legal conceptions and spiritual and humanitarian 
concerns coincide. Human lives are so precious that it is preferable to 
yield in order to avoid bloodshed and to strive to attain desired ends 
by wise and humane compromise. Grotius recognizes the right to 
resist rulers only when firmly established by constitutional law as in 
the seven cases that he mentions when dealing with the diverse types 
of constitution in the feudal state and in the Ständestaat. He affirms a 
right to revolution logically forfeited by the pact of subjection. Apart 
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from that, it is impossible for the ruled to search for the guilty men 
among the rulers and their advisers. This seems to Grotius a vicious 
circle because the social process is so complex and involved that it is 
almost impossible to establish certain responsibilities. Men have to 
rely on God as the Supreme Judge of rulers and people.
Grotius’s recurrent emphasis on the moral aspect of natural law 
derives its force from the analysis of the state of nature and of its 
revolutionary transformation by the establishment of private own-
ership. In the state of liberty, things belonged to men in common. 
The primitive state rested on two principles: a simplicity of life and 
a comprehensive mutual affection among individuals. Both made it 
possible to preserve that way of life for a long time. But men are rest-
less and strive for more perfect things. Hence, the original state of 
communal life could be maintained only under hard natural condi-
tions, as among the American Indians, or by religious communions 
like those of the Essenes, the early Christians, and monastic orders. 
The general bent of human nature moved toward knowledge, com-
petition, and the enjoyment of more refined goods. This tendency 
slowly dissolved “natural communism” by separating the owners 
of large flocks from each other. There remained a limited commu-
nism of common pastures. Tribes and families proceeded with the 
organization of individual property by appropriating lands and 
wells. Grotius explains this process by the paradoxical character of 
human nature. Men as rational beings are never satisfied and strive 
for perfection. Hence, they invent arts, crafts, and industries. Their 
achievements increase their desires and raise ambition and avarice, 
which make reason their servant. Desires and reason as destructive 
and constructive forces abolished the unity of the early communal 
life. Technical difficulties, such as the lack of transportation facili-
ties, and moral deficiencies, such as the vanishing sense of solidarity, 
eliminated a fair distribution of labor and its products.
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In these circumstances, private ownership came into exis-
tence, but not as irrational violence and pressure of the power-
ful in the sense described by Franz Oppenheimer [1864–1943]. 
Grotius explains the process as a kind of agreement, that is, a rational 
compromise and settlement, in the form of occupation and division. 
Occupation at large takes place by a people; division distributes the 
occupied whole among the members of the group.
According to Grotius, introducing private ownership has never 
completely submerged the ancient bonds of solidarity and of com-
munity of property. Grotius states that it was never the intention of 
the progressive innovators to destroy all remnants of communal lib-
erties. On the contrary, their intention was to depart as little as pos-
sible from natural equity. For this reason, it is not a religious norm 
to give to him who is in dire need. Natural law prescribes as a moral 
obligation to the society of owners of private property to see to it 
that established laws provide shelter and protection to those in need. 
“Things have been distributed to individual owners with a benign 
reservation in favor of the primitive right.”
This frame of reference is fundamental to Grotius’s universal 
jurisprudence. It enables him to speak of those communal rights 
that still obtain in the world of individual property. Natural equity 
requires a relative freedom of passage on land and sea, general free-
dom of emigration and migration, and common rights to things and 
acts. These rights remain norms of natural law and have a higher 
dignity than contradictory regulations by individual states. Among 
these rights, Grotius considers the elements of freedom and social 
obligation in the economic sphere regarding prices, monopolies, 
profits, usury, and the freedom of buying and selling where and how. 
All such acts are permitted or vetoed, not as a special favor, but as 
rights deriving from the power of natural liberty that remains the 
lasting frame of reference of natural law.
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This frame of reference is not supposed to be the image of the 
Golden Age. It presents the naive and sympathetic rationality of the 
human animal. In times, enlightened by reason and illuminated by 
spirit, the frame of reference appears as the “common sense of man-
kind.” It can become actual when natural law is commonly under-
stood as a reflection of human nature making possible a world of 
human peace and of humane solidarity. Grotius’s work serves the 
purpose to promote the growing enlightenment of human society in 
order to reestablish the past solidarity as a reflected and understood 





Men who live at a critical distance from their contemporary world 
naturally praise a past age in which they would like to have lived. Dif-
ferent causes have led people at various times to praise the Enlight-
enment. Some fifty years ago, Paul Valéry [1871–1945] expressed his 
preference for that epoch, in which he could have met with Bernard 
Le Bovier de Fontenelle [1657–1757], Montesquieu [1689–1755], 
Denis Diderot [1713–1784], and Jean-Baptiste le Rond d’Alembert 
[1717–1783]. Valéry feared that men would come to be more and 
more specialized technicians and social engineers, losing all com-
mon principles of value. He visualized the forthcoming age as an age 
of scientific barbarism. In contrast to this reality, he saw the epoch 
of the Enlightenment, the eighteenth century, as an age of harmony 
and moderation: 
Europe was then the best of the possible worlds. Despots 
and libertarians balanced each other. Truth maintained 
some moderation. Matter and energy did not yet rule 
everything directly, though they were indirectly felt. 
Science was already fairly advanced, and the techniques 
Published originally in a slightly different form under the title, “In Praise of the 
Enlightenment: In Commemoration of Fontenelle, 1657–1757,” in Social Research 
24 (Summer 1957), 202–26. Republished by permission from Social Research.
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refined. Religion still remained. There were enough whims 
coexisting with considerable rigidity. (Variété, 2:6.)
Now, half a century later, other causes impel men to eulogize 
the Enlightenment. There are enough orthodoxies, fanaticisms, and 
prejudices—radical and conservative, philosophical and scientific, 
intelligent and stupid—that need enlightened reexamination. There 
is the escapism of Arnold Toynbee [1889–1975], the flight from rea-
son into all kinds of behaviorism and existentialism. There are meth-
ods and conceptions that we take for granted because their authors 
have become idols for worship. The desire for enlightened vigilance 
and praise of the Enlightenment are appropriate in the contempo-
rary age of irrational modes of thinking and acting.
The term Enlightenment is a historical category. It indicates a state 
of mind that penetrated all segments of life in the Western world 
during the eighteenth century. Immanuel Kant [1724–1804] defined 
enlightenment as the departure of mankind from its self-inflicted 
immaturity. And he added his praise of Frederick the Great [1712–
1786]: “A prince is to be called enlightened who finds it appropriate 
to speak of his duty not to prescribe anything in religious matters to 
his subjects. . . . On the contrary, he gives them liberty and rejects the 
arrogant term of tolerance. He should he praised for having liberated 
. . . the conscience of his people and having invited them to use their 
reason.”
Thinkers and rulers, theologians and scientists, lawgivers and 
moralists shared in this state of mind. They firmly believed that they 
were obliged to spread the results of scientific philosophy to the igno-
rant in order to liberate them from the inertia of tradition and from 
the authority of prejudices. The princes and their ministers tried to 
establish enlightened welfare states. Frederick the Great and Joseph 
II [1741–1790] were the most outstanding figures in the effort to 
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penetrate legal and administrative institutions with the principles 
of enlightened reason. They believed that the truth of reason would 
eliminate the irrational prejudices by which men live, in particular 
those deeply rooted in religious convictions.
The philosopher of the Enlightenment invited his fellowmen to 
have the courage to learn and to know. Sapere aude! It was an invita-
tion to criticism and an admonition to examine rationally what had 
been taken for granted. Everywhere, people met in salons, in stud-
ies, in laboratories, in order to learn causes and laws, motives and 
responses. The conduct of the philosopher who dedicated himself to 
spreading the new philosophy to the ignorant who wished to learn 
was “enlightened.”
As a historical category, the Enlightenment had a beginning and 
an end in time. The first important works by Fontenelle were pub-
lished between 1684 and 1688, and the Second Treatise of Govern-
ment by John Locke [1632–1704] appeared in 1690. The end of this 
period can be fixed definitely: the day that Maximilien Robespierre 
[1758–1794] turned Notre Dame into the Temple of Reason and inau-
gurated the first religion of modern revolution. That day—November 
10, 1793—marked the apocalypse of the Enlightenment.
“Enlightenment” is a historical ideal type. As such, it is of ques-
tionable value because of the extremely subjective elements of its value 
perspectives. Still today, enlightenment is a curse to some, a blessing 
to others. For this reason, it may be a methodological necessity to con-
struct different concepts for genuinely historical phenomena. Let us call 
them ideal images. Ideal images are the concrete and dynamic repre-
sentations of ideal patterns of philosophizing, of normative modes of 
politics, and of the types of human perfection. Their selection is often 
less arbitrary than the hazardous formation of historical ideal types. 
The Enlightenment can be truly represented by Fontenelle or Mon-
tesquieu, Diderot or Baron d’Holbach [1723–1789], Claude Adrien 
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Helvétius [1715–1771] or D’Alembert. They all are images of the same 
enlightened attitude, which regards the light of reason as the force 
of liberation from traditional beliefs, prejudices, and superstitions. 
 
I
I have selected Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle as the ideal image of 
the Enlightenment, an honor that is fittingly stressed in 1957, which 
is both the tercentenary of his birth and the bicentennial of his death. 
In so regarding him, I have the authority of two of his younger con-
temporaries who praised his contribution to the popularization of the 
cosmology of René Descartes [1596–1650]. D’Alembert, in reference 
to Fontenelle, wrote in the Discours Préliminaire à l’Encyclopédie: 
Books on science seem to have gained the attention of 
the reading public that has been exclusively interested in 
the literary arts. A respectable author whom our century 
is happy to have through a long period . . . has taught 
the savants to get rid of the yoke of pedantry. Superior in 
the art of clarifying the most abstractideas, he has suc-
ceeded in bringing them down to the understanding of 
the unlearned by his precision, lucidity, and method. He 
has even dared to equip his presentation of philosophy 
with the devices of the literary arts, which seem most 
alien to philosophy. His keenness has been justified by 
the most general and flattering success. No one has ever 
reached his great popularity and incomparable success 
in popularization.
And Helvetius, in dealing with the spirit of the eighteenth century, 
mentioned Fontenelle’s decisive role in the development of the spirit 
of enlightenment: 
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Before M. de Fontenelle the majority of savants found 
themselves isolated and deprived of all communication 
with other people once they had reached the peak of sci-
entific achievements. . . . M. de Fontenelle was one of the 
first who pioneered in building a bridge between science 
and ignorance. 
There are other reasons, more important than the testimony of his 
contemporaries, for choosing Fontenelle as the genuine image of the 
Enlightenment. He was a writer who dared to popularize philosoph-
ical texts in order to stimulate critical thought and a reexamination 
of traditional ideas about God, the universe, and the place of man in 
nature. Students of Descartes know the constructive heresies of this 
disciple of the master. His scientific theory and philosophy of history 
are an original contribution to a philosophical anthropology. He was 
the first Cartesian who objected to the idea of the constancy of the 
mind, postulating instead its progress and history. He joined philo-
sophical optimism with a Montaignesque pessimism on the condi-
tion humaine. Fontenelle should be reread because some of his basic 
ideas are relevant to a particular aspect of the philosophy of life in 
the contemporary world. He is an image of the Enlightenment, but 
not a museum piece that we dust off on the occasion of this or that 
centennial. Like that of all genuine philosophers, his work is both 
historical and transhistorical. So also is the historical spirit of the 
Enlightenment part of the perennial enlightenment of philosophy.
We should remember Fontenelle for still another reason. He gave 
us the image of the philosophical life in an age of ecclesiastical and 
political domination. Friedrich Nietzsche [1844–1900] praised him 
as the last aristocratic thinker who knew that esoteric writing is 
indispensable in a world of total conformism. Nietzsche might have 
remarked that Johann Wolfgang von Goethe [1749–1832], too, was 
conscious of the fact that in a bourgeois epoch he could never com-
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municate to his reading public all the terrible verities he had learned 
in his long life.
Fontenelle lived to be almost a hundred years old. He was born on 
February 11, 1657, and died on January 9, 1757. When he was born, 
the physicians found him so weak that they felt it necessary to advise 
his parents that he would probably not survive. This report later 
stimulated his love for Michel de Montaigne [1533–1592], in particu-
lar Montaigne’s criticism of medicine as a scientific discipline. Fon-
tenelle’s physical weakness had a lasting effect on his life. To all his 
friends he seemed absolutely selfish. His egotism, however, was but a 
strict discipline that he imposed on himself in order to give himself 
totally to his work. As a philosopher, he needed distance and reserve, 
the more so as his social role forced him to live in continuous contact 
with society.
His father belonged to the elite of the legal profession. His mother 
was a sister of the dramatists, Pierre [1606–1684] and Thomas 
Corneille [1625–1709]. Fontenelle was a man of many gifts and 
ambitions. He was eager to emulate his famous uncles and, at the 
same time, to be a philosopher in his own right. The revolutionary 
philosophy of Descartes fascinated him. He did not give up his liter-
ary efforts, but these brought him back to philosophy. For example, 
his Eclogues led him to philosophical reflections on pastoral poetry, 
a pioneering effort in applying sociological method in aesthetics. 
The New Dialogues of the Dead, the Digression on the Ancients and 
Moderns, and The Judgment of Pluto, 1683–84, merged philosophical 
reflections with an attractive literary pattern.
In the next four years, 1684–88, Fontenelle engaged in the most 
intense philosophical activities, both as a theoretical thinker and 
as a popularizer. His Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds and 
his History of Oracles were popular bestsellers, subsequently earn-
ing him the title of forerunner of the Enlightenment. The Origin of 
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Fables was a complement to the work on oracles. He had intended to 
unite the contents of the two books and of other related essays in a 
work on the philosophy of history, but never attained that goal. This 
is the more regrettable since Voltaire [1694–1778] was to plagiarize 
and vulgarize Fontenelle’s relevant ideas and deprive them of their 
uniqueness as the only contribution made by a Cartesian to the phi-
losophy of history.
Fontenelle, without neglecting his poetry, gave much attention 
to problems of mathematics, to methodology, and to a philosophy of 
science. He had the daring to write a devastating critique of the con-
flicting Christian churches, a work that almost brought him to the 
Bastille. In 1697, his interest turned in still another direction. He was 
then appointed “Perpetual Secretary” to the Académie des Sciences, 
and in that capacity, he wrote his history of that institution and later 
published the eulogies that he had delivered in his official position.
Through all of Fontenelle’s writings, there runs one genuinely 
Cartesian thought: the principle that the main concern of philos-
ophy is the method of reasoning. He turned this principle against 
Descartes himself and criticized him for having succumbed to the 
temptations of metaphysics. He made it his task to apply the new 
method to moral philosophy and to history, examining the structure 
of history and disclosing the paradox that despite the irrationality 
of human life, history is intelligible. This was a keen and original 
conception for a disciple of Descartes. Fontenelle left many frag-
ments pointing to his endeavor to distinguish different patterns of 
generalization apart from mathematical and logical conceptions. 
He was fully aware that the generalizations men use in construct-
ing historical processes and social action have a character of their 
own and deserve particular consideration. But these reflections, in 
the line of Jean Bodin [1530–1596] and Montaigne’s views on the 
methods of history, Fontenelle did not live to bring to a conclusion. 
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II 
Fontenelle achieved his greatest success with his brilliant popular-
ization of Descartes’s cosmological theory. In the Conversations, the 
work of a true disciple, he developed the Cartesian version of the 
Copernican-Galilean theory of the solar system. What makes the 
book fascinating today is its imaginative discussion on the plurality 
of inhabited worlds—an idea that was then revolutionary indeed. If 
different worlds were possible, it would be logical that there might 
be different religions, philosophies, and values. This was, of course, 
a popularization of Montaigne’s Apology of Raymond de Sebond. 
Fontenelle chose this theme for popularization because it implied all 
problems with which laymen were concerned when at all reflective. 
The topic included the questions of man’s place in the universe, the 
meaning of nature, and the significance of man’s acting and suffer-
ing. The philosopher seduced his readers into giving thought to these 
problems. Readers in the highest ranks of society discussed the ideas 
of the book and derived from such conversations a zeal for know-
ing the truth. This was a precious result in the world of Louis XIV 
[1638–1715] and Mme de Maintenon [1635–1719], who maintained 
a strict authority over religious and political verities, to which men 
had to conform. Fontenelle’s book implemented the rapidly growing 
criticism of the state of total conformism.
In presenting the cosmological theory of Descartes, Fontenelle 
remained a loyal disciple of the teacher, but in the greater part of his 
work, he became heretical. His is the great merit of having intro-
duced the perspective of historical thinking into a philosophy that 
insisted on the constancy of the mind. Fontenelle, challenging the 
Cartesian theory, elaborated the thesis that the mind has its his-
tory and is a process in time, moving in ascending progress from 
the primitive state to the scientific age that Descartes inaugurated. 
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Prior to Locke, Fontenelle stated that experience is the foundation 
of knowledge. Two fundamental experiences are a common heritage 
of all philosophers: the progressive movement of the mind, and the 
resisting movement of intellectual and emotional habits. These make 
up the dynamics of the history of philosophy.
Fontenelle combined the tradition of Cartesian thought with his 
new historical perspective. He was the first author to state the position 
of the moderns in the battle with the ancients, and his analysis was 
the more revolutionary because he was the first to regard the question 
as one of historical perspective. Fontenelle rejected the idea that the 
ancients were physiologically or intellectually better equipped than 
the rest of mankind. The time process, he thought, has no qualify-
ing powers. He agreed with Bodin and Montaigne that different areas 
have different influences on the character of society. But though he 
was willing to admit the influence of geography and climate, he saw 
that modern mankind had compensated such differences by the 
equalizing effects of the migration of ideas, techniques, and inven-
tions from civilization to civilization. The scientific philosopher, he 
held, is always able to explain the individuation of naturally equal 
mankind by the sum total of historical and physical circumstances.
This scientific procedure made him see the blunder of those who 
had made of the accomplishments of the ancients an ideal, absolute, 
and normative good in a historical vacuum. He recognized that it is 
wrong to deprive the ancients of their historical place and to turn 
them into idols for worship. They were the founders and, as such, 
have claim to our lasting gratitude. We have advanced as their disci-
ples; we have learned new things and acquired new and better meth-
ods. We are humble before the greatness of their conceptions. But we 
have no reason for imitating them as the highest authority.
In a radical analysis of the historical process, we find that there 
are always ancients and moderns in the alignments of historical 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N158
generations. It is the natural dialectics of human historicity that we 
change our social roles in the current of our life process from youth 
to maturity. Today we are the moderns; tomorrow we will be the 
ancients. In the field of aesthetics, Fontenelle realized, the historical 
perspective implies new and constructive ideas against the absolut-
ism principle of classic beauty. The theory of the perfect and unsur-
passed Greek drama had brought about the theory of imitation that 
prevailed during the seventeenth century. Fontenelle attacked the 
classical theory as invalid. It would be valid if the ancients had lived 
in an ideal space and in an ahistorical time. Since this was not so, 
it is senseless to expect to find an ideal model of the drama beyond 
historical time. Since perfection is historical, Greek tragedy can-
not be established as an ideal for imitation. The moderns have their 
own canons of perfection in drama and have invented new literary 
patterns, such as the novel, the epistolary form, and the short story. 
Aesthetic perfection is possible in all historical periods. But it has its 
specific norms appropriate to the historical frame of reference. There 
is no universal and formal principle of beauty that could be imitated 
everywhere. 
Fontenelle’s pioneering in historical method is most noteworthy 
in his attack on Descartes’s thesis of the constancy of the mind. The 
great contribution of Fontenelle’s philosophy consists in his revolt 
against this theory of the master. Mind in its unfolding as taste, val-
ues, and social norms has history. According to Fontenelle, the mind 
alone has history. What people usually call history—the changes 
and transformations in political institutions and in the alignments 
of social roles—should be called perennial sameness. There is no 
becoming and advancing in the current of historical time; there is 
nothing but the unceasing identity of human greed, resentments, 
lusts, and hatreds. Fontenelle called this sameness the Heart. The 
first philosopher to acknowledge the progress of the mind, he coun-
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terbalanced his philosophical optimism with classical pessimism on 
the characteristics of human nature.
Fontenelle was a disciple of Descartes, but also of Montaigne. The 
New Dialogues of the Dead illustrates the perfect unity of these two 
discipleships. The dialogue of the dead is an old literary pattern of 
Hellenic origin, meant to be a device of satire. Fontenelle applied the 
form in a grim philosophical mood. Though exposing the stupidi-
ties, inconsistencies, and vacillations of men, he placed the greatest 
value on the human capacity for philosophizing. In this fascinating 
literary form, Fontenelle offered a serious theory of man, anticipat-
ing a philosophical anthropology.
Throughout the Dialogues, Fontenelle presents images of great 
philosophers in conversation with their enemies. The philosophers 
try to defend the nature of philosophy against all opportunistic and 
utilitarian claims. Fontenelle makes his philosophers assume that 
philosophical interest is a unique human attitude. Philosophers are 
the only human beings who by the act of theoretical thinking tran-
scend the expanding life of the organism. The men who dedicate 
their lives to philosophy are rare examples of genuine disinterested-
ness. For this reason, there have been only a few philosophers in the 
current of time because most people are dedicated to the pursuit of 
their material interests.
One of the main themes of the Dialogues is the antagonism 
between the theoretical attitude and the organic structure of man. 
Fontenelle was concerned with the nature of philosophy and the phi-
losophy of nature. The philosopher transcends nature, and nature 
takes her vengeance on the disinterested philosopher who dares to 
transcend her order. Nature produces organic beings for the pur-
pose of living. Man lives by habits and customs, which are his second 
nature. Theoretical reflection discloses the emptiness of life’s rou-
tines, the total irrelevance of daily life. Contemplation makes us see 
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the secret of nature, which is to keep human beings in control by sub-
jecting man to his senses and drives. But men have escaped nature’s 
domination, as philosophers who no longer care for success in social 
action, and nature hates this challenge to her power. For this reason, 
she wars against the philosophical life, which transcends the imma-
nence of nature. She schemes to turn the homo philosophicus into a 
homo faber, who makes of reason a device by which to realize and 
satisfy his vital and emotional needs. The idea of the transcendence 
of immanence is a thesis that Georg Simmel [1858–1918], in his final 
thinking, made articulate against Henri Bergson [1859–1941].
The philosophical attitude of the homo philosophicus carries 
him beyond his social environment and beyond his own self. He is 
ruled by his theoretical vision and never knows where it will direct 
him in the unfolding of its inner law. The freedom of the philosopher 
becomes slavery to philosophy. Fontenelle analyzed these complex 
and hazardous conditions of the philosopher. His Descartes, a very 
un-Cartesian philosopher, agrees with Socrates as to the universal 
domination of nature and the minor place accorded to the thinker. 
Descartes admits that the substance of philosophy is invariable in 
spite of the changing patterns of philosophy. But in agreeing with 
Socrates, he sees the philosophical process in the context of the 
condition humaine, as never finished and never coming to an end of 
its search.
But it is human and philosophical to hope against hope. More-
over, such hopes are counterbalanced by skeptical thoughts in regard 
to the philosophical process: “I even believe that we sometimes find 
the truth concerning problems of considerable importance. But the 
misfortune is that we never know we have found it.” Philosophy 
resembles Blind Man’s Bluff, a child’s game. The blindfolded phi-
losopher sometimes grasps the truth, but not knowing its name, he 
has to let it go. This image of the philosopher indicates a truth of 
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grave importance. It is commonly recognized that human beings in 
the stream of action, and particularly the great men of history, like 
Caesar, do not know how they have achieved their glory and domina-
tion; for this reason, they refer to their good luck. Fontenelle makes 
the same statement in regard to philosophy and the philosophers. We 
do not think as philosophers, but we are possessed by philosophy. It 
is the greatness and misery of man that he is directed toward theo-
retical truth but becomes subject to the domineering spirit of philos-
ophy. Reflections on the uniqueness of the philosophical attitude in 
the human situation are a basic theme of the Dialogues. Few are the 
philosophers in the world of history because people are not inclined 
to give themselves to the disinterested pursuit of truth. Thus, the idea 
of the progress of the mind is compatible with a profound pessimism 
as to the nature of man in social action.
Fontenelle analyzed the ways of human action that have made 
place for the role of human passions in the process of history. Grim 
nature, in the diversity of her desires, is manifest in all ways of human 
behavior. All social roles are expressions of the fundamental needs of 
human beings for recognition. People are ruled by the lust for glory, 
which satisfies human vanity. People pretend to ideal motives, but 
these are nothing but ideologies. In his analysis of Hernán Cortés, 
Fontenelle condemned as cynical ideology the claim of the Span-
ish Conquistador that he acted lawfully and justly in the occupation 
of Mexico.
All human motives arise out of desires to satisfy the needs for 
self-realization and recognition. Fontenelle attempted to establish 
the uncertain character of all ideal motives. His Plato [c. 428–c. 348 
BC] flatly refuses to be a Platonist in matters of love, knowing very 
well indeed that physical needs are inseparable from love. Love is a 
complex phenomenon—the physical and the spiritual are interde-
pendent. Love may be incited by the mind, but it will always meet 
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with the passions of the body. Men and women have only two ways 
of trying to fulfill their desires: ambition and love. The two passions 
are of parallel shape. Both are infinite; both open up new vistas and 
endless horizons. Fontenelle ridiculed a princess who believed that 
the realization of true love would bring a conclusion to the search for 
peace of mind. There is no limit to the ambitions and the erotic lust 
of men. The folly of human beings is most conspicuous in the sphere 
of sex relationships.
In the Dialogues, Fontenelle presented a typology of love rela-
tionships that illustrates the unromantic reality of human intimacy. 
First, there is the pattern of destructiveness, the completely selfish 
and self-centered passion for happiness, pleasure, and adoration. 
Mary Stuart [1542–1587] sacrificed David Rizzio [1533–1566] to her 
lust without understanding that she had alienated him from himself 
and was responsible for his death. There is, second, the type of rec-
ognized futility. The Virgin Queen makes it clear, though in veiled 
terms, that she has passed through all stages of expectation and ful-
fillment. Elizabeth I [1533–1603] carefully phrases her conception of 
the futility of sexual pleasure. She states that people should never 
scrutinize in detail the pleasures of love, for these joys cannot stand 
a thorough examination. They are like bogs and swamps that we 
should trespass on with light feet and quick pace in order to reach 
solid ground. And third, there is the pattern of total ambiguity. The 
famous mistresses of kings exchange reminiscences of their power 
over their foolish lovers, recalling the methods they have success-
fully followed. They all agree that prudence, beauty, and esprit are 
the necessary tools, with esprit defined as the intellectual discipline 
that covered their pretense of love. They never knew whether they 
acted in order to appear lovable or whether they loved as ambitious 
women who were thirsting for domination and power. They never 
underestimated the role of chance in their dangerous game of ambi-
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guity. They were safe as long as their lovers took their appearance 
of love as reality. But not one of them could predict how long she 
would be lovable in the eyes of the dupe of the comedy. Neither their 
prudence nor their beauty could give them security. Love, both real 
and false, is completely irrational in the game of the sexes in which 
victors and vanquished alike are dupes.
Fontenelle covered in the Dialogues the complex human situation 
that results from man’s standing between the opposite poles of the 
theoretical and the erotic. He pictured the ridiculous situations that 
have derived from the prevailing irrational motives in social action, 
the senseless occasions that have led to great historical catastrophes. 
Such completely inadequate causes of overwhelming events have 
induced historians to falsify the truth and to invent solemn and grave 
motivations. Fontenelle portrayed the proud Charles V [1500–1558], 
who boasted that he was ruler of two worlds in a conversation with 
Desiderius Erasmus [1466–1536], who tries to break his pride. Eras-
mus demonstrates that Charles had no personal merit in the acquisi-
tion of his empire; everything had come to him through marriage or 
inheritance. Charles, however, retorts that this is the human lot, that 
Erasmus himself should consider that his genius was not his own 
merit either, but the result of an infinite number of causes the com-
bination of which we call chance until we are able to explain them.
Fontenelle was consistent when he described human ideals as 
chimeras. Chimeras are fictitious, but they have reality in the pro-
cess of human action. They are the prerequisites of all individual and 
collective efforts toward some kind of perfection. It was Fontenelle’s 
contention that men accomplish the possible only when they reach 
for the impossible. Men are always in search of chimeras and spirits 
that transcend the human sphere. They will always be disappointed 
and frustrated, but they will start all over again to look for new ide-
als. Molière [1622–1673] alone cannot be fooled because he has tested 
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his philosophy by experience. When all tragedies have vanished, 
Molière’s work will remain. “One who wishes to work for immortal-
ity should picture the world of dupes and fools.”
Fontenelle was not alarmed about the condition humaine. The 
world of human folly will never end in a state of anarchy. Nature, 
which has produced the homo faber, has equipped him with enough 
prudence and instincts to assure his survival. “The natural order of 
the universe pursues calmly its own way. Nature will always achieve 
what needs to be done, through our folly if it cannot be got from our 
reason.”
Men never know what they are doing when they act. Caesar could 
not understand how he had accomplished his deeds and, thus, he 
ascribed everything to his luck or to his star. Often people strive for 
specific ends and achieve something completely different. “Every-
thing is uncertain. It seems that fortune is anxious to see to it that 
the same acts may result in different achievements. Fortune likes to 
make sport of human reason and to demonstrate its frailty, as it does 
not admit hardfast rules.”
The Dialogues contain Fontenelle’s philosophy in a nutshell 
although they do not yet articulate his discovery of the progressive 
mind. His theory of the stream of nature and of mind’s transcen-
dence breaks through his broad analysis of the areas of human folly. 
This philosophy is a philosophy of life in the tradition of Montaigne’s 
essays. The Dialogues picture the human race on the move, always 
searching for a goal in order to attain satisfaction and recognition. 
It is the lot of all men and women to be on the march toward some-
thing that they are not, and can never be.
Fontenelle’s essay on happiness, too, has a specific relevance to his 
philosophy of life. In contrast to the Stoics, Fontenelle held that only 
in a minor degree does happiness depend on ourselves. We contrib-
ute something by intellectual discipline—we can remove imaginary 
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evils, the drive toward suffering, the urge toward eternal mourning, 
through reflection on the variable character of man. But most people 
will never be happy because they are too busy winning or maintain-
ing prestige, wealth, and power. Happy are only the few who are pre-
disposed by their moderation and kindness to accept the advice of 
their consciences, those who possess themselves in actuality without 
escaping into the future in hope or fear. This is the ideal of happiness 
that Montaigne achieved through the practice of philosophy.
Fontenelle seriously considered whether happiness consists in 
the insignificant goods: a conversation among friends, an eloquent 
silence between lovers, a lonely walk on a brisk fall day, a spirited 
hunt in the forest. Such are the gifts of a stingy Fortuna; most peo-
ple afterward regret that they have not counted them as blessings. 
Passing pleasures, however, are not happiness. The ups and downs 
between moments of pleasure, the pains with which we pay for brief 
enjoyments, suggested to Fontenelle a solution that is in line with 
his scientific and mathematical philosophy. He invented a calculus 
of happiness that made it possible to measure the amount of good in 
our pleasure and the quantity of suffering in our pains. This device 
would give men direction and a measuring rod for their conduct.
There are only a few simple goods that do not involve painful 
cost. These, universally recognized as lasting values, are peace of 
mind, trust in friends, and love of study. Fontenelle concluded that 
the highest good in the human situation is the happiness of living in 
complete harmony with oneself. But this true state of happiness can 
be realized only under one condition of which we are not masters. 
Between poverty and grandeur, people can achieve happiness in a state 
of the mean. Avoidance of the vices of power and of poverty is the true 
condition for happiness of the few who abstain from the temptations of 
the world and from the seductions of the passions. In this conclusion, 
Fontenelle appears as a genuine disciple of Descartes and Montaigne. 
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III 
As a heretic Cartesian, Fontenelle made his greatest contribution in 
his ideas on the philosophy of history, which he developed in two 
directions. In the Origin of Fables, he studied a stage in the progress 
of the mind, while in the History of Oracles, he exhibited man’s rea-
sons for attempting to prevent progress. His hope for a continuous, 
progressive chain of philosophers was closely bound up with his fear 
of the folly and stupidity of the mob.
The Origin of Fables was keen pioneering. This essay on mythi-
cal thinking, based on Fontenelle’s postulate of the progress of the 
mind toward a scientific age, is a daring approach to a theory of 
symbolic forms. It begins with a revolutionary comparison of Greek 
and American Indian mythologies, both of which arose out of the 
intellectual state of primitivism. In contrast to most of his con-
temporaries, Fontenelle held that myths are not pure fiction, but a 
mixture of the true and the false. The true elements are drawn from 
recollections of the past, the false elements from distortions of the 
past in oral traditions, or from pictures of the imagination. Myths—
Fontenelle spoke of fables—are modes of knowledge in the age of 
the primitive mind, specific patterns of causation that explain the 
workings of nature in terms of superhuman action.
Primitive peoples, Fontenelle held, explain unknown nature by 
the familiar principles derived from practical experience in main-
taining their existence. In order to explain things unknown, they 
transfer this primitive knowledge of causation to divine beings; they 
think in terms of a causal process in nature brought about by super-
human acts of the gods. This is the first stage of knowledge. The gods 
are conceived in the image of supermen; their attributes are force, 
potency, and violence. They are thought to be cruel, unjust, and 
ignorant. With the advance of reason, this picture changes and men 
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transform the image of the gods; they are then believed to be wise, 
just, charitable, and prudent. Finally, mythical thinking conceives of 
philosophical divinities, and the myth shifts to historical thinking 
and to its scientific methods of explanation and hypothetical inter-
pretations.
Fontenelle anticipated the perspective later developed by Ernst 
Cassirer [1874–1945] on Kantian assumptions that elements of 
mythical thinking do not completely vanish with the advance of sci-
entific thinking. They remain as residues and exert influence on value 
judgments and the philosophical vision of the universe. Fontenelle 
explicitly maintained that mythical thinking and religious think-
ing are natural phenomena of knowledge through which the mind 
passes in its evolution. More objective than Voltaire, he admitted 
throughout his works that myth and religion are necessary forms 
of knowledge, stages in the unfolding of the scientific mind. They 
express a historical phase in the progress of the mind, though there 
may come times when mankind will be enlightened by scientific phi-
losophers and will not be in need of past patterns for constructing an 
intelligible view of the whole.
The growth of scientific explanation implies a decrease of mythi-
cal thinking and, thus, a decline of marvels, miracles, and religions. 
More specifically, history loses the mixture of true and false in 
its mythical recollections. Historians begin to penetrate into the 
motives of agents and to understand their characters with reference 
to the needs of a given situation. Fontenelle considered such inter-
pretations an advance, though limited and uncertain in their scien-
tific validity. He felt that we can never wholly trust the interpretive 
method. There always remains a flexible element of guesswork that 
is almost impossible to estimate correctly. The historian remains the 
author of certain manipulated and artificial constructs that may be 
called “fables of prejudice.”
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The historian, Fontenelle saw, benefits from the progress of sci-
entific thinking. It gives him opportunities to refine his construc-
tion of the probabilities, hazards, and necessities that make up the 
whole progress of history. In this evolution, history becomes a truly 
important discipline, contributing to a science of man and to moral 
philosophy. Fontenelle was deeply convinced that history is not 
worth the effort if it does not inform us about the variety of human 
possibilities in the diversity of human situations. Scientific history 
is a division of philosophical anthropology, as modern philosophers 
would say. And, apart from its contribution to moral philosophy, 
it can become a tool for understanding ourselves in relation to our 
fellowmen.
Fontenelle, developing his conception of the historicity of man, 
spoke of the concrete historical man, l’homme en détail, and his con-
tinuous changing. But he recognized the identity of human nature 
in spite of the plurality of historical patterns and their continuous 
transformations. The philosopher stresses the context of meaning, 
l’âme des faits, in the bewildering variety of historical experience. 
The genuine historian investigates the conditions and the condi-
tioning responses of men that, taken together, make it possible to 
construct historical forms and images relevant to understanding the 
greatness and misery of the condition humaine.
Scientific history is the analysis of the unfolding mind in all its 
manifestations. It is necessary to explain the transformations and 
renovations of ideas, values, tastes, social conventions, and norms 
of behavior. These changes take place in an almost imperceptible 
process. They seem to be arbitrary, but Fontenelle knew that there 
are hidden and necessary relations that are open to explanation. He 
mentioned the profound changes that had occurred during his life-
time, changes that had affected all patterns of conduct. At the end 
of the seventeenth century, it was taken for granted that members 
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of society had esprit. Polite and refined conversation was the high-
est pleasure of sociability. Everyone was concerned with linguistic 
standards and poetic imagination; tragedy and the novel were the 
mode; the salon was a forum where men and women displayed their 
intellectual independence in discussing the new philosophy. But in 
the eighteenth century, this pattern changed to its extreme opposite. 
There was then no value in the spirit of conversation; gambling had 
taken its place. Sentimentalism became a substitute for esprit; the 
charms of cultivated language and of classical literature had disap-
peared in favor of romantic and pleasant authors.
Such changes, Fontenelle held, were not the work of chance. He 
was convinced that a micro-historical analysis would disclose that 
the movement of the mind is ruled by laws intelligible to scientific 
inquiry. This trust in the progress of scientific method extended to 
the political world. He was absolutely sure that the methods devel-
oped by mathematics and physics could be applied to the field of 
politics—that the hidden laws of politics could be disclosed by 
scientific analysis. Thus, politics, formerly the area of the greatest 
irrationality, would be liberated, and scientific controls would be 
established. (Prince Klemens von Metternich [1773–1859] liked 
to read Fontenelle for his insights into the prudence and folly that 
people exhibit in their social roles on the world stage.) 
Fontenelle was emphatic in asserting that the philosopher needs 
courage and vigilance. The evolution of reason meets with prejudices 
and universal inertia, which prevent the thinker from examining 
traditions and beliefs that are taken for granted. The truly scientific 
philosopher of history would analyze the lasting conflict between 
the philosopher and traditional societies that cling to their indoctri-
nated habits and prejudices. Genuine history would be the scientific 
discipline that describes and explains the unceasing battle between 
the advancing mind and traditional beliefs.
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Fontenelle recognized this situation as inevitable. He character-
ized faith, belief, and prejudice by the summary concept of error. 
As a philosopher, he rejected such beliefs and prejudices, but as a 
philosopher of history, he praised them. Social life is based on errors. 
They make life possible and bearable. Fontenelle widened the scope 
of the idea of error to include everything that is not scientific reason, 
as Bernard Mandeville [1670–1733] called vice all behavior patterns 
not in complete harmony with established laws.
Prejudices, beliefs, and superstitions were, in Fontenelle’s eyes, 
errors that are blessings to human beings. They alone assure the con-
tinuity and duration of social life. They make possible the respect-
ability of social roles; they satisfy the cravings for recognition; they 
create the reality of the fictitious carnival that we call society. They 
strengthen our will to believe, to trust, and to indulge in all kinds 
of illusions. For this reason, Fontenelle thought it necessary to com-
plement the Origin of Fables with the History of Oracles. Together, 
the two works are parts of a project on the philosophy of history for 
which we have only notes. These notes present the dynamics of his-
tory, the impetus of progress, and the elements of resistance. Persis-
tent inertia, the “sleep of the world,” imposes unremitting hardships 
on the progressive mind in its efforts to enlighten men. Fontenelle 
reflected on the human conditions that produce these continuing 
antagonisms.
The History of Oracles is a popularization of a scholarly book 
by Antonius Van Dale [1638–1708], a Protestant Dutch writer who 
attacked and criticized the marvels of the Catholic faith, ridiculing 
the superstitions prevailing among Catholics. Fontenelle took the 
risk of using such a book as a stepping-stone and as a disguise for 
a general inquiry into the miracle, the basic religious phenomenon. 
The term oracle hides his true subject, which was miracles, and their 
acceptance by individuals and groups.
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Fontenelle had been a disciple of the Jesuits, with whom he 
remained on cordial terms. He was a practicing Catholic all his life, 
and his brothers were priests or occupied ecclesiastical positions. As 
a philosopher, however, he was compelled to submit to the demands 
of his free and independent mind. He was not willing to accept 
beliefs unquestioningly when he could find causal explanations for 
the motives that induced men to believe rather than to inquire.
We may see in the History of Oracles a remarkable study of the 
will to believe, an advance critique of William James’s [1842–1910] 
famous book. Here, Fontenelle analyzed the reasons that make it 
possible for human beings to accept the supernatural or superra-
tional. He tried to find out what it is that impels men to yearn for the 
occult, the supernatural; he was anxious to know the significance 
of the longing for the miraculous. The attempt to answer this ques-
tion involves a prescientific pioneering in collective psychology. It 
is almost a summary of the reflections on the role of imagination 
in social behavior and thought that were available to Fontenelle in 
the works of Niccolò Machiavelli [1469–1527], Erasmus, and Mon-
taigne.
Men, contended Fontenelle, are always carried away by their fears 
and hopes; people never live in the present because they are never in 
control of themselves. Being in fear of the present, they hope for a 
better future. Whether dominated by fear or hope, they escape into 
unreality, building up chimeras, wish dreams, a belief in superhu-
man interference. It is this faith in divine or demonic beings superior 
to man, nature, and history that makes society persist. As a mat-
ter of fact, the most elementary human relationships are based on 
trust—that is, on a belief that our friends, our cherished next of kin, 
our fellow workers and business partners will live up to our human 
and moral expectations. Such trust has no scientific basis; it is a blind 
belief that frequently amounts to a belief in miracles. People would 
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rather believe in miracles than be skeptical as to the trustworthi-
ness of their fellowmen.
In the tradition of Montaigne, Fontenelle knew that such beliefs 
are the easiest way to conformism. He recognized that habit is man’s 
second nature. People cling to the prejudices with which they have 
been indoctrinated by their environment. They are satisfied with 
them because these prejudices relieve them of fear and personal 
responsibilities. Fontenelle was well aware of the temptations to iner-
tia that tradition and accepted authority foster in the human mind. 
This kind of docile conformism extends to the world of the unknown 
and unintelligible, which people are ready to admire and to consider 
a reality. He emphasized the frailty of the human mind that per-
mits men to believe in the reality of the unreal and in the unreality 
of the real, as exemplified by ghosts, witches, sorcerers, and mental 
derangement.
Fontenelle stressed this strange craving for the miraculous by ana-
lyzing the history of miracles and oracles as they appear in the docu-
ments and traditions of the pagan and Christian past. The Christians 
had tried to establish a complete break with the pagan tradition of 
oracles, which they attributed to demons. They believed that they 
had a monopoly on genuine miracles—that is, those revealed by God. 
The Christian historians were impelled by their zeal and fanaticism 
to invent fictitious sources in order to justify their faith in miracles. 
Fontenelle showed that these sources—such as the falsifications of 
the Epistles or the Apostles, or the non-authentic gospels—were 
worthless if pious frauds. He found bad faith, ignorance, and folly 
at the very foundation of the Christian tradition and concluded that 
the belief in miracles as one root of religion must be based on a will 
to believe.
The will to believe arises out of a fundamental human need. Two 
different desires merge in its formation: first, a wish to recognize an 
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eternal being within the unceasing changes of nature and history, 
an urge directed toward rest, tranquility, and peace; and second, an 
infinite curiosity to know what is beyond the process of everyday 
life and human experience. Men by nature long for the reality of the 
unreal, the unreality of the real, and the naturalness of the super-
natural. This is a necessary attitude of the imperfect, futile, and frail 
human being; it expresses the true ambiguity of his strength and his 
weakness.
Fontenelle derived his findings from his analysis of human affec-
tions, of fear and hope, wishful thinking and utopian dreaming, 
imaginative planning and messianic vision. Wherever they clash 
with reality, the belief in miracles is born, and the fundamental state 
of mind is the same in all religions. Hence, there never was anything 
mysterious about the miracles. They were simply a means by which 
the priests took advantage of the people’s will to believe. Eventually, 
such conspicuous frauds were bound to open the eyes of the edu-
cated and the ignorant alike. Thus, with the progress of the mind, the 
will to believe is bound to give way to the will to find the truth. Yet 
the belief in miracles will return since the masses will always long for 
the supernatural and for the fascination of magic.
From his Cartesian position, Fontenelle rejected all grounds for 
the belief in miracles and regarded nature as totally explainable. 
From his Montaignesque position, he declared nothing to be surpris-
ing once the folly of men is acknowledged, and thus he considered 
it unnecessary to seek further causes for the universality of super-
stition, which constitutes an ever-recurring offense to reason. He 
had no illusions about the power of the irrational in the life of man 
in history. It will remain a driving force in the drama of mankind. 
Therefore, the greatest effort is needed in order to advance the light 
of reason, to work for the progress of the mind. One who dares to 
philosophize will be able to free himself of ignorance, inertia, and 
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the tedium of everyday life. The person liberated by philosophy will 
wish to share his happiness with his fellowmen and will enlighten 
them with the torch of truth.
As a genuine philosopher, Fontenelle was both historical and 
transhistorical. He dared to be wise. He invited the ignorant to fol-
low him and to gain knowledge and a spirit of criticism. He hoped 
that philosophic education would be an important stride forward 
in the liberation of modern society from traditional prejudices. The 
philosophy of life that he elaborated was in full accord with those 
later presented to us by Bergson and Simmel. In his radical analy-
sis of the will to believe, he was a forerunner of William James. He 
opened up a new perspective on mythical thinking, which antici-
pated Cassirer’s theory of symbolic forms. His philosophy of history 
entitles him to a place beside Jacob Burckhardt [1818–1897], who, 
indeed, was more limited.
IV 
Fontenelle was internationally famous as the encyclopedic writer 
who delivered the eulogies of his fellow scholars and scientists in his 
capacity as secretary to the Académie des Sciences. These documents 
are precious and require mention in any evaluation of Fontenelle. 
They constitute an indispensable reference source for the history of 
the sciences in their pre-specialized state. The scholars he praised 
were all philosophers. As botanists and physicians, mathematicians 
and physicists, they lived, nevertheless, in a universe of learning; 
they wished to discover the nature of all living. Equally notable 
are the eulogies of the associated members of the academy, such as 
the unforgettable image of Mme de Lambert [1647–1733], who was 
dedicated to the advancement of learning. Moreover, Fontenelle’s 
eulogies deserve our lasting admiration as manifestations of cour-
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age and generosity. He was generous in his treatment of those who 
committed errors or were mistaken in their friendships or enmities. 
Throughout the eulogies, he proved himself superior to his fellow-
men in courtesy and tenderness of heart and to men of letters in the 
versatility of his mind.
Fontenelle displayed great courage in his eulogy of Sébastien 
Le Prestre de Vauban [1633–1707]. The famous engineer and social 
reformer had written the Dixme Royale in order to help the king and 
his subjects construct an independent tax system that would elimi-
nate the power of the tax farmers. The book was suppressed before 
publication, and no one was permitted to mention it. Fontenelle, the 
cautious and prudent conformist, had the courage to speak of the 
book, though he mentioned neither its title nor its content. At the 
end of his eulogy, he said of Vauban: “He was passionately attached 
to the king, a subject of ardent and zealous loyalty. He was never a 
courtier; he preferred to serve rather than to please. No one has been 
so often and so courageously the pioneer of truth. He had an almost 
imprudent passion for the establishment of truth, to which he dedi-
cated himself without any reservations.” Fontenelle knew from his 
own experience that even a prudent passion for truth had its dangers 
in an age of total conformism.
Finally, the eulogies stress the relevance of the human coefficient 
to the specific philosophical or scientific achievements of the men 
remembered. Today, they are still normative patterns for recalling 
the chain of death and life in which we are the latest links, working 
toward the progress of the mind in spite of the condition humaine.
There have been times when the spirit of enlightenment turned 
into the tyranny of progress. The spirit of the historical Enlighten-
ment came to an end in the cult of reason. All historical phenomena 
have their positive and negative aspects, according to their specific 
historical patterns. But there will be recurrent situations when the 
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spirit of enlightenment and the criticism of religion and traditions 
will be more pious and constructive than the established and unques-
tioned authorities of church, state, or philosophical sect. The unfold-
ing of the mind is a dynamic process in which its own objectivations 
are broken up in order that they may attain to a new constructive 
power and a new perspective on life and its open stream.
6
Louis Duc de Saint-Simon:
Class Consciousness of the Defeated
It is imperative to give Louis de Rouvroy, Duc de Saint-Simon 
[1675–1755] a place of his own. His Mémoires do not fit into any of 
the historical classifications the political and literary historians have 
constructed. His work has nothing of the classical style of the seven-
teenth century, nor has it the sentimentalism of the eighteenth.
Unable to write in the classical style, Saint -Simon felt quite 
incompetent as an author. But his principle of writing seems to 
the contemporary reader much richer and more powerful than the 
rationalism or sentimentalism of his time. Saint-Simon’s style was 
based on a conception of man as a stream of consciousness that 
moves and is moved in the context of his life, acting, and being acted 
upon—a strange and wonderful phenomenon in which everything 
could coexist, the sublime and the vulgar, the heroic and the vile, the 
ridiculous and the tragic, the proud and the despicable.
The author called his Mémoires “contemporary history,” indicat-
ing the lasting interdependence of the present with past and future, 
the depth levels of man’s historical existence. Furthermore, the term 
encompasses all human events beyond the routine of everyday life, 
Published originally in a slightly different form in Albert Salomon, In Praise of 
Enlightenment (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1963). Republished by permission from 
Frank Salomon.
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everything unusual, rare, tragic, funny, repulsive, attractive, lovely, 
and grim. All such aspects of life are worth recording. Thus, the 
Mémoires have rightly been called the Comédie Humaine. Charles 
Augustin Sainte -Beuve [1804–1869] referred to the author as “un 
Tacite à la Shakespeare.”
Saint-Simon’s description of the patterns of court behavior has 
become a model of analysis. He portrays a total social situation in 
change and transition in which most people are completely absorbed 
in their social roles. In the political and military spheres, however, 
the author does not render the total structure of social action, but 
analyzes only specific configurations of men and those character 
traits that explain their success and failure.
Most relevant to the contemporary reader is the sociological 
reflection on the social situation of his class. Saint-Simon developed 
the class consciousness of a defeated elite, demonstrating the thesis 
that class consciousness comes from the top of society. 
✴     ✴     ✴
Michel de Montaigne [1533–1593] had considered two ways of 
writing history: academic historiography and the historical descrip-
tion of practical affairs by the men who actually participated in 
them. The professor of history was, to Montaigne, an intellectual 
who studied philology and rhetoric and was able to construct an 
artificial world of historical reality from the study of mere docu-
ments. Statesmen and ministers, diplomats and agents, were often 
impelled to write history in the form of Mémoires, or recollections. 
Their aim was eminently practical. They wanted to justify or defend 
their own actions, stressing their expectations, plans, and goals in 
their fields of action (seen from their own subjective perspective). 
Quite often, they candidly disclosed their errors and frustrations, 
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the miscalculation of their strength and of the forces of their adver-
saries. The great political “recollections,” from Cardinal Richelieu 
[1585–1642] to Otto von Bismarck [1815–1898] and Harry Truman 
[1884–1972], however subjective and prejudiced, have, nevertheless, 
a greater claim to a rendering of historical reality than the academic 
constructions of fictitious historical reality. Men of affairs have, it 
would seem, an advantage over the professors in that they under-
stand how human beings act in their everyday lives (as rulers, min-
isters, ambassadors, and the like). They know, far better than most 
academicians, the underlying reality beneath the ostensibly harmo-
nious picture most of us have of our world; being informed by their 
spies and agents about the nature of their opponents, they are able 
to learn in the most concrete fashion the inner workings of their 
social milieu. The experience of political life as a continuous struggle 
between equal and unequal bodies, and as a permanent conflict for 
supremacy, is an invaluable asset for the statesman who writes his 
Mémoires. He is able to give a dynamic perspective and totality to his 
history; his candor and discipline enable him to report objectively on 
men’s faults, errors, and miscalculations. Neither success nor failure 
is necessarily related to true or false expectations or planning, for 
unpredictable elements can always occur that can change the con-
catenation of forces. 
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were heir to a wealth 
of political Mémoires. Written in an age of deep social transforma-
tion, they sought to describe a changing world, reporting the cur- 
rent political scene by means of psychological analysis. Richelieu’s 
“Political Testament” and the Mémoires of François VI, Duc de La 
Rochefoucauld [1613–1680] and of Jean François Paul de Gondi, 
Cardinal de Retz [1613–1679] document the forces that made pos-
sible the absolute state, as well as those that provided resistance to 
this revolutionary innovation.
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Among the Mémoires that encompass the transition from the 
seventeenth to the eighteenth century, those by Louis Duc de Saint-
Simon are the most remarkable—not because they cover a long 
period and consist of forty-one volumes, but because they penetrate 
the last twenty-five years of the rule of Louis XIV [1638–1715] and 
the Régence from 1715 to 1723 in a sincere effort to lay the founda- 
tions for an objective and scientific treatment of his age that assumes 
the form of a precritical historiography. Saint-Simon lived as a court-
ier after he resigned from the army in 1702. For over twenty years he 
took notes; every night he wrote in his diaries what he had observed 
and learned about persons, situations, and events. He exploited the 
knowledge of his friends in the ministry and in the military. He 
carefully listened to his wife, questioned his brothers and sisters-in-
law, and was on the best terms with the king’s physicians and chief 
valet. He was highly appreciated as a confidant by many ladies at 
the court, whose stories were a valuable source of information about 
love, sex, and business at Versailles. He did not seem to mind that he 
was not honored with a court office. He had his own assignment—to 
recount for posterity his world, in its living concreteness and totality. 
Because he took the conception of scientific history very seriously, he 
had an insatiable curiosity about everything human. For the same 
reason, he described everyone in his “Portraits” with a well-balanced 
impartiality—even those he hated most (such as the king; Françoise 
d’Aubigné, Marquise de Maintenon [1635–1719]; Louis de France, 
son of Louis XIV, known as “Le Grand Dauphin” or “Monseigneur” 
[1661–1711]; and Cardinal Guillaume Dubois [1656–1723]).
History, considered as a discipline, is the scientific treatment of 
the past. Saint-Simon, however, stated that he intended to write “con-
temporary history” as a scientific discipline, in spite of the fact that he 
was personally and profoundly involved in his own proposed subject 
matter. Though he was never wholly explicit about it, the term con- 
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temporary history meant different things to him. The contemporary 
is historical because the present is always directed toward the future 
and carries within itself its own past. The elements making up this 
stream can be beliefs, recollections, traditions, ways of life—surviv-
ing and coexisting along with new patterns of behavior. Saint-Simon 
was deeply shocked when he regarded himself as an element of the 
past caught up in the accelerated tempo of social change—he felt old 
and part of a revered political tradition in a world in which a new 
society had established a new social system within the framework of 
the traditional monarchy.
In addition, “contemporary history” meant to him the total social 
situation—that is, the fact that all human acts, thoughts, feelings, 
gestures, attitudes, and the like are determined by the dynamic con-
text of the field of forces that constitute in their totality the condition 
humaine. Saint-Simon conceived of the total social situation as an 
analysis of the depths of social conduct within its specific historical 
context. First, he described the various social roles. There are the 
institutional roles that tradition and destiny impose on some men: 
rulers, slaves, servants, and the like. Some of these identify them-
selves with their roles; some attempt to escape the normativity of 
their position; others are forced into playing a role by means of flat-
tery or because of the images of greatness and glory that courtiers 
and subjects require of their rulers. Other persons arrive at their 
roles by chance or fortune (e.g., mistresses of the king; the king’s 
grandson, who became king of Spain). Some might acquire their 
roles through ambition and lust for power (e.g., Louis August, Duc 
de Maine [1670–1736]). Still others, seeking moral and spiritual 
integrity, might take leave of every social role.
Saint-Simon carefully distinguished the place of social roles in the 
self-realization of human beings from the development, beyond their 
roles, of personal character traits and human passions and whims. 
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He is deeply convinced of the uniqueness and identity of individual 
human beings. What constitutes human nature, what has the great-
est significance in the structures of the condition humaine, is under 
the pressure of constantly changing circumstances. Saint-Simon is 
absolutely certain that men are profoundly molded by the require-
ments of their social interaction. Social relationships disclose the 
precariousness and ambiguity in human action—men living with, 
for, and against one another. Men pretend and parade, betray and 
reveal themselves; they “seem” and “sham,” simulate and dissimu-
late; they “play” public roles and are different in their private lives; 
their behavior is esoteric and exoteric, overt and disguised, accord-
ing to the requirements of the situation and their own purposes and 
goals. Saint-Simon is as deeply critical of the nature of human beings 
as was Montaigne in the “Apology of Raymond de Sebond.” For this 
reason, his notion of “contemporary history” encompasses the total 
social situation, thereby illuminating the complexity of being human 
in the world of here and now. Contemporary history presents men 
in living social interaction with all its contradictions, ambiguities, 
and ambivalences. Human beings within and beyond their social 
roles—as parts of nature, history, and society—are the true subject 
matter of his work.
Saint-Simon’s intention to write about his own world from a 
detached and scientific standpoint is not quite fulfilled, as he insists 
on the right of the scientific historian to express value judgments. 
He did not believe that the critical examination of human social 
behavior is sufficient when it merely describes in an impartial man-
ner the selfishness and often-vicious acts and attitudes of men. 
Saint-Simon’s moral indignation needed an outlet that he found by 
explicitly expressing value judgments on such behavior. Selfish and 
evil men have enough success and pleasure, recognition and glory, 
during their lifetime; the historian, at least, should be permitted to 
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inform posterity and to deliver moral judgments. Saint-Simon bases 
his judgments on Christian or philosophical standards of moral 
behavior.
Men are subject to moral norms that regulate the process of social 
action and establish social standards. However, most people make 
their vested interests the guiding ideals of their lives and only pre-
tend to follow the established normative patterns. Only a few men are 
naturally dedicated to the goals of moral conduct; only a small group 
will preserve their integrity by giving service to the state, the Church, 
or by genuinely developing themselves within the framework of their 
own particular roles. Because this is a universal truth in the histori-
cal life of man, Saint-Simon felt that the historian should be entitled 
to pass judgments on the conduct of man over and above causal or 
other analyses. For this reason, his “contemporary history” is indeed 
a radical innovation, emphasizing as it does neither political, social, 
nor ecclesiastical histories, but rather the total human being. This 
visionary concept implies a variety of methods that, though “presci-
entific” (one might better say imperfectly scientific), we would call 
today psychological, sociological, and even existentialist. Nothing is 
more revealing about the prescience of this approach than the fol-
lowing passage from the preface to the Mémoires:
To write the history of one’s own country and time 
means to construct with refined reflection everything 
that one has seen, handled, or learned from unimpeach-
able sources; it means to report what has happened on 
the stage of the theater of the world, to recall the diverse 
interest groups and the obviously tiny irrelevant events 
which touched upon the configuration of events and 
produced the greatest impact on future developments. It 
means to demonstrate to oneself step by step the nothing-
ness of the world, of its fears, of its desires, of its hopes, 
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of its disasters, of its accidents, of its labors; it means to 
convince oneself of the emptiness of everything in the 
short and rapid duration of all these things and of the 
life of men. It means to remember that no one has really 
been happy and that felicity and serenity do not exist in 
the world; it means to give evidence to the fact that if 
the many people necessarily mentioned here could have 
foreseen the success of their efforts, of their sweat, of 
their intrigues, at least a dozen would have abandoned 
their views and pretensions[.]
The statement is a most eloquent and articulate description of the 
author’s intentions. Man acting and being acted upon, the total 
human being as a sociohistorical creature, is the leitmotiv of such a 
history. It is a position that is closer to our own philosophical and 
historical methods than to those of the eighteenth century.
Saint-Simon inaugurated the trend toward sociological histo-
riography as it has been lucidly and rigorously developed in our 
times by Sir Lewis Bernstein Namier [1888–1960] and his disciples. 
In the analysis of the court of Louis XIV, Saint-Simon performed 
some remarkable sociological analyses; his “Portraits” are a striking 
example of the type of descriptive analysis that transforms the sub-
jects into symbols and images of the various types of human action 
within a continuously changing social context.
Knowledge of Saint-Simon’s method is indispensable to under-
standing the content and style of the Mémoires. His selection of 
subjects was determined by his curiosity for and fascination with 
the diversity of human patterns of action. The human coefficient in 
political, military, and ecclesiastical institutions is his chief inter- 
est, and not these institutions in their autonomy and irrevocability. 
He is anxious to stress the condition of his class and its conscious-
ness of itself as such in the precarious situation created by a social 
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revolution. Finally, he regarded those behavior patterns and human 
situations that were beyond the pale of the routine and average as 
significant in their own right and worth his concern and description. 
For this reason, the scope of his analyses and descriptions, the dra-
matic presentation of human and social situations (whether tragic 
or comic), and the depth of his imagination make him the Shake-
speare of prose. In literary style, Saint-Simon follows the tradition of 
the Annales of his beloved master, Cornelius Tacitus [56–120]. Year 
by year, he reported, described, and analyzed what seemed to him 
relevant and significant in the context of contemporary history. He 
deserves, indeed, to be called the Tacitus of the Empire of Louis XIV.
The Tacitus of Louis XIV’s Empire
Tacitus had established nostalgic historiography as a normative pat-
tern. His own hatred of the Principate and of the emperors was as 
passionate as his love for the nobles and the aristocratic elite of the 
Roman senate and of the consulares. We know today that his account 
of the Empire from Tiberius to Nero in the Annales is partisan his-
toriography. Ronald Syme [1903–1989], who has given perhaps the 
most detailed interpretation of Tacitus’s whole work, points out that 
the literary style of the Annales was a symbol of the tradition of the 
Roman aristocracy at a time when the classes making up the elite 
were rapidly changing.
Tacitus was the ideal master for Saint-Simon. He deeply appreci-
ated the Roman’s stand against imperial despotism and the abso- 
lute majesty of the ruler. He well understood the megalomania of 
the rulers as the result of prostration and flattery by their courtiers, 
ministers, and senators. He found the same characteristics in his 
own society and constantly compared the two patterns of tyranny, 
finding the same pattern of decadence in both the res publica and 
the French monarchy. The Roman Republic, under the control of an 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N186
aristocracy of office and of landed gentry, had ruled the Mediter-
ranean world but had lost its power under the military despotism of 
the emperors after Tiberius [42 BC–37 AD]. From then on, the rulers 
of Rome had the support of the wealthy classes and could slowly dis-
solve the old ruling classes. This was a genuine social transformation 
and an age of decadence for the traditional nobility.
Saint-Simon read Tacitus as a fellow historian and discovered 
their common experiences of historical and social decay. Through-
out the Mémoires, Saint-Simon recalls the former conditions of the 
nobles: their indispensable service to the king, the symbolic function 
of crowning the king at Rheims, their role in government during 
the feudal monarchy, their political activities as compared to the 
grandees of Spain. But all this was gone—the French feudal elite, 
the dukes and peers were in the same situation that the Roman 
aristocrats were in when the military tyrants overthrew the Roman 
senatorial patricians.
To Saint-Simon, the comparison disclosed a complete parallel-
ism. Tacitus had not started his story of the decadence from the 
establishment of the Principate by Augustus [63 BC–14 AD], but 
with Tiberius. So Saint-Simon did not start with Cardinal Richelieu 
or Cardinal Mazarin [1602–1661], but with the ambitious Louis XIV, 
who, though wanting to rule by himself, was pushed toward imperi-
alism by his ministers and courtiers, who played on his lust for glory 
and power.
Saint-Simon described and analyzed the last twenty-odd years of 
Louis’s rule as the decay of his successful imperialism in Europe led 
to the breakdown of the nation economically, socially, and politi-
cally. In particular, the old feudal nobility had given its sons to the 
king because it was an honor for this class to shed their blood for the 
sovereign. But this traditional relationship between the king and the 
nobles existed only on the battlefield. Because of their poverty, most 
L O U I S  D U C  D E  S A I N T-S I M O N 187
of the country gentry could not afford to live at Versailles. This meant 
they could never be promoted beyond the rank of colonel because, 
in order to advance to higher ranks, one had to live at Versailles and 
be rich as well. Thus, the old feudal families had to intermarry with 
the new financial and commercial classes in order to move higher 
in the military, for only then were they able to afford to obtain and 
maintain a higher rank.
Saint-Simon saw all these trends as a decay of the old structure 
of the feudal monarchy. He felt, as Tacitus had felt about his own 
age, that the monarchy of Louis XIV had allied itself with the new 
classes of commercial and financial wealth. These groups could give 
their sons the training and education necessary to enable them to 
buy offices in civilian and legal administration and to serve the 
king. Saint-Simon examined the ministers of the king—all the men 
who had established the military and political power of France had 
been members of the juridical nobility or came from the bourgeois 
officials in government agencies. Saint-Simon called Louis XIV “the 
king of the vile bourgeoisie”; he believed that the absolute state was 
the decadent result of the true feudal monarchy, that it was monar-
chical only in appearance and actually was the symbol of the bour-
geois revolution that would finally destroy even the last remnants of 
the monarchy itself. Though cursing the revolutionary state, he was 
candid and sincere enough to admit that the new classes in govern-
ment and administration were competent, dedicated, and alert. This 
observation, though, grimly implied a reflection back on his own 
class. The social transformation of the state marked the decline of 
the feudal nobility politically, socially, and economically: politically, 
because under the conditions of modern technological warfare, the 
king no longer had to rely upon a feudal class of nobles and knights 
and had no need to share the government with the nobles, since 
he was rebuilding it by means of the bourgeoisie; socially, because 
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the nobles who wanted some favor from the king were required to 
live at Versailles (which usually meant they had to marry into the 
wealthy bourgeoisie to afford the luxury of Versailles); economically, 
because war taxation had completely bankrupted the nobles. It was 
this reflection on his class of dukes and peers that produced in Saint-
Simon a new class consciousness.
Class Consciousness
In a stratified political system with rigid distinctions in the possible 
ways of life, an awareness of oneself as belonging to a particular class 
is simply taken for granted. However, during Saint-Simon’s time, the 
advancing bourgeoisie had not yet developed a class consciousness 
of itself. The classes established by financial and commercial wealth 
liked nothing better than to imitate the ways of life of the nobles 
and to be treated as nobles by the king. Saint-Simon reported that 
the king succeeded in persuading the most important banker of the 
time to give a loan to the state after he had refused for a long time to 
come to terms with the ministers. Members of the bourgeoisie rarely 
revolted with indignation against the pride and impertinence of the 
old aristocratic families, who behaved as if they should be humbly 
and gratefully received by the well-to-do bourgeois when they were 
good enough to marry their girls. But Saint-Simon is full of indigna-
tion when he tells such a story and is full of praise of the bourgeois 
lady who ironically responded to the impertinence of her groom’s 
family that she could not better demonstrate her respect than by not 
reciprocating the visit of the noble family.
The new social classes felt protected by the royal authority but 
had as yet no consciousness of their power over political institutions. 
In particular, without intellectuals, they could not have constructed 
a revolutionary ideology.
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In spite of the conformism prevalent among the economically 
powerful, there were responsible men in government service who 
had drafted the reports designed to inform Louis, Duc de Bour-
gogne [1682–1712] about the conditions of the different classes in 
France. They did not hide the misery of the people or the plight of 
the country gentry. Some authors approved, with keen and critical 
suggestions, a reform of the social and political systems of France. 
In 1687, the Characters by Jean de La Bruyère [1645–1696] appeared; 
in 1695, Pierre le Pesant, Sieur de Boisguilbert [1646–1714] printed 
the Detail de la France; in 1699, François Fénélon [1651–1715] pub-
lished the Télémaque, which envisioned a political utopia based on a 
conservative and constitutional monarchy; and in 1707, Sébastien Le 
Prestre de Vauban [1633–1707] wrote the Dixme Royale. Saint-Simon 
was certainly well acquainted with these books. He belonged to the 
small group of noblemen who worshipped the political philosophy 
of Fénélon, regarding it as the only way to surmount and repress the 
despotism of the absolute state.
Saint-Simon found that members of his class—the dukes and 
peers of France—were being defeated by historical circumstances. 
The king was suspicious of all old feudal families, wanting none of 
them in his service; and, as Saint-Simon pointed out, Paul Duc de 
Beauvilliers [1648–1714] was the only nobleman who had served for 
many years in high governmental office. Since the incident of the 
Fronde [a series of civil wars in France between 1648 and 1653 in the 
midst of the Franco-Spanish war—Eds.], the king had resented all 
noblemen and their clans, but he could not actually control them. 
When he dismissed them, they merely went back to their castles in 
the country and there became relatively independent. But he loved 
to employ bourgeois men of legal training. They were his creatures, 
so to speak; believing they were his own work that he could create 
and annihilate at will, he felt like God. He told his ministers that they 
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should feel grateful and humble for being permitted to serve him, 
and they should never forget that only his grace gave them status and 
prestige. Saint-Simon saw in the political and social advances of the 
economic and cultured classes, however, only the decay of his own 
class. He developed a new concept of his own class as defeated, a class 
consciousness that started at the top of society, not at its bottom. He 
was aware that every despotic regime creates a negative equality of 
all before the tyrant, that the inflated nobilitations of the bourgeois 
ministers and the favoritism shown to illegitimate children made 
the situation of the old feudal families precarious by lowering their 
social prestige.
Saint-Simon belonged to an old family of country gentlemen, his 
father having but recently been made a duke by Louis XIII. Prob-
ably, for this reason, Saint-Simon was more ducal than a duke. He 
had, indeed, such an interest in the ranks of the nobility, in their 
pedigrees, that he soon became an expert on them.
Among the dukes and peers themselves, there was a continuous 
rivalry regarding the ranks of the various clans, for rank among 
them was regarded as superior to position and function. The hier-
archy of rank among the clans depended on when each had been 
made a vassal of the crown, and their respective pedigrees gave evi-
dence of the length of time each had been a vassal. Some families 
were quite unscrupulous and ruthless in this respect, attempting to 
fix their pedigrees to suit themselves, changing their status from a 
lower to a higher position in the hierarchy by setting back the date 
of their establishment. Saint-Simon belonged to the thirteenth clan 
among the established dukes; François Henri de Montmorency, Duc 
de  Luxembourg [1628–1695], who followed him as the fourteenth, 
wanted to become the second from the top. The old clans fought his 
claims regarding the purported establishment of his clan, changing 
the date from 1662 to 1584. Though Luxembourg was supported by 
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some generals and some relatives among the dukes, Saint-Simon 
conducted the campaign against the famous general before the Par-
liament of Paris so effectively that the general’s claims were rejected. 
This success made the unknown young Saint-Simon the political pil-
lar of the dukes. As an expert on pedigrees and on establishments, he 
became the recognized leader of the dukes and peers in maintaining 
the standards of the old traditions against would-be usurpers, as well 
as against the anti-feudal policy of the king.
The class consciousness of the defeated cannot produce politi-
cally effective changes. What remains to the vanquished is just the 
old way of life in its manners, mannerisms, and patterns of behavior. 
Here they take their last stand. This is what the victors, on the other 
hand, cannot achieve because that way of life is the fruit of old tra-
ditions, of indoctrination, emulation, and discipline, practiced for 
generations; the defeated are driven back on themselves and their 
own ways by the rise of a new, more powerful class. The aesthetic 
element of their way of life, their poise, their attitudes as expressed in 
the rights and privileges of etiquette, is the last position after defeat 
in the historical process.
The Don Quixote of Etiquette 
Saint-Simon saw that this particular kind of class consciousness 
produced specific patterns of behavior and ways of life among the 
dukes and peers. These distinguished old families of the nobility 
experienced a new meaningfulness of their old rights and privileges 
that distinguished them from the new c1asses. Their titles were the 
symbols of their traditional roles in the feudal monarchy, signaling 
the closed ranks of the nobility, next to the royal family and to the 
princes of the blood.
Saint-Simon was fascinated by the strict and rigid regulations of 
the Spanish court ceremonies that both symbolized and governed 
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the rights and duties of the grandees. In particular, he gave his full 
attention to the rules that regulated the rights of the Spanish nobles 
to remain covered before the king or to cover themselves when 
invited by the king. In the historical analysis of this solemn etiquette, 
he laconically remarked that the balance of power between the feudal 
vassals and the monarchy was reflected throughout in the establish-
ment and changes of etiquette. The Hapsburg emperors and kings 
had infringed on the independence of the Spanish nobles, who were 
accustomed to appear covered before their rulers. In stages, with the 
increase of their control over the aristocracies, the Austrian kings 
changed the traditions, finally granting privileges of various kinds to 
the diverse classes of noblemen, old and new. In spite of such changes, 
Spain still remained for Saint-Simon rather like a fairy-tale country 
that still preserved the rigid rituals and ceremonies of a feudal mon-
archy. For this reason, his journey to Spain as Ambassador of France, 
to arrange the marriage of Louis XV with the Spanish Dauphine, 
was one great climax of his life. He wrote about all the details of his 
reception by the king and queen, the place of the chief of protocol 
on the stairs when he arrived for the formal audience, the arrange-
ment of the seats in the hall of audiences, and the informal visits with 
their majesties. He included drawings in his report to emphasize the 
solemnity and feudal dignity of court etiquette in Spain.
In his digression on the Spanish grandees and their etiquette, 
Saint-Simon compared their rights with those acquired by the 
French nobles. It seemed to him that the French nobles had many 
advantages over their Spanish cousins. They had truly cooperated 
with the feudal king in building up the greatness of the monarchy. 
They had raised the crown over the head of the new king at the coro-
nation at Rheims. They had enjoyed the most important offices in the 
service of the king. Actually, the monarch had been the first among 
his peers.
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He recalled the grandeur of his class in the past when he exam- 
ined its plight at the court of Versailles. While there was only one 
nobleman of distinction in the ranks of the ministers, the rest 
belonged to la noblesse de robe, or still worse, to the bourgeoisie itself. 
Saint-Simon used his ardent debunking of generals and government 
agents as a scientific device—we would say a device of the sociol-
ogy of knowledge—in order to verify the thesis that the so-called 
monarchy was actually a bourgeois revolution concealed behind the 
splendid façade of the kingdom. There were generals whose fathers 
had been clerks in Parliament or attorneys of the guilds; there were 
government officials whose ancestors had been merchants or arti-
sans. The historical process showed conspicuously the rising tide of 
bourgeois advance and penetration in government. For this reason 
Saint-Simon was resolutely determined to keep alive the rights and 
privileges of the dukes and peers, even when they had become social 
rather than political distinctions. Everywhere the bourgeois minis-
ters claimed the same rights at court as the old noble families. They 
aspired to wear the same court suits prescribed by the rules of eti-
quette for noblemen, while they were supposed to come in the official 
robes they wore in Parliament. For a long time, Saint-Simon and the 
dukes blocked egalitarian claims.
His concern for the standards and integrity of his class derived 
from his conception of the total historical context in which a new 
social world was being born. The trial against Luxembourg was but 
a symbol for the things he most highly cherished. [Luxembourg got 
caught up in L’affaire des poisons (1677–1682), a sensational criminal 
investigation and trial. He was acquitted at trial.—Eds.] By means 
of his leadership among the dukes, Saint-Simon tried to revive the 
meaning of etiquette as a factor crucial to their unity and distinc-
tion. Though his handling of the Luxembourg affair gave him a new 
reputation with the dukes, it did not impress the court, where the 
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great general had many friends. But Saint-Simon believed he had a 
worthwhile cause.
Duchesses customarily collected at the King’s Mass. Once, two 
ladies not of the highest ranks of nobility refused to collect and asked 
to be excused, whereupon Saint-Simon became alarmed and advised 
Mme de Saint-Simon and the duchesses not to collect either—in a 
kind of aristocratic sabotage of a privilege that the king considered 
an honor. Louis XIV became very angry over the incident; Saint-
Simon asked for and was granted an audience. He explained to the 
king that his whole endeavor was to rekindle the awareness of the 
diverse patterns of etiquette in order to strengthen the dedication 
of the nobles to the king’s service and to close their ranks around 
him against the onslaught of the bourgeoisie. The king seemed to be 
satisfied, but really cared little for this cause, and concluded that all 
the duchesses should collect without any exception.
Although it is impossible to mention all the rules that had been 
usages, and then codes, for the privileged classes, a few examples 
should make Saint-Simon’s zeal understandable. It was considered 
an honor, for instance, to be invited by the king to hold the candle-
stick at his coucher. Saint-Simon repeatedly stated that he was asked 
to hold the candlestick just at the time the king had blamed him for 
his intervention on behalf of the dukes. Every courtier was anxious 
to be invited to the intimate and favorite seats of the king, like the 
Château de Marly or Fontainbleau. They asked when the king came 
from Mass: “Sire, Marly?” His answer was a sign of favor or disgrace. 
Saint-Simon was for a long time in disgrace and did not go to Marly.
A distinct privilege of the dukes and duchesses was the kiss by 
the monarch. Saint-Simon still remembered when he was introduced 
to the monarch that Louis XIV kissed his father repeatedly (but, of 
course, the number of kisses referred to the rank of the family, and 
his own family was thirteenth!). Most important to the duchesses 
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was the privilege of the taboret, or the right to sit on tiny, armless, 
backless chairs. This was indeed a great honor because there was 
no alternative for the others except to stand. A duke would be quite 
willing to renounce his own privileges if he had the chance to obtain 
the taboret for his duchess. As important as the taboret was the seat 
of the dukes at the official dinner parties. The Minister of Proto- 
col had to take care of the hierarchy in seating princes and dukes. 
Madame once scolded Saint-Simon because he dared to take the seat 
belonging to a German prince. Most conspicuous in these descrip-
tions was the dramatic incident involving the wife of a minister who 
had, simply by mistake, taken the seat of a noble lady who was right 
behind her. The wife of the minister was willing to change seats, but 
the lady asked her simply to forget it. The king was upset and had an 
outburst in Mme de Maintenon’s living room—an event symbolic of 
his split loyalties. While stating that the bourgeois should be happy 
and grateful that he had admitted them to his service and even to 
the court, he insisted that they should never forget the superiority of 
the nobles to whom they owed respect and obeisance. But Louis XIV 
knew that the bourgeois ministers had made his greatness and that 
the conservative and static tradition of privileges and rights belong-
ing to the dukes was not a constructive principle of politics.
Even the prescribed robes and gowns became to Saint-Simon 
mythical forces that might revive the power of a class without politi-
cal functions. For example, he was eager to see that the etiquette for 
mourning and visits of condolence was maintained, that the rules 
of conduct as to who was obliged to visit whom on these occasions 
should be observed.
It is a rather nightmarish experience to analyze these enduring 
concerns of Saint-Simon. Here is a man of intellectual stature and 
of remarkable sensitivity, who nevertheless makes it his life’s work 
to keep up the rigid standards of social etiquette in order to pro- 
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duce the integration and the reestablishment of meaning and status 
for his class. It is possible to derive a generalization from such pat-
terns of behavior—a politically defeated class will maintain its social 
standards and its ways of life, regardless of its political position. The 
French aristocracies have verified this generalization throughout the 
revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Saint-Simon considered Louis XIV the living image of genuine 
politeness, able to transform stereotypes of etiquette into genuinely 
gracious and courteous actions. The king made etiquette the mani-
festation of his own genuine sensitivity:
He made distinctions for age, merit, and rank, and 
showed them in his answers, when they went further 
than the usual “Je verrai,” and in his general bearing. 
Such fine gradations were perfectly displayed in his man-
ner of giving and acknowledging salutations when one 
approached or left him. . . . But above all, he was unri-
valed in his courtesy to women. . . . For ladies he took his 
hat quite off, but more or less far as occasion demanded. 
For noblemen he would half-remove it, holding it in the 
air or against his ear, for a few moments or longer. For 
landed gentlemen, he only touched his hat. Princes of the 
blood he greeted in the same way as ladies[.]
For Saint-Simon the most important part of etiquette was the 
hat (bonnet). The regulation of being covered or uncovered before 
the Parliament was for him a political fact of greatest significance. It 
had seemed to him that the defeat of his class was most pronounced 
in the behavior of the members of Parliament and of their presi-
dents. They had refused to give the dukes and peers the salutations 
they had given to the princes of the blood and to the members of 
the royal family—by removing their hats. President Nicolas Potier 
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de Novion [1618–1693] did address the king’s representative bare-
headed while speaking to the dukes whose heads were covered. This 
became to Saint-Simon “L’affaire des Bonnets.” It seemed to him the 
most urgent issue of the new government by Philippe II, the Duc 
d’Orléans [1674–1723] over and above misery, inflation, and taxa-
tion. To restore the ducal rights of the bonnet in Parliament was to 
Saint-Simon a great political issue against the claims of the bour-
geois nobilité de robe.
Under Louis XIV’s regime, the rights of the dukes and peers had 
been allowed to lapse because the king had allied himself with the 
subservient Parliament (which had made no objection to the king’s 
urgent request to legitimize his bastard children). Thus it had become 
a habit for the President of Parliament to remain covered before the 
dukes, while the dukes had to uncover themselves when speaking. 
The members of Parliament had made the greatest efforts to reduce 
the prestige of the dukes; their President, Novion, had thought, for 
instance, of having a councilor sit on the dukes’ bench so as to lower 
their rank.
The advance of the Parliament, the symbol of bourgeois power 
promoted by “the king of the vile bourgeoisie,” was to Saint-Simon 
the most humiliating defeat. After the king died, the field was open 
for the vengeance of the dukes. Saint-Simon urged the Duc d’Orléans 
to restore the right of the nobles to remain covered when address-
ing the assembly. But the Regent felt very uncomfortable: “He said 
several times that the ‘affair of the bonnets’ was indeed an intoler-
able infringement of our rights, and the other matters of which we 
complained not less so, but that we should choose a better occasion.” 
Finally, though, Orléans gave in, and during the first session of Par- 
liament after the king’s death, Saint-Simon was allowed to make a 
point of order. He recounts: 
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I said that I was charged by the peers to announce to the 
assembly that only in consideration of the urgent and 
vital nature of the matters now to be discussed (the Last 
Will and Codicil of the late King) would they tolerate the 
shameless usurpation of the privileges of the bonnets and 
many other abuses of which they had to complain. In so 
doing they showed their very proper regard for the vital 
importance of state affairs. Nevertheless, I have made  
the strongest possible protest in the most formal manner 
and in the name of the whole body of peers and with the 
consent of M. le Duc d’Orléans.
It was Saint-Simon’s intention to restore the superiority of the 
dukes in matters of etiquette over the bourgeoisie (which continued 
to grow in social, as well as political and economic, power all over 
France). Saint-Simon really believed that such a victory, though only 
in formal conduct, would give the dukes a renewed prestige and 
importance in society.
For this reason, he can rightly be called the “Don Quixote of 
Etiquette.” Like Don Quixote, Saint-Simon knew that a new world 
was in the making. Both wanted to remain true to the ideals of a 
feudal-knightly past that no longer existed except in their imagi-
nations. Both were wise, sensitive, and imaginative men, except for 
their respective idées fixes. But these idées fixes gave each a new per-
spective on the depths of the human being as a creature concretely 
engaged in the changing constellations of social and historical forces. 
It is indeed remarkable that a completely mad assumption opened up 
the use of what became genuinely sociological methods in historiog-
raphy, as well as a general conception of the total social situation as a 
field for scientific inquiry. 
The general sociological implication is quite relevant for the 
explanation and understanding of contemporary experiences in an 
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age of almost total revolution. All politically defeated classes tend to 
maintain their manners, mannerisms, attitudes, discipline, and ways 
of life as something they cannot and will not be deprived of. The chal- 
lenge of defeat is the test of human strength—so, for instance, the 
concentration camps in Nazi Germany presented a challenge to the 
intellectual, moral, and vital discipline, the courage and endurance 
of their inmates. Saint-Simon did not anticipate anything approach-
ing this, except for his account of the sadism of the dragonnades, but 
he knew that it was a blessing for human beings to be convinced of 
the meaning of themselves as a class and of the significance of their 
traditions for the historical-social process.
It belongs to the dialectics of history to study how old patterns 
of etiquette and new types of social conduct clash with one another. 
But etiquette can be a dynamic and living concern, just as it can be a 
mere sham. In all societies, etiquette is the prerequisite for the func-
tioning of social interaction. It constitutes the ritual for the encoun-
ter of men in their various roles and establishes the ceremonies that 
make articulate and meaningful the routine of everyday life and 
the solemn interruption of it by the great festivals of life and death. 
Etiquette is the symbolic expression and manifestation of mutual 
recognition by men in their social roles, as superiors and inferiors, 
as coordinated agents, or in hierarchically organized bureaucracies. 
All lasting social institutions have their etiquette that guides men 
on their respective roads toward their various goals, whether it be 
within a family, a military unit, a business office, or an ecclesiasti- 
cal institution. Everywhere men live according to specific rules— 
rituals, etiquette, or stereotypes of behavior. At first, all such types of 
behavior have a specific meaning; they can become irrelevant when 
new patterns of acting come into being, but they can be revived and 
receive a new meaning and force as a last resort of defeated classes 
and groups. This is precisely the sociological significance of the 
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ardent fights by the dukes and peers against the new wave of the 
bourgeois. It is a historical and human phenomenon, tragic and 
comic, bearing at once the depth of human grandeur and misery. 
The loyalty and allegiance to our traditions, to the training by our 
ancestors, and to the teaching by our fathers remain a lasting good 
for those who follow this way of life.
The Grim Carnival: The Court as Appearance and Reality
At the court of Louis XIV, the etiquette of the times prescribed rigid 
social rules. The courtiers, the nobles and their clans, the ministers, 
the generals, and the bourgeois of the robe had firm guideposts for 
their behavior within the complex social stratification. The etiquette 
prescribed the varying degrees of politeness; it established the legal-
ity of the courtiers’ behavior; its moral content was the work of the 
individual human beings who made it function. Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe [1749–1832] once remarked that politeness has two 
aspects: the one defensive, constructing fences to preserve distance 
and aloofness; the other, the politeness of the heart, indicating the 
deepest sensitivity of a human lover for the independence and inner 
freedom of the beloved. Saint-Simon knew very well that although 
the king and Mme de Maintenon could fully control the legality 
of the norms of etiquette, they rarely realized the morality of the 
behavior of the courtiers. Appearance and reality often merged in 
the “carnival’’ at Versailles, particularly when members of the royal 
families were born, married, or died. Even in the routine of everyday 
life that was formed according to the routine of the king, the stereo-
types of prescribed behavior made life at the court appear, at least to 
the outsider, regimented, although harmonious. But to the analyti-
cal eyes of a presociological historian, this harmonious totality was 
sheer deception, as fictitious as a carnival. Only on the surface was 
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it gay and superior to the routine of everyday life; underneath was a 
complex of unleashed greed, fear, and combat, merged and united by 
the demonic pressure of sex. Saint-Simon, though often enjoying as 
an aesthete the amenities of the carnival, was too serious a sociologi-
cal historian not to see the grim aspect of reality behind the stage of 
the world.
Saint-Simon distinguished three different social groupings at 
Versailles, the formation of which was related to the lonely majesty 
of the king. No one really enjoyed the life at the court but rather 
feared the whims of the old man who had become the incarnation of 
Fortuna for most men. Even the next of kin were frightened of him. 
Monseigneur, a man fifty years old, felt the pressure of his father’s 
glory, power, and pride as depressing, his suspicions and jealousies 
as shocking. The king had driven him into indifference and inertia 
because he had kept him aloof from all participation in government 
and politics. What remained to him was just forced leisure that he 
enjoyed with his mistress, whom he secretly married (in the example 
of the king and Mme de Maintenon). Monseigneur, however, was to 
the king and to the courtiers a most important person. In the near 
future, he would probably be the king of France. For this reason, he 
maintained his own court at Meudon. He was surrounded by his 
friends and generals, nobles, and princes who were speculating 
upon his forthcoming government. But, according to Saint-Simon, 
the Dauphin and his friends never talked politics or discussed 
war and peace or the decay of his father’s imperialism. All these 
men and women looked forward to his coming to the throne as the 
moment to share in the spoils. In spite of the splendor and grace- 
fulness of the appearance, reality was an ill-concealed struggle for 
personal interest, for the exploitation of lucrative offices, alimonies, 
or promotions. In a genuinely sociological analysis, Saint-Simon 
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described the “rackets” of Monseigneur, as we would analyze a poli-
tical administration—the pragmatic and utilitarian “gang” speculat-
ing on the future as a business proposition.
Saint-Simon pointed out in a radical way that the court was the 
central institution for the production and distribution of power. In 
marvelously descriptive imagery, he revealed the court as a social 
mechanism. The court, he said, is a competitive society in which dif-
ferent associations—called “machines”—struggle with one another 
for the monopoly of power. The social process is mechanical because 
it is subject to the law of attraction and repulsion, men moving and 
being moved. They gather together for realizing their purposes 
under the pressure of competing machines. The reality of this game 
is tough and disillusioning as its appearance is aesthetically perfect 
in a complete, though fictitious, harmony. The courtiers and mis-
tresses, the confessors and generals, the dukes and the physicians 
of the king are the engineers and puppets of the show that seems to 
be controlled by the great magician but is, in reality, directed by the 
king’s associates and agents.
Saint-Simon’s analyses of the patterns of reciprocity at Versailles 
are masterpieces of an applied theory of social interaction. The king, 
worshipped like a god, is to Saint-Simon the victim and the prisoner 
of his ministers, his confessors, and his mistresses. His ministers 
depended upon Mme de Maintenon, who for her part was under 
the pressure of her friends, whose promotions and support were 
indispensable for her own position and prestige. Thus, Saint-Simon 
conceived of a second machine centered around Mme de Maintenon. 
She was the lasting center for the men who made up the government 
or aspired to it. This interdependence of the ministers and of Mme de 
Maintenon was logical and inescapable. The ministers, on the other 
hand, were superior to Mme de Maintenon and to the king regarding 
information, learning, and administrative skills. They knew from 
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experience what could and should be done under the conditions 
of the king’s and Mme de Maintenon’s minds and attitudes. Such 
superiority was, however, balanced by the insecurity of the system 
in which they were constantly exposed to intrigues of all sorts. For 
this reason, they knew that their superiority could only be secured 
when granted by Mme de Maintenon. She alone could support them 
in the end because she needed the ministers for her own security. 
Being under the pressure of the influential clans, officers, bishops, 
and personal friends to help them to get offices, promotions, and the 
like, her reputation depended on her ability to satisfy the requests of 
the many who implored her support for gaining favor with the king. 
But apart from her role as confidential adviser to the king, she was 
anxious to rule and exploit the ministers for her own vested interests. 
She was mainly interested in the treasury, and in the ministry of war, 
for distributing funds and offices. She obliged the ministers, who for 
objective reasons did not comply with her requests to be ruthlessly 
removed. Most ministers were prudent enough never to object to her 
demands, for they had their own vested interests. They were eager to 
bring their sons and relatives into office with the twofold purpose of 
enriching themselves and of surrounding themselves with relatives 
whom they could trust. Thus, their relationship with Mme de Main-
tenon was like that one might have with a mutual insurance company.
Saint-Simon referred to still another machine made up of those 
who gambled on a better future. They hoped that the young and 
remarkable Duc de Burgogne might become Dauphin in the event 
of Monseigneur’s death. The prince embodied (to a few thoughtful 
and imaginative noblemen) the idea of an anti-despotic, reaction-
ary constitutionalism, with the emphasis on the dukes and peers in 
government and on the Estates as an advisory body. Fénélon was 
the political and spiritual leader of this small group, to which Saint-
Simon also belonged. 
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The three groups were not organized “rackets,” but open asso-
ciations for specific purposes, and cross-relations were therefore 
inescapable. At a court where Fortuna seemed to rule the lives of 
everyone, everyone was anxious to have insurance against the acci-
dents of court life. Saint-Simon had friends and relatives in all camps 
who knew quite well that even an idealist and Christian gentleman 
needed virtue and prudence.
One of his remarkable observations is contained in the statement 
that men never act as individuals, but as members of a clan. The great 
families asked favors even for distant cousins because their dynamic 
strength increased with their influence on and in government. The 
new bourgeois families had learned from the feudal clans: One for 
All and All for One. The king liked such closed ranks in his service, 
for he had learned from experience that he could rely more on group 
responsibility than on that of individuals. He felt that a clan could 
better discipline and control its own members for common solidar-
ity, so as not to bring disgrace upon the whole group. They would 
serve the king well and would see to it that they enriched themselves 
in a respectable way. Louis XIV found this tradition of recruitment 
most satisfactory. After all, he could not forget that the clan of Michel 
Le Tellier [1603–1685], including Jean Baptiste Colbert [1619–1683], 
François Michel Le Tellier, Marquis de Louvois [1641–1691], and 
Louis François Marie Le Tellier Marquis de Barbezieux [1668–1710], 
had laid the foundations for his own grandeur. Saint-Simon, how-
ever, avidly cursed these bourgeois who had destroyed the feudal 
pattern of the army and had constructed the beginnings of a rational 
militarism. His emphasis provides a valuable perspective for histo- 
rians: it is probably necessary to reconsider many histories and to 
stress neither the importance of individuals nor of collective trends, 
but of the articulate power of the great families.
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Saint-Simon enjoyed analyzing the techniques that men applied 
for achieving their ends. The court was the ideal place for intrigues, 
conspiracies, and pressure groups; it formed the social jungle 
where everyone fought for vested interests. There is no human 
relationship that was not used or abused for social advancement, 
political power, or economic gain. Almost all social interaction was 
reduced to “business,” in a competitive struggle for superiority. 
Some advanced on the social ladder because the king liked them 
as champions at billiards; others used their charm and wits in the 
drawing rooms of Mme de Maintenon, in order to gain careers in 
the army or in the civil service; still others tried to push their way 
up through love affairs with princesses or mistresses of princes. 
Husbands became the procurers for their wives in order to achieve 
great careers.
Saint-Simon was fascinated by the motives of the actors at 
court. He found that men everywhere are moved to act by their 
own interests and passions. Honoré de Balzac [1799–1850] and 
Stendhal [Marie-Henri Beyle (1783–1842)], the genuine Saint-Simo-
nians, have verified the universality of his thesis, at least for the 
nineteenth century. Saint-Simon concluded that all institutional 
behavior is primarily determined by social interests, not by ideal 
postulates. Power, he contended, is the final goal of men in all walks 
of life; it alone secures independence and freedom of action; in all 
groups, men yearn to be first, superior to all others. Antagonism 
and competition merge in the lust for power. Thus, he saw the life at 
court as grim; there men struggle for predominance in the general 
struggle for survival. The court was but the beautiful picture of the 
jungle of social action that exists all over the world. Saint-Simon 
knew from his own experience how sweet vengeance and the bestial 
triumph over hated enemies can be.
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But other human beings in Saint-Simon’s presentation set the 
images of the saint, the hero, the moral human being in the midst 
of the jungle. There are the ascetic princes of the Church, men of 
true dedication to God and to their parishes, living in the Imita-
tion of Christ. There are the great soldiers who do not seek glory 
for themselves, but cherish victory for the king and perfection in 
their commands. There are Louis-François de Boufflers [1644–1711], 
Nicolas Catinat [1637–1712], and many others who are dedicated and 
ascetic men in their fields.
Throughout the Mémoires, Saint-Simon mentions nobles and 
successful courtiers, ministers, gentlemen, ladies, and princesses, 
men and women who had gained prestigious reputations in politics 
and love, who suddenly departed the scene of their triumphs and 
devoted themselves to God in penitent orders, often the Carmelites. 
For the purely descriptive variety of human destinies, Saint-Simon 
drew from the tremendous range that presented itself at the end of 
the seventeenth century. Here he disclosed all the lusts of flesh and 
of power, the enjoyment of vanity and glory, the beauty of wealth and 
its possibilities, and, at the same time, the most sublime vision of the 
divine and the most creative unfolding of the mind. The elements of 
transition and change and the constituents of eternity were inter-
twined in this age with pretense and truth, appearance and reality, 
in the ambiguity and ambivalence of natural, historical man.
Shakespeare of Portraits  
Saint-Simon lived by his eyes, agreeing fully with Homer that living 
should be defined as seeing the light of the sun that gives plasticity 
and pattern to the living. The light of the sun is a blessing and a curse, 
illuminating and burning, creative and destructive; but Saint-Simon 
knew as well the opaqueness of the night, the abyss of sex, and the 
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voluptuousness of love. He had seen the sublime and the vulgar in the 
intimate relationships of the actors on the stage of the world. In the 
description and analysis of the social world, he had witnessed contin-
uous change in the fluid structure of the court; he had inaugurated a 
presociological approach intended to explain the total human-social 
situation in the interdependence of its constituent parts. For this rea-
son, his “Portraits,” being constructs of the total human being, are 
relevant for the understanding of sociohistorical action.
The method deserves some attention. In contemporary history 
some scientists, following Max Weber and others, construct ideal 
types according to their specific scientific interest; these might be 
political, social, or even economic. This methodological device makes 
it possible to build a coherent and logical world, a fictive construct 
that satisfies the scientific concern. We may ask whether the price the 
scientist pays for his objectivity is too high.
Saint-Simon either constructed images of various human beings 
in their ongoing action, or he painted their portraits after they died. 
The former have to be put together like a mosaic, while the latter are 
always living images of a stream of a total human unfolding.
The pattern of the portrait was initiated not by Saint-Simon, but 
by the efforts of a defeated class to observe its own way of life and to 
reflect on its own interaction with other classes. Under the influence 
of Montaigne, René Descartes [1596–1650], and Bernard Le Bovier de 
Fontenelle [1657–1757], the former Frondists [Fronde Parlementaire 
(1648–1649) and the Fronde des nobles (1650–1653)—Eds.] serious-
ly attempted to reflect on themselves and to encounter the others 
of their time as persons of another class (i.e., as alter egos). Saint- 
Simon, however, was able to bring the style and form of the portrait to 
such fullness that we are able to grasp the fact that each human being 
is a microcosm whose beginning and end merge into the cycle of 
life itself. Saint-Simon was completely dissatisfied with his portraits, 
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thinking them clumsy and rudimentary fragments of images that he 
was unable to frame properly, in the classical style. He was indeed not 
a writer of the eighteenth century, as he rarely displayed balance in 
punctuation or sentence structure. Yet, it is just this nonclassical style 
that makes him an almost contemporary writer. The nongrammatical 
and asyndetic coexistence of terms describing human qualities in the 
portraits turn them into a true spontaneous experience of another’s 
own inwardness, the expression of an open system of possibilities. 
Saint-Simon usually began with the description of his subject’s 
physical qualities. He was most anxious to separate these from the 
“acquired” qualities: the ways of speaking, moving, and other bodily 
gestures, poise, politeness, discipline, and the like. For this reason, 
he can be said to have followed continually a sociological method 
in describing and interpreting the various persons conceived as 
images or types of men. The training and education of the young 
noblemen produced human beings whose bodies and minds were 
taught to represent a specific way of life, to embody specific social 
roles every moment of their lives. The educated and cultured classes 
of the bourgeois patricians had been brought up in the appreciation 
of graceful conduct rather than mere behavior, in the goods of the 
cultura animi rather than in the virtues of aristocratic conversation, 
in the achievement of objective values instead of the subjective pre-
sentation of a social self. For this reason, too, Saint-Simon’s portraits 
have a depth in the dimension that recognizes the power of recollec-
tions, the strength of traditions in the formation of human beings; 
his description of persons as “bourgeois” is never a value judgment, 
but a sociological category that explains certain ways of speaking, 
modes of politeness, and inner independence in social situations, as 
they are correlated with bourgeois standards. Men have a natural 
constitution, but their social roles and historical destiny are of the 
utmost importance for their growth or decay.
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The character of Louis XIV became a model case in Saint-Simon’s 
portraits. He had natural charm, poise, and dignity; he had been kept 
in ignorance but was alert enough to adapt easily to his informed 
and learned ministers; and he had acquired the will to rule by him-
self and not to be the puppet either of his mother or of Cardinal 
Mazarin. But most important in his development were the prostra-
tion and flattery of the courtiers, confessors, and mistresses. They 
were the ones who created the image of the glorious, benevolent, and 
absolute king, whose power was unshakable in the Western world. 
His ministers made him believe that his wisdom ruled their own 
work, while in actual fact, he granted nineteen of twenty decisions 
submitted to him by the ministers. No one, however, could predict 
just what decision would be the one rejected by him, in his effort 
to show his absolute power. The minister of war was most careful 
not to risk hazards in his field. He kept the king busy with parades, 
new uniforms, and regulations for garrison duties, and asked him to 
think of rewards, medals, and the like, for individuals and standards 
for regimental units that performed with credit.
Saint-Simon anticipated a genuinely sociological problem in his 
description of the relationships between the king and his courtiers. 
Louis XIV established an image of his greatness that was accepted by 
the people at the court. But the courtiers continuously manipulated 
this image, and the king was willing to adapt himself to their image 
of him. As a consequence, the image of the “great king” as a social 
pattern survived the defeats of the last twenty years of his life, the 
misery of the people, and the plight of the nobles.
In the portrait of Mme de Maintenon, he achieves an admirable 
completeness and balance in describing her positive and negative 
qualities. He was, indeed, fascinated by the natural intelligence and 
alertness of the former Mme Scarron. He had seen that her precari-
ous character could only have been the result of her various social 
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roles. As Mme Scarron, she had learned to please; she had known 
what love affairs were really like and had been conscious of the tran-
sitory character of most human relationships. She had been ready 
to make the best use of the opportunities that Mme de Montespan 
[1640–1707], Louis XIV’s mistress, had offered her. Mme de Mon-
tespan forced the king to appoint Mme de Maintenon as governess 
to their illegitimate children, although the king initially thought 
the younger woman to be disgusting and repulsive. But, once in 
position, she prudently managed to obtain his attention. She wisely 
advised Mme de Montespan not to embarrass the king with her 
moods; she talked to him and demonstrated the deepest concern for 
his feelings. After the death of his queen, Marie-Thérèse of Austria 
[1638–1683], and his final estrangement from Mme de Montespan, 
Mme de Maintenon succeeded in gaining his affection by a strange 
combination of religious piety and sensual warmth, a mixture of 
fictitious propriety and political scheming.
She persuaded the lonely king to marry her secretly, but she never 
accomplished her heart’s desire to see the marriage publicly declared. 
She was witty and alert by nature; she had learned to be polite, pleas-
ing, and compliant. Her ambitions made her a conscious planner, a 
careerist with superior intelligence who intrigued for her own bene-
fit. She was, besides this, a marvelous actress who would play almost 
any role, having experienced years of servitude during which she had 
to practice distance and modesty. But, having achieved her goals, 
she performed all the roles of the carnival with grace and relaxation. 
She beautifully pretended the virtues of truth and frankness, while 
dissimulating her lust for power and her ambition to rule the state by 
controlling the king.
The most dramatic portrait is that of Louis Duc de Bourgogne, 
the grandson of Louis XIV. Having been very close to him, Saint-
Simon gives us a lucid picture of a complex and dynamic human 
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being. In his youth, he had been open to all kinds of passions, thirst-
ing for pleasures with violence. But, being open to everything, he 
was vulnerable to the spiritual passions and noble enthusiasm of his 
tutor, the Abbé Fénélon, who had indoctrinated him with a politi- 
cal utopia—Télémaque—of a reactionary constitutional monarchy. 
This old, yet new, monarchy was to be focused around the reestab-
lishment of the political position of the dukes and peers, in order to 
destroy the despotism of Louis XIV. Fénélon was able to channel the 
uninhibited desires and passions of the prince into a spiritual disci-
pline of dedication to his duties. He felt the blessings of asceticism in 
his life, and began to hate the continuous war. Thus, he created many 
enemies at court and in the army, with the king leading the criticism 
of his own piety. The young prince had been the hope of all noblemen 
who longed for a new constitutional regime if and when he would 
become Dauphin. To Saint-Simon, he was the living image of the 
transforming power of spirituality—turning the profligate young 
man into a serious and dedicated statesman of complete integrity. 
He had taken Saint-Simon’s conception of the dukes and peers seri-
ously and was in full agreement with him. The statement on the 
transforming power of the spiritual is not, therefore, a contradiction 
of Saint-Simon’s reflections on the motives of collective action. But 
he had seen too many character developments that deviated from 
the general tendencies of socially approved behavior for him to trust 
completely this image he had formed of the prince.
The portrait of the man who had been the tutor of the Duc 
de Burgogne and the revered political thinker who gave hope to 
Saint -Simon and his class is the most plastic. The portrait of the 
archbishop Fénélon was written with profound sympathy and 
devotion; it is a picture of a most complex human being, one whose 
very contradictions reveal in their unity the greatness of the man. 
M. de Fénélon had been tutor to the grandson of the king, friend 
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and spiritual adviser of Mme de Maintenon, to whom he had also 
introduced his mystical friend, Jeanne-Marie Bouvier de la Motte-
Guyon [1648–1717]. He was at the height of his influence and 
power when his colleague and competitor, Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet 
[1627–1704], and other jealous prelates rallied to destroy him 
because of his adherence to the mystical pattern of Quietism.
Fénélon never flinched from his belief in the genuineness of the 
mystic, Mme Guyon. He submitted with humility and sincerity to 
Mme Guyon’s condemnation by Rome. In a move that was supposed 
to be his exile, he quietly left Versailles for Cambrai. There he exhib-
ited a true spirit of charity; no one harmed the Jansenists, and there 
everyone in need of physical and spiritual support, regardless of his 
occupation, found admission to Fénélon. His burning love for the 
way, the truth, and the life gave him the courage and patience to live 
up to his own ideals of maintaining himself in devotion to God and 
to the expectations of his followers at Versailles.
Saint-Simon was right to stress the point that a spiritual flame 
was burning in Fénélon’s heart. Fénélon took his own aristocratic 
descent as a moral and spiritual obligation; pride and humility were 
not alternatives to him. And, indeed, he enjoyed the gifts of learning, 
of mystical vision, and the stream of love that God had given him in 
His Grace.
The description of Fénélon’s physical being is unforgettable—a 
tall, slim man, with a long white face, an aquiline nose, and eyes 
the flames and spirit of which overwhelmed one like a torrent. This 
face, while revealing the most contrasting traits, did not disturb the 
inner harmony and integrity of his mind, but expressed a unity of 
gravity and charm, of seriousness and joyfulness. It manifested the 
scholar, the bishop, and the grand seigneur. All these diverse ele-
ments and aspects were united and merged into the open stream of 
a continuously growing personality; it contributed to his greatness 
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and to the halo of saintliness that had taken the blows of destiny 
and of the intrigues of his enemies. He was superior to his fate, how-
ever, because he had affirmed it with humility and the creative spirit 
of spiritual liberation. His greatness was visible even at the surface 
of his conduct, combining a delicate politeness with genuine depth 
and integrity, nobility with a radiant mind, and spirituality with 
the deepest concern for the life of man in the world. Saint-Simon 
was convinced that this human being embodied the greatest range 
of human possibilities that he had discovered and presented in the 
single images of his “Portraits.”
Throughout the Mémoires, many persons are described in a 
mosaic in various situations and summarized in a portrait as a com-
memoration of their death. In such interpretations of human beings, 
men are always open and dynamic systems, streams of experience 
and consciousness with an infinite number of possibilities. The 
portraits are dramatic in the highest degree, tragic and comic alike; 
often the acting and suffering of the persons presented are tragic 
and comic in the same acts. It is this totality, this complete compre-
hension of a person in the understanding of his actions that brings 
Saint-Simon closest to Shakespeare’s plenitude. 
The drama of Madame [Marie-Thérèse] is displayed through- 
out the Mémoires. As a proud German princess, conscious to the 
utmost of her own pedigree, she is pictured at the opening of the 
Mémoires lamenting the engagement of her son to an illegitimate 
daughter of the king. The weakness of her son, who had promised 
not to comply with the king’s wishes, was shocking to her. She felt 
free to demonstrate her anger before the court and to box the ears 
of her son when he greeted her with a hand kiss. She knew the Duc 
d’Orléans well enough to understand his weaknesses. She had once 
told Saint-Simon that it was most unfortunate that her son had so 
many remarkable qualities—esprit, wit, intellectual curiosity, poise, 
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tact—but that he never turned those positive traits to any good. 
He was irresponsible, escaping from the enforced marriage and 
the unkept promises of the king into a life of debauchery. He could 
never resist his lusts and moods and ultimately pursued various 
seductions with pleasure.
Madame had been very much in love with the charming and 
handsome king before his affairs with Mme de Maintenon. She never 
forgave him the secret marriage and often wrote to her German rela-
tives about the king’s love for this person whom she often dubbed his 
concubine and whore. She gave a true picture of Mme de Maintenon’s 
power over the king and over France. She never was prudent enough, 
however, to consider the implications of such sweeping statements 
on the censorship of the royal family. A censor once found the text 
of her letters rude enough to warrant sending a package of them to 
the king. The king never mentioned this to Madame, but his rela-
tionship to her became very formal. When Monsieur died, Madame 
faced an embarrassing dilemma; the marriage contract specified she 
either enter a convent or retreat to a lonely country house. Madame 
disliked both possibilities immensely and tried to see the king about 
it. But he ordered her to visit Mme de Maintenon, who had received 
the incriminating correspondence from the king. The scene between 
the two ladies is a model case of catharsis in a tragic and comic sense. 
Madame complained that their relationship had become extremely 
formal and that she regretted it. Mme de Maintenon took Madame’s 
letters and showed them to her, upon which Madame broke down, 
humiliated herself, asked forgiveness, and let Mme de Maintenon 
enjoy her triumph. It was a genuinely dramatic scene; its greatness 
for Saint Simon’s presentation consisted in the fact that he showed 
sympathy for Madame and, at the same time, made transparent the 
objectively comical aspect of the situation. It could be enjoyed in its 
grim ridiculousness because their conversation turned out well— 
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Madame was allowed to remain at the court. This final portrait by 
Saint Simon is a classic example of his style:
She was strong, courageous, German to the utmost 
degree: frank, straightforward, good and charitable, 
noble and great in her conduct—and petty and pedantic  
in everything that was due to her. She was truly pos-
sessed, always writing letters to her family and friends, 
except for the few hours she had to give to official enter-
tainments. Otherwise she was alone with her ladies, 
harsh, rude, easily repulsed by people and things, feared 
for the responses she gave in conversation; no kindness, 
no alertness, no intellectual dynamism, though not 
without esprit; no flexibility, jealous to the bone, as was 
said, of everything that was due to her; the figure and 
boorishness of a Swiss guard and, with all this, capable 
of a tender and inviolable friendship.
The end of the portrait is the center of the character analysis; the 
description at the beginning refers to the qualities deriving from 
her education and social roles, from her loneliness and forlornness. 
Continuing the analysis, Saint-Simon interpreted her sensitivity and 
intellectual standards and found them wanting; but finally he came 
to the basic roots of her existence, which were, he felt, in strong con-
trast to her physical appearance. Everything is intertwined, logically 
unintelligible but understandable as the essence of a human being: a 
unity in contradiction.
The portrait of her son, the Duc d’Orléans, is most revealing 
because, from their early youth, he had been Saint-Simon’s best 
friend. At the beginning of the Mémoires, Saint-Simon described him 
as insecure and helpless before his mother and the king’s sweet coer-
cion. Regardless of his character, everyone would have submitted to 
the command of the king. The enforced marriage, however, remained 
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without political consequences; no political or military assignment 
came to him. Much later, he obtained military positions in Spain and 
Italy. But before that happened, he escaped into a variety of activities 
that serve to illuminate his intellectual standards. He was fascinated 
by the sciences, devoted to chemical experimentation and to prob-
lems of physics. Later he was attracted to painting and had his daugh-
ter model for him in a slightly incestuous relationship. In spite of 
 Orléans’s intellectual curiosity, his main escapes were his indepen-
dent love affairs. He was firmly antireligious, probably following the 
sophisticated pattern of Fontenelle. On the other hand, he believed 
that men might know the unknowable and that people could predict 
the future. Saint-Simon reported in the minutest detail how Orléans 
listened to a girl who, staring in a glass, correctly described the fur-
niture and equipment of a place she had never actually seen. When 
he asked her manager about his own future, he was surprised that 
the man did not see the king’s grandsons in the picture of the future, 
although he let him see a closed crown without the insignia, the 
meaning of which he could not discern. In spite of such games with 
destiny, he was highly intelligent and sensitive, but without goals and 
convictions—drifting where his friends and moods pushed him. He 
was full of wit and irony, and enjoyed twitting the narrowness of 
the king. When he was sent to Spain as the commander of an army, 
he asked the king to give him a friend as his aide. The king refused 
on the argument that the man was a Jansenist. Orléans corrected 
the statement: “But the man is an atheist!” This was not objection-
able to Louis XIV. Orléans told the story to Saint-Simon with irony 
and laughter. He was willing to forsake prudence and forget possible 
political consequences wherever he could express his wit and his 
secret criticism with irony. In Spain, he ironically toasted the two 
great ladies who ruled France and Spain. He did not mention their 
names, however; but this foolish act, nevertheless, earned him the 
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lasting hatred of Mme de Maintenon and Mme des Ursins [Marie-
Anne de La Trémoille, princesse des Ursins (1642–1722)].
He was fascinating in his contradictions: sentimental and cynical, 
alert in thinking and irresponsible in action, a loyal friend, but care- 
less of his enemies. He was a charming and nonchalant weakling, 
never taking himself or his duties seriously. Saint-Simon and the 
popular singers of the day called him “Debonnaire.” Orléans himself 
laughed at his own reputation, but respected intellectual standards. 
He had contempt for vulgar and trivial people. He was sensitive in all 
his relationships; his manners and attitudes were refined. He never 
spoke of himself but had definite ideas on the value of others. His 
greatest weakness was his belief that he resembled Henry IV [1553–
1610] in everything he did, and he took to imitating Henry IV’s 
mannerisms and witticisms. Like Henry IV, he was good, human, 
sympathetic, unwilling to harm anyone. But he shared in his nega-
tive aspects of an easygoing character as well. Orléans had no will or 
intention to act and did not even care for the direction that he should 
have followed in politics. As Regent, he underwent the routine of 
government as if it were a nightmarish dream, while his real life 
began after the sun had gone down (when he gave himself over to his 
pleasures and mistresses). All his esprit, wit, and intellectual supe-
riority were worthless because he did not care for his social position 
and was deeply disgusted with his life; a sense of frustration and 
of melancholy voluptuousness penetrated his cynicism. For this rea-
son, Saint-Simon’s picture of the dying Orléans, his decaying body 
taken as a symbol of what it is to be human, is a summary of the 
wasted life of a man who could have been something else.
There are many more pictures and portraits of people who 
did not play significant roles in the political life of the times—the 
human beings whom Saint-Simon selected for their own unique 
characteristics, tender or rude, courteous or vulgar. He took notice of 
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kidnappings and elopements, and of comical situations in general. 
There is the short portrait of a physically small lady-in-waiting, 
and the most tender words for her: “tout âme tout esprit et charmant, 
toujours nouveau . . . délicat sur l’esprit et amoureux de l’esprit, 
quand elle le trouvait à son gré.” There is the rich story of Mme de 
Charlus [née Marie Françoise de Paule de Bethisy (1657–1719)], 
whose wig caught fire at the dinner table. The Archbishop of Rheims 
quickly removed the wig in order to save her life. The lady, however, 
not aware of what had happened to her, was full of wrath and threw 
her boiled egg into the face of her neighbor. Saint-Simon reported, 
as well, the robberies by gangsters who had relieved two noblemen 
of their possessions when traveling in their coach. After the robbers 
had departed, one of the gentlemen found that they had overlooked 
some valuables hidden in his clothing and was overjoyed at his 
good fortune. His friend, however, was so angry that he called the 
gangsters back to take the rest of his friend’s property!
Throughout the Mémoires, the portraits illuminate the scope 
of human possibilities, the condition humaine in its infinite vari- 
ety—but the same human condition that every man carried with 
himself—in its depth layers, as they result from the acquired and 
required qualities of man in his historically conditioned social roles. 
There is no prose writer who comes closer to the imaginativeness 
and sensitivity of Shakespeare than Saint-Simon. His openness to 
all human potentialities, whether sensual or spiritual, courageous or 
fateful, patient or enthusiastic, makes it evident that for him every-
thing human is worth observation and understanding.
Saint-Simon did not provide a portrait of himself. He was the 
child of aged parents, physically weak, small, unattractive, and 
nervous. Having been educated and reared among older people, he 
lived far more in their worlds, in the past of revered traditions, than 
in his own. He was willing to accept their values, and he grew up 
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with a sense of worship for Louis XIII [1601–1643], the benefactor 
of his father. To Saint-Simon the image of this king was that of the 
chaste and virtuous man—a rather precarious yardstick for king’s 
successor. Saint-Simon was not sensual; he praised the pleasures of 
the mind as superior to the futility of the senses, but he was able 
to give, nevertheless, a delicate portrait of Anne Ninon de L’Enclos 
[1620–1705], who was intellectually in control of her love affairs and 
often took a quite ironic look at her lovers and those who aspired to 
become her lovers. Though he was not sensual, he was still always 
seeking, always aware. “See and be radiant” is profoundly true for his 
genius, for with his eyes he penetrated everything; they were organs 
of cognition and illumination, constituting the hypersensitivity that 
made him one of the greatest pre- and postpsychological thinkers of 
the social and historical world.
He was obsessed and absorbed by an idée fixe—the reestablish-
ment of the political rule of the dukes and peers in a world that 
was being carried away by the stream of the urban and bourgeois 
advance. For this reason, he started his reform by infusing meaning 
and relevance into the rules of etiquette, which he took to be the 
symbol for noble superiority. The “Affaire des Bonnets” became to 
him a revolutionary deed, one of extreme urgency even while the 
country was being threatened with financial bankruptcy and human 
misery. The triumph in the life of the little duke was the Lit de Justice 
after the king’s death. Having proclaimed the old rights of the dukes 
as over against the usurpations of the noblesse de robe, he described 
himself:
Joy was nearly killing me. I truly felt as though I were going 
to swoon, for my heart seemed to swell within me and 
could find no room in which to expand. I did violence to  
my feelings in order not to betray them, yet the very tor-
rent was a delight. I remembered the long days and years 
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of servitude, those unhappy times, when like a victim I 
was dragged to the Parliament to witness the triumph of 
the bastards. Now at last my eyes would see the fulfill-
ment of my prophecy. I could rightly congratulate myself 
that all this has been brought about by me—and that I 
enjoyed the shining splendor of the hour in the presence 
of the king and all that august assembly. I triumphed, 
I was avenged, I rejoiced in my vengeance. I delighted 
in the satisfaction of my strongest, most eager, and most 
steadfast desires[.]
He too was tragic and comic alike. But there is greatness in the 
man whose sensitivity and imagination, whose penetrating and illu-
minating eyes, made him conceive of the historical world and of its 
social patterns as the comédie humaine. In his ultimate glory, he is 
not the historian, sociologist, or psychologist, but the great poet who 
magically resurrected a world of dead men and transformed them 
into loving and hating people, conspiring with, for, and against one 
another in their lust, their aspirations for power and recognition by 
others, and the problem of being themselves. Here was a man whose 
work was an inspiration to the great French novelists of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, as it is even now to psychologists, 
sociologists, and philosophers. It stands today as a major source of 
aesthetic suggestion and scientific challenge.
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Notes
1. The term total social situation was coined by Marcel Mauss [1872– 
1950], the nephew of Émile Durkheim [1858–1917] and a distinguished 
sociologist and anthropologist in his own right. Saint-Simon antici-
pates this notion in his own conception of “contemporary history.”

7
 Montesquieu: The Historical 
Variables of the Condition Humaine 
The Personality and His Meeting with Himself 
When Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montes-
quieu [1689–1755] published his book on Rome [Considérations sur 
les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence (1734)—
Eds.], he presented the work personally to Louis Duc de Saint-Simon 
[1675–1755], who lived in retirement at his château. This meeting is 
symbolic of Montesquieu’s political views and his insatiable curios-
ity for the minutest details that make up a historical-political totality. 
Montesquieu’s visit to Saint-Simon was a political demonstration. 
Both grand seigneurs were united in violent hatred of the despotism 
of the absolute state and shared a longing for the constitutional pat-
tern of traditional medieval monarchies. Both could only visualize a 
reactionary monarchy in which the king shared the government with 
the estates of nobles, clergy, and patricians. Both were dedicated to 
the fight for a constitutional conservatism that understood political 
liberty as the balance between the sovereignty of the monarch and 
the rights of the Estates in participating in the royal government. 
Their political attitude was later on taken up by Louis Gabriel de 
Bonald [1754–1840] and Joseph De Maistre [1753–1821]. 
Published originally in a slightly different form in Albert Salomon, In Praise of Enlighten-
ment (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1963). Republished by permission from Frank Salomon.
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Montesquieu’s visit was motivated by still another reason. No one 
but Saint-Simon could tell him more vividly the minutest details of 
the functioning of the political mechanism under the rule of Louis 
XIV and the Régent than the old courtier and friend of the Duc 
d’Orléans. Saint-Simon had begun to write his Memoires after hav-
ing collected notes and observations for almost thirty years.
Here were two grand seigneurs who were political reactionaries 
and philosopher-poets. They both had conceptions of the historical 
worlds as Human Comedies, intelligible though often absurd; they 
both had their ideas on the providential meaning of history or its 
meaninglessness; both believed in the identity of human nature that 
could appear in a variety of social roles and realize itself in confor-
mity with them, in escaping from them, and in revolting against 
them. 
They were philosophers like François de La Rochefoucauld [1613–
1680] and Charles de Saint-Evrémont [1613–1703], in spite of being 
grand seigneurs and noblemen of the highest rank. They trans-
formed their frustrations and failures into illuminating reflections 
on the causes of grandeur and misery; they succeeded in conquering 
their defeats and gaining distance and independence because they 
were philosophers and seers. They had hoped to play roles in public 
life and were rejected or defeated or exiled.
Montesquieu, who had traveled for years through Italy, Central 
Europe, England, and the Netherlands, had hoped for a position 
in the Foreign Office and was not accepted. This disappointment, 
merged with erotic and other human defeats, led him to scholarship 
and learning, the best activities for overcoming grief and conquering 
human suffering and disappointment. 
Montesquieu was trained in law. His families belonged to the 
noblesse de robe and to the noblesse d’épée. Throughout his works, he 
stressed the political and juridical concerns of his work. Apart from 
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these social conditions of his life, he was a Southerner from Gascony, 
like Michel de Montaigne [1533–1592], who had received legal train-
ing and was councilor at the same Parliament of Bordeaux. They 
knew the plight of the individual surrounded and limited by abstract 
and unfeeling generalizations of law, court procedure, and grim 
judgments. Both were violently anti-Christian. In Montesquieu’s 
thought, there are many reflections that could have been derived 
from Montaigne’s Essays. As a matter of fact, Montesquieu seriously 
considered writing about Montaigne. Both men knew the complex-
ity of words, how to be sensual and rational in one. Montesquieu’s 
thesis that reason is the noblest of the senses is completely in line 
with Montaigne’s basic idea of the inseparable relationship of nature 
and reason. 
Montesquieu was keenly aware that he was living at a crossroad 
of history. He stressed that the age of feudal and military patterns 
of life was vanishing and with it the ideal of the hero; the coming 
age of commerce and business capitalism would create new types of 
government, new types of freedom of religion. 
Living within the world and in critical distance to it gave him the 
opportunity for a comparative study of political societies, ancient, 
medieval, and modern, always directed by this concern: What will 
human beings look like under the total system of conditions that 
determine their political governments, and how will they respond 
to such conditions and determine their determinations? This is 
still a Montaignesque question as to the variables of the condition 
humaine. 
Montesquieu could realize his philosophical and methodological 
innovations because during his lifetime he experienced the rise of 
scientific philosophies. John Locke [1632–1704] and Isaac Newton 
[1643–1727], René Descartes [1596–1650] and Nicolas Malebranche 
[1638–1715] were as relevant to his complex thought as were Hugo 
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Grotius [1583–1645] and Samuel von Pufendorf [1632–1694] in the 
traditions of natural law and Machiavelli in his immanentism.
Montesquieu visualized the totality of the social and human 
situation. He was convinced that such complexity of historical 
man needs conceptualizations more dense and imaginative than 
the abstractions of philosophy could afford. He coined the term 
philosopher-poet, which he applied to Plato, Malebranche, Lord 
Shaftesbury [1671–1713], and Montaigne. To Montesquieu, the 
title was one of praise. The Plato of the Socratic dialogues was 
to him a thinker who grasped the totality of human possibilities. 
Malebranche had understood the positive working of imagination 
as a source of logical errors; he attributed the power of imagina-
tion to climatic conditions and was often used by Montesquieu 
for such insights, in particular, in the Persian Letters (1721). Lord 
Shaftesbury belonged to the group as a developer of a theory of 
moral taste that merged aesthetic and social patterns of think-
ing, suggesting a theory of gentlefolk’s behavior. Montaigne set the 
pattern for a poetic treatment of the concrete human situation. 
Experience alone gave him the density and imagery for describing 
and interpreting love, friendship, social roles, and the opposite 
affections of suspicion, hatred, resentment, and hypocrisy as they 
developed in a situation of civil war. 
Descartes, Blaise Pascal [1623–1662], and Montesquieu knew that 
Montaigne was a philosopher-poet. His philosophical concern was 
Mind, Self, and Society; his poetical concern, the human constitu-
tion in love and death. His work was indeed a philosophy of the place 
of man in the universe of nature and society. Montaigne established 
the pattern of philosophy that starts from the total immanence of 
life disregarding all transcendental or a priori elements.  
Montesquieu, under the impact of Machiavelli, transferred the 
conception of total immanence from the process of nature to that 
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of history. Nature remains an important element as a condition for 
political and historical ways of life, but it is not the totality of the con-
text of meaning that unfolds in the process of history. Montesquieu 
recognized that there are pre- and posthistorical human possibili-
ties beyond man’s historicity. Hegel praised Montesquieu for having 
discovered the individual character of the historical in contrast to 
the passing stream of nature. Montesquieu’s conception of the total 
immanence of the historical process implies its total intelligibility to 
natural and moral causation, pointing out that moral causes always 
have priority over natural causes.
The emphasis on the total intelligibility of history is a calm, 
though vigorous, blow to all patterns of providential history. Jacques-
Bénigne Bossuet’s [1627–1704] Discours sur l’Histoire Universelle 
(1681) was a challenge to Montesquieu’s radical immanentism. The 
book on the considerations of the causes of the grandeur and decay 
of the Romans is closest to Machiavelli. 
Nothing is unintelligible in the history of a society. The Romans 
followed a certain pattern of behavior in their ascendancy and logi-
cally changed to another one when their conditions and fields of 
action required new patterns of behavior. In historical action, neces-
sary conditions and their concatenations make possible choices at 
rare occasions of breaking structures. 
The Innovator 
Montesquieu knew that he was an innovator and at the same 
time continued the traditions of the philosopher-poets. He was 
proud of having revolutionized philosophy by his mode of writing 
and method. His literary style had turned erudition (“docuit quae 
maximus Atlas”) [Virgil, Aeneid, I, 741—Eds.] into enlightened 
communication with the thoughtful reader, in order to enable 
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men to reflect on their political institutions as ways of life and as 
relatively best establishments. He was keenly aware of the fact that 
the Spirit of the Laws had no predecessors. “Prolem sine matre crea-
tam” [Ovid, Metamorphoses, II, 553—Eds.] meant two things: first, 
the book does not follow any political or legal tradition, though 
Montesquieu intended to continue the traditions of Grotius and 
Pufendorf; second, it expresses the pride of a virile reasoning that 
cuts through the infinite nuances of historical plenitude to make a 
systematic treatment of the variables of politics possible. 
His method was revolutionary in its comparative study of clas-
sical, medieval, and modern patterns of government in the entirety 
of their natural and moral conditions and societies’ responses to 
them: conditioning the conditions or closing the cycle of the 
historical dynamics in which acting and being acted upon and react-
ing are intertwined with one another. Equally revolutionary was his 
method of applying the concept of Newtonian Law to the historical 
process in which nature is one of the conditions of human behav-
ior. He was, however, too much of a political and legal philosopher 
not to see that historical men are the junctures of a variety of laws 
and norms beyond the natural laws and the laws of nature. Men 
are ruled not only by the diverse laws of nature, but also mores and 
folkways, statutory laws, ecclesiastical laws, political constitutions, 
rules of manners, religious laws, and social laws. The diversity of 
these laws is dynamic and open to various hierarchies according 
to the natural and moral conditions of people. All laws are relative 
to the specific conditions of society; the relatively best laws are 
those that people can accept. For this reason, the lawgiver is to 
Montesquieu the scientific philosopher who is able to discover from 
scientific analyses of natural and moral conditions the normative 
patterns that should regulate behavior and the conduct of concrete 
societies in concrete time and certain space.
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Although Montesquieu directed his work to the construction of 
basic patterns of political government, in contrast to Montaigne’s 
concern with Self and social roles, he actually took his institutional 
detour in order to arrive at the Montaignesque question: What will 
human beings look like who are the products of the basic forms 
of government, and what kind of men will the political patterns pro-
duce or prohibit, stifle, or corrupt?
Montesquieu finally settled the argument dealing with a common 
denominator of the historical process. The fundamental patterns of 
government are the frames of reference for the entire fabric of soci-
ety. The political pattern is basic because a political constitution 
determines the scope and autonomies of the diverse institutional 
segments—such as family, education, the military, religion, com-
merce, mores, and manners—all indispensable for the continuity and 
duration of any society. Political patterns set the standards of society 
because governments create the laws according to their nature and 
principles, including the laws that determine economic behavior. 
Montesquieu believed that he gained his basic generalizations 
on the nature of government from an empirical study of historical 
states. Actually, his categories of republics, monarchies, and despo-
tisms are a priori constructs of the governments as they appear in 
the context of a common sense world; they might even be described 
as eidetic descriptions in Edmund Husserl’s [1859–1938] sense. But 
these categories become total and genuinely social and historical 
when united with their principles, which indicate the passions and 
value attitudes that are the foundations of their establishment and 
make their dynamics possible. Montesquieu implied with the merg-
ing of nature and the principle of government that there are no gov-
ernments that are not ways of life in the development of their reality. 
Democracy implies the emotional evaluation of equality of some 
kind and a genuine sense of dedication and sacrifice that Montes-
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quieu calls virtue. Montesquieu’s description of democracy demon-
strates his knowledge that this political pattern opens the avenues 
toward truly human greatness and ways of life that can become 
imperative for many human situations. Aristocracies are imbued 
with a sense of moderation in superiority in order to come closest 
to a democratic republic. Monarchies in constitutional form need 
the cooperation of the intermediate powers of Estates and a sense of 
honor among those who make such elaborate mechanisms work. The 
realm of despotism, though marginal to politics (which is defined 
by laws and rational organization), is of alarming relevance to Mon-
tesquieu because of its duration and frequency, resulting from man’s 
lust for prostration and desire to obey. 
The Realm of Despotism
For Montesquieu, despotism, slavery, the subjection of women, and 
the rule of eunuchs and freedmen were lasting concerns, because 
the greater part of Asia and Africa, as well as parts of Europe, felt the 
human effects of such regimes that produce degrading and corrupt-
ing qualities in human beings: indifference, inertia, conformism, 
cowardice, betrayal of kindred and friends, and other viciousness—
all to compensate for the basic fears of death and violence. Despotisms 
may spring from the radicalization of republics and monarchies that 
have destroyed the moderation and balance of constitutional pow-
ers. But there are tyrannies in Asia and Africa that, according to 
Montesquieu, resulted from the natural conditions of the climate. It 
is desirable to reflect upon the role of natural conditions in his work. 
Even though Montesquieu grants that moral conditions always have 
priority over physical causes, a great part of the Spirit of the Laws 
deals with the effects of climate on political and social conditions. 
The lawgiver, however, is equipped with the wisdom to check and 
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control the dangers of bad climate, as in China. The question then 
arises, Why was the same priority of moral principles not possible 
in other parts of Asia and in Africa?
Montesquieu needed natural conditions to explain realities that 
were not justifiable morally and were taken for granted by the 
prejudices of his age, which the philosopher shared. His reference 
to natural conditions in distant lands is, moreover, a deliberately 
ironical allusion to the great and petty despotisms still existing in 
the moderate climate of Europe, making the immoderate excess 
of despotism more hateful. Despotism is the pure pattern of domina-
tion and servitude, as Georg Hegel [1770–1831], a careful and atten-
tive reader of Montesquieu, explains in Phenomenology of the Mind 
(1807). It is the total humiliation of human beings and the abolition 
of their dignity. It is a pattern of government that is against the rules 
of natural and moral law. 
Among the natural conditions that explain despotisms is the size 
of the bodies politic. For Montesquieu, space is a tool for explaining 
despotisms without justifying them. His theory was rather primitive. 
Republics are possible in small territories like the Greek and Roman 
polis and their imitations during the Renaissance. Actually, Mon-
tesquieu could not imagine democracies as modern political govern-
ments at all. (It is moving to think that he mentioned as democratic 
organizations the Quakers and the State of the Jesuits in Paraguay.) 
Middle sized territories made enduring monarchies possible, while 
despotisms were required for continental empires like Russia. This is 
an explanation of the existence of a historical reality, but Catherine 
the Great—repressing Montesquieu’s advice to transform her realm 
into a federation of states or a federal state—loved the Spirit of the 
Laws for giving her a good conscience. 
The existence of despotism all over the world is a historical, not a 
moral phenomenon. It is Montesquieu’s deepest concern to answer 
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the question: Why do men easily found tyrannies that endure, while 
moderate and free governments are rare and short lived? His answer 
is sad and shows his disillusionment. Men prostrate themselves and 
obey; they like to be relieved of responsibilities and to be permitted 
to indulge in their own petty interests. Though they might occasion-
ally revolt, they prefer to submit and to believe that their rulers are 
legally and morally entitled to be their betters. Inertia is a fundamen-
tal prerequisite for the rise and duration of tyrannies—the security 
of misery is better than the misery of insecurity. 
The same statement should be made about Montesquieu’s attitude 
toward slavery. Opposing Aristotle’s statement that some men are by 
nature slaves, Montesquieu postulated the equality of human beings. 
Slavery is against nature and against civil and moral law. A great 
part of his inquiry into slavery is in reference to and repudiation of 
Roman and Christian legislators who manipulated legal norms to 
entitle rulers and citizens to own slaves. 
The passage is a model case for one of the leitmotivs of the Spirit 
of the Laws—Montesquieu’s war against some prejudices of contem-
porary society. In his analysis of the assumptions of the legislators, 
he praises knowledge as making men tender by enlightenment and 
reason, advancing them toward Humanitas (i.e., toward the destruc-
tion of prejudices). 
Montesquieu acknowledged the general human situation that we 
all take certain behavior patterns, habits, and values for granted—
they are our prejudices. The philosopher shares certain prejudices 
with his age, but he should not add new ones of his own. No legisla-
tor could ever hope to elevate himself above all prejudices, but Mon-
tesquieu had enough integrity and sensitivity to demonstrate his 
indignation and moral superiority over the prejudices of his times. 
He ridiculed the color taboo of the white man by remarking that 
the Egyptians were the best philosophers of the world and had dark 
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black hair. In grim irony, he wrote: “Small minds overemphasize the 
injustice done to the Africans. If such injustice really existed, would 
it not have come to the attention of the princes of Europe, and would 
they not have agreed upon a general convention for the sake of char-
ity and pity for the natives of Africa?”
With great fervor, Montesquieu maintained the inefficiency of 
slave labor, insisting that even the construction of the Pyramids 
would have been more efficient with free labor. But the economic 
point of view is inferior to Montesquieu’s moral point of view. In a 
passage related to the question by Jean de La Bruyère [1645–1696] on 
the meaningfulness of life for the rich and the poor, Montesquieu 
asked: Who would vote for maintaining slavery in a general refer-
endum? His answer was that only the leisured classes would like to 
see slavery maintained. All other classes detest slavery because they 
know from their own experience that social recognition and reci-
procity establish genuine happiness and relaxation. 
For Montesquieu, the subjection of women is the most conspicu-
ous case of the degrading effects of such a human situation. Mon-
tesquieu liked to demonstrate a universal thesis in the context of 
Islamic and Oriental worlds. Thus, he described a climate of great 
sensuality and the complete domination of women by men, who are 
the owners of female human beings as wives or slaves in the seraglio. 
The ownership of women—present or absentee—is a symbol for 
a way of life in which everything depends upon the arbitrariness of 
the domineering man. He is master of life and death, of the honor 
and virtue of his women slaves and of his wives, who are actually not 
in a better position. The seraglio is a model case for the effects of ser-
vitude and slavery—it shows the sexual inertia and the mechanisms 
of sensuality among the female occupants when used for lovemaking 
by the owners. But the women do not know what love is because they 
are never given free choice or the opportunity for spontaneous deci-
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sions. All slavery, and in particular slavery of women, is the greatest 
excess of human alienation in which human beings are turned to 
economic goods and objects. 
In the Persian Letters (1721), Montesquieu described with keenest 
realism the relationships of sexual slavery and despotic ownership, 
anticipating in literary form the theme of human freedom and love 
in their interrelationships. The sexual relationships between a master 
who is an absentee owner and the wives whose lusts he inflamed and 
then left to the care of eunuchs is the prerequisite for the revolt in the 
seraglio. The despotism of sex, in Montesquieu’s profound insight, is 
as degrading as the ownership of human beings abused as means for 
ends that are unrelated to the unfolding of their very being. Against 
sexual despotism in the seraglio, women can fight only by deceit, 
ruse, and hypocrisy. 
Love is suffocated in a world of violence, cruelty, and sensual-
ity—all three despotic and oppressive. Love requires mutual spon-
taneity, decision, and resolve because human beings encounter one 
another in and through acts of liberty. Montesquieu condemned the 
abuse of domination in all human relationships—even those beyond 
political and social roles. He felt that the necessary establishment of 
super- and subordination in political and social institutions was a 
grim requirement for the duration of the social fabric. Montesquieu 
regarded as criminal all domination and domineering beyond these 
organizations. Human beings should meet one another in freedom 
and with distance. It was his deepest conviction that the growth of 
human beings in reciprocity required a lasting rekindling of spon-
taneity and affection to keep the flame burning in all personal and 
collective communions. 
This basic concern for human independence is conspicuous in 
Montesquieu’s reflections on the meaning of eunuchs from the Per-
sian Letters to the Spirit of the Laws. The condemnation of slavery 
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implies the rejection of eunuchs. Montesquieu regarded them with 
some bewilderment as strange symbols of the ambiguity of human 
nature. They are men alienated from themselves and equipped with 
power to dominate over healthy and complete men. Montesquieu 
regarded the eunuchs as phenomena of despotism. Its servants must 
be alienated from themselves in order to obey all orders by tyrants. 
This very condition gives them the resentment and hatred against 
the subjects of domination that assures the despots that these ser-
vants will remain the loyal executioners of their will and command. 
In dealing with despotism and slavery, sexuality and love, Montes-
quieu built a bridge between political patterns and the loneliness of 
the human Self. 
Despotism as the symbol of lawlessness is, in turn, a symbol of 
the dark, vital pressures that unleash the diverse types of lusts: lusts 
for power, lusts for domination and ownership, lusts for sensual plea-
sures—sexual, sadistic, and murderous. It is the realm of the human 
animal deprived of the wisdom of instincts that animals enjoy; it 
is realm of the unredeemed creature, the area of total irrational-
ity. Throughout all these systematic presentations, Montaigne’s basic 
attitudes and ideas are conspicuous. Montaigne, who experienced 
all possibilities of despotism in a civil war and in unconstitutional 
monarchies, is alive in Montesquieu in a systematic pattern; the Per-
sian Letters, in the analysis of sex, love, and freedom, are as keen as 
Essay Five, Book Three, of Montaigne’s Essays, “On some lines of 
Virgil,” dealing with sex, love, and marriage. 
The treatment of despotism, sensuality, violence, and arbitrari-
ness is a general theme of the Oriental stories. The short stories that 
deal with the Greek landscape breathe a different kind of sensuality, 
one penetrated by love and tenderness with a touch of irony regard-
ing the fictitious character of the eternal unity of love and fidelity. 
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The Rationality of History and Its Manifestations
Though Montesquieu is inclined to consider despotism as marginal 
to the realm of politics and laws, he regards it as one of the lasting 
human possibilities of the will to power and of the lust to prostrate 
oneself. It expresses the nightmarish abyss of the condition humaine, 
which Montaigne had recognized in the description of a sadistic 
father who in uninhibited anger beats his son almost to death. 
Montaigne postulated laws against the upsurge of such bestiality. 
Montesquieu systematized and elaborated on this suggestion as the 
true theme of his work. In spite of the negative potentialities of man, 
the constructive powers prevail in the realm of human historicity. 
Montesquieu, with deep insight, remarked that the realm of his-
tory is the segment of life in which the constructiveness of reason 
unfolds through the legal organization of societies. The lawgivers 
are scientific philosophers who, by analysis of the totality of condi-
tions under which individual societies live, are capable of establish-
ing rules, norms, and laws that enable societies to live with, for, or 
against one another according to the requirements of their fields of 
action.  
“We must explain history by laws” means to discover the inner 
rationality of the organization of mankind through the various legal 
and social systems that men impose upon their total existence for the 
sake of the duration and continuity of their institutions. Against all 
irrational and superrational philosophies, Montesquieu maintained 
the intelligibility of political behavior and social action of historical 
mankind. 
Laws are to Montesquieu the totality of norm systems that direct 
and control social action within the patterns of politics. Granted the 
priority of the political patterns, historical societies exist on a variety 
of autonomous layers within the total constitutional structure. The 
entirety of norm systems makes historical man the juncture where 
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all normative patterns meet. Societies are subject to all kinds of 
law: of climate, of religion, of manners, of mores, of constitutions, 
of civil and family codes, and of commerce and finance. Laws are 
the symbols of the constructive powers of dynamic and open reason 
that make possible the development of new norms according to the 
changing conditions of nature, tradition, and the requirements of the 
moral standards of society. The Spirit of the Laws is the merging of all 
norm systems in a meaningful totality, constructing and discovering 
the basic rationality of the historical organizations of mankind in 
political bodies. Montesquieu wrote the book as a handbook for the 
statesman and lawgiver. 
He had the distance and aloofness to penetrate both the neces-
sary and the foolish prejudices that are taken for granted prior to 
all rational norm systems. All groups take certain values, behavior 
patterns, and habits for granted. There are prejudices required for 
the foundations of social action in all historical societies. But there 
are also foolish and unintelligent prejudices against which we must 
revolt as creatures endowed with critical reason. 
All lawgivers have two assignments to fulfill: they must secure the 
laws that permit people to survive in the lasting competition among 
nations, and they must consider the individualities of the concrete 
states. This means that men are ruled by general norms concerning 
the common traits of collective humanity, such as common passions, 
fears, hopes, pride, and aggressiveness. The communion in finiteness 
and frustrations, the passio humana, is indeed the bond that unifies 
mankind. But this aspect needs complementing by the consideration 
of the specific individualities of the single collectivities. Montesquieu 
spoke of the ends of states; he implicitly suggested that these goals 
are not decisions or choices, but, instead, the manifestations of a col-
lective subconscious revealing itself in the sequence of one specific 
concern or value throughout the changing structures of historical 
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developments. The end of Israel was religion; the end of Rome was 
imperialism; the end of England was liberty. The Jews did not choose 
to be God’s people; they were chosen and understood themselves as 
such; Montesquieu defines the Roman telos in the first chapter of 
the book on the Romans—they began to build magnificent temples 
when the citizens still lived in log cabins. They experienced the urge 
for a pagan messianism to rule the world with sword and law. The 
English people did not consciously intend to become free. But their 
whole history, from the struggle of the nobles and the people against 
the kings to the religious freedom and tolerance of modern times 
and to the economic freedom of capitalism, contains a thread mov-
ing through their institutional organization of government. 
In the historical process, republics and monarchies establish 
rational institutions by meaningful legislation. As citizens, men 
are historical. Montesquieu knew that historicity is one segment of 
human existence—we are products of our own particular histories 
(i.e., we are shaped by the totality of conditions under which we live 
and which we influence by our own responses). These conditions and 
responses are expressed in diverse norm systems that we call laws. 
The structures of laws differ in republics and monarchies. Republics 
can be democracies or aristocracies, but they have in common the 
idea that a majority or minority rules for more or less an egalitar-
ian society. Societies in which subjects and the objects of sovereignty 
coincide are egalitarian. Military, economic, ethnic, and religious 
criteria for citizenship determine the scope of a democracy. The 
institutions that facilitate differentiation among democracies— 
especially the rights and duties of citizens to vote, to serve in the 
armies, and to become public servants—fascinated Montesquieu. He 
clearly saw the range of democratic republics from radically egali-
tarian to plutocratic and aristocratic republics, in particular on the 
basis of a slave economy.
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Democracies are avenues toward constitutions of liberty in which 
citizens enjoy political rights, voluntarily submitting to the obliga-
tions of political office. Montesquieu felt that the people had the 
political sensitivity and instinct necessary for selecting trustworthy 
leaders; he was convinced that they would rarely fail in their choices 
of men to be nominated for office. But such qualifications do not 
equip the people for holding political office. He maintained that 
government is an art that is traditionally learned and transmitted 
from generation to generation in a political aristocracy. Unrestricted 
in his admiration for the political wisdom and moderation of the 
Roman Senate, he praised the esprit d’corps of these gentlemen, their 
imagination, stubbornness, their ruthlessness in war and diplomacy, 
their perseverance in adversities; they seemed to him the ideal politi-
cal elite. Their wisdom and political acumen made possible repub-
lican freedom in which the aristocratic and democratic elements 
balanced, rather than opposed, each other.
The institutions of political freedom were not destroyed by indi-
viduals. Montesquieu coined a term that anticipates Max Scheler’s 
[1874–1928] theory of resentment—he spoke of the Eternal Malady 
that caused the end of political liberty. This illness consisted in the 
fact that all groups abuse their power by accumulating more and 
more power in fear of being deprived of it; they are fascinated by the 
chimera of a monopoly of domination that would permit them to 
crush competitors and adversaries. It meant, further, that all classes 
that have been offended and humiliated, when politically recognized, 
will overcompensate their resentments and hatreds and will abuse 
their new powers and destroy freedom and democracy. In Rome, he 
saw the unleashed masses abusing the power of the tribunes of the 
people, establishing the military dictatorship and with it the end of 
the freedom of the Republic.
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Montesquieu was aware of the dialectics of all political prin-
ciples. He knew that the corruption of a government begins with its 
principles. There is an inner logic in all principles to be carried 
to their extremes. The principle of democracy—emotional dedica-
tion to equality—could easily turn into radical resentment against 
all officers and representatives and result in the surrender of all 
political functions to the democratic majority (i.e., a collective des-
potism). Montesquieu analyzed the disintegration of the democratic 
virtue in Thucydidean terms: “What was maxim is now called rigid-
ity, what was taken for granted as rule is now described as coercion; 
attention and vigilance is now fear.”
On the other hand, Montesquieu believed that democracy could 
be a most excellent way of life when directed by wise and happy men. 
Such leaders could set an example and a normative image of unself-
ishness and happiness for a tiny group of democratic citizens. Mon-
tesquieu even granted the possibility of a positive democracy founded 
on commerce and capitalism when businessmen would recognize the 
ascetic devotion required by the inner logic of modern economy.
It is the greatness of Montesquieu’s description of the rationality 
and legal organization of political patterns that he understood them 
as ways of life and historical variables of the condition humaine. This 
great discovery is paralyzed by the fact that democracy as a political 
pattern is to Montesquieu a historical phenomenon of the ancient 
world, surviving as a religious or social pattern. In spite of his fasci-
nating anticipation of a new administrative and revolutionary world 
after the princes of the House of Thurn and Taxis established a Euro-
pean Mail Service, he could not imagine democracy and its dialectics 
as Tocqueville would a century after Spirit of the Laws. 
In contrast to democracies, monarchies are symbols of modern 
times in which neither the polis of antiquity nor its empires are 
possible. Montesquieu still lived under the shadow of the fateful folly 
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of Louis XIV’s attempt to establish a Spanish-French Empire and 
to turn the old feudal monarchy into an absolute imperial state. 
The mechanism of monarchies functions without the moral ethos of 
democracies and the fear of despotisms. Constitutional monarchies 
are smoothly working machines that achieve great deeds without 
virtue. The legal structure of monarchies is directed toward dis-
tributing and balancing the king’s sovereignty with the intermedi-
ate powers of the Estates. It was the function of the Estate to build 
bridges between the monarch and his people and to reconcile the 
privacy of the subjects with the authority of the king. In a constitu-
tional monarchy, the Estates represent the social forces of the sword, 
of the cross, and of wealth. The subjects remain private and are not 
citizens. Monarchies unite the purposive rational ends of an elabo-
rate military and civil administration with the emotional values of 
glory and prestige for the sovereign. The social space of the monar-
chy is the court of the king. Montesquieu constructed the pattern of 
the courtier as the product of this social structure and described him 
as the most disgusting type of human being. This analysis could 
have been written by Montaigne as the extreme negative of the con-
dition humaine. To Montesquieu, the courtier is the sad experience 
of a good form of government. He is the parasite of a monarchy. He 
never lives up to the truth of his role as a loyal servant to the king; 
instead, he abuses his position for self-aggrandizement and exploits 
it for vested interests. Pretending zeal for the royal service, he enjoys 
leisure and inertia except when he is busy receiving economic favors. 
The debunking of human virtue and the ridicule of integrity dem-
onstrate the open cynicism of a man who abuses allegiance as a 
business proposition. Montesquieu regarded the courtier as a typical 
phenomenon of corruption in a monarchy. But the phenomenon is 
universal; all regimes have their courtiers, regardless of whether they 
are called lobbies, pressure groups, or rackets.
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The laws of the monarchy require an organization of ranks, pre-
ferments, and distinctions for the noble classes in their social roles. 
For this reason, Montesquieu postulated honor as the principle of the 
monarchy; incentive makes the wheels of the machine move. Honor 
makes men conscious of social distance and sensitive to privileges. 
This field of action will always move according to the ambitions 
for honor and distinction. Whatever the motives of the individuals 
might be, even the most selfish ambitions for high ranks can produce 
great deeds. It is the political pattern of the Fable of the Bees, where 
private vices create public virtues.
Monarchies are the schools of honor. Their sociological analysis 
is a masterpiece of understanding the basic pattern of the modern 
competitive society. In contrast to democracies or despotisms that 
require the total presence or absence of human beings, monarchies 
offer a model case for demonstrating a fundamental law of sociol-
ogy—the interdependence of appearance and reality, pretending and 
acting, the identification with social roles or their abuse in favor of 
vested interests while playing the normative roles.
Aesthetic fiction is the required pattern of this society, which 
Lord Shaftesbury well described when he coined the term moral taste 
as a criterion for judging a court society of gentlefolk. Social roles 
played to aesthetic perfection make up the honor of the social ranks 
and all actions are judged as beautiful, not as good.
Three postulates are indispensable in a monarchy: people should 
put a certain nobility into their virtues, a certain frankness into 
their behavior, and a certain politeness into their manners. Montes-
quieu commented on these ideals. When courtiers speak of virtue, 
they mean what men owe to themselves, what distinguishes them 
from their fellow men. In the same way the courtier would inter-
pret the term frankness to mean the parading of keenness and the 
fiction of independence, not the zeal for truth. Politeness means 
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to the courtier total conformity in order to belong and make a 
career. Montesquieu actually made a sociological analysis of mod-
ern competitive society that developed in a monarchical frame of 
reference. Men act on a stage, performing various roles in diverse 
plays in changing density and intimacy or distance and aloofness. 
To compete successfully and advance their social prestige, men 
are anxious to recognize others so that they might be recognized 
by society. Everybody accepts mutualities and reciprocal gentle-
ness and sweetness. In such societies, people do not judge human 
actions as good, but as beautiful; not as just, but as lovely; not as 
reasonable, but as extraordinary. The transformation of the moral 
world into an aesthetic and sensual entity is completely understood 
by Montesquieu by means of a sociological approach to language.
What Montesquieu described as the pattern of monarchy is 
indeed the way of life of bourgeois society, setting the pattern for 
Georg Simmel’s [1858–1918] theory of sociability. Goethe’s Masken-
züge and the Roman Carnival are in complete agreement with 
Montesquieu on the fictitious character of the social world and its 
inescapable domination.
Montesquieu saw the old feudal-military world vanishing and 
with it the ideal image of the hero. He saw the new society as a 
capitalistic bourgeoisie with new horizons and values, with more 
politeness, but with tough individual competition. But he did not 
see a law of progress in history. In examining the historical worlds 
of antiquity—the Middle Ages and modernity—he discovered that 
the requirements of the historical fields of action had demonstrated 
the creative and dynamic power of human reason to establish a 
sequence of laws relative to the natural and moral conditions of par-
ticular societies.
We explain history by laws. We describe the total immanence 
of life, the inseparable unity of nature and reason in the diversity 
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of normative systems that create for men the junctures in their 
historicity where all laws meet and articulate the unfolding of their 
possibilities. 
Montesquieu is still a modern thinker in the radicalism of his 
philosophy, of his historicity intelligible through explanation and 
understanding. He succeeded in enlightening history by the cre-
ative discovery of logos in the organized legal worlds of history.
History and Laws 
Montesquieu clearly understood the mutual interaction of the 
constructive powers of reason with the totality of moving struc-
tures that make up the historical process of concrete time. While 
dynamic and open logos enlightens, organizes, and articulates the 
space and time of history, the changing kaleidoscope of historical 
structures explains the laws and their transformations according to 
the changing requirements of the fields of action.
“We must illuminate the laws by history” is complementary 
to “we must illuminate history by laws.” In the sixth part of the 
Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu inserted some historical chapters 
that deviated from the systematic character of the work. Here he 
applied the new method of grasping the individuality of a historical 
phenomenon by examining the general and particular causes that 
made it unique.
Book XXVII deals with the origins and changes in the Roman 
laws of succession; it is a brilliant merging of sociological and 
historical causation. The general causes that explain the origins and 
changes of this group of laws are definitely political, while the par-
ticular causes refer to the place of the female in Roman society. The 
transformations of these laws cannot be explained as resulting from 
the inner logic of the problems in the legal context. The historical 
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understanding of the political ideas that made such changes desir-
able or necessary is decisive.
The original legislation manifested the radical conflict between 
natural laws and equity on the one hand, and the political-military 
concerns of a feudal gentry and of soldier citizens on the other. The 
general spirit and the mores of this fighting nation were ascetic, 
frugal, and pious. Romans were dedicated to the glory of the Repub-
lic; for this reason, they considered wrong the people who did not 
conform to the spirit of the body politic. The Roman people were 
hostile to ladies who enjoyed their wealth for the pleasure and lux-
ury it gave them. This social situation had a decisive impact on the 
first laws of succession.
The original laws excluded all females—widows and daughters 
alike—the right of inheritance. The male succession assured the 
inviolability of the estate as the economic background for the mili-
tary strength of clan or family. In this context, Montesquieu’s rea-
son disclosed itself as reason of state, which often must clash with 
the wisdom of legal reason and with the principle of equity. Such 
laws will always harm the natural sentiment of human beings. Like 
Montaigne, Montesquieu experienced and recognized the lasting 
possibilities of conflict between legal norms and human feelings. 
Montesquieu was grimly aware of the precarious character of man 
in his social roles and in his historical status restricting his natural 
humanity. Like Montaigne, Montesquieu never forgot that men are 
subject to their political duties and to the norms imposed on them 
by society, and that they are exposed to all kinds of suffering beyond 
their social roles. Societies take for granted that the rules of the body 
politic and the norms of society, class, and office have priority over 
the claims of man to be human and to live according to the natural 
sentiment of his own self.
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To Montesquieu, the female in the history of Roman legislation 
was a good example of such a plight. The political, military, and 
economic interests of the imperialistic republic necessarily wronged 
women in the laws of succession. But such laws were designed to 
limit the luxury of women in the interest of the commonwealth. 
In the perspective of the ruling elite, it was a necessary law, giving 
higher value to the polis than to any individual. The change of such 
laws cannot be understood but by a complete transformation of the 
general spirit and mores. That alone could produce a new evaluation 
of women in the political and social context.
The Principate of Augustus (which a twentieth-century historian; 
Ronald Syme [1903–1989], has called The Roman Revolution) was to 
Montesquieu a complete social transformation. The civil wars and the 
reciprocal killings of nobles and people had reduced marriages and 
legitimate children. The Principate marked the end of the civil wars 
and the inauguration of the Roman Peace. Augustus was determined 
to rebuild the highest ranks of society and to introduce the new social 
elite of his regime—the new wealthy middle classes. Their mores and 
general spirit were indeed worlds apart from the old republican spirit. 
This traditional virtue and the pious mores of the ancestors had van-
ished; the new elite regarded the present and future without consider-
ing the past. Such attitudes were shared by the judges, who were only 
motivated by equity, moderation, and the ideals of propriety (deco-
rum), a situation that made possible the introduction of “modern” 
legislation. Augustus promulgated the Papian Laws that encouraged 
marriages and the procreation of legitimate children. The success of 
the laws rested with their promise of possible succession, thus ending 
the discrimination against women. Wives with children could be made 
successors in the wills of their husbands. Montesquieu commented 
on the blessing of this law by stating that the laws often achieve great 
goods that are hidden and small evils that are most sensitive. 
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From the Emperor Claudius to Justinian, there was continuous 
progress in the recognition of the legal rights of women to succeed 
their husbands and fathers. Justinian believed that he followed the 
reason of nature when he liberated himself of the last residues of the 
traditional prejudices of the men of the old republic. Actually, this 
legal and moral revolution was caused by the same reasons that the 
republican government had applied. Imperial Rome was as much 
concerned with the social continuity of the political elite as had been 
the old republic. Both were convinced that the legal stability of the 
economic foundations of the ruling class gave the state some security 
for the duration of this class. Montesquieu stressed this social prob-
lem as extremely important to the political system. Though he did 
not emphasize the point, he observed that a new elite was indispens-
able to the revolutionary state because the old senatorial nobility 
had either been exterminated in the civil wars and during the first 
imperial regimes or retired from the public scene. Montesquieu did 
not state a thesis, but the structure of the chapter implies that every 
sociopolitical revolution will be forced to establish a new ruling class 
from which to recruit the office holders and the loyal servants of the 
new regime.
Most interesting in this section of Spirit of the Laws is the socio-
logical method that Montesquieu used to describe the functioning 
of the old laws of succession. It was an analysis of the tricks fathers 
and husbands applied in order to escape the rigidity of the laws and 
to make their daughters or wives succeed. This was possible, Mon-
tesquieu rightly stated, because of the purely formal character of the 
Roman jurisdiction.
Still more important for the enlightenment of the laws by history 
are the last two books of the sixth part, which deal with the origins 
of the feudal laws in relation to the monarchy and to its revolutions. 
The method is historical in the causal analysis of the circumstances 
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that produced and established feudal laws. These laws created infinite 
goods and evils; they produced norms with a trend toward anarchy 
and anarchy with a tendency toward order and legal harmony. 
What is most important is that these two books are not merely 
appendices for partisan purposes. They complement the two pat-
terns of the systems of liberty that Montesquieu developed in Book 
XI, the classical pattern of the Roman Republic and the modern 
pattern of the constitutional monarchy in England. The last books 
present the medieval pattern of feudal constitutional monarchy; it is 
a system of liberty in which king, nobles, clergy, and the free people 
balance their rights and obligations in freedom and moderation. 
For this reason, the books belong in the systematic context of the 
Spirit of the Laws. On the other hand, these books are political and 
partisan and never as aloof and disinterested as the other parts of 
the work. They were Montesquieu’s scholarly answer to the writings 
of Count Henri de Boulainvilliers [1658–1722] and Jean-Baptiste 
Abbé Dubos [1670–1742] on the history of the French monarchy. 
These authors had written learned treatises on the subject, each with 
a different political purpose. 
The nobleman Boulainvilliers used the vast materials from legal 
and political sources to demonstrate that the true monarchy is the 
feudal monarchy in which the king is the first gentleman among 
equals, and the feudals are the main pillars of the government and 
in charge of the political and administrative offices. The historical 
analysis was a political critique by the nobility facing the absolute 
state and the decay of the feudal monarchy. Though Montesquieu 
was in full agreement with the political goal of Boulainvilliers, he 
disagreed with his argument that the Franks had made a general 
legal settlement that put the Romans in a kind of servitude. The 
aristocrat seemed to Montesquieu to indulge in a conspiracy against 
the Third Estate.
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The Abbé Dubos, on the other hand, attempted to deal a death-
blow to the feudal gentlemen by demonstrating the old coopera-
tion between kings and the bourgeois urban classes, of which the 
absolute state was the true and logical expression. Montesquieu was 
conscious that his own argumentation, though more learned than 
the others’ (in spite of his admiration for the erudition of Dubos), 
was determined by his own political position. He took it for granted 
that all scholars live in and with their prejudices; he only advised 
them not to add personal ones to those that rule their era, nation, 
and class.
Montesquieu shared indeed in the prejudices of his class in 
interpreting French medieval history. He had presented his book on 
the Romans to the Duc de Saint-Simon, the author of the Mémoires 
and a friend and political follower of Boulainvilliers. Montesquieu 
was a conservative thinker who, like all genuine conservatives, was 
in revolt against a despotic and bourgeois regime. He spoke with 
enthusiasm of the political philosophy of the Archbishop François 
Fénélon [1651–1715], who had set the pattern for a traditional consti-
tutionalism as the remedy against tyranny of Louis XIV.
Montesquieu’s historical investigations convinced him that the 
system of feudal liberty had resulted from the political traditions 
of the Franks when they occupied France. They had taken just the 
lands they needed with moderation and had not entirely deprived 
the Romans of their estates. Montesquieu concluded that the con-
quering Franks were not moved by a tyrannical spirit, but by the 
hope of reconciling the mutual needs of both peoples.
Montesquieu, however, was induced by his methodological dis-
cipline to inquire into the mores and laws of the Franks before he 
could explain their political constitution. He stressed that these con-
quering people of a violent and brutal mind demonstrated the scope 
and quality of their reason by their precise and refined laws. Montes-
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quieu was fascinated by their legislation of a criminal code that pun-
ished the wrongs and crimes committed in the fury of vengeance. 
These laws considered in detail the circumstances, the subjective 
attitude, and intention of the offended; they weighed the demands 
for satisfaction in the context of the situation. For Montesquieu, such 
refined laws demonstrated that these barbarian people had left the 
state of nature and had reached the true state of historicity in which 
the law-giving power of reason prevailed.
The same laws were used by Montesquieu to analyze the class 
structure of medieval society. He wanted to show the prominent role 
of the nobility in the establishment of law and order in the anarchy 
of civil wars and in revolutions against helpless rulers. He analyzed 
the fees that the laws had imposed upon the offenders who had killed 
members of different social classes. The study showed that the vas-
sals or feudals were worth six hundred saigas; a Roman, guest of the 
king, three hundred; a Frank, two hundred; an ordinary Roman, one 
hundred; and a Frank freedman or serf, forty-five. This was an inge-
nious way to construct a theory of stratification and to prove that the 
nobles were the highest rank in society. Furthermore, it proved Mon-
tesquieu’s thesis that Franks and Romans lived and worked together 
despite differences in social rank.
The feudals were, first of all, warriors who had taken an oath 
of loyalty to one or several seigneurs. They became vassals and, as 
such, they had received their fiefs. The structure of feudalism is the 
hierarchy of dependencies from the king to the different ranks of 
seigneurs. At the same time, it was a political and social system in 
which personal allegiances and objective functions, economic status 
and social prestige, were one and indivisible. Montesquieu was aware 
of all these implications and admired the legal constructiveness of a 
society in which greed and murder had contributed to the state of 
anarchy in the early centuries of the Middle Ages.
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Montesquieu was fascinated by the idea that the Franks had 
originally elected the king for his nobility, although, later on, they 
had made the crown hereditary. But they always elected the Mayor 
of the Palace for his military virtue as commander of the armies. In 
the growing anarchy of the political world under incompetent and 
greedy kings, the feudal lords were compelled to make the Mayor of 
the Palace a charismatic leader or to grant leadership to a Mayor of 
the Palace who suggested his role as leader for a specific enterprise. 
The nobles gave him full powers for all military, civilian, and political 
matters. Montesquieu saw the sublimity of reason in this feudal and 
independent society: “One needed to invite rather than to coerce, one 
needed to give and promise fiefs when vacated, continuously reward 
and avoid preferences: the administrator should be also the general 
of the army.” This rational organization of the feudal world was to 
Montesquieu a great experience. While the political world seemed 
to disintegrate hopelessly, human reason could still find some device 
for establishing a social order with freedom and moderation, in spite 
of the cruelty and selfishness of groups and persons.
The interaction between the Mayor of the Palace and the feudal 
lords brought into being a cautious and moderate government that 
was to protect feudal society against incompetent kings. The position 
of the mayor was firm as long as he was protected by the nobles and 
satisfied their vested interests. The seigneurs used and abused the 
mayor’s power against lawless and despotic rulers in order to receive 
new fiefs and privileges. To Montesquieu, this was the era of feudal 
reason, in which the pattern of constitutional and legal freedom was 
constructed: the hierarchy of vassalages or fiefs and the jurisdictional 
power of the seigneurs.
In the anarchy of unceasing civil wars, people could rely on the 
jurisdiction of their seigneurs, not on the fictitious authority of a 
king. Charlemagne appeared to Montesquieu the ideal pattern of the 
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good feudal monarch. He had founded a system of political liberty 
by constructing a balance between the clergy, the nobles, and the 
free men in their relationships to him as king. This liberty consisted 
primarily in the political and jurisdictional government of the feu-
dals in their regional districts while they remained true to their oath 
to the king. Charlemagne and Saint Louis seemed to Montesquieu 
the expressions of moderation, wisdom, and resolution in their 
political institutions. It was Montesquieu’s idea that such rulers 
proved that the authority of political-legal truth renders the power 
of a king invincible in penetrating the vested interests of all estates 
with the political reason that unites the parts of the states with a 
common purpose. Political reason meant to Montesquieu a system 
of moderation and liberty in which all elements had a segment of 
interdependence within a common cause that all took for granted 
through the oath of loyalty.
Among the successors to Charlemagne, the weak rulers lost 
the basis of their powers when they gave away their property, their 
domain, to the nobility or to the clergy. Each group abused its 
strength in controlling the other and satisfying its infinite greed. 
The transformation of the feudal system in extending vassalage and 
fiefs to free men and in the one-sided declaration of the feudals that 
they would only serve in wars of defense were signs of the decay of 
feudal constitutionalism.
Montesquieu illuminated the almost unintelligible laws of the 
early Middle Ages by submitting them to the criteria of historical 
causation. History had served him to illuminate the laws and to 
show the constructiveness of legal reasoning and the working of 
moderation in the legal establishments that made political liberty 
possible when violence and greed prevailed. Montesquieu, finally, 
agreed with Boulainvilliers and Saint-Simon—the old feudal mon-
archy had realized political freedom; the absolute monarchy had 
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destroyed it. It is interesting to note that Montesquieu did not insert 
the description of the feudal monarchy in Book XI of the Spirit of 
the Laws, where he dealt with Roman and English liberty. Montes-
quieu’s personal values and his political commitment to the system 
of conservative constitutionalism led him to place the two books at 
the end of the work. They were, indeed, his last word on the very 
reality of freedom as a political pattern in France to be remembered 
in an age of despotism.
But freedom was to Montesquieu an even more fundamental 
concern than political institutions. These were, indeed, the prereq-
uisite for the unfolding of a man’s spontaneity in self-realization.
In the Thoughts, there are many remarks testifying to his grim 
conviction that superordination and subordination, command and 
obedience, domination and service are inescapable necessities for the 
continuity of a political and social order. But in all genuinely human 
encounters, domination, even disguised as love, is unbearable. 
Meetings of men in mutual intersubjectivity are to Montesquieu 
the highest human values when reciprocal spontaneities produce 
the growth of men in affection and love. Montesquieu was fully 
conscious that people live on various levels of pre- and posthistorical 
existence for the thinker who attempts a comprehensive examina-
tion of the total human situation.
Man in historical action remains part of nature though playing 
social roles. Montesquieu draws the attention of the reader to the fact 
that the blessings of law are compensated for by the ills they might 
convey to the natural sentiments of human beings. It is not by chance 
that Montesquieu spoke of the law of nature before entering into the 
analysis of the meaningful context of the laws of politics. All men are 
inherently equipped by nature with certain sentiments, regardless 
of their historical and political situation, specifically the feelings of 
being a human creature. All humans have by nature the desire to 
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belong and live with and for others; they look for peace in order to 
overcome their fears and they cooperate for shelter and protection. 
These basic laws of nature are invariables; they are the emotional 
foundations of happiness, value attitudes, and political organiza-
tion for the sake of equity. But they often and necessarily conflict 
with legal institutions based on grim generalizations and abstrac-
tions such as in the Roman laws on succession. The normativeness of 
equity succumbs easily to the social and political pressures of chang-
ing historical structures.
Parallel to the natural desire for happiness are the equally natu-
ral sentiments of shame, which to Montesquieu is of the highest 
importance as the emotional reaction to our frustration of human 
intentions toward perfection and integrity. There is still another pat-
tern of conflict in men when a natural sentiment can be destroyed 
by another stronger, natural sentiment. Montesquieu explicitly 
mentioned, with grave seriousness in the phrasing of the statement, 
that under the conditions of despotism, women are exposed to a 
heartbreaking antagonism of their feelings. Most women have a deep 
longing to bear and raise children. But when they live under a system 
of tyranny that breeds fear, cowardice, and hypocrisy, abortion has 
a definite human function. Not to bear children who would have to 
live as slaves becomes an escape into freedom and free will. Under 
total tyranny, people believe that it is better not to be born than to 
live as slaves. This is a pattern of thinking that might be the cause 
for many childless marriages in totalitarian countries. This conflict 
of sentiments is one of the strongest examples of Montesquieu’s pro-
fundity of experience of human servitude and is an eloquent state-
ment about the needs for human liberty.
For Montesquieu, the human beings who achieve Humanitas—
the serenity and moderation of the soul that is beyond the Heart 
and the Spirit—are posthistorical. The Stoic emperors gave him the 
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courage to love life, in spite of the monsters who followed them. For 
Montesquieu, they incorporated the reality of historical men tran-
scending themselves: greatness of soul. It is such greatness of soul 
that gives men the strength to be superior to destiny. Christina of 
Sweden [1626–1689] resigned her crown for the contemplative life 
of philosophy, and another queen asked her Estates to associate her 
husband to her office as ruler—both were moved by eros, and charity 
passed through their historical and social roles and illuminated their 
human nature by acts of genuine creativity. 
Posthistorical sentiments remain—in the last analysis—creative 
acts that control reason and virtue. Though reason and virtue seem 
to Montesquieu the highest goods, they are exposed to radical 
alienation under the laws of uprooted autonomous developments. 
Montesquieu has no answer to the question of what human factor 
creates the moderation required for all balance in political, social, 
and human relationships. The disaster of the condition humaine can 
be averted only by the wisdom of the soul—its Humanitas, the smile 
of reason over its own folly to be more than human and the positive 
affirmation of being part of a whole in spite of defeats and the passio 




 Adam Smith as Sociologist 
 
Unity, Purpose, Ethos
The classical social sciences developed as a division of philosophy, 
and classical philosophers devoted their works to the exploration of 
the truth about the whole. The human world was a specific part of a 
universe that could be studied, explained, and understood by itself.
The modern social sciences came into existence as a revolt 
against philosophy—not against philosophy as such, but against a 
system of philosophy that was imbued with the spirit of Christian 
theology and spiritual idealism. The authors whom we regard as the 
founders of the modern social sciences did not intend to construct a 
new system of sciences. They simply thought to reform the branch of 
philosophy that dealt with moral conduct. They attempted to use the 
new methods of psychology to explain the working of moral stan-
dards in social action, and, in this effort, regarded the varieties of 
social structures and of social changes as understandable in terms of 
the never-ending transformations of social conditions.
The autonomy of the field of their investigations became appar-
ent, however, when they succeeded in explaining the functioning of 
moral norms in terms of social-psychological and sociological anal-
Published originally in a slightly different form in Social Research 12 (February 
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yses of human needs, instincts, and passions. This was a comprehen-
sive effort to eliminate all religious and metaphysical presuppositions 
from the understanding of social action and of societal relationships. 
It represented a conception that can almost be described as one of 
total immanence, and yet most of these thinkers tried to preserve the 
idea of a divine and creative reason. In the psychological dynamics 
of human nature, they saw the intentions of a wise Intelligence that 
establishes again and again a universe of harmony and order, despite 
the many destructive forces. This was in many respects an effort to 
rehabilitate nature and human nature, long degraded by many writ-
ers on Christian philosophy. In this enterprise, many authors were 
forced to admit the truth of a teleological interpretation of the life of 
man in the world. Though they did not refer to Aristotle, the mod-
erns who attempted to understand social life by itself were inclined 
to grant the necessity of regarding a teleological interpretation as the 
most probable one.
In this development, Adam Smith [1723–1790] had a unique posi-
tion.1 His work was a junction where three roads merged: the tradi-
tions of the science of jus naturae; the trends in British philosophy 
toward a shifting from reflection on moral goods to the analysis of 
moral acts; and the religion of nature, or deism. Adam Smith suc-
ceeded in unifying these three tendencies into an interdependent 
system combining sociology, economics, and political science—the 
social sciences. In his work, the social sciences were still one and 
indivisible, centered around the idea of a “science of the statesman” 
that would meet the various requirements of controlling social action 
in its many aspects. Smith was attracted throughout his life by the 
science of the statesman. What was this science?
There were no departments of political science or economics in 
the Scottish universities. Adam Smith held a chair of moral philoso-
phy. He was required to lecture on four subjects: natural theology, 
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ethics, natural law, and practical problems of politics. In a superficial 
sense, these courses account for the unity of his work: The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments2 covers the first two courses; the Lectures on Justice3 
are a copy of the course on natural law; and the Wealth of Nations4 
deals with the practical problems of politics. From within, however, 
his books are integrated by a never-deviating intention. They all were 
the preparation for a forthcoming study on natural jurisprudence, 
the science of the statesman. Smith repeatedly expressed a desire to 
conclude his investigations on the principles and techniques of soci-
ety with a theory of natural law, “the most important and least culti-
vated science of all.”5 A short time before his death, he still expressed 
a dim hope of summing up his life work with such a system of the 
principles and rules of social justice.6
Time and again, Smith praised Hugo Grotius [1583–1645] as the 
founder of this science and as its most comprehensive scholar in spite 
of his shortcomings.7 Smith was attracted by the ethos of Grotius’s 
scholarship. He shared Grotius’s idea that the scholar carries respon-
sibility for the enlightened conduct of the rulers and for the moral 
standards of society. Between rulers and ruled, the intellectuals—as 
the torchbearers of wisdom and illumination—have to be concerned 
with the preservation of justice and of the values of the good life 
in the disruption of the Christian universe. But while Adam Smith 
carried on the humanistic ethos of Grotius, he believed that social 
responsibility is merely one aspect of the scholar’s function. A scholar 
is responsible not only for the enlightenment of his group but also for 
the truth about the whole. The search for truth implies a continual 
reexamination of the methods and techniques that make it possible 
to establish the truth. This constant inquiry becomes a dynamic fac-
tor when ends and means do not meet. Then scholars revolt against 
the presuppositions that bar the approach toward new methods for 
getting at the truth.
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N260
Smith and his friends carried on Grotius’s humanistic beliefs 
concerning the moral character of the interaction between theory 
and practice in what they considered to be an emergency situation 
in English society. Smith described the situation in a comprehen-
sive sociological analysis of the institutions of higher learning in his 
contemporary England.8 The universities, he held, were hardening in 
past patterns that were intended to educate theologians and clergy-
men, not gentlemen. They were corporations in which a few privi-
leged thinkers enjoyed a good life without being concerned about 
research and teaching. There was no university where a gentleman 
could be trained into an enlightened politician. Smith and most of 
his friends and students drew the conclusion implicit in this obser-
vation and, as tutors, accompanied young noblemen on their grands 
tours, which were the substitute for adequate academic training of 
aristocratic youth. This situation contributed to the social disposi-
tion of the Scottish thinkers—to their belief that reflection on the 
principles of the good and just life must be united with analysis of 
the techniques and means that make it possible to realize those prin-
ciples in the changing situations of the social process. 
Smith repeatedly stated that he recognized only two sciences as 
useful: ethics and natural jurisprudence.9 Several times he compared 
ethics to criticism, and jurisprudence to grammar. He reproached the 
highly esteemed Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines that ethics, though 
useful and agreeable, was not precise. On the other hand, his praise 
of moral philosophy was restricted. Moral and aesthetic philoso-
phy, he contended,10 may formulate precepts and exhortations that 
in general and vague terms encourage the practice of virtue, but it 
does not provide instruction in how to realize the perfect life. A great 
advantage of the science of natural law is that it can elaborate and 
define in final terms the general principles of social action and the 
specific rules for their application. Smith believed that we can teach 
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the elements of the just life, as we can teach the elements of gram-
mar. Both are simple and unambiguous, clear and evident. Everyone 
is able to use the rules of grammar intelligently and to learn how to 
read. Everyone may learn to use the rules of natural jurisprudence in 
order to live a good and just life.
This admiration for the systematic precision and clarity of the 
science of natural law, and for its easy applicability by rulers, is evi-
dent in Smith’s frequent references to Hugo Grotius. As mentioned 
above, however, Smith’s thinking contained an element that was 
lacking in Grotius, who remained in the great juristic tradition and 
dealt with systems of norms and abstract requirements. This new 
element, fundamental to the origins of the modern social sciences, 
is the trend toward the concrete. Thus, Smith spoke violently and 
indignantly of the contemplative scholar who takes no responsibil-
ity for the social problems of his world.11 Frequently, he referred to 
the abstract and speculative point of view that levels down the com-
prehensive character of social reality.12 He blamed metaphysical and 
abstract theories for preventing the proper analyses of social action.
This general trend toward a comprehensive explanation and inter-
pretation of social reality reveals the intention to understand human 
life in society with all its interdependent actions. Grotius’s precision 
and clarity were those of the jurist who systematizes norms. Smith 
tried to understand and explain social and moral values as tenden-
cies that come into existence in the experiences of man in society 
and constitute his social being. Grotius located the legal and moral 
spheres in an all-pervading spirit of Christian spirituality. Smith 
postulated the social sciences as the science of man in society, the 
transformed science of natural law that establishes the laws of nature 
by a scientific analysis of the incentives, interests, and intentions of 
man in social action. These social sciences are the tools for discover-
ing the criteria of right and just social action, and the instruments 
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for establishing freedom from theology and metaphysics as the foun-
tain of universal knowledge.
Mutuality, Sympathy, Socius
Smith laid the foundations for an empirical science of society in his 
Theory of Moral Sentiments. Its main purpose was to analyze the ele-
ments whose interaction makes possible the continuity and duration 
of society. This science of the social constitution of society does not 
recognize a conflict between individual and collectivity. It is a study 
in mutuality. Smith regarded mutuality as the primary datum of 
societal relationships, and his theory of mutuality is a cornerstone 
of his sociology. Giving and taking, acting and being acted upon, 
encroaching upon another and self restraint—these are the original 
elements of the social constitution. They establish a dynamic unity, a 
whole that can be compared to a kaleidoscope.
These fundamental relationships point to the essential equal-
ity of human beings. Smith stressed this point frequently.13 Giv-
ing and taking, acting and being acted upon, are potentialities in 
every human being. All men are rich and poor. This mutuality is a 
universal phenomenon, pervading all spheres of social action, and 
is not restricted to the sphere of economic needs. Smith explicitly 
stated that by nature all men are equal. What we call the different 
characters and the diverse talents result from habits, education, and 
indoctrination. By nature, we all live as potent and productive and 
also as needy and incomplete beings. By establishing mutuality, we 
create a whole. But we do not create this unity by reasoning. Smith 
shared with David Hume [1711–1776] a deep distrust in the power of 
reason. Smith recognized that the expanding powers of the organism 
serve and also disclose the immediate ends of man: self-preservation 
and security. In the certainty and immediacy of his instincts, nature 
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has endowed man with a prerational knowledge of the means to be 
applied in serving these ends.14 Self-interest and self-preservation 
are, however, dialectical concepts. Actually, the self is realized only 
in social action—that is, in the cooperation, competition, and con-
flicts of societal relationships.
Thus, man is primarily a socius.15 His sentiments make him 
reflect on the effects of his actions on his fellowmen. He cannot 
establish his own security without considering the situation and the 
judgments of his fellows. He can never attain individual well-being 
without thinking of the effects his actions will have on the whole 
of society. Individual happiness is possible only when it is approved 
by and in harmony with society. All human beings and all societies 
strive for happiness. But happiness is a complex phenomenon.16 On 
the one hand, there are the requirements of the organism: care of 
the body, health, and the economic needs whose satisfaction is an 
indispensable condition for the good life. On the other hand, there 
are the requirements of one’s status in society: a modest security and 
independence. Finally, there are the requirements that hold both for 
society and for the individual: peace, tranquility of mind, and a good 
conscience. Smith declared that nothing can be added to human 
happiness when these requirements are met.
Smith’s theory of society is necessarily a theory of sympathy. But 
in this context, sympathy cannot be defined as compassion, empathy, 
or any imitation of feelings. Smith defined his use of the term sev-
eral times, most clearly in his critique of David Hume.17 He sharply 
rejected Hume’s usage, in which sympathy was described as pleasure 
in the technical perfection of a system of usefulness. Smith objected 
that Hume confused means and ends when he made utility the cri-
terion for the highest virtue. Hume could conceive of the whole only 
as a perfect machine, but society too is a whole, and one in which 
means are subordinate to ends and values. Thus, Smith suggested 
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the concept of sympathy as a measuring rod for perfect conduct in 
societal relationships.
Sympathy, according to Smith, is the cognitive feeling that is 
constituted by understanding and evaluating. It is, for the socius, 
the “logic of the heart,” if Blaise Pascal’s [1623–1662] term may be 
transferred to the sphere of social action. Smith stated explicitly that 
sympathy implies a critical understanding of a social situation—
evaluation of the motives of the agent, of the object of his action, and 
of the response of the person acted upon.18 Sympathy connects the 
agent and the person acted upon, within the frame of the structured 
situation. It permits analysis and appreciation of the elements that 
constitute the types of mutuality.
In every social situation, there are persons acting and being acted 
upon. Their relationships establish the varieties of social experience. 
Sympathetic understanding and sympathetic value cognition are the 
centers that constitute social mutuality, the fundamental interaction 
of men in social contact. They are the integrating elements of society 
because their context is the whole of society and their reflection is the 
harmony of the total structure. Sympathy makes possible, within the 
focus of the “Impartial Spectator,” the unification and integration 
of the varieties of societal relationships.19 It establishes the unity of 
society as a dynamic whole because it is a cognitive intuition, mak-
ing transparent the value qualities of patterns of conduct that build 
up a social structure of justice and a frame of decency.
This concept of sympathy necessarily involves analysis of the rise 
and development of the standards that are required for sympathy on 
the various planes of society. Mutuality implies that the social whole 
has a dual character. Thus, Smith distinguished two opposite types 
of social value attitudes and two opposite social goods. The value 
attitudes are what he called the respectable and the amiable virtues, 
and the highest goods are justice and benevolence.20 This analysis 
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is the more interesting as it shows clearly that Smith attempted to 
transfer the perennial question of mystical theology—how to recon-
cile justice and agape, order and love—to the scientific grounds of 
psychological and sociological analysis. Man is in need of both and 
capable of both. Both are necessary for achieving the finite happiness 
of which societies are capable. Smith’s formulation was not entirely 
clear, however, in regard to their equal strength and value. He said, 
on the one hand, that a society can exist when based on justice. On 
the other hand, he declared that no society can last without the ami-
able virtues, such as goodness, devotion, and sacrifice.
Smith was aware that the presence of these opposite virtues 
and requirements in human beings is an antinomy in human life. 
He tried to reconcile the opposites by analyzing the sequence and 
spheres of our social obligations. He violently attacked the philoso-
phers who have described as immoral the virtues of prudence—that 
is, the tendencies to strive for health, economic security, and social 
status.21 They are indispensable though they are the lowest goods of 
human happiness. They are indispensable as the necessary condi-
tions for peace of mind. They are lowest because they are merely 
instrumental to the true well-being of the individual or the group. If 
these activities remain instrumental, they are goods. Then they have 
a meaning in the higher sphere of justice, the correct and appro-
priate distribution of the rights and duties of the socii in the frame 
of society. The best and ultimate situation would be that in which 
the virtues of prudence, justice, and benevolence merge. A society 
in which justice and kindness of heart converge would be a perfect 
one. Such a situation, in which the exactness of justice meets with the 
radiant and creative power of the heart, Smith called the realization 
of true wisdom. He knew that this would be a utopia. With human 
beings as they are, they are capable, as socii, of establishing justice 
because they reflect on the interdependence of the members of soci-
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ety and know the utility of peace, and, as individuals and friends, 
they are able to build up intimate relationships in which justice is 
overshadowed by kindness of heart.
This inquiry into the different aspects of sympathetic cognition 
brought forth a description of the different stages of social sympathy 
and social obligation.22 There is an original sympathy among the 
members of a family and a habitual sympathy among the members 
of a clan or of a neighborhood. There is a conventional sympathy 
of cooperation and of common interests among the members of a 
profession or of a trade. In social action, these appear as mores or 
social conventions. They are habits that are taken for granted within 
any specific group. They make possible the systems of approval and 
esteem that we call public opinion in a rational society. In discuss-
ing these bonds, Smith envisaged society as prescribing the rules of 
justice and exerting pressure toward the fulfillment of obligations 
that cannot be enforced by the state.
This sociological trend of thinking is apparent in the descriptions 
of the “Impartial Spectator.”23 The Impartial Spectator is an image. 
He mirrors the common standards and evaluations of the socii 
regarding the welfare and the common good of their lasting relation-
ships. But he is also the individual conscience, as emancipated from 
the pressure of public opinion. This dualism between a sociological 
and a personal basis for the continuity and duration of societal rela-
tionships is a characteristic feature of Smith’s thinking. On the one 
hand, the Impartial Spectator is Aristotle’s phronimos aner (the prac-
tical, wise man), the image of the general standards that are taken for 
granted in an individual historical situation. At the same time, he is 
the image of the human being who comes into his own when devoted 
to the pursuit of values beyond the pale of social institutions. 
Smith thoroughly analyzed the constitution of man as socius, 
presenting a phenomenology of social attitudes and of patterns of 
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conduct. He did not at all believe that man is completely explained 
by the habits, values, and opinions of his society. Only the superficial 
and the vulgar, he maintained, submit to the judgment of the social 
elite, the lowest tribunal in the establishment of social sympathy and 
social standards. Thoughtful and responsible men will submit to the 
judgment of the Impartial Spectator who, as the representative of 
social consensus, reflects the true public opinion of the whole soci-
ety. They will comply with it as individuals and identify it with their 
own conscience.
These judgments are actually those of the higher tribunal within 
our breast.24 Man can appeal to this court from the arbitrary and 
fashionable opinions of a ruling class. Even when he is in conflict 
with public opinion, he can appeal to the sympathetic intuitions in 
his own heart. Then the Impartial Spectator becomes both personal 
conscience and social compliance. Thus, there is still a supreme court 
to which man can appeal. This court does not, however, judge the 
conduct of man as a socius. Men who have failed, or been defeated 
in spite of the noblest motives, can turn to the supreme court of the 
deity that alone is able to recognize and to judge upon the truth of 
goodwill. But it is the human being who can be acquitted, not the 
socius. The socius is always esteemed or despised for his positive or 
negative contribution to the happiness of society.
Smith knew that man is not completely defined as socius, but he 
was reluctant to admit it. He described the individual conscience as 
able to recognize the truth about the happy life and to understand the 
principles of justice, but he asserted that the individual conscience, 
which he called “institution,” is derived in great measure from the 
authority of the lower tribunal—society. Moreover, individual con-
science frequently reverses society’s judgments According to this 
sociologistic view, the total control represented by society preceded 
the rise of an understanding of social values. It was the philosophical 
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knowledge of these values, however, that made possible the respon-
sible human being. The conscientious individual alone can achieve 
whole happiness because only he is capable of achieving tranquility 
of mind as a creative act of his own. This thesis of Smith’s on the 
origins of moral consciousness has greatly influenced sociological 
histories of morals, such as Edvard Westermarck’s [1862–1939] well-
known book.25
Smith established in his works a pluralistic theory of mutuality. 
He described the unity in the variety of the different spheres of soci-
ety; in his conception of man as both socius and person, he recon-
ciled contradictory requirements.
This general theory is accompanied by a consideration of particu-
lar problems that were so important to Smith that he dealt with them 
in all his books. There is, for example, the problem of consensus 
and authority in society26—a by-product of the theory of sympathy. 
Sympathy as recognition of superiority can occur in four different 
ways. Men are willing to submit sympathetically to the physical or 
to the intellectual powers of individuals. But it is only among primi-
tive societies that military heroes and wise old men are recognized 
as highest authorities and rulers. Smith shared Pascal’s idea that, in 
modern societies, it is impossible to recognize such personal quali-
fications by social sympathies. There remain two other sources of 
authority and superiority: economic power and noble birth. Since 
men are inclined by nature to sympathize with the light and positive 
sides of life, they tend to parade their wealth and hide their mis-
ery. They consider it easier to stand the atrocities of destiny, in the 
manner of the Stoic wise men, than to endure the contempt of soci-
ety.27 For this reason, people recognize, with sympathy, the owners 
of wealth and power as their superiors. They admire and serve them 
without any expectation of their benevolence. They are stirred by 
their superiority without any belief in their happiness. They admire 
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the potential of their means, the perfection of the social fabric that 
makes possible such achievements.
Smith set it forth as a sociological rule that men by nature long to 
recognize authority and superiority as the seals on peace and order. 
Even when the conditions shape compellingly toward revolution, 
the socii will not easily give up the traditional consensus.28 Smith 
objected to the philosophers of resistance, declaring that nature has 
taught men to submit to the owners of power and wealth. There is a 
natural impulse toward respect, an impulse that is profoundly con-
nected with our longings for justice and peace. Thus, socii recognize 
the place of the powerful as fact and right, as value and example. 
Men offer this positive sympathy of consensus because they appreci-
ate peace and order. The socii are even willing to sacrifice sympathy 
with the poor to the primary sympathy with power and authority.
The rulers know of this impulse toward reverence. They have 
met it with a pattern of external splendor, of politesse, and of refined 
and delicate manners. They have answered a true social need with 
a theatrical show. They have responded to a genuine desire with a 
pattern of fiction. Smith described perfectly the necessity for social 
images and symbols. Theoretically, he was a republican; actually, he 
remained true to English political traditions. He declared that love of 
country is the first obligation in the sequence of social values—first, 
not because it is a part of mankind, but because it is a microcosm of 
the whole. He defined love of country as respect for its constitution 
and the enlightened will to improve conditions within that frame.29 
He remained true to the liberal spirit of reform even after the French 
Revolution began. In the last edition of his Theory of Moral Senti-
ments, he indignantly rejected the “doctrines of system” and the 
“men of system” who believe that they alone know the key to social 
redemption and that the latter can be realized by the illegal violence 
of revolution.
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Smith added still another observation to his analysis of the elite. 
The British middle classes, he said, had transformed the licentious-
ness and corruption of the court of Charles II into a model example 
of the virtues of generosity and liberality. They had transformed the 
frivolous reality of the courtier into the image of the perfect gentle-
man30 and had completed the circuit by ridiculing the ascetic virtues 
of the Puritan lower classes, regarding them as the vices of hypocrisy 
and avarice.
Society establishes consensus for its usefulness as much as for its 
authority. In fact, according to Smith, the two original tendencies in 
politics referred to a preference for authority or for utility as a basis 
of consensus. His thesis is applicable to the principles of conservative 
and liberal politics—Tories believe that the state and its authority are 
prior to society, while Whigs believe that the state is purely instru-
mental to the ends of society.31
These investigations stimulated an extremely useful analysis of 
the sociological significance of customs and fashions.32 To a con-
siderable extent, customs condition social attitudes and patterns of 
conduct, having the power to transform rational values into social 
habits. In particular, the trades and professions develop certain pat-
terns of behavior that meet the objective requirements and remain 
the property of the respective occupations. But society transforms 
the objective patterns into social images. These can be turned either 
into heroic transfigurations or into the caricatures of a comic strip. 
It is a great merit of Smith’s that he stressed the difference between 
patterns and images and suggested a sociological analysis of the role 
that the mores play in creating images according to the prevailing 
ethos and its fashions. In an enlightened society, the image of the 
soldier or of the clergyman will easily be transformed into its ridicu-
lous potentialities, while in a militaristic country, the merchant and 
the scholar will be in the same situation. In all societies, there are 
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images of age groups, ranks and professions, determined by the 
standards of the ruling social elite. Changes in social structure 
revolutionize customs and fashions, for new societies continuously 
reevaluate the worth and function of the different occupations and 
attitudes.
Smith’s sociological ideas contain the hypotheses of his theory of 
economic processes and the division of labor. The primary motive 
of social action is not an economic one, for the laborer is capable 
of obtaining wages that make possible a tolerable situation. The 
main motive is a sociological one—the desire to be applauded and 
to be considered superior. It is this craving for social prestige and 
social rank that has stimulated all progress toward civilization. Men 
can easily satisfy their economic needs and attain a modest social 
security, even in the lower ranks of society. Nature, however, has 
unleashed the restless and never-ending efforts of men to improve 
their social status and to build higher and higher the structure of 
civilization. Nature was wise to deceive man on the value of wealth 
and power. He always tends to mistake their instrumental character 
for real values and genuine ends, but this mistake has made possible 
the progress of mankind in all spheres of civilization.33 The sphere of 
social action is subject to the same deceiving trick—even the most 
avaricious entrepreneur will necessarily share his profits with his 
tenants and laborers and invest them in his lands, because his own 
needs are satisfied with a small part of his gains.
Smith took it for granted that this transformation of evil pas-
sions into good results would finally establish harmony and justice 
in society. Thus, his concrete realism was turned into a spiritual 
naturalism. He knew that needs and desires end when satisfied, 
while competition is infinite. Mutuality does not necessarily mean 
harmony; goodness does not mechanically create the response of 
goodness. Nevertheless, the concept of society as nature postulates 
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the optimistic belief that societal relationships will transform the 
subjective and selfish passions into the objective goods of a right 
and happy society when they develop beyond the pale of political 
institutions. This normative thesis is opposed to Smith’s sociological 
analysis of the nature of society in history.
History, Progress, Nature
Smith applied the insights achieved in his sociological analysis of 
the natural societal relationships to the social processes in history 
and of the change in social institutions. In these investigations, his 
sociological theory became a universal method for understanding 
social change. In particular, he demonstrated the truth of his theory 
of reciprocity as a measuring rod of social equilibrium. This is found 
in his analyses of militarism, academic institutions, and churches,34 
in which he examined the technical, economic, financial, and social 
conditions that determine the changing aspects of these institu-
tions. He concluded that when the mutuality between give and take, 
between teacher and student, minister and community, army and 
society, is broken up, then social institutions have lost their effective-
ness and are on the point of decline. When the socii who make these 
institutions work neglect their social functions and establish bodies 
of vested interests, the whole of society as an equilibrium of relation-
ships is jeopardized, and social change becomes inevitable. Social 
change is indispensable for the establishment and reestablishment of 
social harmony. This general trend in the social process of history is 
a sociological rule. Men are always inclined to escape their responsi-
bilities toward the whole and to settle down as owners and exploiters 
of privileged institutions. This selfish escapism disrupts the balance 
of rights and duties in the whole of society and makes necessary the 
reestablishment of a genuine mutuality.
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In the Lectures and in the Wealth of Nations, Smith gave much 
attention to the development of social institutions in history,35 sub-
jecting to a thorough analysis the conditions that impede progress in 
agriculture and industry. He explained the slow progress as result-
ing from the political structure of the feudal ages. The never-ending 
wars, the instability of governments, and the resulting insecurity of 
legal protection made it impossible to improve the economic prod-
uct of the country. The feudal idea of landed property as the basis 
of political power, and its legal expression in the laws of primogeni-
ture, suppressed all economic considerations. The social conditions 
of labor were such that no group of agricultural workers could find 
any incentive for productive labor or for accumulating stocks. Slaves, 
serfs, and tenants could have no interest, economic or social, in mak-
ing improvements. Under absolutism, the mistakes of mercantilist 
policies made it impossible to develop the potentialities of the rural 
economy. In dealing with these subjects, Smith was fully aware that 
societies exist on a variety of planes that are interdependent. The 
economic, legal, and political spheres interact and are interrelated in 
a lasting mutuality.
He applied the same method in his analysis of urban institutions, 
insisting on the decisive role that political power played in the orga-
nization of the townships as a new center of social importance.36 
Here, however, he introduced a new element as a condition of prog-
ress—the ethos of the ruling elite. The noble lord despised barter and 
exchange as a vulgar and mean business. To him, power was wealth. 
Powerless farmers and craftsmen could devote their efforts to the 
miserable business of attaining wealth; gentlemen did not need it, for 
they had power. As a result of this attitude of the feudal rulers, the 
progress of urban societies was slow and precarious.
There was a political motive, however, that furthered it. The 
urban centers were favored by the absolute princes because they 
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supported them against the feudal class and, thus, the urban soci-
eties could establish themselves as military-economic citizenries. 
They introduced order and good government, and made liberty 
and security the main concern of the constitution. The townships 
became the center for the surrounding country. As the central mar-
ket, they opened new economic possibilities for the rural areas, and 
they established new patterns of behavior that contributed to the 
economic progress of the whole. The merchants and the industrial 
classes developed different habits from those of country gentlemen, 
learning to employ their money in profitable projects and becoming 
bold in new enterprises. They came to emphasize order, economy 
and attention, and to expect honesty and reliability in business 
affairs. Thus, they furthered the institutions of liberty and security 
among the rural societies. Smith analyzed also, however, the nega-
tive aspects of this progressive movement. He saw that increasing 
industrialization could lead to shocking exploitation of labor; he was 
aware of the dehumanizing effects of standardization and specializa-
tion in mechanized industrial work.
This emphasis on the reciprocity of social conditions, this aware-
ness of the positive and negative effects of changes in social institu-
tions, was fundamental to Smith’s ideas on history. While he had no 
doubt that the urban professional and business classes made possible 
important progress in modern history, by spreading the spirit of 
enlightened moderation and wise social equilibrium, he nevertheless 
insisted that this progress was accidental, not necessary. It happened 
that historical conditions favored commerce and industry before they 
made for improvement and cultivation in rural societies—an example 
of what Smith called the unnatural and retrograde order of history, 
the perversion of the natural order of things.37 History, he contended, 
is primarily conditioned by the vested interests of the ruling elite, by 
the vanity of the big landed proprietors, and by the ruthless pressure 
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of business interests. History is the concept for the time process in 
which political development takes place. It is a process of distorted 
progress, of obscured truth, errors, failures, and miscarried mean-
ings. Historical progress is progress quand même, progress in spite of 
the arbitrary and irrational situations of the historical process.
Progress was a basic concept in Smith’s thought. What he meant 
by it, however, was not the historical process of society but the very 
telos of societal relations. “From savagery to civilization” could be 
his definition of progress. This is the natural progress of social mutu-
ality, the very purpose of social self-realization. It is an ever-present 
potentiality, and also a possibility in the here and now, reflecting 
the never-ending effort to enlighten the dark forces in nature. It can 
never be historical evolution. Progress materializes when the pro-
cesses of civilization have established a lasting harmony between 
town and country, between the urbanized farmer and the rural citi-
zen. Progress indicates the potential perfection of society according 
to the nature of man as socius.
Nature, on the other hand, is represented by the creative acts of 
sympathetic mutuality that establish and reestablish the whole of 
society as an open system of justice, emancipated from the histor-
ical-political process. Socii intend to create happiness in such acts. 
Individuals are happy when socii are happy. There is a sequence 
of goods required for happiness. By nature, man needs, first, the 
means of subsistence; second, economic independence; and last, a 
good conscience. Hence, it is a principle of natural justice that the 
improvement of the country, the area that affords subsistence, should 
come before that of the town that furnishes the means of comfort. It 
is a natural rule that the surplus product of the country constitutes 
the subsistence of the town. For this reason, the natural progress 
of society consists in establishing a lasting harmony and mutuality 
between country and town.
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Societies are happy that have succeeded in satisfying the biologi-
cal, economic, and moral requirements in their true sequence. In the 
mutuality of societal relationships, potential perfection is eternally 
present. Through that mutuality, the passions of competition are 
reconciled with the longings for peace. Nature’s dynamic center is 
society. The natural drives and the teleological intentions of the socii 
make it possible to realize the harmony of nature and the justice 
of society, for the sympathetic attitudes of the socii imply a cogni-
tive intuition of the values that establish the useful cooperation and 
just organization of the social whole. Thus, in spiritualizing organic 
nature as carrying the “seals of eternal wisdom,” Smith established a 
unification of utilitarianism and teleology.
According to Smith, the “Author of Nature” has implanted the 
rules of conduct in man, the socius, in order to make him a respon-
sible judge for his own and society’s moral standards:  “the Author of 
Nature has made man the immediate judge of mankind and has . . . 
created him after his image and appointed him his viceregent upon 
earth to superintend the behavior of his brethren.”38 Man as socius 
or society as a whole thus becomes the delegate of God. The social 
whole is the center of responsible freedom and of just service because 
the deity has fitted the organic drives to coincide with the true ends 
of justice and perfection. Through this spiritualization of nature, the 
deity has made society the creator of its own destiny and the respon-
sible author of social happiness and justice. This nature-society is a 
universe of intelligible knowledge that can be explained and under-
stood scientifically. Smith regarded the analysis and interpretation of 
social conduct as the instruments for scientifically establishing the 
principles and rules of the good and just life, and for grasping an 
intelligible knowledge of the creative wisdom of the deity. 
This praise of nature expresses a scientific ethos that attempts to 
reject all transcendental factors in explaining the social constitution. 
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Thus, Smith rejected those theories in which religion is necessary for 
an understanding of the motives of social conduct. According to his 
thinking, philosophy and commonsense have made it evident that 
the sense of duty, not theology, is the ruling principle of conduct. 
As scholars, we are able to analyze and explain the rules that are 
valid for this life and that make possible the control and prediction 
of social action. We cannot explain scientifically our responsibilities 
toward God, but we can describe objectively our responsibilities as 
socii. In social action, we can fulfill the creative responsibilities for 
the happiness of society that the deity has transferred to society as an 
independent and intelligent agent, as the center of nature.
Smith described this transfer in terms of the religious myth that 
God has appointed man his vice-regent on earth. The image has a 
tradition, and Smith was probably the last who applied it in order 
to describe the place of man in the universe. Pico della Mirandola 
[1463–1494] was probably the first, who in his De dignitate hominis 
had God say to Adam, “I have put you into the center of the world 
that you can easily look around you and inspect everything. I cre-
ated you as a being neither celestial nor earthly, neither mortal nor 
immortal, so that you may be your own free creator and conqueror. 
You can degenerate into a beast or elevate yourself into a God-like 
being.” The man of the Renaissance was enthusiastically and grimly 
aware that he was capable of both the sublime and the cruel in mold-
ing his destiny. He knew that he could achieve both self-redemption 
and self-condemnation, as his own liberator and judge. Life to him 
was the passio humana, the sum total of sufferings and exaltations.
Smith’s socius is not disturbed by such radical alternatives. He is 
not his own creator, but an independent agent of a divine wisdom. 
He can accomplish a social equilibrium merely because the Author 
of Nature has turned even the selfish instincts of the individual to 
the common good of the whole society. Good and considerate con-
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duct will create kind and good responses. There are no alternatives 
in Smith’s nature-society. This nature is a social panentheism,39 a 
normative state between organic nature and the world of history.
The myth of the deified society illuminates the criteria for an 
independent and self-responsible society in history. As reality, how-
ever, this historical society is the arena where human passions and 
interests present the spectacle of human corruptibility and wicked-
ness. What remains is the disillusioned but ever-present courage of 
the scholar. Being in possession of the true measuring rods of nature, 
he can explain the failures and deficiencies of the historical process 
by analyzing its changing conditions and revealing the disrupted 
equilibrium of societal relationships.
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 Goethe (1932) 
Das Fütreffliche ist unergründlich, man mag damit 
anfangen, was man will.
I
On March 22, 1832, at the age of eighty-two, Johan Wolfgang von 
Goethe died in Weimar. He had attained the summit of worldly 
fame but had not escaped loneliness that, like an aura, seems to sur-
round all great poets. This seeming paradox of fame and loneliness 
offers a good opportunity to begin these observations. No one saw 
more clearly the spuriousness of the sort of recognition that we call 
fame than Goethe himself. In his “Dedication” (Zueignung), and 
again and again in verse and prose, he equated fame with falsehood, 
turning upon it his diabolic irony and expecting posterity to be no 
more than a vacuum.
Wer wohl versteht, was sich so schickt und ziemt,  
Versteht auch seiner Zeit ein Kränzchen abzujagen; 
Doch bist du nur erst hundert Jahr berühmt, 
So weiss kein Mensch mehr was von dir zu sagen. 
Published originally in a slightly different form in Albert Salomon, In Praise of 
Enlightenment (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1963). Republished by permission 
from Frank Salomon.
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Goethe’s profound serenity was undisturbed by the fact that 
Friedrich Schiller [1759–1805] was far more popular and alive among 
the people than he was, even though, as he once remarked to Johann 
Peter Eckermann [1792–1854], Schiller’s nature and character were 
incomparably more aristocratic than his own. On the hundredth 
anniversary of Schiller’s birth, November 10, 1859, all Germany 
celebrated his achievement. There were countless public readings 
of “Die Glocke” (The Song of the Bell) and many performances of 
Schiller’s plays. Jacob Grimm [1785–1863] was merely being exact 
when he called the day a public festival. He chose as the most appro-
priate close to his speech that very praise of fame, in which Schiller 
expresses his own conception of the highest glory of life.
Von des Lebens Gütern allen 
Ist der Ruhm das höchste doch,  
Wenn der Leib in Staub zerfallen,  
Lebt der grosse Name noch.
They were good words with which to close a joyous memorial to a man 
whose very name conveyed a free and unified sense of conviction. In 
swearing allegiance to Schiller, the German middle classes became 
the bearers and proclaimers of the fame of “their” poet, whose ideal-
istic pathos had raised them above the gray sobriety of everyday life 
and whose rhetoric of freedom had moved them deeply. His praise 
of bourgeois existence had conferred worth and self-respect upon 
an entire class that, in its turn, loyally passed his name from genera-
tion to generation, renewing and remodeling itself through his spirit. 
Genuine fame always binds a man’s name to a community. Through 
his spirit, the community renews the awareness of its own spiritual 
structure by recognizing and transmitting the fame of the man and 
his work. Schiller imposed a moral and spiritual form on the Ger-
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man bourgeoisie, which gave it meaning and self-consciousness and 
justified both its patriotism and love of freedom.
The special relation to a given human community that supports 
fame is always precarious. When social structures no longer create 
representative—that is, objective—bases for cohesive relationships, 
society disintegrates into solitary groups incapable of performing 
general functions. Thus, the work and achievement of a man may 
not find the necessary historical factors to transmit his fame. Occa-
sionally, the scope and greatness of a work transcend the available 
historical media. Both sets of circumstances coincided in Goethe’s 
case with striking clarity. The words at the beginning of Rilke’s book 
on Rodin could easily stand at the head of any Goethe biography: 
“He was lonely before fame came, and the fame which did come 
made him lonelier still. For what is fame but a collection of misun-
derstandings which tend to gather about a great name?” This dis-
solution of fame in loneliness, indeed its virtual abolition, becomes a 
convincing reality, if no social groups exist that dare to carry on the 
tradition of the great man in a manner consistent with his message, 
and if society is composed of nothing more than solitary individuals 
and enemy camps.
That is why the modern world cannot be bearers and prophets 
of Goethe’s fame. Any attempt to transmit his name and work as 
if they were generally known and accepted, no matter under what 
auspices or with what pathos, is condemned to failure. It is false and 
fraudulent. Any genuine achievement of historical perfection must, 
of necessity, break out of the specific confines of its own era. Like 
Rembrandt, Bach, Shakespeare, and Mozart, Goethe remained tied 
to the historical circumstances of his particular existence but, at 
the same time, overcame and outgrew them. He eventually attained 
almost complete isolation. The hundredth anniversary of Goethe’s 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N286
birth served to emphasize the starkness of his isolation. The ruling 
classes stood coolly on the sidelines, full of distaste for a man whose 
religious and political views were thoroughly repellent to them. The 
free bourgeoisie, fighting its final struggle for an already lost revolu-
tion, could see in Goethe nothing but the arch-aristocrat and the 
parvenu. In many places, violent demonstrations took place against 
ceremonies in honor of the poet’s memory. There remained only a 
small class of educated men who gathered to honor the poet and to 
testify to the productive and creative force of his spirit. They could 
only transmit to one another the mystery of personal cultivation 
and development through the medium of his wisdom and poetry. 
They stood for an educational inheritance; they testified to the great-
ness and loneliness of his life, not to his fame.
At this moment, there will be no hate or violence aroused by 
memorial ceremonies. The people, torn and wearied, have never 
been further from unity of will as a nation than at this moment. The 
masses, through no fault of their own, have been made brutal and 
incapable of extracting any meaning from such recollections. The 
educated class, once homogeneous, has been fragmented, dissolved, 
and buried. Under such conditions, ought not shame, seriousness, 
and honesty compel us to carry out our memorial without show and 
in silence? We cannot transmit his fame. We have no living tradition 
to carry on. Must not every word of remembrance be meaningless 
and vain?
Yet the very forces of dissolution and destruction call forth their 
antidotes. “Where there is danger, there is also salvation.” [Fried-
rich Hölderlin (1770–1843) in his poem “Patmos”—Eds.] An hour 
of recollection removes us from the containment and distraction 
of our daily lives and confronts us unexpectedly with an aware-
ness of the timeless and the eternal. In this simple act, we hurl the 
idea and the essence of greatness into the teeth of our age. Great-
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ness is, after all, the only measure of tradition for us today. Jacob 
Burckhardt [1818–1897], in his Force and Freedom: Reflections on 
History, summed up the essence of historical greatness in one of his 
characteristically sharp and lucid phrases: “Greatness is what we are 
not.” This formulation seems negative, but it is actually a voluntary 
recognition of merit and a humble and submissive acceptance of a 
spiritual hierarchy of values. This awareness of the possibility of 
fulfillment of human striving contains at the same time the will to 
keep great men alive. We see in them the embodiment of what 
alone gives worth and dignity to human existence: the complete 
development of an entire personality in its relation to the infinite. In 
unity of personality and meaning, a profound simplicity—one of the 
special characteristics of greatness—develops. For what is greatness 
if not the productivity of a pure heart and great thoughts? Greatness 
can be understood here and now. It is effective everywhere and at 
all times because it probes the basis of existence itself, as each and 
every one of us experiences it, be it in love, in moral or spiritual deci-
sions, or in death. If we are not seized by the presence of something 
eternal in a work, then it can never be more than an incomplete and 
transitory achievement, exquisite, fine, interesting, perhaps, but 
always capricious, always an exercise in taste or intellect, and always 
without binding force. There is nothing more insufferable than the 
multitude of elevated intellectual and artistic accomplishments that, 
lacking any sort of objective task, remain a mere expression of pri-
vate existence.
Western culture has become a monstrous department store in 
which the customers hurry from counter to counter without being 
able to choose among the overwhelming number of loudly praised 
articles being offered. People also need spiritual bread and sacred, 
sobering water. Only a work and a personality that, in themselves, 
are simple and true can provide the right sort of sustenance. Great-
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ness alone creates measure, form, and law. As an example and mea-
sure of greatness, we call forth the memory of Goethe and hold his 
image up to the twisted features of our time—not, to be sure, as the 
image of a hero, nor as a mythical figure (this tendency must always 
be countered), but as a memory of a great and pure expression of per-
fection. The process of making his meaning our own, which is, after 
all, the principal task of all tradition, must be renewed. Goethe him-
self approved of no other form of memory. In November 1823, when 
someone proposed a toast to memory, Goethe broke out angrily:
I do not accept memory in your sense. You are merely 
expressing yourself incorrectly. When we meet some-
thing great, beautiful, or important, we should not recall 
it afterwards from outside ourselves or hunt it out. On 
the contrary, from the moment of meeting, it should 
weave itself into our inner self, become one with it, create 
a new and better self, and so continue to live on within 
us shaping and forming. There is no past for which we 
should yearn. There is only the new, which builds itself 
from the enlarged elements of the past. Genuine yearn-
ing should always be productive and should strive for 
something new and better.
This is the only way we can think of Goethe today. The shades of 
great men ought only to be called forth when we have brought our 
voluntary offering of devoted service into the magic circle of love.
II
Goethe’s work occupied a peculiar place in the history of world 
literature. Most great poets—Dante Alighieri [1265–1321], Pedro 
Calderón de la Barcs [1600–1681], William Shakespeare [1564–
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1616], or Pierre Corneille [1606–1684]—drew their ideas from 
the surrounding world of human activity. The real, material 
substance of life became art through the transforming power 
of their work. German life in Goethe’s day offered an art-
ist very little raw material that he could use. The lack of national 
themes—indeed, the lack of any sort of themes suitable for a 
poet—remained one of Goethe’s loudest and most frequent com-
plaints, most famously and sharply expressed in his autobiography 
Dichtung und Wahrheit (Poetry and Truth). In “Shakespeare and No 
End,” he praises the great playwright’s good fortune to live in such a 
worthy time. Shakespeare’s effect would not have been so great if he 
had not been the spokesman of a vivid, lively era. He portrays Eng-
lishmen whose humanity is evident, rather than poetical Romans. 
Shakespeare had the advantage “that he came at the right time to 
harvest, that he was able to work in a rich and lively Protestant coun-
try, where for a time the madness of bigotry was still. A truly pious 
son of nature, like Shakespeare, had freedom to develop his pure 
inwardness religiously without relation to any specific religion.” A 
German poet born about the middle of the eighteenth century found 
neither in political nor social life any such poetic inspiration. Goethe 
describes in the seventeenth book of Dichtung und Wahrheit the 
peaceful, comfortable, unpolitical condition of the German classes, 
their philistinism, and remoteness in their own narrow world. The 
American Revolution was much too far away to have any great effect, 
and the beginnings of political unrest in France were taken far more 
seriously by the cabinets than by the public.
The inner situation reflected the external conditions exactly. The 
leadership of the literary movement Sturm und Drang had passed to 
Goethe, whose Götz und Werther, as well as his campaign against the 
rococo, epitomized by the work of Christoph Martin Wieland [1733–
1813] and the trivial rationalism of the day, effectively demonstrated 
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his supremacy. The movement showed by the direction of its attacks, 
its realistic tragedies and novels, the first impetus to a new poetic 
imagination arising from the spirit of bourgeois morality. The awak-
ening middle classes were swelled with the proud conviction that at 
last they had become the true bearers of culture. The eruption of lux-
uriant feeling, the overflowing dedication to nature, and the passion-
ate attack on the dullness of the world and its order were not merely 
the manifestations of a “youth movement,” but also the elementary, 
intellectual, and spiritual stirrings of the growing self-consciousness 
of the bourgeois spirit. The stable political nature of Germany and 
the stolid character of the German middle classes forced this first 
modern German revolution to take place in the domain of literature 
and condemned it thereby to fail from its inception. The anxious 
traditionalism and the prudent sobriety of bourgeois commerce 
reflected a narrow and provincial social situation. Members of the 
educated middle class (by no means lacking in vision and daring 
as individuals) formed an entirely self-contained group, which was 
insulated from other circles, entrenched in the career hierarchy of the 
civil service, and thoroughly assimilated to the existing social order. 
Thus, the group itself, whose spiritual and intellectual structure was 
given exaggerated attention by the young generation of poets, had no 
meaningful subject for poetic expression. No active and busy world, 
no beginnings of great deeds, demanded poetic transfiguration and 
intellectual expression. The world seemed to offer no impetus to the 
poetic—that is, elevated and meaningful presentation. For all those 
who felt themselves called to great deeds, the condition was abso-
lutely unbearable. The young men of Sturm und Drang felt that they 
had to break out of the narrow and tranquil circle of the German 
middle class in order not to suffocate and to remain true to them-
selves; filled as they were, however, with the intellectual, moral, and 
spiritual atmosphere of their class, they could only do so by virtue 
G O E T H E  (19 3 2) 291
of their own genius, individuality, and art. An emotional return to 
nature and tearful sentimentality were the means by which they 
sought to flee the emptiness of their own condition and to attain the 
elevated and the grand.1 Although the essential lack of direction of 
the movement ultimately brought about its failure, it was a turning 
point for Goethe.
When Goethe decided to go to Weimar, he severed his connec-
tion with the bourgeois world and the formlessness of Sturm und 
Drang. His conversion to classicism and humanism represented his 
final liberation from the emptiness of German existence. By taking 
a position in the government of the Prince of Weimar, he broadened 
the scope of both his experience and effectiveness. At the same time, 
by this dramatic acceptance of the traditional, customary way of life 
of the upper classes, he altered the subsequent course of German cul-
ture. He introduced a quality of humanist quietism that seeks only 
the personal cultivation of the intellectual and moral faculties while 
consciously leaving all established social structures untouched. This 
decision has, in addition, very important consequences for the exter-
nal and internal form of his poetry.
III
Although I have considered Goethe the leader of the Sturm und 
Drang movement, I have done so with one major reservation. The 
fight against the existing order was not a destructive activity for 
Goethe. On the contrary, the struggle against the ordinary, the com-
monplace, and the weak was really the expression of his own attempt 
to liberate the great forces within himself. Freedom meant no more 
than adequate room in which his passionate compulsion to work 
could unfold. In an Aeschylean mood, he begs God to give him room 
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for the seething and expanding power of his own mind. Götz and the 
large sketches for Caesar, Mahommet, Prometheus, and the begin-
nings of Faust, all works of the time before Werther, seem to seek 
a form in which a grand individual and a striving, busy nature can 
break out of the bonds of a small and narrow world. That is why the 
works of this period are both lyrical and realistic. They are filled by 
the pressing need of the poet for freedom, which is to be understood 
as the possibility of living greatly.
During this phase of Goethe’s career, a very strange thing hap-
pened. In the following decades, he suddenly reversed himself and 
plunged into the very heart of the social and national life of Ger-
many, struggling with constantly changing techniques to purify 
that life’s meaning and to raise it to a general and valid form. Thus, 
the conversion of the natural productive genius of the seventies, as 
Goethe admits in Dichtung und Wahrheit, was completed, and the 
poet became a self-conscious educator and teacher of his nation. 
Whereas in all the other Western nations, poetry has been the most 
exact expression of the essence of the age and the poet has been the 
voice of his time, Goethe’s work—in precisely the opposite direc-
tion—was an attempt to infuse into his people a meaning and form 
drawn from his own personality. The poem was to be the way leading 
from philistinism to freedom. “Poetic content is the content of one’s 
own life. No one can give it to us; it can, perhaps, be darkened but 
never impoverished.”
This undertaking fixed the outer form and inner content of 
his poetry. It explains the peculiar quality of remoteness that all 
his characters have—even when nearest to us. In order to serve as 
pedagogic devices, his characters must be transparent and must 
have especially clear outlines. Goethe always admired Shakespeare’s 
capacity to portray full human beings by simply describing the Eng-
lishman from head to toe, but he himself could not afford to do the 
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same. All his poetic figures are German in the sense that the spiri-
tual and moral inheritance of German life, transmuted and relived 
in Goethe’s spirit, always shines through. But they are less German 
than the figures of Shakespeare and Molière [1622–1673] are English 
or French. They are more like Goethe than the Shakespearean fig-
ures are like Shakespeare. For this reason, the works of his classical 
period have always been unsuccessful as drama. They cannot appeal 
to a wide public that wishes to be moved and touched by portrayal 
and interpretation of its own existence. The object of these works 
was to refine the personality and to lead it by moral reason toward 
purity of heart and active love. Unfortunately, the great mass of the 
people simply cannot be gripped by the image of a higher humanity. 
What does occur in these works is something quite different. The 
clarity of the presentation of these elevated themes lifts the violence 
of human conflicts onto a higher plane, one that transcends, in form, 
the actual dimensions of human life. This image of humanity is pres-
ent in every age and illuminates the murky atmosphere of historical 
reality. Indeed, it sometimes transfigures historical reality, standing 
forth in the timelessness of the “experienced moment.” No matter 
how varied and confused the garb of time may be, there comes for 
each man an hour when he must shed that garb and “stand bare-
headed under God’s thunderclouds.”
The unavoidability of final decision in the realm of human activ-
ity, the treatment of joy and sorrow, fulfillment and destruction, sins 
of omission and commission, all these things are eternal subjects 
for poetic presentation. In the Iphigenia, the healing power of pure 
humanity is treated. Since truth and self-denying love make up the 
inner substance of the work, the characters in the poetic fable are 
neither Greeks nor Germans, but pure creatures from the mind and 
the soul of the poet. If one compares Hermann und Dorothea with 
the idyll Luise by Johann Heinrich Voss [1751–1826], one recognizes 
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in both works the world of the small German city and its residents. 
In Goethe’s presentation, the narrowness and poverty of that exis-
tence disappear because the characters are raised to a purer level 
through the clarity and tenderness of their emotions and awareness 
of their deeds. This world of exalted humanity is ultimately the place 
where all human decisions are made and where the rank and worth 
of personality is tested. Hermann und Dorothea can never lose its 
contemporary significance because all its human situations are eter-
nal. Their effect and meaning remain unforgettable for those who 
seek to escape the dullness and compulsion of daily life and to attain 
the brilliant light of spiritual form and decision. They are unforget-
table because they glow from within.
The problem of poetic form can be most dearly observed in a com-
parison of the two versions of Wilhelm Meister. The earlier version, 
Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre (Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship), is a 
realistic bourgeois novel with an almost Dutch liveliness and hearti-
ness. In the final version, Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre (Wilhelm 
Meister’s Pilgrimage), all trace of realism has vanished. The style is 
delicate and suggestive. By fixing the actual events in a precise rela-
tion to the idea of the whole, the real empirical world becomes both 
transparent and mysterious. The various areas of life, the theater, the 
home, the palace, and the society of the nobility turn into more or 
less obvious symbols of a general meaning. Mignon and the Harpist, 
who represent the polarity of purity and guilt, act as mirrors that 
reflect the image of the times in a thousand ways. The same prin-
ciples of style are used in Faust, West-östlicher Divan (The Western-
Eastern Diwan), and Die Wahlverwandtschaften (Elective Affinities). 
One can best compare the style of those works with the landscapes 
of Claude Lorrain [1600–1682], who, not by chance, enjoyed Goethe’s 
great affection. In Claude Lorrain, “we see a perfect human being, 
who thought and felt beautifully and in whose spirit lay a world not 
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easily found elsewhere. These pictures possess the highest truth, but 
not a touch of reality. Claude Lorrain knew the real world by heart 
down to the smallest detail and he used it as a means to express the 
world of his own beautiful soul. True idealism knows how to use 
real materials in such a way that the truth that emerges creates the 
illusion that it is real.”
Goethe could not have described his own style more aptly. From 
Iphigenia to Faust II, all his works have this in common—the high-
est truth without a touch of reality. They are landscapes of the soul, 
heroic only in the sense that they depict an enlarged, purer existence. 
They make things appear real that are in fact the appearance of truth, 
and through the beauty of illusion, they reconcile us with the world.
IV
Reconciliation means both the settlement of a conflict and its sub-
ordination in a higher unity. The moral force of the intellect accom-
plishes the one, the magic of a loving heart the other. The purity 
of Goethe’s poetry effects such reconciliation in a remarkable man-
ner. He believed that light in the physical world and intellect in the 
moral world were “the highest conceivable, indivisible energies,” but 
that man could only perceive them indirectly as a reflection on the 
surface of life. Truth could also be perceived by man’s spirit only 
when reflected in beauty. Thus, the poet and his art were true media-
tors between man and truth and between the empirically restricted 
world and the pure forms of the spirit, which Goethe called “the 
ordinances of the supreme director.” “Art is a true intermediary” 
and “great talents are the most beautiful means of reconciliation.” 
The painful and unhappy conflicts of existence are banished by the 
presentation of the beautiful, for as Goethe pointed out, “there is no 
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surer way to escape the world than through art and there is no surer 
way to tie oneself to the world than through art.” In art, insoluble 
problems of existence can be dissolved in beautiful appearances 
and universal harmony. There is the danger that a flight into poetry 
may become a means of avoiding decisions that should no longer be 
postponed. Since, however, the reality of art appears only in a moral 
relationship (because all reality without such a relation is common 
and art by its nature is noble), art is able to reenter and influence the 
world. This is possible only if the poet performs his highest function 
and “as representative of the most natural of conditions, of the fin-
est style of life, of pure moral endeavor, of the majesty and earnest 
worship of God, dares to employ common and ludicrous contrasts.” 
Realizing his own function, Goethe would only speak of the task of 
a poet in allusive terms. “Art rests on a kind of religious sense, upon 
a deep, unshakeable seriousness, which is why it unites so happily 
with religion.”
As a messenger of truth, the poet has a formative moral task. 
Goethe revised the traditional theory of the function of poetry that 
had been transmitted from the ancient world via humanism to the 
Enlightenment. Although he still regarded poetry as a means to 
enlighten and improve humanity, its appeal was not to be made nec-
essarily through reason alone. The experience of living beauty would 
supplant reason. Inevitably, the problem of form and content and the 
question of the meaning of beauty became major preoccupations. In 
the characters of both Pandora and Helen, Goethe tries to answer the 
latter question. Beauty is simultaneously a form of perfection and a 
mere illusion. It emerges in life only to disappear again. He attempted 
to arrive at an answer in several ways. Pandora, for example, is not 
given to the active, busy Prometheus, but to the worried, thoughtful 
Epimetheus, the sidelines observer. She illumines his existence even 
after her disappearance because she leaves with him his most val-
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ued possession—the knowledge of beauty. In the existing sketch of a 
sequel to the fragment, Pandora appears as the mediator among the 
warring factions and restrains them all by her beauty. She becomes 
the judge who settles all quarrels and, as perfect form, ennobles the 
coarse manners of the world of affairs. Epimetheus sings her praises:
Sie steiget hernieder in tausend Gebilden
Sie schwebet auf Wassern, sie schreitet auf Gefilden
Nach heiligen Massen erglänzt sic und schallt
Und einzig veredelt die Form den Gehalt; 
Verleiht ihm, verleiht sich die höchste Gewalt 
Mir erschien sie in Jugend—, in Frauengestalt. 
In the above passage, beauty is conceived as pure and ennobling 
form, not of this world but appearing in it, never granted to the man 
of action but only to those who have taken the world and human-
ity into their inmost selves. Pandora is, therefore, an apparition. The 
Helen whom Faust evokes and who wanders by his side only seems 
to be real. After the fall of Euphorion, she disappears and leaves her 
beloved nothing but a veil as a token of remembrance. The veil plays 
an equally important role in Ottilie’s existence, and in “The Dedica-
tion” (Die Zueignung), the poet receives the veil of poetry from the 
hands of truth. The veil is a symbol of something enshrouded, whose 
glow is barely visible through its fabric. Goethe was deeply con-
vinced that neither the truth nor the sun could be allowed to shine 
unshaded in the eyes of men. “In the colored reflection, we have life.” 
For him, truth was only visible in reflection, in apparitions, and in 
illusion. Beauty, one of the many types of illusion in nature, is the 
most exalted because it has no other purpose than itself. Being pure 
form, it can express eternally valid truths. Art as illusion is the medi-
ator between time and eternity. In and through it, the contradictions 
and tensions of this world are reconciled and disappear.
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The ennobling moral character of poetry is caused by the appear-
ance of truth in the beautiful, and men are encouraged by it to seek a 
higher existence, the good, the beautiful, and the true, those eternal, 
pure forms in which the highest truth manifests itself. Originally, 
Goethe had set out to infuse significant meaning into the life of his 
people through the use of poetry and beauty, but, after the French 
Revolution, he enlarged his task and began to erect a monument 
to the unchanging and the eternal. While the inherited orderliness 
of life degenerated into an unparalleled chaos, and everything was 
relentlessly sucked into the maelstrom of politics, Goethe stood aloof 
and, out of the purity and greatness of his own spirit, dared to sal-
vage the eternal, inextinguishable features of the human heart for 
the future. He was never more successful in this endeavor than in the 
West-östlicher Divan, which, like the ever-turning vault of heaven, is 
always new and wonderful. Here one finds all life’s manifestations: 
dominion and service, love and trust, good will and forceful self-
assertion, worth and pride, shadowy happiness and pure reconcili-
ation, elevated to the tenderest level of words. Yet nothing could be 
more false than to suppose that the geniality and unfettered feeling 
of the poem arose from a lack of participation in or an alienation 
from the world. Especially with regard to The Divan, he tried to stand 
beyond all factions, consciously and joyously: “with awareness, so 
that he shrinks not before the terrible; with joyousness, so that he 
knows how to present everything delightfully.” This joyousness is the 
expression of inner love through which the poet transforms life into 
pure image.
Goethe praised Molière for being the judge of his era and not its 
servant. In such a high function, the poet can only fulfill his task 
alone and isolated from his age: “the poet as man and citizen will, of 
course, love his fatherland, but the fatherland of his poetic talents and 
creativity is bound to no special province or country. It is the Good, 
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the Noble, and the Beautiful which he captures and shapes wherever 
he finds it.” What is the meaning of patriotic activity? “Could a poet 
who has spent his entire life fighting harmful prejudices, eradicat-
ing narrow-minded views, enlightening the spirit of his people, 
purifying its taste and ennobling its convictions, do something more 
patriotic than that?” Beauty transmits to his people an awareness of 
eternal and immutable truth. 
Goethe’s poetry often recalls the harmony and balance of the 
classic epic by the way conflicts are reconciled as if by divine inter-
vention. The tragic in life is not overcome; it is avoided. Goethe once 
confessed that the strain of writing a tragedy would burst his spirit 
wide open. The reconciliation achieved in his works cannot, there-
fore, be permanent because it depends entirely on the poet’s person-
ality and on the expansive power of his love. It is an illusion that 
hovers over the abyss and bears no one across it. Its beauty is a clear, 
inwardly directed magic, which enchants without transforming. It is 
temporary, a false consciousness.
V
The outer and inner form of Goethe’s poetry was conditioned by spe-
cial historical circumstances: the lack of content in German life, the 
demonic release of energy in the French Revolution, and the twenty 
subsequent years of military catastrophes. Although these circum-
stances have changed, the wisdom and meaning of Goethe’s life and 
work continue to shine brightly.
Hermann Grimm [1828–1901] suspected as early as 1893 that 
the twentieth century would learn to appreciate Goethe’s wisdom 
but lose the ability to understand his poetry. “Falsehood belongs to 
the age, truth to the individual.” Goethe became ever more sharply 
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aware that truth is granted only to certain important individuals 
who, as in a solemn procession of blessed souls, pass the torch of life 
from one to another across time and space. “The Epoch condemned 
Socrates.” Masses and majorities are always the bearers of falsehood, 
stupidity, and confusion. This attitude led him to a strictly antihis-
torical worldview in the age of Hegel and Marx, who were busily 
subordinating man to the world spirit. Goethe had observed enough 
worldly activity from sufficient proximity to accurately assess the 
degree of caprice, circumstance, and corruption that went into the 
decisions of the political world. His disillusionment with the practice 
of politics remained his private property and never became the sharp 
and implacable critique of the French moralists. He tended to view 
the domain of politics as an arena in which certain types of human 
acts were constantly repeated. Since he watched the affairs of the 
world with incomparable exactness and sober attention, his observa-
tions were always shrewd. He saw the Revolution coming long before 
most statesmen and believed that both rulers and ruled would bear 
equal guilt for the disaster. Sovereignty and authority, freedom and 
protest, misuse of power and revolt, the necessary weakening of 
the inner legitimacy of the structure of a state and the rise of new 
orders—all the possible and typical expressions of political life were, 
in his opinion, perpetually recurrent complications of human affairs. 
The struggle of the old, the established and the conser-
vative against new developments, education, and reform 
is eternal. Every order gives rise to pedantry and, in 
attempting to rid themselves of that evil, men destroy the 
order as well. After a while they become aware that they 
must create a new order to replace the old. The wise ruler 
would try to moderate this struggle so that he prevented 
the defeat of his own side. This has, however, never been 
granted to men and God would not appear to want it so.
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Perhaps even more typical of Goethe’s thought is this observation 
on the possibility of maturity in a nation:
I would say yes to that question, if all men could be born 
thirty years old. Since, however, youth always makes too 
much noise and age too little, the mature man finds him-
self hemmed in by both and has to help himself in any 
way he can.
One can, in a certain sense, call this realism, though the concept 
contains an overtone that does not echo Goethe’s fundamental atti-
tude. It is in these remarks, and there are countless others, that one 
senses an insight that cuts through reality, through the noise and 
variety of human activity, to grasp eternally recurrent drives and 
necessities. The need for both authority and freedom in the political 
sphere, for regulation and order, on the one hand, and resistance and 
instinct, on the other, became for Goethe the necessary polarities of 
any analysis of political life. The quest for pure forms may have given 
him his capacity to trace the future development of Western civiliza-
tion with almost frightening clarity, as in his remark, “Before the 
Revolution everything was striving. Afterwards came the demands.” 
During his years of travel, he described with dismay the development 
of the mechanized age and predicted the emigration and impover-
ishment of the rural population.
After the July Revolution of 1830, Barthold Georg Niebuhr 
[1776–1831] sent Goethe the second volume of his History of Rome. 
In its famous introduction, the author predicted the coming of a new 
age of barbarism. Goethe agreed. Barbarism is, after all, merely the 
incapacity to recognize excellence.
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VI
Goethe’s natural theory of history arose from this highly positive 
idea of man bearing his own greatness, his faith in the possible per-
fection of man, the unending struggle upward, and the achievement 
of universality. Wilhelm Meister declared that the highest goal man 
could reach was a pure heart and good thoughts. It was Goethe’s goal 
as well. His youth had been devoted to a passionate struggle to liber-
ate himself and to assure himself room to expand. The mature man 
could only work if he were fixed in an ordered existence, regardless of 
the type of order, and constantly reminded of his own contingency. 
Goethe’s conception of the political-historical man as an original 
phenomenon was enlarged by the idea of man as a component of cos-
mic life. This enmeshment in the orderliness of the universe and the 
growth of all organic life created not only a protection and a home 
but released his greatest effectiveness:
How can man face the infinite if he cannot gather all 
his spiritual faculties, so often distracted by the things 
around him, if he cannot ask himself, “How dare you 
ever think of yourself in the midst of this eternal living 
order, unless that wonderful awareness, circling around 
a pure center, emerges tangibly within?” Never mind 
how difficult it may be to find that middle point, you will 
know it at once because a harmonious, beneficial effec-
tiveness emerges from it and testifies to it.
The remarkable effectiveness of all his active faculties, released 
by being fixed in an eternal order, characterizes Goethe’s develop-
ment and fulfillment. The Daemon of the first of the Orphic sayings 
describes it as “fixed form which develops itself in living.” Goethe 
expressed it at another point:
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The highest gift we have received from God and Nature 
is life, the rotating movement of the Monad about itself, 
which knows neither rest nor quiet. The drive to protect 
and cultivate life is born in each of us. Its singularity 
remains for ourselves and others a mystery. The second 
favor from the Being which works from above is expe-
rience. The living, moving individual grows conscious 
of, and seeks to influence, his environment. Thus, he 
becomes aware of his inner limitlessness and outer fixity. 
Through this lived experience, we can achieve clarity if 
we have ability, concentration, and much good luck. To 
others, this too is always a mystery.
Goethe’s compulsion for activity, not only as a poet but as an 
active scholar, natural scientist, botanist, and geologist, caused him 
to remark that he had never known four weeks of real ease in his 
entire life. In the last fifteen years of his life, he sat like the magician 
Merlin in his silent study, always transmuting new knowledge into 
wisdom. With a shiver, we read the remark in one of his last letters 
to Carl Friedrich Zelter [1758–1832] that he had uncovered so many 
new ideas it would really be worthwhile to be young again. Then there 
is the almost demonic letter in which he closes a memorial to his 
dead son with the words, “And so over the graves, onward!” In effec-
tiveness and in increasing activity, he found the only way to assert 
himself in the world of suffering and human complication. For this 
reason, during his last years, he wanted young poets again and again 
to concentrate on healthy, elevating, heartwarming themes in their 
poetry. Anything that stimulated vigorous activity, the exploitation 
of the moment, or self-preservation, was positive, whereas indul-
gence in sickness, pampering of weakness, self-reflection, and self-
punishment were contemptible. He hated everything that left men 
entangled without improving or helping them to a higher awareness.
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This demonic existence is the key to understanding Goethe’s 
meaning. Once he had begun to accept this law, everything else fol-
lowed.
VII
Goethe’s powerful need for activity compelled him to find ways to 
express his creativity within the existing order and forced him to 
solve for himself the eternal conflict between freedom and law. He 
accepted a position in the bureaucracy of a princely house, but his 
decision was not motivated by philistinism, as is so often implied 
by his critics. He wanted to think and create on a grand scale. It was 
impossible for him to approach the world resentfully or to permit 
class resentments to enslave him. His passionate affirmation of the 
world as it is led him to seek a niche in which to nurture his freedom, 
and he found it at that time in that particular palace. Consequently, 
he was always inclined, quite apart from any social or political sig-
nificance, to accord positive value to any extant order as a potential 
workshop of human testing and development. His remarks on the 
preservation of dueling and the indissolubility of marriage are, of 
course, well known. Typically, he disregards any positive justification 
or meaning in these institutions. They are valuable simply because 
they exist, regardless of their validity. He once remarked that he 
would rather put up with injustice than disorder. He submitted fatal-
istically to existing laws and social structures because they served 
as the arena for human activity. There is a perfect expression of this 
view in Winckelmann: “We should stick it out where fate, more than 
choice, has put us. To stand by a people, a city, a prince, a woman: to 
relate everything to it, to do everything because of it: to put up with 
everything, that is admirable.”
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Goethe’s profound revulsion to anarchy sprang from the extraor-
dinary regularity of his own existence. His own creative force was an 
objective law to him, an Entelechy or Monad, which he had to exert 
and put to work uninterruptedly in great and worthwhile under-
takings. All the metaphysical categories under which he sought to 
comprehend his own existence were always mere descriptions of the 
innate stream of his own productivity. This was for him the one and 
only objective category and form for creative and civilized behavior. 
He hated nothing in the nineteenth century more than its caprice 
and subjectivity. He differentiated between subjective and objective 
epochs in history and called the former unbearable and undesirable, 
the latter fruitful. Nineteenth-century subjectivity was leading to the 
abyss. It was unwilling to confine itself and unable to accept volun-
tarily limitation from without. “There is nothing more pitiable than 
to observe the contemporary striving for liberation from restraint in 
this thoroughly restrained world: In 1830, it is, perhaps, less fitting 
than ever before.”
His emphatic recognition of the completely conditioned and 
limited area of human efficacy was the bittersweet result of a life 
that, step-by-step, had gathered the knowledge of the necessity for 
circumscribed and conditioned order. The struggle between freedom 
and law was not only the subject of all his poetry up to the very last 
verse of Faust II, but also his own strongly felt personal task and 
moral demand. He comprehended ever more deeply this perpetual 
conflict and followed his mysterious path, which led inward. In his 
youth, freedom had been a fight for a place in the world. In the clas-
sical phase of his existence, the conflict between the great individual 
and the world was transferred to the arena of the spirit. Tasso, for 
example, failed in the world because he lacked the strength to submit 
to the moral law. In Goethe’s old age, the conflict has been resolved 
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since the law is now conceived as the innate form of the individual 
who lives morally. Ottilie, Makarie, the Faust of Part II, live in such 
a way that freedom and law are reconciled in the individual’s own 
inner law. “On the highest level, there is no freedom.” That is the final 
wisdom of Goethe’s fight for freedom. “He alone achieves both free-
dom and life who must daily conquer it.” The apparent contradiction 
between the two propositions is resolved by the poet’s insight that 
only in law can freedom attain its greatest efficacy. All subjectivity 
remains fruitless because it is not fixed in an objective connection 
to an ordered existence. In the eternal unfolding of creative activity, 
freedom continues to exist as a form of the development of the world 
itself. Only in the instant of awareness of his limitations can a man 
feel truly free. “He who early experiences his limits arrives easily at 
freedom; he who learns it late and unwillingly, finds his freedom 
bitter.” The attainment and maintenance of this awareness is the pre-
condition of all creative and formative work.
VIII
The concept of a reconciliation between freedom and law contains 
within it the idea of renunciation. Thoas’s loving renunciation and 
the confrontation of Tasso and Antonio are examples of self-denial 
as the prerequisite of beautiful and moral deeds. Self-denial is an 
abiding theme of Goethe’s poetry and thought. The second part of 
Wilhelm Meister bears the subtitle “Die Entsagenden” (They Who 
Renounce). The Wilhelm Meister of The Apprenticeship, a man seek-
ing to build his own personality, becomes the busy, shrewd surgeon 
of The Pilgrimage, a man who works for the community. In busy, 
restricted activity, he finds himself. One sees most clearly the impor-
tance of self-denial for Goethe’s idea of man in his observation that 
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the fundamental axiom in all natural scientific research is renuncia-
tion—the border that the scientist uncovers between the realm of the 
knowable and the unknowable. In Dichtung und Wahrheit, he says: 
Our physical and social lives, our mores, customs, 
worldly wisdom, philosophy, religion, yes, even coin-
cidental occurrences, require that we resign ourselves. 
What we need from outside ourselves to augment our 
lives will be taken from us anyway and, in return, we will 
be compelled to accept much that is alien and burden-
some. We are robbed of things that we have painfully 
acquired and of things amiably granted us. Before we 
realize our loss, we have to start surrendering our very 
personalities, first bit by bit and at the last completely. 
Since it is our common fate, we are right, therefore, not 
to respect someone who behaves unfittingly as a result 
of his losses. On the contrary, the bitterer the cup, the 
sweeter should be our expression when we drain it so 
that the calm spectator need not be offended by our gri-
maces. Nature has outfitted man with more than enough 
force, vigor, and durability to enable him to master this 
difficult task. A sense of humor is especially helpful and 
it is always there for us. Through it we can cheerfully sur-
render one thing at one moment, if only we be allowed 
to reach for something new in the next. So we give back, 
unconsciously, our entire lives. We put one passion in 
place of another. Occupations, inclinations, hobbies, and 
diversions, we try them all, only to cry at the end, “all 
is vanity.” No one is horrified at this false, yes, blasphe-
mous outcry. Indeed, we think we have said something 
irrefutable and wise. There are but a few who understand 
in advance this unbearable truth and, in order to avoid 
all partial resignation, resign themselves once and for all.
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    Such people convince themselves of the reality of the 
eternal, the necessary, and the lawful, and try to form 
such conceptions as are indestructible, which do not 
disappear through observation of the transitory but are, 
on the contrary, confirmed by it. Because there is some-
thing superhuman in this endeavor, people of this sort 
are usually regarded as inhuman, godless wretches. One 
can hardly imagine the kinds of horns and claws people 
fancify for them.
These words shed the clearest and loveliest light on the affirma-
tive, constructive side of Goethe’s greatness. He would not with his 
pure heart accept the wisdom of the Preacher as true, for he was 
unshakably convinced of the lasting reality of the Good and the 
Beautiful. The world is not all vanity. There is an eternal connec-
tion with the powers of the Good, the Fruitful, and the Beautiful. 
To resign oneself wholly is to place oneself completely in the service 
of these powers. Renunciation reveals a fundamental phenomenon 
of moral life: proportion and inner order enable mankind to make 
contact with eternity.
IX
We have seen that Goethe considered the border between the know-
able and the unknowable to be a fundamental reality (ein Urphän-
omen) of the science of biology. Similarly, he believed that in the 
world of morality, these fundamental realities indicated the border 
between fruitful and unfruitful activity. The moral Urphänomene 
may be called “the appropriate” in social convention, “the beauti-
fully harmonious” in art, and “proportion” at the highest stage of 
perfection:
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The meanest of men can be complete if only he moves 
within the limits of his capabilities. Even beautiful attri-
butes can be darkened, dissipated, and destroyed, when 
that essential sense of proportion is lacking. This is an 
illness which is more and more manifest in the modem 
era. Who is able to meet the demands of the present with 
its incredible speed and awful exaggerations?
The limits of fruitful activity are outlined by the concept of 
proportion. It is not fixed but elastic. It can always be expanded or 
altered. The only thing about it that we may call fixed is its existence. 
We must believe in the existence of an ultimate meaning that we 
can never fully understand. Since there is no limit to the drive to 
know and to the striving for truth, man becomes a fighter in life and 
suffers its wounds. He must always live with the perilousness of his 
daily decisions and his struggle for proportion and direction. This 
proportion is not the classical doctrine of aesthetic harmony. It is 
a moral task through which the individual himself guarantees the 
divine order of existence. “So divinely is the world established that 
each man at his place, in his home and time, deems all the rest irrel-
evant.” Since the cosmos is divinely ordered and external activity 
unfolds in it, morality can be revealed in one’s very security in this 
existence. The moral order can be renewed in oneself every day. By 
contrast, the supernatural world order of the Middle Ages directed 
man from above. The world of historical idealism, by making man 
a mere function of the development of a historically clothed world 
spirit, controls him from within.
Goethe’s vision of man stands between these two worlds. It is 
curious that no one has ever thought of comparing Goethe’s concep-
tion of the place of man in the cosmos with that of Søren Kierkeg-
aard [1813–1855]. Neither man in history, nor man in the security 
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of a supernatural authority, but man himself, by nature precarious 
and yet secure, is the eternal figure of Goethe’s attention. The wan-
derer is a recurrent character in all his works. This wanderer always 
has one goal, not so much the perfection of his own personality, but 
his inclusion in a whole where he realizes his own creative forces. 
Romanticism knew only too well that Goethe’s idea of man would 
henceforth be the perennial goal of all progressive culture. In this 
struggle for proportion, for balance, for reconciliation, Goethe 
fought for a higher synthesis, not for the vanity of self-expression. 
The Romantic Movement knew this as well. In the maintenance and 
fulfillment of Goethe’s divine cosmos, everyone, as a participant, 
had to bear full responsibility for its continuance and growth. This 
idea of communal responsibility for the maintenance of civilization 
is, perhaps, Goethe’s most important legacy to our times. In its hopes 
and despairs, in its deification of the state and technology, our era 
has completely lost all proportion and direction. It has broken out of 
the eternal order and thus ceased to revere all that can neither be lost 
nor explained. Lack of proportion and anarchy, barbarism, and the 
destruction of genuine order have been the necessary consequences. 
Goethe conceived man as one who, through the daily exertion of his 
sense of proportion, could build his own compromise with the world 
and thereby participate in the eternal realization of the divine. He 
proclaimed the praise of this high humanity:
Alle Tage und alle Nächte
Preis ich so des Menschen Los.
Setzt er ewig sich ins Rechte,
Ist er ewig schön und gross. 
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X
The eternal man of Goethe’s conception is the one who loves and 
through loving is included in the life of the human community. Love 
the basic divine law of eternal creativity, is the true and good in one. 
Love is the eternally creative expression of being. All striving and 
seeking is, in the last analysis, “eternal slumber in God, the Lord.” 
This is the existential foundation of life, where love and creative work 
are merely different modes of expression of the same active nature. 
This is the essence of Goethe’s faith, perfect security in life itself, 
a joyous awareness of God’s Fatherhood from which all the power 
of creative and loving beings arises. The manifold possibilities of 
expressing his own existence assure him of the divinity of the world 
and his portion in it. This is the only way in which to understand the 
following passage from The West-Eastern Divan:
The one and only theme of world and human history is 
the conflict between belief and unbelief. All other themes 
are subordinate. All epochs in which faith ruled, regard-
less of the form it may have taken, were brilliant, heart-
warming, and fruitful for the age and for posterity. The 
others in which unbelief in any form whatever gained a 
pitiful and short-lived victory may for a time have glit-
tered with a false splendor, but ultimately they disap-
peared entirely in the light of posterity. No one wants to 
discomfit himself with the awareness of sterility.
Since faith is the expression and appearance of a supreme spiritual 
nature, and since only through faith does the visage of man appear 
pure and open, the true subject of human history can be seen in the 
struggle of faith against the powers of sterility, subjectivity, ugliness, 
and enslavement. This is a theology of history without history. It 
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reflects the utopian world of love that emerges in the conclusion of 
Wilhelm Meister and in the Moses vision of the dying Faust. Even in 
Iphigenia and Hermann und Dorothea, unity in love as moral aware-
ness and liberation of heart is also established. 
In the music of Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart [1756–1791], espe-
cially in The Magic Flute (it is not a coincidence that Goethe under-
took at one point to write a second part to this very opera), the world 
of pure love emerges in harmony and tone, something that no work 
of language can ever achieve. It is pure love because it seeks not its 
own but the freedom and unfolding of every soul. It is the magic of 
the conquering and transforming power of the spirit. It alone bursts 
the bonds of time and sets man down in the ageless kingdom of eter-
nal forms.
In Goethe’s work, love as a genuine expression of a true human 
community is demanded and presupposed. As such, it retreats into 
utopian distance but remains, at the same time, the supreme form of 
human contact. “There is no external sign of courtesy that has not 
its profound moral basis, and there is a courtesy of the heart that 
is closely related to love.” In the creative man, love is the ability to 
accept alien life into his own. All orderliness in human behavior is 
possible only through love. “Voluntary devotion is the loveliest of 
conditions, and how would it be possible without love?”
In Schiller’s famous birthday letter to Goethe, there is a celebrated 
passage in which the younger poet suddenly abandons his envy of the 
older man and writes, “there is no other means of salvation against 
the great advantages of another but love.” Goethe rightly numbered 
this famous sentence among Schiller’s most valuable insights and 
reflections. The only way Goethe could accept the unbearable rigor 
of Kantian ethics was to define duty in his own way: “Where one 
loves what one commands oneself to do.”
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In Wilhelm Meister, the wandering hero is surrounded by a lov-
ing and attentive society. The lost and misguided Faust, even in his 
plunge into the abyss, has the vague sense that he will not wholly per-
ish. Love, as grace, accepts the striving human eros into the unique 
glory of the divine reality. The yearning eros, ever pushing outward 
toward perfection, and the love pouring forth from that perfection 
are merely different aspects of the same essence.
No memorial could be more tenderly and lovingly concluded 
than with Goethe’s own words, dedicated to the memory of departed 
lodge brothers [Goethe was a member of the Amalia Lodge of Free-
masonry in Weimar from 1781 until his death—Eds.]:
We all suffer in life. Who, except for God, will sit in judg-
ment on us? Let us, the survivors, occupy ourselves, not 
with their sufferings, nor mistakes, but with their deeds 
and achievements. We knew them as human beings by 
their faults but as individuals by their virtues. We share 
the same fates and the same failings; our virtues belong 
to each of us alone.
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Notes
Translated by Jonathan Steinberg. This essay was prepared in 1932 to 
honor the centenary of Goethe’s death.
1. It is important to distinguish between the rationalistic sensitivity 
of the rococo and the pathos of grand passions, the formless over-
flowing of the spirit, which characterized the Sturm und Drang.
10
 Goethe (1949) 
 
To Johann Wolfgang von Goethe [1749–1832], Bildung is the sum 
total of all efforts to “discipline man’s natural impulses by assimilat-
ing that which is higher than man and that which transpires about 
him.” It is the constructive power of man to shape his individual 
person into the general context of nature and civilization.1
The mark of culture is to be mindful of the deeds and examples 
that set our standards and enlighten our minds. Such mindfulness 
implies a voluntary acknowledgment of the truly excellent—a human 
independence—which Goethe regarded as the distinguishing char-
acteristic of Bildung as against barbarism. He thought it the highest 
quality in man to be able to respond to outstanding superiority with 
love, eschewing resentment and envy. He made his own bow to this 
liberating attitude when he incorporated a statement from Fried-
rich Schiller’s [1759–1805] first letter (establishing their fellowship) 
almost verbatim into his Maximen und Reflexionen: “There is no 
therapy but love against great advantages of another human being. 
Such attitudes are the characteristic features of the cultivated man.”2
Goethe objected strongly when friends proposed a toast to 
Remembrance. 
Published originally in a slightly different form in Social Research 16 (September 
1949), 289–319. Republished by permission from Social Research. 
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I am no devotee of remembrance in your sense of the 
word. That is an inept way of putting things. Whatever 
great, beautiful, or significant experiences have come our 
way must not be recalled again from without and recap-
tured, as it were; they must rather become part of the tis-
sue of our inner life from the outset, creating a new and 
better self within us, continuing forever as active agents 
of our Bildung. I do not acknowledge anything past that 
we would be warranted in longing to recall; I admit only 
the existence of what is eternally new as it shaped itself 
out of the expanded elements of the past. True longing 
must always be productive and create something that is 
both new and better.3 
In the same vein, reflecting on William Shakespeare [1564–1616], he 
remarked that the mind of genius stimulates creative thought at all 
times.4 
In 1949, the bicentennial of Goethe’s birth, we must honor 
Goethe’s central postulate of mindfulness. That is, we must consider 
the elements in him that today stimulate our constructive thinking.
✴    ✴    ✴
The general trends of modern civilization are directly opposed 
to Goethe’s idea of Bildung, and the ill effects of technological civi-
lization justify Goethe’s prophetic concern about the future of the 
human person. On the other hand, there are tendencies in mod-
ern thought that revolt against the prevailing trends in civilization. 
These trends find support in Goethe’s theoretical thinking. Goethe 
was antidogmatic and anti irrational in his efforts to conceive of the 
totality of life. He understood the process of nature as a dynamic 
polarity. All phenomena of life have aspects positive and negative, 
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constructive and destructive. Life is complex and dynamic, moving 
in a variety of polarities. This basic philosophical attitude of Goethe’s 
unites naturalism and spiritualism in a new kind of realism. As such, 
it has been stimulating to modern efforts to counteract the general 
trends of positivistic and mechanistic methods and philosophies.
In the field of philosophy, Georg Simmel [1858–1918] attempted 
to find the prototype of his philosophy of life in Goethe’s thinking. 
Professor Barker Fairley [1887–1986], a student of Simmel’s, has 
verified Simmel’s thesis in his Study of Goethe, the most remark-
able work on Goethe produced since Carl Gustav Carus [1789–1869] 
wrote his profound books. Fairley explicitly states that Goethe has 
significant, immediate bearing on the problems of an age of destruc-
tive introspectiveness. “The special appeal in our time of abnormally 
introverted figures like [Rainer Maria] Rilke [1875–1926], [Friedrich] 
Hölderlin [1770–1843], [Søren] Kierkegaard [1813–1855], [Franz] 
Kafka [1883–1924], and others reminds us how near we still are . . . 
to [Young] Werther and [Torquato] Tasso. To this extent Goethe’s 
problem is . . . part of our problem. We cannot affect to ignore it.”5 
Professor Fairley clearly discerns the relevance of Goethe, as thinker 
and a model of Bildung, to our age.
Bildung is not a purely aesthetic category in Goethe’s theory of 
conduct. It is not an ivory-tower notion. It is the primary defense of 
the human personality against the imminent threats of nationalism, 
statism, ecclesiasticism, Saint-Simonism. It is the only constructive 
mode of conduct for maintaining the highest standards of West-
ern civilization against all odds. It is the only creative possibility of 
extending and integrating groups of educated and cultured persons 
all over the globe, and thus transcending national, political, social, 
and religious borderlines. Therefore, men of Bildung alone can estab-
lish a social power that might work for peace, toleration, and sym-
pathetic understanding. This is the function of world literature and 
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of world citizenship. As Professor Hermann J. Weigand [1892–1985] 
put it in a brilliant phrase: “It was Goethe’s fate to be a German; it 
was his destiny to become a world citizen.”6
The international celebration of Goethe’s bicentennial is itself a 
milestone in the realization of Goethe’s vision of an age of world 
literature. Goethe coined the term in 1827, at a time when the mas-
ter and his works had become a center of authority for American 
and European men of letters and of learning. His books were trans-
lated into many languages, and his translators and admirers kept 
in contact with him by visits and correspondence. Thus, he became 
familiar with everything that was going on in literature, philoso-
phy, and science in Europe and the United States. He visualized an 
age in which all open-minded, educated persons would meet, learn 
from each other, and establish a solidarity of Bildung beyond the 
limitations of tribal, national, social, religious, and professional 
boundaries.
For Goethe, world literature was involved in the development 
of modern civilization. It could come into existence only after all 
nations had met each other in the most terrible wars. When they 
regained their national frontiers after the peace settlement, they 
became aware that, in such meetings, unknown intellectual interests 
and curiosities had arisen. Thus, the various cultures opened their 
doors to each other, and the methods of laissez faire were effectively 
applied to literary and philosophical exchange.7
Goethe was of the opinion that such exchange of cultural goods 
would extend sympathetic understanding among nations and 
increase the number of men of good will who would rejoice in the 
magnificent intellectual achievements of other civilizations. “The 
same interdependence between the general and the specific occurs 
in the practical life and conduct of men. In human action, too, wis-
dom and moderation result from the sympathetic understanding of 
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poetry and belles-lettres and spread some sparks of light and illumi-
nation into the world of malevolence, selfishness, cruelty, and false-
hood.”8
Goethe was too much of a realist and too well trained in Spinoza 
to have any illusions about the extent of the enlightening influence 
of Bildung on political affairs. He was confident, however, that meet-
ings between gebildete persons or groups would lay the foundations 
for mutual toleration. Toleration meant to him the positive recogni-
tion of specific qualities as constructive elements in the progress of 
Bildung, thus raising the standards of human sympathy and creating 
the communion of a supranational, supraprofessional elite to be cen-
tered around the idea and grounded in love.
In the area of Bildung, Goethe adhered to the conception of prog-
ress. He regarded the contemporary state of individual Bildung, with 
its universalistic implications, as the result of a long historical devel-
opment. He had touched on this theme in an essay that reads like the 
first draft of a theory of culture.9 Goethe distinguishes a number of 
successive stages in the social development of intercultural Bildung. 
He postulates an initial, idyllic age of esoteric patriarchalism. In that 
era, tiny groups differentiate themselves from the rude and brutish 
horde; these groups cultivate and praise in song and literature the 
most intimate relationships. Such esoteric groups must establish a 
distance from the masses in order to maintain standards of sensitiv-
ity and thought. But they compose in their native language.
Goethe calls the second era the “social and civic” stage. New and 
larger groups come into existence. Society itself becomes dynamic, 
and the groups of cultured people are receptive to foreign languages 
and to the works of different civilizations. They remain separate but 
tolerate others.
In the general era, these groups meet with each other and exercise 
a mutual influence. The final stage, which in Goethe’s view the future 
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must achieve, is the universal era, in which occurs the unification 
of all groups of Bildung into an organic entity. All such groups then 
acknowledge one goal as valid for all those who had experienced the 
constructive effects of cultural exchange regarding the concrete and 
ideal issues of the contemporary world—to extend the sway of uni-
versal humanization. 
In spite of his firm faith in such progress, Goethe was very real-
istic in his appraisal of the specific forms such progress would take 
under the conditions of the modern world. He distinguishes between 
the tendency toward international literary mass production and the 
supranational trends of genuine poetry and philosophy. The cultural 
needs, expectations, and requirements of the mass of average people 
are the same everywhere. Writers and intellectuals will readily sup-
ply this market with standardized productions; there will be interna-
tional writers, just as there are international business relationships. 
This will cause difficulties for the sincere and serious thinkers and 
poets. These will not easily find a public if they maintain their stan-
dards without yielding to popular demands. On the other hand, 
the men of the intellectual and literary elite will meet each other 
all the sooner because they stand apart in dedicating themselves to 
the highest standards. There are everywhere such sincere and honest 
people who are concerned about the genuine progress of mankind. 
These “Happy Few” will carry on their work in esoteric communi-
cation. They will devote themselves to the eternal obligation of the 
man of Bildung—vitaï lampada tradere (to secure the continuity of 
the traditions and standards of philosophy and of Bildung). They 
are conscious that the esoteric tradition is indispensable, because it 
would be futile to oppose the broad stream of the commonplaces of 
the contemporary world.
Goethe had hoped that such meetings and experiences would cre-
ate world literature and world citizens. World literature would con-
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sist of literary or philosophical works enriched by the experience and 
understanding of the works of foreign civilizations. The assimilation 
and appropriation of these values would transform native writers or 
thinkers into world citizens. 
As a man and citizen the poet will love his fatherland, 
but the fatherland of his poetic powers and of his poetic 
activity is the good, the noble, the beautiful, which is 
the property of no particular province and no particu-
lar land. . . . And what does it mean to love one’s father-
land, and what does it mean to be patriotically active? 
If a poet has endeavored all his life to fight harmful 
prejudices, to eliminate narrowness, to enlighten the 
spirit of his people, to purify their taste and to ennoble 
their sentiments, what is there better for him to do?10  
And more concisely: “There is no patriotic art and no patriotic sci-
ence. Like all exalted, good things, both belong to the whole world; 
and they can be made to prosper only through a general free interac-
tion of all contemporaries coupled with a steadfast regard for that 
which is left of the past and known to us.”11  
Such communion of world citizens should be distinguished 
from the Republic of Letters12 or the Society of Scholars. Although 
both transcend the boundaries of racial, national, political, social, 
religious differentiations, they constitute communities determined 
and integrated by objective ideals. Goethe’s communion of World 
Citizens through World Literature is united in a philosophical and 
humanitarian hope that the continuous interaction and interdepen-
dence of various civilizations in open-minded hearts will contribute 
to our progress in knowledge and in human standards of Bildung. 
Goethe was always convinced that only the totality of mankind has 
the complete truth, and that the continuous exchange of intellec-
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tual and poetical goods would extend the pluralistic universe of the 
verities. For this reason, the world citizen, the man of Bildung, is 
the man who realizes humanitas—that is, the transformation of the 
knowledge of nature and man into a way of life. Men who have read 
as human beings, not as experts, Homer and Hafiz [c.1320–1388], 
Shakespeare [1564-1616] and Pedro Calderón de la Barca [1600–
1681], Menander [342–291 BC] and Molière [1622–1673], Jean Racine 
[1639–1699] and Sophocles [c. 496–406 BC], Lucretius [99–55 BC] 
and Immanuel Kant [1724–1804], Plato [c. 428–c. 348 BC] and Bene-
dict de Spinoza [1632–1677], will meet with each other in modera-
tion and friendship. They will meet in the We-relationship of people 
united in the common pursuit of extending and enriching their own 
humanity by sympathetic understanding of all possible modes of 
living.
Goethe hoped modestly and realistically that such esoteric groups 
would tend to reduce the frictions between nations and societies. He 
was convinced that this kind of progress was a constructive good in 
a world in which many other progressive movements were accom-
panied by deplorable developments. Even the ideal of Humanität 
has its dark prospect for the future: “I look forward with great plea-
sure to the third part of [Johann Gottfried] Herder’s [1744–1803] 
work. . . . No doubt, he has admirably developed that lovely wish-
dream of mankind that some day things will be better. And I must 
admit I, too, believe that Humanität will eventually triumph; only 
I fear that at the same time the world will become a vast hospital 
where each will play the role of warden to the other patients.”13
As for the technological progress of his time, it is fashionable to 
quote his prescient 1827 remarks on the probability of the construc-
tion of the Panama and Suez canals and their consequent revolu-
tionary impacts. It is correct to state his interest in technological 
progress as a condition for world citizenship. But it is the characteris-
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tic feature of Goethe’s complexity that he visualized the other side of 
technical progress as well. We should not forget that he anticipated 
the fate of the textile workers in the rural districts following the rise 
of the industrial technology: they were left with the alternative of 
emigration or starvation.
The most articulate prediction of the shape of the new world 
occurs in a letter to Carl Friedrich Zelter [1758–1832], who had writ-
ten Goethe about a performance of a new Beethoven symphony: 
I cannot end the letter without coming back to the over-
crowded music (of which you report). Everything, dear 
friend, is now ultra, everything is in a state of transition 
in thought and action. Nobody knows himself any longer, 
nobody understands the elements and foundations of life 
and action, nobody cares to understand the material and 
elements with which he has to work. No pure simplicity 
is extant any longer; simpletons, however, abound. Much 
too early do young people get excited and tense, much 
too early are they drawn away by the accelerated pace of 
the times. People admire wealth and velocity. Everybody 
strives for them. Railroads, the express stage, steam-
ships, and all new facilities of communication are the 
main concerns of educated society. Here they compete, 
here they surpass each other, with the result that they 
persevere in mediocrity. And this is the result of the gen-
eral trend of the contemporary world toward an average 
civilization, common to all. This is the goal of the Bible 
Societies . . . (and of some English methods of teaching). 
Actually, it is the century of smart and competent minds; 
it is the age for alert and practical men who, equipped 
with a certain shrewdness, feel themselves superior to 
the masses, though they themselves are not qualified to 
aspire to the highest. Let us persevere as much as possible 
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in the spirit in which we came so far. With some few, we 
will be the last of an age that will not return very soon.14   
Goethe saw the historical situation as a process in which differ-
ent tendencies are intertwined, without merging into a single, philo-
sophically significant stream of historical progress. Technological 
progress has its constructive and destructive aspects; Humanität has 
its positive and negative aspects; and even in Bildung, the most con-
structive element, there is a possible negative aspect through unwar-
ranted pride in sheer quantity of knowledge. Goethe’s criterion is the 
idea of a human being as the highest product of nature and mind. 
The dynamic harmony of such a person must reconcile antagonistic 
elements in the heightening and intensification of his individuality. 
Goethe is not concerned about the developmental process of man-
kind as a whole. He flatly rejects the idea of an abstract humanity. 
He scathingly ridicules the theories of Saint-Simonians, who postu-
late a collective and dynamic mankind in which all individualities 
are absorbed. For Goethe, groups are simply the unified, merging 
interactions of a variety of societal relationships between individu-
als. They present on a higher plane the simple types of relationships 
of give and take, superiority and inferiority, acting and being acted 
upon, remaining and wandering, connecting and separating, loving 
and hating, freedom and servitude, and so on.
Goethe was too free from the hubris of the nineteenth century 
to believe that there is an objective meaning of history that can be 
verified philosophically. He remained true to the idea of the continu-
ity of the tradition of Bildung and of the growth of truth. This was 
progress in the real sense.
Goethe made a point of referring to movements of thought to 
which he was indebted in the historical part of the Farbenlehre and 
in his autobiographies. He held that the history of ideas is an infal-
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lible instrument for rectifying the foolish and trivial theories of the 
contemporary scene.15
He was, however, filled with a devastating skepticism in his 
appreciation of history as a discipline and as an instrument of social 
action. History as a discipline is ridiculed because its methods are 
questionable, and the thesis of the historian is no more than the 
commonplace that humankind had always suffered and that life 
was miserable anyway. More seriously, he questions history out of 
his concern for the individual: “The historian is on the lookout for 
results and we do not blame him; but this involves sacrificing the 
individual act as well as the individual human being. History . . . 
always suggests the corpse and the scent of the tomb.”16 Goethe is 
only interested in the human being who has turned appropriated 
ideas and beauty of all times into a way of life that we call wisdom 
and moderation or Bildung.
For this reason, he shared the traditional view of the Enlighten-
ment regarding the historical process and historical actions as con-
stituting a sphere of human stupidity, low ambitions, and vanity. He 
had studied the world of politics closely enough to know that non-
sense rather than sense ruled there. Goethe accordingly developed 
a natural theory of societal relationships that makes it possible to 
understand the historical process as a recurrent pattern of change. 
The struggle of what is old, established, and set with the 
forces of development, expansion, and change is always 
the same. All order, finally, turns into pedantry. To get 
rid of the latter, people destroy the former, and some 
time elapses before the need to re-establish order makes 
itself felt. Classicism versus romanticism, rigid guild rule 
versus laissez faire, a policy of large estates versus one of 
small holdings—it is always the same conflict that ulti-
mately generates a new one. The most intelligent policy 
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on the part of those who govern would be, therefore, to 
moderate this struggle so as to effect a compensating 
swing without the destruction of the one side. But this 
is not given to man, and it does not even seem to be the 
will of God.17
Goethe himself had been an extremely accurate analyst of the 
historical situation of prerevolutionary France. On the occasion of 
the Diamond Necklace Affair (1785), he predicted the downfall of a 
monarchy that had lost its dignity and respect. He maintained that 
the ruling classes are always responsible for revolutions because they 
turn their political obligations into social privileges.18 
But he treated revolution as the perennial return to the state of 
nature, lawlessness, and abandonment of restraints.19 He preferred 
a state of injustice to a state of disorder. Thus, he endangered his 
own idea of the independent person in order to maintain the sta-
tus quo against majorities, masses, revolutions.20 His deepest reflec-
tions relating to a theory of history deal with those aspects of history 
in which conduct and action are determined by ideas—that is, in 
which ideal and normative goods are the decisive elements in social 
change.
“The deepest, the only theme of human history, compared to 
which all others are of subordinate importance, is the conflict of 
skepticism with faith. All epochs that are ruled by faith, in whatever 
form, are glorious, elevating, and fruitful in themselves for poster-
ity. All epochs, on the other hand, in which skepticism in whatever 
form maintains a precarious triumph, even should they boast for 
a moment of a borrowed splendor, lose their meaning for poster-
ity because no one can take pleasure in wrestling with the study of 
what is essentially sterile.”21 This is not a metaphysics of history but a 
dynamic theory that contains elements of polarity, not of dialectics.
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Henri de Saint-Simon [1760–1825] and Auguste Comte [1798–
1857] closely followed Goethe’s pattern: their dichotomy of organic 
and critical periods corresponds to Goethe’s distinction. Faith for 
Goethe is contrasted with skepticism. In setting up these opposites, 
Goethe implicitly defines faith not as pure spiritual commitment but 
as a firm conviction and consciousness of the good in the human 
situation. Faith as confidence in the communion of cultured men 
for realizing the esoteric empire of progressive enlightenment makes 
possible Bildung.
Thus, history has significance only as the progress of Bildung, 
while the concrete process of historical action is a jumble of vile 
passions and vile interests. There is only one scene in contemporary 
history where the trend toward Bildung and the dynamics of his-
tory converge—this is the phenomenon of Napoleon [1769–1821]. 
To Goethe, Napoleon was the embodiment of the type of demonic 
ruler, like Frederick the Great of Prussia [1712–1786] or Julius Caesar 
[100–44 BC]. He was still more to Goethe. Napoleon alone was able 
to construct the all-embracing frame of a unified Europe and break 
down the narrow barriers of national prejudice. Thus, at least a Euro-
pean League of World Citizenship and World Literature could come 
true, and the irrational sphere of politics could once again serve the 
cause of progress in world citizenship.22 Goethe’s attempt to associ-
ate the freedom of Bildung with centralized Caesarism is logical and 
congruous with his philosophy of society.
Having had his experience with political and administrative 
action and having observed the narrow, personal interests and 
resentments that dominate that area, Goethe was convinced that the 
average government agency will always bungle matters. But at the 
same time, and as a result of the same observations, he attributed the 
highest importance to the quality of executive action in politics: “In 
a state everything depends on the executive power. Let the legislative 
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power be ever so enlightened, it avails the state nothing if the execu-
tive power is not effective.”23
Goethe was a perfectionist to the very core of his being. For this 
reason, he hated bungling wherever it occurred. The young Goethe 
was in love with Frederick the Great, not as a sovereign of Prussia, 
but as the demonic ruler. The mature Goethe distinguished between 
degrading tyranny and despotism as a regime of efficiency and of 
welfare, attracting characters, able and great.24 “Despotism produces 
great characters. A wise, tranquil grasp of affairs, strict administra-
tion, firm determination—all qualities required to serve the des-
pots—develop in all individuals and procure for them commanding 
positions in the state when they learn to become rulers.”25
In the cases of Alexander, Frederick, and Napoleon, Goethe found 
proof of the stimulating and constructive potentials of this type of 
government. Despotic government sets a pattern for independent 
groups of free fellow workers, who cooperate in creating goods for 
the community.
Goethe was firmly convinced that men as constructive workers 
were free in the most humble conditions: the textile workers in the 
Thuringia Forest, the carpenters at Weimar, were as independent as 
Goethe or his Duke in achieving works that were beneficial to society. 
That the act of objectifying work makes human beings free was the 
most authentic experience and the deepest truth Goethe perceived 
throughout his life. In fact, Goethe was aware that his perception 
of this truth was the great divide in his life. He knew that his youth 
and student years, the periods of Werther, Iphigenie, and Tasso, his 
love of Charlotte von Stein [1742–1827], had been marked by a com-
pletely self-centered emotionalism, introspection, and subjectivism. 
Italy was the symbol of his change. From 1788 on, he established 
complete control over his moods, tendencies, and potentialities. He 
turned his interests in nature, art, society, into objective, scientific 
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theories, his poetical fancy into metaphysical poetry, his attitude of 
the eternal wanderer into the steady and stubborn pursuits of the 
scholar.
The symbolical expression of the dual character of his life is 
the arrangement of his major works—the autobiography, Wilhelm 
Meister, and Faust—each of which has two parts indicating articu-
late changes in personal history. Most revealing is the radical trans-
formation betrayed in the two parts of the autobiography.
Dichtung und Wahrheit contains the history of his youth from 
his early years to the invitation to go to Weimar. This part of the 
autobiography begins with a half-serious, half-ironical presentation 
of the astrological chart of his life—his horoscope. At the end, in 
connection with the sudden change in his destiny when called to 
Weimar, comes a significant description of the Demonic. The initial 
and terminal stories indicate that the author was completely aware of 
the determining conditions of his life, whose youth had been passed 
in recording, with the sensitivity of an Aeolian harp, the slightest 
movements of the world. In contrast, the various divisions of the 
second part of the autobiography26 are concerned with the objecti-
fications of his life, in his concern with science, philosophy, philo-
sophical poetry, the relations between philosophy and poetry, the 
theories of the Human Condition, and the roles of poetry and art in 
the historical process.
Goethe was conscious that the formation of his life, the image of 
Bildung that he had established in controlling his subjectivity and 
transforming it into the liberating objectivity of theoretical truth, 
was a general contribution to setting standards for the intellectuals 
of his and all future times. At the end of his life, he stated as his con-
viction: “Those who come to understand my writings and, indeed, 
what I stand for as a whole, will have to acknowledge that they have 
attained a certain inner freedom.”27 
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This is the meaning of Wilhelm Meister and Faust. Only those who 
dedicate themselves to a worthy cause are able to realize true indepen-
dence. Goethe rejected the escape of the romanticists into the com-
fortable shelter of the Catholic Church. He constructed in Wilhelm 
Meister a social utopia based on the figure of the early American settler, 
in which modern subjectivity merges with dedication to the common 
goal of a welfare communion of independent men. Wilhelm Meister 
achieves genuine humanity only after he has wandered through the 
various aesthetic and erotic experiences and recognized the value of 
a profession that is of objective value to society. Faust achieves com-
plete humanity after his odyssey through the theoretical-esoteric, the 
social-erotic, the political-exoteric, the individual-erotic-aesthetic, 
and the despotic landscapes of the soul. He rules as a benevolent des-
pot like Frederick the Great, subject to the temptations of power and 
victim to the magic implications of organized power. As demonic 
ruler, he is immune to the experience of guilt; the man of action is 
always without conscience. But in the final achievement of humanity, 
Faust turns to a democratic community of free men, which sets free 
the constructive elements in human nature and controls the elements 
of resistance, negativity, and worry to which all humans are subject.
Goethe was concerned with the elements that constitute society 
from the time of his Italian journey, from the moment when the 
French Revolution had undermined historical society, and he him-
self had settled into a position marginal to society. He applied his 
encyclopedic knowledge of human conduct and action to elaborat-
ing a theory of the Human Condition. In Wilhelm Meisters Wan-
derjahre he coined the term symphronistic method, which indicates 
a comparative study of the structures of human situations and the 
typical responses to such conditions.
It sheds light on Goethe’s deep distrust of the demands of society 
that, when he had discovered its reality, he described it in the same 
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terms that he had applied in describing the Demonic—it is complete 
ambiguity. In his concrete analyses of the Roman Carnival and of 
the Rochusfest in Bingen, he formulates the thesis that the life of 
society is Schein, appearance or illusion—humans are actors who 
have to play their roles whether they are equipped for them or not. 
Throughout his mature life, Goethe acknowledged the power and 
reality of society, to which he submitted with the personal reserva-
tion of remaining marginal to it. At the same time, he never gave up 
the idea that the power of social reality was simply that of appear-
ances—of parading or of pretending. It is the realm of Schein: He 
presents society either as carnival or festival. Or he describes it as 
worlds in decay, as in Stella, in Die Wahl Verwandtschaften, in the 
court in Faust II, or in the prerevolutionary society in Die Natürliche 
Tochter; here the people are presented as helpless puppets rather than 
as complete human beings.
Goethe formulated his analysis most articulately in the Märchen. 
“Three things rule the world: wisdom, appearance, force.”
“Appearance” is the conditio sine qua non of political and social 
organization. We live by playing roles and pretending, says Mephisto 
in the Maskenzug of 1818. All societal relationships are founded on 
representation and illusion. And is representation not an illusion as 
well? Goethe explicitly praised the constructive effect of illusion in 
human action and endurance. Illusion alone makes man capable of 
taking and preserving life. Illusion constitutes the meaning of con-
ventions, mores, and etiquette. Illusion serves to maintain the estab-
lished status of society.
Goethe knew that his daughter-in-law was very unhappy with 
August Goethe, who was a drunkard, beat her when he was drunk, 
and continually had affairs with other women. He insisted, however, 
on her maintaining a noble attitude of aesthetic resignation in order 
to avoid scandal. It is bitterly ironical to see the poet and thinker 
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who had cherished the cause of human Bildung and Humanität thus 
submit to the Schein of the requirements of society. He preferred to 
sacrifice a suffering human being on the altar of the idols of society 
rather than give her freedom from social coercion.
Nonetheless, he remained true to the ideal of the Pure Man, who 
is within and yet beyond society. The three forces that control the life 
of man—wisdom, force, appearance—are basic elements in the con-
stitution of society. But there is still another element of constructive 
activity that is not among the foundations of society. That element is 
love. When the young, aspiring prince asks the wise man whether 
love is not an element of social control, the philosopher rejects the 
suggestion: Love is not a device of social control. “Love is a formative 
process. This is more.” Man lives within and yet beyond society. He 
is forced to live in a social frame of reference. He must cherish illu-
sions and appearances in order to be an efficient actor on the stage 
of human life. But he should not let himself be completely absorbed 
in his social role. Goethe praised Molière’s Misanthrope as one of 
the greatest and most human portrayals of the frustration of man 
who attempts to escape the hypocrisies and illusions of society. The 
problem is that of Montesquieu’s tale in the Persian Letters. All the 
Frenchmen get embarrassed and confused when the Persians dress 
like Frenchmen. What remains when we lose the specific character-
istics of our social lives? What happens when we do not wear the 
costumes of our role? What does it mean to hold the claim of being 
simply human?
Montesquieu did not have an answer to the question. Goethe did.
Man is within and yet beyond society. Two modes of conduct 
and two attitudes make us transcend the Schein and the enforced 
roles of society—one is the intimate relationship of genuine affin-
ity in love and friendship; the other is dedication to truth. Actu-
ally, both are the aspects of a single phenomenon: the constructive 
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and formative powers of man, like all creative acts, are in their very 
essence love.
The notion of love has no romantic or sentimental connota-
tions. It is the objective love of the productive mind that creates out 
of the fertility of its experiences. It goes without saying that men 
remain within their social roles when they realize We-relationships 
of friendship and love and identification with causes worth living 
and dying for. But at the same time, they succeed in being beyond 
society; they transcend the climate of Schein, when they realize the 
eternity of genuine love and the perennial being of truth.
The mature Goethe praised Molière as the young Goethe had 
praised the Greeks and Shakespeare. He calls the Misanthrope a 
tragedy because it brings to our minds what drives us to despair 
and makes us seek to escape. Molière represents the Pure Human 
Being who has remained natural although he has acquired the high-
est standards of Bildung. Such a man wishes to be true and sincere to 
himself and to others. But we see him in conflict with society, which 
is based on hypocrisy and shallowness.28
Goethe’s main concern was Pure Man in Divine Nature, the 
position of man in the universe. For this reason, all his normative 
conceptions of human enhancement as Bildung and Humanität are 
focused on the idea of Pure Man.
Pure Man, however, is neither rational nor primitive man. The 
man who has transformed learning into a way of life is the human 
being in whom nature and art merge. This is not primarily an aes-
thetic category, but a cosmological one. “Nobody will understand 
that the formative process is the supreme operation, indeed the only 
one, alike in nature or art.”29 Gestaltung is the very center of the 
universe: what humans strive to achieve as their summum bonum 
is pure humanity, and the process of achievement is Bildung—the 
pattern of cosmic Gestaltung in the human world.
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Goethe would have been completely aware of the role that the 
unconscious played in the rhythm of his life between creative and 
barren periods. In a letter that answered Schiller’s illuminating 
interpretation of Goethe’s nature (the letter of August 27, 1794, 
that became the basis of their ambiguous friendship), Goethe drew 
Schiller’s attention to the fact that Schiller would “discover at closer 
acquaintance a kind of obscurity and hesitancy which I cannot con-
trol although I am completely conscious of it.”30 Wilhelm von Hum-
boldt [1767–1835] and Carl Friedrich Zelter [1758–1832] remarked on 
such states of mind occasionally. Humboldt refers to Goethe’s com-
plete silence when some of his works were critically analyzed, and 
Zelter describes in detail the depressing atmosphere when Goethe 
was moody and aloof. 
But Goethe knew that he had to take such breaks from the reign 
of his sovereign intelligence. This is conspicuous in his description 
of the Demonic. “The Demonic is that which defies analysis by the 
understanding and by reason. I am not endowed with it, but I am sub-
ject to its influence.”31 As mentioned before, Goethe considered the 
impact of the Demonic as decisive in shaping his destiny. It is effec-
tive in humans, in events, and in nature: a cosmic power. “Although 
this demonic essence can manifest itself in everything corporeal and 
incorporeal—it exhibits itself in animals in the most remarkable 
ways—nevertheless it is pre-eminently in the human sphere that it 
shows its exceedingly strange workings. It is a power either opposed 
to the moral order of the universe or at least at cross-purposes with 
it, so that the one may be regarded as the warp and the other as the 
woof of the tissue.”32
Goethe liked to apply the metaphor of the weaving process in 
order to indicate unity in polarity as the dynamics of life. The pro-
cess of life is articulated by the continuous interaction of the con-
scious and the unconscious, by the lasting interplay of the demonic 
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and the intelligent. This is a polarity, not a dualism; it is the very 
nature of life to be unity in polarity. For this reason, he could say 
to Heinrich Meyer [1800–1873] that life itself is the only purpose of 
life. Most explicitly, he told Friedrich Wilhelm Riemer [1774–1845], 
“Man cannot dwell for long in a conscious state, or in consciousness. 
He must again take refuge in the unconscious, for that is where his 
life is rooted.”33
In the final formulation of his philosophy of life, he describes life 
as the highest gift we have received from God and Nature, “the rotat-
ing movement of the monad about itself, knowing neither pause nor 
rest. The impulse to nurture this life is ineradicably implanted in 
each individual, although its specific nature remains a mystery to 
ourselves and to others.”34
This is the prose version of the first stanza of the “Urworte, 
Orphisch” where Goethe spoke of the Dämon. In the prose phrasing, 
he calls it Monas, in other places, in particular, referring to Faust’s 
immortal parts, the entelechy, signifying the individual structure 
that establishes from the day of birth the very law of the individual’s 
growth: this is the law of enhancement, the continuous heightening 
and ascending power of the Monas that overcomes the elements of 
resistance and negativity in its tension toward a summum bonum. In 
such a description, elements of the conscious and of the unconscious 
are intertwined and not separated from each other. This applies to 
the whole complex of these poems as the sum total of his philosophy 
of life. Necessity and chance (ananke and tyche) represent the unpre-
dictable and irrational elements of life that press upon the individual 
from without. In acts of love and hope, however, self-determination 
and consciousness again appear as constructive elements in the life 
of men beyond the conditions of nature.35
The characteristic feature of Goethe’s comprehensive way of life 
is his ability to turn his theoretical understanding of the interrela-
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tionship between conscious and unconscious to practical use. He 
had learned by dire experience that he could do something about 
the inner balance of his own life by liberating himself from the 
continuous pressure of introspection and of recurrent shocks and 
depressions. The only effective cure, Goethe discovered, was work, 
transforming his subjective moods and intuitions into objective 
understanding and knowledge.
He practiced psychotherapy, first of all, on himself. Throughout 
the autobiographical writings, Goethe stated explicitly that when-
ever he suffered shocks and disappointments, he took refuge in his 
scientific or poetical labors in order to liberate himself by objectivi-
cation. After the return from Italy, he felt deeply hurt and depressed 
because he remained alienated from old friends, isolated from famil-
iar society. He overcame his depression by hard, constructive work. 
But he no longer sought liberation from suffering by expressing it 
in subjective poetry. On the contrary, he cured himself by devo-
tion to the theoretical study of nature, society, and art. Throughout 
the mature part of his life he applied such psychotherapy with the 
utmost energy.
In one specific case, he explicitly recommended his method of 
objective description and interpretation as effective therapy against 
the rise of resentment. The Paralipomena to the Annalen, the second 
part of his autobiography, point out that he intended to continue the 
work. Among these notes, there is one referring to August von Kot-
zebue [1761–1819]. This man was a famous playwright at the time 
of Goethe’s maturity and during the period when Goethe directed 
the theater at Weimar. Socially, he was much better liked by pro-
ducers and the audiences than Goethe. He was shrewd and skillful 
enough to give the masses what they longed for. The man was con-
sidered ruthless and cynical, and without conscience as a producer. 
Goethe disliked and resented him intensely. But Goethe was keenly 
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aware that Kotzebue should have a place in his autobiography as his 
antagonist, for Goethe was convinced that he himself had achieved 
considerable progress in the literary and theatrical standards of the 
German stage by his influence on its repertory and acting technique. 
Kotzebue’s plays had been an obstacle to Goethe in his effort to raise 
the taste of the German public. They had strengthened the middle 
classes in their addiction to a sentimental dream world of harmo-
nious happiness. The note for the Annalen presents Kotzebue as 
the embodiment and mouthpiece of the middle-class taste. Goethe 
does not refer to his subjective character; he analyzes him as a social 
power and explores the relationship of his influence on the public 
and vice versa. He explicitly mentions the insights that he owes to 
the man as to the needs and requirements of the bourgeois masses, 
considered as a clientele for the theater. Goethe gives a completely 
objective explanation of Kotzebue’s role and function in the social 
dimension of the theater. He concludes with a personal remark: “I 
would enjoy my confession most thoroughly if I could learn that oth-
ers in a similar situation effectively applied my device. My method is 
neither moral nor Christian; it springs from an enlightened Egotism. 
For there is nobody who would not do everything in order to get rid 
of the most unpleasant of all feelings—impotent resistance and futile 
hatred.”36
Goethe also practiced psychotherapy casually as an obligation of 
friendship. In a letter of September 5, 1785, addressed to Charlotte 
von Stein after the return from Karlsbad, Goethe writes: 
Last night I played a psychological trick. Frau Herder 
was still under a most hypochondriacal strain about 
all the disagreeable things that had happened to her in 
Karlsbad, particularly the way she had been treated by 
her companion. I caused her to tell me about them and 
to report everything, the ill behavior of other people and 
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her own mistakes with the slightest of details and con-
sequences. Finally I granted her absolution and jokingly 
gave her to understand under that formula that those 
things were now bygone and thrown into the depths of 
the sea. She herself became quite cheerful about it and is 
now really cured. 
Among his literary-philosophical works, Faust and Die Wahl 
Verwandtschaften, as well as the short stories in Wilhelm Meisters 
Wanderjahre, bear witness to his comprehensive understanding of 
the unconscious. Faust, under the spell of his youth, renounces sui-
cide. Faust in search of complete humanity understands that neither 
escape nor repression can achieve the totality of the human being. It 
is the crucial meaning of Grim Care,37 the sister of death, to restore 
Faust’s complete humanity. All humans are blind throughout their 
lives; Faust becomes blind at his end in order to bear the whole bur-
den of a human being, the passio humana, without which his death 
would not be victory in defeat. Being blind, Faust is subject to the 
anxieties and traumas of human insecurity. But he is keenly aware 
that there is a remedy against such paralyzing forces—continuous 
activity for, and disinterested dedication to, a worthy cause. The 
complete human being builds his dynamic self in his unremitting 
efforts of his constructive love, which pervades all his relationships 
and is superior to the dark forces of the unconscious. We gain free-
dom and life only in unceasing efforts to balance the conscious and 
unconscious elements in the dynamics of the individual law of the 
Monas.
Die Wahl Verwandtschaften depicts in the minutest gestures and 
utterances of the agents the lasting interdependence between pre-
tending and betraying. The natural-choice relationships among the 
two couples of the plot conflict with the pressure of legal norms, 
social conventions, and result in psychological repressions and per-
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versions. Thus, the so-called noble renunciations are not a genuine 
liberation; rather are they the hypocrisy of sacrifice and the pseudo-
bravery of endurance for fear of social conventions. They shun the 
effort of psychological emancipation that involves fighting for genu-
ine human relationships.
The reader of Die Wahl Verwandtschaften may not readily observe 
that Goethe unintentionally pronounced the hardest judgment upon 
such psychological repressions for the sake of aesthetic and social 
convention. For he had loved his daughter-in-law, Ottilie, and con-
sidered her a saint. He does not seem aware that the short story of the 
two strange neighbor children incorporated within the novel com-
pletely condemns the pseudoliberation of resignation. The story is 
focused in a parallel to the plot of the novel itself and reveals hidden 
love relationships that are disguised as conflict and hatred between 
the youthful lovers.
They liberate themselves from their repressions only when they 
risk their lives in order to commit themselves to each other for time 
and eternity. They seek happiness not through elective affinities, not 
as choice, but as decision. Theirs is the decision to test their will to 
belong to each other by the sacrifice of life. This is the seal of their 
mutual sincerity. Combat and constructive action, happiness gained 
by the spirit of dedication, is the psychological-moral measuring rod 
that passes judgment on the character of the aesthetic puppets of the 
main plot.
One should note that Goethe integrated his knowledge of the 
dynamics of conscious-unconscious into the general theory of polar-
ity and metamorphosis. For this reason, he has no systematic theory 
of the unconscious. It was his conviction, which Simmel reformulated, 
that any rationalization of the unconscious destroys its very nature.
This does not mean that the poet and thinker Goethe, the archre-
alist, was not fully aware of the tremendous power of sexuality. In 
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the most obscene verses among the Paralipomena to the Roman-
tic Walpurgisnight, Satan parodies the Sermon on the Mount and 
preaches to the he-goats at his right and to the she-goats at his left 
that sex and money, money and sex, are the only true needs of the 
deepest nature. Mephisto displays the destructive and nihilistic pat-
tern of bare sexuality when abstracted and emancipated from the 
totality of human powers. Goethe’s analysis goes so far that he even 
ironically presents Mephisto’s claim that he has a key explanation for 
all human phenomena by imputing everything to the power of sex. 
The irony is most sublime when Mephisto interprets his own defeat, 
in the battle against the Lord, in terms of his homo-heterosexual 
passion for the angels. He forgets completely what he knows—that 
in the Prologue in Heaven the Lord had already settled the outcome 
beyond Faust’s death.
Goethe is closer than Freud to the truth about human nature 
because he is closer to the truth about the whole of nature. Goethe 
grants the lasting interdependence of the conscious-unconscious, 
the unity of which makes up the dynamics of human life. Because he 
understands life as the unity in the variety of its various Gestalten, he 
denies any analytical procedure that is not completed by a synthetic 
one. Analysis per se abstracts from the context of life and destroys 
its whole by imposing one or another human faculty—whether sex 
or mind—as the absolute and general denominator, and ascribing to 
it the role of chief agent in the construction of life. Both abstractions 
are transcended by Goethe’s idea of the dynamic Gestalten of the 
universe of nature.
His spiritual naturalism, which he first formulated in the Frag-
ment über die Natur in 1782–1783, still remains in 1828 a paradox 
seeking its resolution. Goethe rounds out the conception by defining 
the driving forces of the process of nature as polarity and enhance-
ment. Polarity is the continuous interaction of attraction and repul-
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sion, the polarity of the material substructure. Enhancement is the 
continuous heightening and ascending power of the mind. Matter 
and mind are conceptual abstractions. Actually, there is no matter 
without mind, no mind without matter. For this reason, polarity and 
enhancement are valid for the totality of life. Polarity or metamor-
phosis on a higher human plane is freedom and servitude, give and 
take, gain and loss, conscious and unconscious.
Enhancement is the category that describes the inner dynamics of 
the demon, of the individual man that strives to realize itself in contin- 
uous and ascending activity and to transcend its organic boun daries 
by the objectifying powers of the human mind. In Homunculus’s long -
ing for total humanity, in Faust’s striving for immortal spirituality, 
in the orgiastic hymn on the cosmogenic Eros, and in the meeting 
of Eros and Agape in the ascending of Faust’s immortal parts—there 
is the concrete image of the movement of enhancement as the very 
intention of Faust, as the very meaning of his passio humana.
It is certainly correct to recall Goethe’s statement that Faust is 
an image of the modern intellectual, not a picture of his own life 
development. But this very attitude of never-ceasing struggle for Bil-
dung, for higher Gestaltung, remained Goethe’s concern to the last 
moment of his life. It certainly is evident to those who recall his last 
letter, written five days before his death at eighty-three years of age. 
The addressee is Wilhelm von Humboldt. Goethe refers to a question 
by Humboldt as to the final draft of Faust II. He grants that the forces 
of consciousness and will had to be mobilized in order to fill the gaps 
that the failure of the unconscious had left open. 
Undoubtedly it would have given me infinite pleasure to 
communicate these very earnest jests to my many excel-
lent, deeply appreciated, far-scattered friends while I 
am still alive. But the day in which we live is so absurd 
and confused that, according to my conviction, my 
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honest and long efforts to build this strange structure 
would have been ill-rewarded. Driven upon a barren 
shore, they might have lain there like ruined wreck-
age and have soon been covered by the sands of the 
dunes. Confused doctrine leading to confused action 
rules our world, and I have no dearer purpose than to 
heighten what is in me and remains in me and to con-
centrate my very special character as you, my excellent 
friend, seek to do in the fortress in which you live.38  
“To heighten what is in me”—to the last breath, this is Faust’s and 
Goethe’s conviction. This act is the inseparable working together of 
the conscious and unconscious.
In Goethe’s reflection on genius it becomes apparent that stress-
ing the role of the unconscious does not mean neglecting the role 
of the conscious. He writes to Schiller on April 14, 1801: “I believe 
that all that genius does as genius happens unconsciously. A man of 
genius can also act reasonably, deliberately, from conviction, but he 
does so on the side, as it were. No work of genius can be improved or 
freed from its faults by reflection and its immediate consequences. 
Action and reflection can serve, however, gradually to refine genius 
to such a degree that it ends by producing faultless works.” His most 
explicit statement of the constructive power of the conscious is the 
maxim that says the first and supreme obligation of the genius is the 
love of truth.
Goethe’s sovereign capacity is to balance the relationship between 
the conscious and unconscious and to see their interaction as a con-
tinuously changing structure of the individual personality. Either 
side may be constructive or sterile, vital or barren. The interaction 
depends completely on the elements that constitute the human situ-
ation. Most emphatically Goethe stressed the role of reason in his 
G O E T H E  (19 4 9) 343
reflections on freedom, some of which are genuinely like Spinoza 
in spirit and letter. He expresses his own experience: “Who learns 
to understand his conditions in early life, easily achieves freedom; 
who experiences the pressure of necessity late in life, gains only bit-
ter freedom.”39
Never was he near to any of the modern positions of irrationalism. 
On the contrary, precisely, because he understood the working of the 
unconscious upon the totality of human existence, he knew that the 
conscious was not a passive element in the Gestalten of life. Conscious 
and unconscious were both acting and both acted upon. Both could 
be constructive or destructive, both could be fruitful or barren.
The constructive power of working intelligence was of the great-
est relevance to Goethe in his militant speculations on the Socratic 
“Know Thyself.” Actually, Goethe was never free of the suspicion 
that this imperative smacks of false religiosity; it seemed to him a 
trick of priests to impose introspection, thus paralyzing independent 
thought and spontaneous action. “If then we examine the significant 
adage, Know Thyself, we must not put an ascetic interpretation upon 
it. It does not point to the self-probing of our modern hypochondri-
acs, humorists, and self- tormentors. It means very simply: Keep a 
moderate watch upon yourself in order that you may become aware 
of your relations to your fellow men and the world. For this no psy-
chological self-tormenting is needed. Every worthwhile individual 
knows and experiences what it means. It is a good piece of advice of 
the greatest practical benefit to everyone.”40
Goethe had a special author in mind when referring to the mod-
ern hypochondriacs. The famous anatomist and physiologist, Jan 
Evangelista Purkyně [1787–1869], who had started as a disciple of 
Goethe’s speculative science of colors and of his morphology, had 
developed a theory of Heautognosia of which Goethe disapproved. 
In 1827, Purkyně made Heautognosis axiomatically the conditio sine 
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qua non of every scientific endeavor. The thesis met with Goethe’s 
decided opposition. According to Goethe, radical introspection will 
eventually lead to self-tormenting. It will paralyze creative thought 
and action. Only in rare cases will men of sovereign intelligence be 
able to control introspection so as to make it productive.
“It takes the endowment of a robust constitution to practice 
introspection without morbidity. To look into oneself soundly with-
out undermining oneself; to venture into the unexplored deep not 
with illusion and make believe, but with a pure gaze, is a rare gift. 
But then, too, the results of such exploration for the world and for 
science constitute a rare good fortune.”41
Most emphatic are Goethe’s statements that only intelligent activ-
ity and active intelligence teach us what we are, make us aware of 
our potentialities, and liberate us from the pressure of resentments. 
“How can one learn to know oneself? Introspection is a hopeless 
method whereas action may lead to success. Try to do your duty, and 
you know your mettle straightway. But what is your duty? The sum-
mons of the day.”42
This is wisdom’s last conclusion, indeed. Faust’s insight is that 
maintaining the standards of life and freedom requires the lasting 
vigilance and constructiveness of the joint action of idea and love, of 
the conscious and of the unconscious.
We should recall Goethe’s concern about the constructiveness of 
mind as an irreducible element of all-embracing nature. This is not 
a philosophy of life, as Simmel tries to present Goethe’s basic ideas. 
Neither can the students of Paul Carus [1852–1919] or Carl Jung 
[1875–1961] use Goethe’s name as a pedigree for their philosophies 
of the irrational. In our constructive reconsideration of what is living 
in Goethe from our own perspective, we must reject such interpre-
tations. Our understanding of the unique greatness of Goethe for 
our times is that he was able to maintain the lasting sovereignty of 
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his mind precisely because he had passed through all experiences of 
being conditioned by irrational, unconscious, and external forces, 
and because he had recognized that there is only one therapy against 
all trauma: the unceasing effort to find and establish truth in objec-
tive works.
Still another element in his life is relevant to our precarious condi-
tion. The mature Goethe lived half of his life under the continuously 
darkening shadows of the political, of the social, of the technological 
revolutions of the modern age. But he did not recognize defeatism 
or submission to destiny as an honest and constructive way of life. A 
large part of his work was an effort to meet the challenge of the his-
torical situation. He wished to demonstrate that creative individuals 
and cooperating fellows in social action are capable of combining 
the positive goods of the independent person and those of the objec-
tive society in which the individual comes into his own by fulfilling 
service to the social whole.
He was never romantic about reality or about the range of human 
idealism in action. But he was fully content with the idea of a slow 
progress of world literature, of the esoteric groups of world citizens, 
and of the humble and modest contribution such meetings could 
make to the unification and pacification of the world. As intelligence 
was constructive only when applied to activity, so Bildung was cre-
ative only when turned toward the good fellowship of world citizens.
In our world of historicism and relativism, Goethe’s arrival at a 
natural theory of conduct and of societal relationships, founded on 
his encyclopedic historical knowledge and consciousness of his his-
torical situation, is a marvel. We can elaborate his theory by applying 
his method.
Goethe, gifted with the most sublime sensitivity, with the bur-
den of great passions, and with a sovereign intelligence, was never 
victim to any partisan doctrine, to any extreme position in thinking 
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and action. Moderation was to Goethe Bildung and Humanität alike. 
His philosophy was not Spinoza’s; Goethe himself states that he was 
primarily fascinated by the philosopher’s way of life, which achieved 
serenity and peace of mind.
Goethe was not a man out of classical antiquity. He was con-
vinced that he once had lived under one of the “good emperors,” per-
haps under Hadrian [76–138], like Epictetus [55–135]. He was brave 
enough to accept the role of being merely an epigone of Homer. It 
appears probable that the mature and old man worked with stub-
born energy in all the fields of knowledge open to him in order to 
build up an ark that should contain everything worth preserving for 
the future. Thus, new generations would have something to live on 
when the floods of the various revolutions should recede.
But there was neither fear nor resentment in him. There was only 
the enduring will to act and create to the last moment of his life, 
remaining true to the end to his voluntary dedication to Bildung: 
vitaï lampada tradere. 
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With regard to the translations in the text of this article, the author 
wishes to express his gratitude for the excellent selection of Goethe’s 
philosophical writings made by Ludwig Curtius and translated and 
edited by Professor Herman J. Weigand (published under the title, 
Goethe: Wisdom and Experience [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1949]). For all my notes that I was able to find translated in this vol-
ume, I have used Weigand’s translations. In one instance, I have used 
a translation by Ludwig Lewisohn; for the rest, the translations are 
my own, but have been checked with earlier versions.
     Quotations from Maximen und Reflexionen are cited by number 
and date as given in Max Haecker’s edition, vol. 21 of Schnittenden 
Goethe Gesellschaft (Leipzig-Weimar: 1907). In only a few cases was 
it desirable to cite the G. von Loeper edition (Goethes Sprüche in 
Prosa [Berlin: Hempel, 1870]), and these have been indicated.
    Two abbreviations recur frequently in the following footnotes: JA 
refers to the Jubilaumsausgabe, 40 vols. (Stuttgart and Berlin: 1902–
7); Biedermann refers to Goethes Gesprache, Gesamtausgabe, ed. von 
Flodoard Frhr. Von Biedermann, 5 vols. (Leipzig: 1909–11).
1. Biedermann, 2254: Maximen und Reflexionen 649 (1829).
2. Maximen und Reflexionen 389 (Loeper).
3. Biedermann, 2185; von Müller, November 4, 1823.
4. JA, 37:37.
5. Barker Fairley, foreword to A Study of Goethe (New York: 1947).
6. Wiegand, Goethe: Wisdom and Experience, 25.




10. Biedermann 3051 [March 1832].
11. Maximen und Reflexionen 690 [1829].
12. The Republic of Letters (Respublica literaria) was a community 
of intellectuals in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in 
Europe and America.
13. Letter of June 8, 1787, Goethes Briefwechsel mit Charlotte von 
Stein (Leipzig: 1923), vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 87.
14. Letter of June 6, 1825, Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und Zelter 
(Leipzig: 1915) 2:339.
15. Maximen und Reflexionen 352 (Loeper).
16. Weimarer Ausgabe, Werke, 28:358 [draft of Preface to Dichtung 
und Wahrheit, III, 1814].
17. Maximen und Reflexionen 346 (1826).
18. Biedermann 2214, Eckermann, January 4, 1824. [The Diamond 
Necklace affair has been the subject of many scholarly and popular 
books. See, for instance, Jonathan Beckman, How to Ruin a Queen: 
Marie Antoinette and the diamond necklace affair (Boston: Da Capo 
Press, 2014); Alexandre Dumas, Pere, Le Collier de la reine (Paris: La 
Presse, 1849–50).—Eds.] 
19. Maximen und Reflexionen 955 (posthumous). 
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20. Kampagne in Frankreich, JA, 28:257.
21. West-östlicher Divan, JA, 5:217.
22. Goethe was well aware of the hubris in Napoleon’s genius and of 
the destructive elements in his demonic nature at the same time that 
he recognized his constructive vision.
23. JA, 16:264.
24. Tyranny is degrading because it destroys the foundations of poli-
tics within its legal frame. Despotism is constructive as the effective 
action of a demonic ruler who promotes the standards of his people 
by continuous improvements of administration within the frame-
work of right and law.
25. West-östlicher Divan, JA, 5:173.
26. Annalen; Italienische Reise; Au seiner Reise in die Schweiz 1707, 
Aus Rhein, Main und Neckar 1814/1815; Kampagne in Frankreich.
27. Fairley, foreword to A Study of Goethe.
28. JA, 38:161ff.
29. Letter of October 30, 1808, Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und 
Zelter, 1:221.
30. Briefwechsel mit Schiller (Stuttgart: n.d.), 1:33.
31. Biedermann 2927, Eckermann, March 2, 1831.
32. Dichtung und Wahrheit, JA, 25:125.
33. Biedermann 1317, August 5, 1810.
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37. I wish to express my deep gratitude to Dr. Alvin Johnston who 
made the suggestion that the traditional translation of “Worry” be 
changed to “Grim Care,” which reconstructs the ambiguous mean-
ing of the German concept.
38. Letter of March 17, 1832; see Ludwig Lewisohn, Goethe, The Study 
of a Man (New York: 1949), 2:447ff. (italics added).
39. Maximen und Reflexionen 654, 1020, 388 (Loeper).
40. Ibid., 657 [1829].
41. Weimarer Ausgabe, Werke, pt. 2, Wissenschaftliche Schriften, 
11:269ff.
42. Maximen und Reflexionen 2, 3 (Loeper).
11
 Henri de Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, 
and the Origins of Sociology 
The Scope and Structure of Sociology
When the economist Joseph A. Schumpeter [1883–1950] wrote the 
introduction to his analysis of Karl Marx [1818–1883], he divided it 
into three parts: Marx as a prophet, as sociologist, and as economist.1 
A similar division is characteristic of the thought of those French-
men who personally transformed sociology by combining social sci-
ence—including hardheaded economic theory—with humanitarian 
ideals. In breaking out of the traditional European role of the philos-
opher, Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon [1760–1825] 
and Auguste Comte [1798–1857], like Marx, tried to put theory into 
practice. Their philosophy was not a system, not an Encyclopédie, 
nor was it an additive summation of philosophic knowledge. Rather, 
it was a summa that contained all aspects of philosophy—epistemol-
ogy, methodology, ethics, and the theory of history—the hierarchi-
cal totality of objective knowledge itself. It was also an intuition that 
attempted to carry the implications of primitive capitalism to their 
ultimate conclusion. One should not be misled by the fragmentary 
nature of the actual writings of these sociologists—leaflets, speeches, 
Published originally in different form in The Tyranny of Progress: Reflections on the 
Origins of Sociology (New York: Noonday Press, 1955). Republished by permission 
from Frank Salomon.
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articles and essays—into believing that their philosophy itself was 
occasional or fragmentary. Their vision was, in fact, a future orga-
nization of knowledge in which nothing could possibly remain 
unknowable. 
Émile Durkheim [1858–1917], who was always remarkably blind 
to the totalitarian aspects of the Saint-Simonian approach, did fore-
see precisely what would happen to philosophy in the hands of these 
sociologists. He wrote:
  Saint-Simon saw clearly that his work would be a 
response and challenge to the Encyclopédie of the eigh-
teenth century. The old Encyclopédie was critical and 
destructive. His own work would be constructive and 
integrative. He planned to build a systematic organiza-
tion of all the sciences for the practical use of reorganiz-
ing society. For this reason, philosophy and what Comte 
was to call “sociology” were merging in a new pattern 
which was theory and practice at the same time.
   The new philosopher was not only a participant ob- 
server, but simultaneously a participant agent.
   In other words, Saint-Simon was completely aware of 
the fact that he proposed a new approach to philosophy. 
The philosopher is, at his peak, contemplative, but his 
thoughts are fruitful only if he is not merely the disin-
terested observer, but shares, with sympathetic under-
standing, in the grandeur and misery of society in its 
specific moments. Thus Saint-Simon is deeply convinced 
that from now on every philosophical system should and 
would be a social system.2  
Knowledge under this new dispensation would consist of three 
things: the synthesis of scientific methods, the objectification of the 
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scientific organization of mankind, and the religion of humanity, all 
of which, taken together, would inspire each man to work in good 
conscience for the welfare of all. The three elements of this philoso-
phy, inseparable in the minds of its authors, formed a triumvirate of 
ideas that would challenge all prior philosophic systems and would 
transform the area of dispute into a true battleground in which these 
sociologists, like the heroes of old, would be locked in mortal combat 
with the forces of darkness. As we shall see, it was not by accident 
that the men who saw philosophy as the work of society interpret-
ing itself within history should have given the world its first taste of 
totalitarian social theory.
One must remember that Saint-Simon, his disciples, and Auguste 
Comte were deeply in debt to such “counter-revolutionaries” as Louis 
de Bonald [1754–1840] and Joseph de Maistre [1753–1821]. If Anne 
Robert Jacques Turgot [1727–1781] may be said to have laid the foun-
dations for sociology as a philosophy of total progress, Bonald must 
be given credit for having contributed another basic element—the 
idea of total order. In his Introduction aux Travaux Scientifiques du 
Dix-neuvième Siècle, Saint-Simon explicitly acknowledged Bonald’s 
influence as follows:
When I read and reflected on de Bonald, I became con-
vinced that this author had felt profoundly the usefulness 
of systematic unity. For he suggested to his contempo-
raries that, in the present state of learning, systematic 
unity should be the basis and the goal of all scientific and 
literary research. In this respect, I am in full agreement 
with M. de Bonald.3
“Systematic unity!” Saint-Simon’s words plainly show us his deep 
fascination with the strict organization of the sciences, which Bon-
ald had applied to the social process. Furthermore, he adds:
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   If I succeed in demonstrating that the law of univer-
sal gravitation is the only cause of all physical and moral 
phenomena, I will have found the integrating principle 
for organizing all disciplines of learning.4
Like Bonald’s, Saint-Simon’s interpretation of history was colored 
by his personal repudiation of the French Revolution. Moreover, both 
men had discovered the same principle of social unity, the absolute 
authority of an elite; and both were attracted by the idea of a society 
in which legal thinking would be considered anachronistic, and all 
reliance on the traditional divine right of kings would be abandoned 
for what might be called the inner logic of power. In Bonald, that 
logic was expressed in his “scientific” law of conservation, the further 
expansion of what he thought must be natural law of any society to 
insure its own self-preservation—the relation between the holders of 
power and the subjects.5 For Bonald, this relationship was the inner 
truth of society, the manifestation of the most basic social realities. 
The sovereign made his wish; the minister carried it out in his name; 
the subject heard and obeyed. These three indivisible social entities—
sovereign power, minister, and subject—made up the essential part 
of the collective itself. And, according to Bonald, they had a tendency 
to reach a natural balance, a status created by their interdependence. 
Consequently, it was the function of the sovereign to establish and 
maintain power and, thus, preserve the whole structure. 
Saint-Simon responded favorably to the implications in the Théo-
rie Du Pouvoir that man was, first of all, a part of the whole, which is 
society; that the formation of his character was the work of society; 
and that social man always came before individual man. In fact, he 
was influenced to such an extent that he eliminated the individual 
from what he considered the “real” social world and made him 
merely an abstraction. He left no place in his universe for expression 
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of individual conscience—whether it was progressive or reaction-
ary, royalist, constitutional, or liberal. In other words, Saint-Simon 
believed that his attack on individual reason was confirmed by Bon-
ald’s thesis, which replaced the Cartesian authority of evidence with 
the evidence of authority.
Saint-Simon is said to have kept a statue of Napoleon Bonaparte 
[1769–1821] standing on his desk, and he again and again repeated, 
both in his writings and his conversations, his ambition to become 
the “Napoleon of the sciences.”6 In breaking out of the political 
framework, he entered the area of social change; he took from the 
society Napoleon had brought into being the idea of total control, but 
without Napoleon’s use of political domination or military violence. 
In Saint-Simon’s eyes, he—that is, Napoleon—had no true under-
standing of what he had created. Accordingly, the new sociologists 
needed to take the experiment upon which he had stumbled and give 
it its true dimension.
Saint-Simon wished to transfer to a new scientific elite the 
authority that, under Napoleon, had belonged to a military elite. 
These most creative minds, along with managers, entrepreneurs, and 
workers—all unhampered by the prescientific character of politics 
and metaphysics—would be organized under governing boards who 
would administer in the “spirit of love.” Under their influence, all 
society would be brought into harmony—something that Napoleon 
had never been able to accomplish. Above all, Saint-Simon hoped 
that such a society could bring the poorer classes into position where 
their relationship to other groups could be constructive, without 
having to undergo the dreadful shocks of a class struggle.
If this general picture is kept in mind, Saint-Simon’s works may 
be divided into four parts, the first three of which have relevance 
to our problem: science, industrialism, and the new religion. The 
essays between 1802 and 1814 are concerned with the application of 
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scientific methods to human experience. He believed that, if modern 
scientists were permitted to work without political coercion, they 
would create a society that could enjoy peace and progress through 
the intelligent management of industry. To his interpretation of 
Turgot’s theory of total progress, Saint-Simon added what is his 
own extraordinary contribution—that the triumph of science could 
occur only as a moral revolution. In castigating the scientific special-
ization of his age, he held that scientists themselves were responsible 
for the intellectual anarchy that had brought about the crisis of his 
time. Mankind needed, and had not received, a general synthetic 
theory that could be verified in every detail—a theory applicable to 
the worlds both of nature and of history through which scientific 
men would make rational the meaning of the social process. Such 
an integration, he believed, occurred only in the “organic periods” 
of history:
The new social structure succeeds the diverse periods 
of crisis which have shaken us for three hundred years. 
It will come as a result of the law of the development of 
mankind.
   This law, which was revealed by the genius of Saint-
Simon, and verified by him in many historical examples, 
shows us two structural patterns of society, distinct and 
alternating. We call the one type “organic.” In the organic 
state, all human activities are classified, foreseen, and 
planned by a general theory of meaning, which defines 
clearly and articulately the goal of society’s actions.
   The other pattern should be called “critical.” It refers 
to social situations in which communion of thinking 
and feeling, all communal action, all coordination, has 
ceased to exist. In this state all common bonds are gone 
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because there is no unity of mankind to integrate them. 
Society is just an aggregate of isolated individuals who 
fight one another.7
The authors point out that Saint-Simon made an important dis-
tinction, one that approximates the Hegelian dialectic of thesis and 
antithesis. It was later accepted wholeheartedly by the school of 
Comte, who were fully aware that history had its own logic and that 
this logic was necessarily dialectic.
Between 1816 and 1824, Saint-Simon elaborated his conception 
of the organic as it applied to the social organization of the indus-
trial system. His humanitarian scientism would be administered by 
a “society of industrialists”—managers, scientists, and entrepreneurs 
(workers all, he considered them)—who would join together in a 
common quest for victory over nature. He wrote:  
The producers of useful things are the only useful people 
in society. They alone should have a share in regulating 
the march of society as they alone should have the sover-
eign control of social action.8
These industrial “societies” would be under the control of boards of 
competent specialists who would draft the blueprints of what should 
be done for the welfare of all, later submitting them to an executive 
planning board for its final decision. Thus, “constructive” scientists, 
planners, industrialists, and artists would eventually take charge of 
the actual dynamics of society. As Saint -Simon said:
The industrial class satisfies the deepest, most primary 
needs, the physical tastes of all levels of society. It is they 
who furnish all the instruments which are useful. The 
industrial class is the fundamental class, the class which 
nourishes the rest of society.9
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In the final analysis, the structure of society would be industrial 
and hierarchical. In contradiction to the variety of social and eco-
nomic levels of the French society of his day, Saint-Simon believed 
that the perfect social organization should be stratified according to 
social function. The following quotation illustrates his point of view:
In a surprising correspondence to feudal hierarchy, sys-
tematization of interests, and governing levels, the ele-
ments of the industrial society point toward a merger 
which produces a parallel type of social structure. The 
industrial society is going to constitute itself in a well-
integrated structure of industrial commanders, func-
tional hierarchies, systematic organization, and common 
destinies.10
In this society, the artist’s role would be to appeal to the imagi-
nation of the public, to set literary and artistic styles, to manipu-
late taste, and to improve morale—in other words, to assume all the 
functions of a full-fledged propaganda ministry. The role of physi-
cians would be to establish health regulations and that of industrial-
ists to make laws and issue administrative decrees. Lastly, control of 
the executive branch of the government, the planning board itself, 
would be held exclusively by bankers, those who were accustomed to 
bear the responsibility for the well-being of society.
One must remember that this was the age of those great private 
banks, whose social and financial powers had just emerged with the 
full organization of a workable credit system. For Saint -Simon, as for 
Vladimir Lenin [1870–1924] a century later, the banks seemed the 
hand that secretly turned the wheels of production. If one looked 
closely at political institutions, one found that bankers were the true 
rulers of society. It was as logical for Saint-Simon to have given bank-
ers the central role in his administrative scheme, as it was for Lenin 
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to have treated the nationalization of the banks as the key to the 
destruction of the bourgeois class’s stranglehold on society. Lenin 
saw the banks themselves as the very agency through which total 
planning might take place. He thought that what he regarded as the 
present anomaly of production 
must give way to the organization of production. Pro-
duction will not be directed by isolated entrepreneurs, 
independent of each other and ignorant of the needs of 
the people. This task will be entrusted to a specific social 
institution. A central committee of scientifically trained 
men, who are able to review a broad field of social and 
economic problems from a higher point of view, will reg-
ulate the process of social action in a manner that will be 
useful to the whole of society. It will transfer the means of 
production into the hands appropriate for that purpose, 
and maintain the equilibrium between demands and 
production. There are institutions which include among 
their functions a certain organization of economic work: 
the banks.11 
Lenin, possibly jealous because Saint-Simon’s version of totalitarian-
ism had preceded Marx’s, quoted the above passage from a second-
ary source. And he called it “the guess of a man of genius, but still 
only a guess.”
The contemporary student of the French sociologists will dis-
cover in their writings four alternative modes of social organization: 
the managerial, the technocratic, the planned welfare, and the har-
monious “socialist.” In Saint-Simon, the choice among these modes 
is not specifically made. Although the pattern of total organization 
is clear enough, he was careless in outlining his theory of social con-
trol. There are two possible interpretations of his position. The first 
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would suggest a managerial society in which the managers, filled 
with sympathy for all members of society, would integrate by scien-
tific means all social and economic activity into an overall “plan,” 
which by eliminating the wastes of competitive existence would 
bring about the welfare of all. The second would emphasize the ten-
dency in his thought toward a technocratic society, since engineers 
and technicians would run the social machine under the assumption 
that they would operate it efficiently for the benefit of all classes. In 
either interpretation, the executive planning board must be accepted 
as Saint-Simon’s repository of final authority.
Saint-Simon saw a society that would be divided into only two 
classes: the workers and the nonworkers. The former would consist 
of all varieties of manual and intellectual laborers, even including 
capitalists, who would contribute their share, both morally and 
financially, to productive enterprise. One should note here that 
the Marxist dichotomy between capital and labor was unknown to 
Saint-Simon; his “industrialists” were not capitalists in the Marx-
ist sense at all, and “capitalism” was not a negatively critical term 
for any of the French sociologists. When they spoke of “nonwork-
ers,” they meant the idle, those who simply lived off their rents, were 
politically inactive, and in no way contributed to the operation of 
society. With this in mind, we more easily understand Saint-Simon’s 
vision of a new industrial world, in which it would be impossible 
to be idle since all men would work for the common good. What is 
more, Saint-Simon believed that
society moves toward an organization in which all mem-
bers will receive an education through society. Such 
education will enable all men to bring to the fore their 
potential qualifications. They will be classified according 
to their merits in order to be rewarded according to their 
works.12
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Extreme disproportion in the ownership of goods would disappear 
from such a world, but not because all men would then be equal. 
The concept of equality does not belong in Saint-Simon’s view of the 
society of the future. Rather, he has in mind a social organization 
that is neither democratic nor liberal in the accepted use of these 
terms. It must be understood as a kind of giant industrial pyramid in 
which total planning has replaced political government, and where 
each man is rewarded according to his abilities and use thereof.
Any analysis of Saint-Simon’s theory of social organization must 
begin and end with its totality. Perhaps that is why the very language 
he uses in his writings seems such a mixture of curiously unscien-
tific ideas and the most hardheaded technical economic theory. His 
idiom—the words, phrases, rhythms—often makes his words sound 
like a sermon on redemption. His economic doctrines are stated in 
the rhetoric of a prophet just because he was so confident that the 
society of the future need not concern itself with defending that bal-
ance of economic power that is guaranteed by political constitutions. 
Society’s interest lay only in a perpetual revelation of the truths about 
the correct organization of production and distribution. For Saint-
Simon, the structure of economics is the only relevant problem for 
administrators in a universe whose ends are already evident.
On the other hand, he was aware that such economic planning 
could not be justified on the grounds of efficiency alone. In his last 
book, he put forth a secular religion that predated Marx’s “real 
humanism” by twenty years. The key to understanding this religion 
lies in its subtitle, “The True Gospel for the Advance of the Poor.” 
This doctrine of improving the lot of the indigent provided the spiri-
tual content for Saint-Simon’s new faith. At one and the same time, 
he tried to give a religious justification to the drive toward totali-
tarianism, while he condemned Christian sectarianism. He sounded 
very much like a vengeful Émile Zola [1840–1902] when, asserting 
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that Christianity neglected to apply science and its development to 
improving the situation of the great majority of human beings, he 
stated:
There is a science much more important for society than 
the results of natural science—that is the science which 
constitutes society—its morals. Now morals have pro-
gressed in absolute opposition to that of the sciences. 
Its foundations were laid more than 1800 years ago and 
since then the greatest thinkers have not been able to 
discover a principle superior . . .  to that given by the 
founder of Christianity. When society lost sight of that 
principle . . .  it fell always under the yoke of a Caesar . . . 
I am convinced that I accomplish a divine mission when 
I recall the people and the princes to the genuine spirit 
of Christianity.
   . . . I dare to tell the Holy Alliance directly: “The supreme 
European power which rests in your hands is far from 
being the ideal Christian power that it should have been 
. . . All the important steps which you have taken point 
toward a worsening of the lot of the poor, not only for the 
present but for many generations to come . . . Princes, lis-
ten to the voice of God which speaks through my mouth 
. . . return and become good Christians.”
   . . . I accuse the Pope and his Church of heresy . . . The 
instruction which the Catholic clergy gives to its lay peo-
ple is vicious, it does not direct their conduct towards a 
Christian way of life. The Christian religion proposes the 
immediate improvement of the moral and physical exis-
tence of the poor as the temporal goal of the faithful . . . 
The clergy should direct their attention in their sermons, 
in their education, in their teachings, to the fact that the 
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immense majority of the population could enjoy much 
higher material and moral standards and that the rich could 
do the same by raising the standards of living for the poor  
. . . It is a grave irresponsibility to have turned the attention 
of their flocks towards paradise instead of the sciences.
   . . . I accuse the Pope and the Cardinals of heresy . . . They 
do not possess or care for the knowledge of the sciences 
which would enable them to direct the faithful toward 
the road of their temporal salvation.
   . . . I accuse the Pope of heresy . . . of conduct more con-
trary to the moral and material interest of the poor than 
any secular ruler against the population of his country. 
   . . . In the Ecclesiastical States there exists no industrial 
production, although the cheap labor cost would make 
industrial establishment very successful. All branches 
of industry are paralyzed or nonexistent. The poor have 
no work and would die of hunger if charity did not feed 
them. The poor fed by charity are badly fed . . . and they 
live in coercive leisure which is the mother of all vices.13
Saint-Simon held that in their failure to incorporate science into their 
doctrines, Christians had forgotten their true mission—to make 
human beings more human. But his new Christianity would assume 
responsibility for the entire functioning of society, not merely look-
ing on man’s moral life as the sole aspect of the complex social ani-
mal that came within its jurisdiction.
“The Saint-Simonians,” as his disciples called themselves, have 
left a perfect example of the way followers rationalize a master’s 
ideas. The members of the school—Barthélemy Prosper Enfantin 
[1796–1864], Amand Bazard [1791–1832], Olinde Rodrigues [1795–
1851], and the rest—gave to Saint-Simon’s “systematic unity” the 
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character of a dogma. They looked on their mentor as the founder 
of a philosophic school and, at the same time, as the promulgator of 
a gospel that would bring about a new spiritual communion among 
men. To put it differently, they admired him as the philosopher of 
industrialism and worshipped him as the philosopher of love.
To be sure, they tried to demonstrate through their analysis of 
economic life the inevitability of the scientific method, convinced 
as they were that industrial society would eventually eliminate the 
antagonisms between working and leisure classes (which, inciden-
tally, they saw as identical with the antagonism between construc-
tive industrial man and destructive political systems). But it was not 
enough because the Saint-Simonians were not able to derive ideals 
for human action from science itself. They found it necessary to 
introduce another element—that of religion. In order to bring love 
into industrial life, they invented a spurious sort of human affec-
tion that would provide the necessary directing force for science. 
Plato [c. 428–c. 348 BC] and Aristotle [384–322 BC], as well as the 
bearers of the Jewish and Christian traditions, were aware of the fact 
that cognition and love are in reality inseparable. What the Saint-
Simonians did in artificially regrafting one onto the other was actu-
ally to encourage that specifically modern dichotomy between the 
rationalism of science and the irrationalism of the affections that 
has destroyed any concept of the unity of human nature. The Saint-
Simonians’ vision of the scientist was of a man who would pursue his 
heedless ways unless he were restrained by the power of collective 
love. This is an indication of the extent to which sociological science 
had already been alienated from earlier scientific philosophies, such 
as that of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe [1749–1832], which had been 
determined by a teleological view of nature.
The Collective Being, which Saint-Simon had seen as the true 
essence of the philosophy of history, became in the minds of his 
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disciples the basis on which to establish the priority of collective love 
over scientific method. To them, the historical process itself gave 
empirical evidence of the success of the new religion. The rhythm 
of the process expressed itself by three historical “laws”: the law of 
decreasing antagonism and increasing “association” (later socialism); 
the law of decreasing exploitation and increasing functionalization; 
and finally, the law of decreasing property rights and increasing 
socialization. In other words, they drew “socialist” postulates from 
the dynamics of a planned society in the belief that economic selfish-
ness could be controlled by the manipulation of love.
The Saint-Simonians thought that the first of these laws could 
be verified by the historical observation that wars were diminishing 
and that economic rivalries between mercantile states were rapidly 
being superseded by international agreements. As for the second 
and third laws, they seemed to be substantiated by the fact that the 
relationships between master and slave, between patrician and ple-
bian, between the idle and the working, were steadily improving. The 
Saint-Simonians took all this as scientific evidence that the day could 
not be far off when exploitation would cease, not because of political 
revolution but because men would join in a common program for 
peace that would attempt to solve those genuinely human problems 
that faced them by the use of technological methods. If industrial 
man was educated by the Saint-Simonian elite, then it would be pos-
sible for the leap to be made from competitive capitalism to a state 
in which the age-old struggle between exploiter and exploited would 
be eliminated. This would be accomplished by a functionalism in 
which all property rights, including those to the means of produc-
tion, would be transferred to organized society. As Saint-Simon said, 
“Property is a function; and man is the functionary of production.”14
In the Saint-Simonian scheme, centralized credit banks would 
plan and direct production for the benefit of all society, and they 
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would be assigned the task of organizing branch banks for the vari-
ous specialized areas of agriculture and industry. The bankers them-
selves would administer the whole project in a “systematization of 
effort.” Saint-Simon said:
Industry is organized; everything is interrelated; every-
thing is planned and foreseen. The division of Labor is 
carried out by each according to his ability, every ability 
according to its achievement. The combination of inter-
locking industrial productions becomes more and more 
powerful.15
In their approach to the economic aspects of social problems, the 
Saint-Simonians made one great contribution to socialist theory. 
Modern societies no longer recognize any privilege of rank or birth 
with the single exception of property. Hereditary property, this last 
claim to privilege, is the basis for the development of the two social 
classes of modern times: the bourgeoisie who hold property, and the 
proletarians who do not. The Saint-Simonians, who saw this divi-
sion clearly, were convinced that property owners, who had been 
prepared by class background and personal inclination to handle the 
responsibilities of economic administration, should serve the new 
society as the trustees of production. Property would no longer be 
an arbitrary right, but a social function pertaining to the managerial 
elite concerned with the distribution of the means of production for 
the benefit of all. The Saint-Simonians held that, as long as distribu-
tion was on the basis of property rights, rents, and interest, society 
could not stop the exploitation of one man by another. Incompe-
tent and unequal economic distribution had been the cause for the 
contemporary crisis, and administration by men with neither the 
knowledge nor the interest to inquire into the needs of industry or 
into the desires of men was responsible for the period’s anarchy. 
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Only total organization of all social and economic enterprise could 
successfully meet the needs of a mass society. Therefore, property 
could not accrue haphazardly to those who happened to inherit it, 
but must belong to society itself.
Unfortunately, the Saint-Simonian pattern of social organization 
has often been misinterpreted as a stepping-stone to Marxist social-
ism. Actually, it has no connection with the Marxian theory of class 
struggle. Rather, it is a spiritual socialism (not a religious socialism 
because this term refers to the efforts of such Protestant theologians 
as Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich to reconstruct the foundations 
of socialism in the spirit of Christian responsibility). Harmonious 
socialism might be the best descriptive term of all for the Saint-
Simonian state since it attempts to enlist everyone, even capitalists, 
in the task of increasing the material, moral, and intellectual wealth 
of industrial society. A socialism based upon the harmonious inter-
action among the various members of society is possible only if it is 
mutually agreed that the establishment of a modest level of security 
for all will release the most constructive potentialities in each human 
being. Thus, the Saint -Simonians, by founding their spiritual social-
ism, brought together for the first time science and love.
Just as Bonald provided the inspiration for Saint-Simon to com-
bine the ideas of progress and order, Joseph de Maistre strengthened 
Comte’s early conviction that scientific society must have a spiritual 
direction. De Maistre, who had served as the Sardinian ambassador 
to the court of St. Petersburg in 1803, wrote a series of philosophic 
books in which he dealt with the problems of political power in the 
post-Revolutionary world. He maintained that no state was secure 
that was not founded upon the absolute authority of a spiritual 
power. Although he accepted the fact that a constitutional monarchy 
could exist, he insisted that the temporal power of even this sort of 
government was always secondary to the power of the pope. In his 
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essay and in his famous treatise, he developed certain ideas that later 
fascinated Auguste Comte.
It was de Maistre’s thesis that religion was a universal element 
in the constitution of society, the sovereign power that established 
the rules of conduct and controlled the passions. Like Bonald, he 
was primarily interested in power, but, in his case, it was power as it 
pertained to the Roman Catholic Church, stripped of its supernatu-
ralism, of course, but still authoritarian. Surprising though it may 
seem, this functional approach to religion came to be incorporated 
into the social ideas of Saint-Simon’s most important disciple.
While still a student, Comte had struggled with the problem 
of social organization and had become convinced that it could not 
exist without the binding power of some sort of spiritual ethos. His 
own mind was that of an engineer for whom scientific truth was 
indispensable, but, even at that early stage, he had gone further and 
attacked the validity of subjective experience itself. Since the indi-
vidual was unable to see himself and his fellow man as subjective 
human beings, there could be no scientific theory of consciousness. 
Only society was real, and only the dynamics of the social process 
were of significance. Comte eliminated from his system the ideas of 
primary and final causes, of inner observation, and of the experi-
ence of the will because he believed that only by denouncing these 
worn-out concepts could he establish a scientific philosophy. He 
held that only by the analysis of the invariable relationships between 
phenomena and their laws could one arrive at certain knowledge. 
In contrast to traditional philosophy, he found history itself, as well 
as nature, subject to these laws. In fact, Comte thought he had dis-
covered a basic law of history that would make possible foreknowl-
edge of man’s own development. This knowledge was relative in that 
every situation was conditioned in its entirety by the dynamics of the 
social process, but it also had to be considered as a specific moment 
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in the unceasing revelation of the truth, for Comte once said that the 
only absolute possible was the relative.
Comte believed that he qualified as the interpreter of the law of 
history, not because he was a philosopher but because of his particu-
lar position in history itself. Nothing better reveals the revolution-
ary nature of the break between Comte and traditional philosophers 
than Émile Durkheim’s book.16 Durkheim, who was very much 
influenced by the Saint-Simonians and by Comte, pointed out in his 
book that the sociologist was no longer able to justify his interpre-
tations of political or social philosophy on the grounds of his own 
status as a philosopher, nor could it be held any longer that he alone 
was free from bias. For Durkheim, as for Comte, it was inconceiv-
able that a philosopher could establish the verities of social conduct 
except by serving as the mouthpiece of a specific historical situation. 
Only history could make it possible for man to understand the vari-
ety of conditions that bore upon each individual situation. What dis-
tinguished man from the animals was that he was intimately bound 
up in history, that he was a part of that continuous chain of mutual 
interactions between generations that is called civilization. Hence, 
history alone, and not the philosopher’s ineffectual “reason,” could 
give the key to the changing structure of the social order.
Furthermore, Comte interpreted civilization as the intrinsic bond 
between the single man and the whole species, past and future. All 
the achievements of society seemed evidence to him that the indi-
vidual was a product of society, for mankind’s past was contained in 
the subconscious of every human being, and man was recognizable 
as a concrete entity only in his social role.
The intensity with which Comte stated his position did not spring 
solely from his methodological genius; he was inspired with the fervor 
of a missionary for a new communitas. Convinced that his philosophy 
was the manifestation of “common sense,” he believed that it would 
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appeal to the overwhelming majority of the masses, who would rec-
ognize that it was motivated by love. The workers, he was sure, would 
adopt the doctrine of positivism almost as a matter of course because 
it was neither science for the sake of science itself, nor an apology 
for capitalism, but rather an explicit statement of the union of social 
altruism with science—a doctrine dedicated to the workers them-
selves whom he considered the only spontaneous element in society 
during an age of radical transformation. He stated as follows:
Training in Positivism is primarily directed to the pro-
letariat. The proletariat is open to such a philosophy 
because they do not share in our refined and sophisti-
cated system of education . . . The positive studies are log-
ically and immediately tied up with the social program 
of the proletariat.17
But Comte’s feeling for the “people” was not limited strictly to the 
proletariat. He mentioned women, as well as philosophers and work-
ers, as the main bearers of his positivism. They alone had kept alive 
the sources of affection that the outmoded educated classes had dis-
sipated in their misguided intellectual specialization. He wrote:
The Moral Force rests upon the union of the three ele-
ments in society who are excluded from the sphere of 
politics, strictly speaking. In their combined action lies 
our principal hope of solving, so far as it can be solved, 
the great problem of man’s nature, the successful struggle 
of Social Feeling against Self-love. Each of the three ele-
ments supplies a quality indispensable to the task. With-
out women this controlling power would be deficient in 
purity and spontaneous impulse, without philosophers 
in wisdom and coherence; and without the people in 
energy and activity.18
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When Comte speaks of “people” he means the largest body in soci-
ety, all the workers—as below:
    The dictatorship which our transitional policy requires 
as long as the spiritual interregnum lasts must arise in 
the first instance from the ranks of the people—in a 
word, The People. There is a fortunate ambiguity which 
may serve to remind us that the proletariat is not, prop-
erly speaking, a class at all, but constitutes the body of 
society. For it precedes the various classes which we 
regard as the organs necessary to that body. . . . 
   The working class is in a better situation than any other 
with respect to generality of views and generosity of feel-
ing. In knowledge and experience they might be ordi-
narily deficient and therefore not fit for the work of any 
special department. But this does not disqualify them for 
the supreme power, or indeed any of the higher offices 
for which breadth of views rather than special knowledge 
is required. These may be filled by working men whose 
good sense and modesty will at once lead them to choose 
their agents for special departments from the classes 
which have usually furnished them before.19
The new men of authority, the scientists of humanity, would take up 
their tasks in the same spirit. When the rule of the competent had 
overcome the chaos that had resulted from the rule of the politicians, 
they would direct where feudal lords had dominated; they would 
treat their subordinates as “associates” where in the past the masses 
had been only serfs. The function of the new rulers would be to unite 
the responsible knowledge of the savant with the virtue of the priest. 
It was not enough simply to govern humanity—one must also love it. 
Just as the members of society would fall in love with the “process,” 
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which carried them along, so the philosopher-scientist would be 
attracted by that mysterious, wonderful totality of contradictions, 
the strivings and the longings of mankind as a whole. Out of such 
love would arise the philosopher’s desire to become the spokesman 
of society itself and his resolve to dedicate himself to its continual 
improvement.
Comte assumed that the true nature of the emotions was evident 
and absolute, and that empirical study of them would result in final 
scientific answers. His work was a crystal-clear examination of the 
terribly enigmatic structure of nineteenth century society. Comte’s 
analysis was sometimes marvelously simple: the only problem he 
saw in the destiny of mankind was how moral and social inten-
tions could be united. It is quite clear that his concept of the total 
organization of human life was closely modelled on that institution 
that had welded together into a great power a most irrational gospel 
and a most rational hierarchical organization—the Roman Catholic 
Church. If one left out of the Catholic system the idea of Christ, then 
one could imagine how human beings might be controlled on every 
level of their existence. The function of the sciences when applied to 
the correct historical moment was to unify mankind in an organiza-
tion that surpassed even this model.
Actually, Comte’s system can be considered a secular imitation of 
the Augustinian social doctrine, but with the change that, in his case, 
the civitas terrena would have to be understood as identical with the 
civitas terrena. More than this, Comte derived his social organiza-
tion directly from the techniques of church government. His writing 
is filled with ecclesiastical phraseology—the final authority of the 
gospel as against the personal authority of the leader; the role of hier-
archy, discipline, and subordination; the spiritual elite; the marginal 
freedom of the laity to advance through learning and conviction into 
the ranks of the elite. The scientific planners were not merely manag-
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ers, but priests of a gospel of redemption of which the truth was not 
revealed but demonstrated. In the new religion of humanity, those 
that followed the doctrine would be both rulers and ecclesiastics.
The followers of Comte even went so far as to compare themselves 
to the apostles of Christ—modern bearers of a message of social 
regeneration who would call humanity to a new life. Because they 
had discovered this new “bond of affection” that had the power of 
reconstituting society, they believed that egoists, beggars, individu-
alists, speculators, and all sorts of human monsters would thereby 
be transformed into altruists. This indeed was a new church and 
one with an advantage over the old—the church of the disciples of 
Comte would replace the Catholic Church’s authoritarian structure 
with one that was totalitarian. The old church prescribed the limits 
of moral and social conduct permissible to its members. Within 
those confines, men might enjoy a certain restricted freedom. But 
the control of the new regime was total because it based its principles 
upon science rather than upon faith.
Comte’s concept of social organization closely followed that of 
Saint-Simon, merely strengthening the systematization of the origi-
nal. The society created by positivism would be brought into existence 
by his disciples, who would serve much like the board of a business 
corporation to promote the general welfare. In fact, these compe-
tents would assume administrative control of something much like 
what today we would call a “welfare state.” Naturally, this would be a 
positivist society since Comte insisted that all classes should be edu-
cated in the spirit of positivism—that is, to concern themselves with 
the life of man in society rather than with such studies as rhetoric or 
aesthetics. In this welfare state, the philosophers—in this case, the 
positivists themselves—would be the elite. Comte had no illusions 
about the coming men of power, the new captains of industry. He 
was completely convinced that, only if the scientific-spiritual elite 
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kept all final power in their own hands, could they control the selfish 
impulses of the industrial lords and compel them to serve society.
It is important that we remember that the sociologists’ dream was 
of the union of mankind in one universal organization and that they 
believed that the whole progress of the Western world was toward 
this goal. The development from the isolated tribe, to the city-state, 
and to the nation seemed to them to indicate a logical progression 
towards world brotherhood, when man would be the same every-
where, with the same modes of behavior, unseparated by national or 
political boundaries. Societies which, in the past, had wasted them-
selves by foolish military ventures would, in the future, be ruled by 
the fraternal love that would enable men everywhere to recognize 
one another. Why? Because the ruthlessness that had distinguished 
personal ambitions, whether in private industry or in international 
politics, would disappear from a world in which economics would be 
the province of disinterested human engineers whose only concern 
would be the improvement of the species.
There is nothing irrational in an attitude toward mankind that 
tries to increase its interaction and its homogeneity. Moreover, Comte 
made a most correct prediction of the general direction that a tech-
nological world seems to be taking. The Marshall Plan and the Point 
Four program, apart from their economic and political goals, are 
both conceived in the humanitarian spirit of the Saint-Simonians. 
But this philosophy included within it, not only scientific predictions 
but also a sympathetic treatment of the constructive potentialities 
of science in an industrial age. As such, it stayed well within the 
boundaries of intelligent imagination in looking forward to a uni-
fied society in which each man would be able to enjoy real, though 
modest, economic and social security. It almost might be said to 
have something humane, even middle class about it—the belief that 
no man should suffer because of the structure of social life itself. 
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To remove the residue of serfdom and slavery from a technological 
world by judicious humanitarianism and to restrain the otherwise 
autonomous progress of science could easily be part of a very “safe 
and sane” program.
What is irrational about this sociology, however, is the idea that 
collective sympathy somehow is the inseparable complement of sci-
entific rationalism, and that modern man should be seen as split into 
two opposing camps: the scientific-rational and the subjective-irra-
tional. Both these concepts are as abstract as the methods of the nat-
ural sciences themselves and offer a fatally misleading methodology 
for the understanding of man in history. Thus, what was an authen-
tic attempt to revitalize the organization of society tended instead to 
widen the gulf between social analysis and social gospel.
Many religions have demanded total dedication to their systems 
of meaning, but the unique contribution of this new religion was 
that it required complete submission to a philosophy of history that 
brought together both theory and practice. Honoré de Balzac (1799–
1850) called these sociologists the seers who inaugurated the age of 
the intellectuals. Because they believed that they possessed the final 
truth of history, they could not feel themselves to be alienated from 
the day-to-day events in the real world. Their ideas, experiments, 
quarrels, and decisions took place within the historical moment, 
not outside of time and space. Their laboratory was society, not the 
limbo of prescientific thought. Since they were bound by historical 
interpretation, they could not even have painful disagreements. The 
end was predestined, and the engineer or the scientist was at lib-
erty merely to question the efficiency of the means. This change in 
perspective marks the journey from the universitas literarum to the 
institute of technology. Since the scientist was clairvoyant, his job 
above all else was to be ready for the future historical moment. A 
new culture-hero had arrived—the competent man.
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These French sociologists thought they held the key to the final 
total organization of society—final because it was scientifically 
demonstrable; total because it undertook to explain all aspects of 
social action and thought through a spirituality that would per-
manently establish the ends of society. Because of the merging of 
scientific progress with humanitarian sympathy, the last obstacle to 
the rationalization of mass society had been removed.
The Religion of Progress
Saint-Simon and Comte held that political revolution dealt merely 
with superficialities, ignoring the real tasks that confronted the 
modern age, and that only total social revolution could bring about 
the perfection of mankind. They insisted that these aims could be 
accomplished peacefully, even though the spirit of revolution is not 
peaceful, and the total social reconstruction of society is violent. 
Saint- Simon in particular was never able to reconcile himself to the 
fact that, if a revolution unites both theory and practice, it cannot 
be brought about without revolutionary action. On the one hand, 
he described the future victory of science as if it could not possibly 
meet any opposition; on the other hand, he stated his position in 
the polemical language of the militant revolutionary. His descrip-
tion of the contemporary world is filled with hostile epithets and, 
sometimes, has a nearly apocalyptic tone. He spoke, as did Comte, 
constantly and continuously of the “anarchy” of his age. They were 
not speaking simply of Marx’s “anarchy of production” but of a more 
complex and more profound anarchy—the existential chaos that 
they felt poisoned their world at every level of life.
Anarchy is a key term for these sociologists. It indicated for them 
a social climate of such moral insecurity that all people must long 
for the destruction of everything that had gone before. Durkheim 
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might have called it “anomie”—that death of the spirit that lets the 
savagery lying beneath a superficially peaceful surface erupt. “Anar-
chy” implies a time when no one of the competing faiths can prevail 
unless it provides a home for the weak and a guide for the strong. It 
has other names as well, such as “alienation” and “uprootedness,” 
and it always indicates that the sources of the mind have lost their 
meaning. Such was the background of these French thinkers. They 
had grown up in a Europe that had been torn apart by conflict. When 
the Napoleonic regime broke down, they were abruptly cut off from 
the ambitions of empire and were left to turn elsewhere for their pri-
vate ambitions. We must ask in every age what happens to those men 
who have been engaged in the political and social life of their time 
if that life is suddenly brought to an end. After Napoleon, the vast 
numbers of the officer corps and of the intellectuals were set free to 
become Napoleons themselves, freed to form what we now know to 
be the fascist potential of any age. These were the men who wanted 
to reconstruct society in such a final, stable pattern that never again 
would it return to the state of nature.
Perhaps it is natural that those who had lived through the Napole-
onic period were particularly hostile to the world that followed. They 
were eager to expose that world as being wholly chaotic. They saw 
disorder everywhere. They listed countless examples of the paraly-
sis of authority. In industry, they pointed to the irrational conflicts 
that were endemic in a competitive economy. In the sciences, they 
attacked that specialization that had made each discipline autono-
mous. In the arts, they were depressed by the lack of concern for 
spiritual values. All in all, they felt that their own period climaxed 
a moral crisis that had been growing worse for three hundred years. 
Since the Reformation and Renaissance—in France since Michel 
de Montaigne [1533–1592] and René Descartes [1596–1650]—man’s 
concern with the individual consciousness had focused interest on 
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the single self to the exclusion of the general good of society. Individ-
ualism, which had caused the “anarchy” of the age, had destroyed the 
bonds of affection between human beings. The crisis was so pervasive 
that intellectual and economic selfishness were actually accepted as 
primary moral values. To Saint-Simon and Comte, the subjectivism 
of the nineteenth century was a barometer of the increasing anarchy 
of the contemporary scene.
It is ironic that social scientists trying to establish a scientific 
society could have made so unscientific a judgment. Nothing that 
occurred in French society between 1822 and 1848 could realisti-
cally be called anarchy. There were the beginnings of finance 
capitalism, a modest constitutional government, some respectable 
academic achievements, and a refinement of sensibility in human 
relationships. A scientist who called this “chaos” was apparently 
unable to make competent empirical judgments. “Anarchy” simply 
is not a scientific category. It is an evaluative judgment on history so 
unrealistic that it obviously bears reference to some system that has 
no relation to the true state of affairs. Actually, “anarchy” is a mythi-
cal category, and “anarchy” as opposed to “science” is a mythical 
antithesis. 
In reality, the process of history is not mythical. All historical 
events can be understood in terms of objective causes and subjec-
tive motives, both rational and irrational. On the other hand, the 
life of myth takes place in prehistory. There is a respectable body of 
social and psychological knowledge that has been gathered from the 
precise examination of the mythical in primitive life—that period 
of man’s experience when he believed himself the son of the gods, 
living in their service and engaged in combating their enemies, the 
demons. The mythical world is populated by divine and antidivine 
powers, whose wars, victories, and defeats make up the destiny of the 
universe. Categorically, the world of myth is the world of primitiv-
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ism. How then is it possible to apply the term mythical to an analysis 
of a modern historical situation?
The one time when modern man steps outside his historical situ-
ation and relives these ancient mythical conflicts between gods and 
demons is at the very moment of revolution. Then, and only then, is 
the world actually divided. Because all revolutionary groups, whether 
“progressive” or “reactionary,” assume that they possess the final and 
absolute interpretation of the meaning and end of history, whatever 
stands in their way must be a final and absolute enemy. Only image 
and counterimage exist during a revolution, and all communication 
between the two breaks down. The antagonisms of revolution are dis-
tinguished from all other types of social antagonism by the extrem-
ity of their positions. Revolutionary adversaries see one another in 
terms of mythical terror—“We are the gods, they are the demons.” 
When sociologists spoke of “anarchy,” it was merely the symbol of 
everything they opposed. In other words, it was demonism.
Modern revolutions have revived mythical thinking in a very 
specific form and have followed the existential division between 
the total friend and the total enemy. During the French Revolution, 
the nobleman struggled with the citizen. Later, the Communists 
manipulated the polarity between the bourgeois and the proletariat. 
The French sociologists, as we have seen, divided society into the idle 
and the workers. In our time, the Aryan has been opposed to the Jew, 
and, to a lesser extent, there is now a mythical conflict in the ultra-
conservative American mind between individualism and socialism. 
Since one qualifies for membership in a revolutionary group by one’s 
belief that it alone possesses the absolute truth, revolutionaries must 
look with hatred upon those who do not recognize this absolute 
claim. They see their opponents as depraved, while they themselves 
are bathed in the light of a holy communion. The French sociologists 
who held that there was an essential antagonism between the steril-
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ity of eclectic philosophy and the creativity of systematic rationaliza-
tion were acting within this ancient tradition. By giving the aura of 
myth to totalitarianism, they helped to prepare the way for the full 
development of the religion of scientific progress.
In his sociology of religion, Max Weber [1864–1920] investigated 
the relationships between interest-motives and meaning-motives in 
social action. The same approach must be applied to the revolution-
ary secular religions that swept through the nineteenth century, 
paving the way for modern totalitarianism. Since we have grown 
accustomed to characterizing our world as secular, we have come to 
believe that the decline of traditional religion in our age is symptom-
atic of the end of religion in general. But sociologists, who use cat-
egories that are not value-determined, must not discard the concept 
of religion even if the specifically theological has lost its meaning. 
For this reason, we speak of the religions of progress in the nine-
teenth century. These spiritual beliefs of the industrial world should 
be considered as genuine social phenomena, as the dynamic forces of 
social movement and the vital realities of the totalitarian ideal. We 
can call the nineteenth and twentieth centuries profoundly religious 
epochs because the social and economic issues at stake cannot be 
separated from the religious meanings that men attributed to their 
revolutionary action.
Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel [1772–1829] wrote, “The revolu-
tionary desire to realize the Kingdom of God is the flexible element 
of progressive learning and the beginning of modern history.”20 This 
remark illuminates, as does no other statement, the Romantic idea 
that the dominion of God may be established in the here and now, 
not in the infinity of the historical process. The same remark might 
very well have been made by any of the more illustrious Roman-
tics—Samuel Taylor Coleridge [1772–1834], Perry Bysshe Shelley 
[1792–1822], and Novalis [Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von 
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Hardenberg (1772–1801)]—or by the Romantics of sociology, for all 
these men identified religion with progress and sought to unify intel-
lectual advance with an emergent spirituality. Actually, this yearn-
ing for a new religion is a characteristically Romantic attitude. These 
men were both enthusiastic about the possible extension of creative 
thought, and cast down because, as intellectuals, they were lost in a 
world of philistines and bourgeois. The experience of the modern 
intellectual has combined the power of the mind with alienation 
from society, and, in the case of the Romantics, this created a need 
in them for a messianic religion that they found in the religion of 
progress.
But the Romantic conception of progress was entirely different 
from any previous philosophy of progress. During the seventeenth 
century, intellectual progress was identified with the discovery of 
the superiority of the modern mind over the classical. The attack on 
the classics was primarily an attack on authority itself. Even Tur-
got, whose contribution to a religion of progress was enormous, did 
not try to endow his theories with religious dignity. By progress, he 
meant total revolution—in other words, the practical effects of the-
ory on the whole of society. Herbert Spencer’s [1820–1903] sociology 
of progress is not a religion either, despite its influence on the Prot-
estant churches of the Anglo-Saxon world. And the “philosophes” of 
the Enlightenment were definitely antireligious. But, when Comte 
spoke of progress, he meant something else entirely. He hoped to 
recreate a catholic universe of meaning. By reconstructing the pat-
terns of superiority and submission, he wished to provide a new sys-
tematic spiritual home for the individual that would take the place 
of religious sanctity. From the Renaissance to the French Revolution, 
progress had implied intellectual liberation, independence, and even 
freedom. But, with the Romantics, the pendulum began to reverse 
itself, to swing back toward the Middle Ages. The progress of these 
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sociologists was in effect a promise to reconstruct the security of past 
ages, to build a shelter for the homeless victims of “anarchy.” Like 
no institution that had existed since the medieval church, the new 
religion of progress offered an escape from all personal responsibil-
ity since all decisions would be left to the authorities. The concepts of 
progress that had preceded the Saint-Simonians could be answered, 
they felt, in only one way. Something had to assume the functions of 
a transcendent God; something had to provide an ultimate meaning 
to history. When that transcendence disappeared in the material-
ism and the atheism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it 
was absolutely necessary that a new ontology be found. This they 
called Humanity. Some spoke of peoples or nations, but the accepted 
social reality was Society; and History, for the Romantics, was the 
demiurge of the world of progress, the bearer of absolute meaning. 
For Georg Hegel [1770–1831], for Comte, for Saint-Simon, and for 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon [1809–1865], the true reality of history was 
the self-realization of an emerging absolute. If the establishment of 
the Kingdom of God on earth was one of the primary elements in the 
new idea of progress, then the social movements of the nineteenth 
century must be seen as nothing less than religious. For the Saint-
Simonians, the gospel was one of pan-humanitarian collectivism; for 
Comte, it was a secular, scientific, and sentimental catholicism, made 
harmonious with the total planning of industry. Even the doctrines 
of the “godless” revolutionaries look very much like negative reli-
gions. Marx’s atheism has been translated into an unimpeachable 
theology, interpreted by a body of priests who dictate Holy Writ and 
proscribe heresy. Whatever Marx’s personal attitude toward his own 
work might have been, the Russian version of Marxism has become 
a genuine doctrine of progress and meaning, a religious faith and a 
militant church. And finally, that the atheism of Mikhail Bakunin 
[1814–1876] and Proudhon is the most radically religious of all can 
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be seen in the fervor of its attack on institutionalized religion. These 
two men felt deeply that there could be no social questions that were 
not involved with the theological. They fully recognized that, in the 
modern world, revolutions were not simply concerned with the orga-
nization of society, but instead with refashioning all human institu-
tions in the image of progress itself.
One can find the fundamental principle of religion in all the vari-
ety of social programs put forth in the nineteenth century. This is 
partially the result of the century’s political heritage. These men were 
the spiritual heirs of French Jacobinism, and of the religions of Rea-
son, of the Supreme Being, and of Theophilanthropy. In spite of their 
opposition to the Revolution itself, all of them shared its messianism. 
The Jacobins, who began historical messianism as a religion of prog-
ress, bequeathed to the nineteenth century the idea that a spiritual 
power, separate from the temporal, directs the mind and soul, and 
controls the unending process of human history. It is this principle 
that made the idea of a perfect world normative in the minds of the 
Romantics.
No one has expressed more clearly or more beautifully than 
Proudhon the nineteenth century intellectual’s eschatological 
vision of a dying world. He saw his struggle with constitutional-
ism as a decisive battle of destruction and spoke frequently of the 
revolutionary conflict as a Napoleonic encounter. In the decline of 
the bourgeoisie, he was able to see its sequel—the disappearance of 
Christianity. Although at this faith’s “last hour,” as he called it, he 
remembered what there was to be said in its favor, he felt that it was 
destined to perish along with the social and political institutions of 
the modern world. He wrote:
All traditions are abused, all beliefs abolished, while the 
new gospel has not yet entered the mind of the masses. 
That is what I call the dissolution. It is the most atrocious 
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moment in the history of society. Everything merges in 
order to depress the people of good will . . . I have no 
illusions and I do not expect to see reappearing in our 
country . . . intelligence among the bourgeois and com-
mon sense among the plebians . . . The killings are going 
to come and they will be followed by a terrifying prostra-
tion. We are not going to see the work of the new period. 
We are going to fight in the dark.21
Nowhere in classical writing can one find anything that resembles this 
description of terror, and there are similar passages in Saint -Simon, 
Marx, and Comte in which the historical situation is described in 
eschatological terms. When Thucydides [460–395 BC] described the 
fall of Athens, he explained it in terms of human motives and social 
laws. Neither Sallust [86–35 BC], in analyzing the corruption of the 
Roman nobility, nor Tacitus [56–120], the analyst of the Roman 
court, ever left the province of historical and sociological under-
standing. Even when they were most moved at observing the death 
of what they loved best, they remained within the sphere of human 
behavior. Perhaps it is necessary for one to have passed through the 
final phases of Christian dogmatism before one can confuse the 
pax terrena and the pax coelestis or allow oneself to indulge in the 
romantic fantasy that God and society are one.
Among the new religions, Saint-Simonianism deserves special 
attention for two reasons: first, because most French sociologists 
passed through this phase in their own development; and second, 
because all technocratic religions originate in the Saint-Simonian. 
What is more, Saint-Simonianism has a particular interest because 
it predates the age in which capitalist antagonism came out into the 
open. All were welcome in this church: bankers, engineers, profes-
sional revolutionaries, labor leaders, social reformers, and capitalists 
themselves.
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Saint-Simonianism completely discarded the principle of a 
Divine Being, or the substance of a Holy. Its spiritual power did not 
derive its dignity from any transcendent God; it derived it from the 
identification of scientific with humanitarian thinking. Since posi-
tive science provided a providential plan for the universe, scientists 
would make up the main body of the new clergy, and they, supported 
by poets and artists, would take the initiative in sustaining the tem-
poral power of the industrialists. Obviously, religion—that is, the 
spirituality of the scientists themselves—would be the all-embracing 
creative factor in the social world, the key to the successful operation 
of society as a whole.
The “clergy,” in the minds of the Saint-Simonians, had a further 
duty to elaborate the fundamental religious norms, the gospels of 
labor, of brotherhood, and of the poor. The interesting turn that 
these sociologists gave to the gospel of labor was that they believed its 
blessedness lay in its connection with unlimited productivity. Those 
who worked contributed to society’s well-being and would enter into 
a state of grace; those who did not work would be “atheists.”
No matter what may be thought of the Saint-Simonian idea of 
scientists as part of a new “clergy,” this gospel of brotherhood and 
the religious transfiguration of the poor cannot possibly be justified 
on scientific grounds—only on the grounds of humanitarian love 
itself. It was an attempt to transfer the principle of charity to the 
plane of social reality, as if the improvement of the condition of the 
poor was a religious requirement that would somehow be met by the 
gospel of labor. The flaw in Saint-Simon’s new Christianity was not, 
of course, that it held out its hand to society’s most impoverished 
group, but that it insisted that technology itself was a social ethic that 
would meet the needs of that group. This association of technology 
and humanitarianism is neither logical nor natural, and those who 
argued in favor of it were suffering an optimistic delusion.
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The Saint-Simonians were convinced that, in the transition from 
one organic period of history to another, their religion would prove 
superior to monotheism because they had eliminated from it the last 
remaining antagonism between spirit and matter. This was truly the 
doctrine of a materialistic technical society. Their own term for it 
was pantheism—in the words of Saint-Simon, “God is one, He is all 
that is . . . He manifests Himself under two main aspects, spirit and 
matter.”22 According to their preaching, however, the foundation of 
divinity is located in social reality and social progress, and, for this 
reason, the term pantheism is misleading. A possible interpretation 
is that, instead of a divine substance that pervades the All, there are 
simply human emotions and human thoughts that in themselves 
express the complex unity of human nature and the divine. Human 
nature in itself contains what might be called the “trinity” for Saint-
Simonians: truth, usefulness, and beauty—the three facets of knowl-
edge, security, and love.
In the Saint-Simonian creed, there are two blessings: the glorifica-
tion of labor and the transfiguration of the affections, both of which 
serve to unite the otherwise separate forces of matter and spirit. This 
creed expressed itself in various ways: in propaganda for the reha-
bilitation of the flesh, in efforts to eliminate the rivalry between the 
sexes, in the introduction of the idea of the “total person,” and finally, 
in a search for the divine mother. One can see that this religion had 
only one purpose: to give religious dignity to those intellectuals who 
spread the Saint-Simonian gospel of the total meaning of history and 
social evolution. Alas, despite the hopes of the Saint-Simonians, this 
doctrine did not transform the world. However, it did inspire other 
men to see the infinite possibilities that lay within the idea of total 
social control.
Comte takes this doctrine up where the Saint-Simonians left off 
and applies it more insistently and more systematically. From the 
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very beginning, scientific positivism included within it the religion 
of humanity.23 In Comte’s view, both science and religion unify and 
bring order: the former by controlling nature, the latter by control-
ling society. In the positivist religion, there are two levels of expres-
sion: the intellectual and the moral. On the first level, intelligence 
expressed itself in faith and dogma; on the second, in worship, devo-
tion, and service. Comte described faith as the intellectual affirma-
tion of dogma that provides that security—the knowledge of the 
universe itself—that makes possible the improvement of the state of 
mankind. The universe is demonstrated, not revealed; and our life 
within it is distinguished by both fatality and freedom of choice—a 
fatalité modifiable—for our destiny, although already determined, 
may be manipulated within the limits of the historical moment. On 
the moral level of existence, however, we can show our belief in the 
truth of the dogma by living for others, by devoting ourselves to the 
service of humanity, and by acting out in worship and prayer the 
blessings of our subordination and our gratitude at our liberation 
from individual choice.
This was Comte’s religion, an industrial version of capitalism and 
a church that offered a frame of reference within which obedience, 
subordination, and service would acquire value and meaning. Here 
was a spirituality superior to politics, a morality superior to men. 
Since in this way the positivists hoped to convert the human animal 
into a social animal, morality ranked higher than sociology in the 
hierarchy of this science.
The religion of humanity was quite literally the self-adoration of 
mankind, for the absorption of mankind into the process of history 
(which formed an unbroken continuity from the dead, through the 
living, to the unborn) was for Comte a religious experience in itself. 
The positivists believed that the natural sciences had destroyed the 
classical cosmos by their discovery of the infinite, open character 
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of the universe. Their religion of progress was designed to build a 
new universe of meaning in place of the old universe of creation 
and, thereby, to define the religious mission of the industrial classes. 
Their sociology would transmute the Christian process of salvation 
into the progress of society, and by social and political developments 
would then become matters of spiritual concern and, ultimately, 
areas of absolute action.
Comte’s religion of humanity left nothing to the imagination. It 
was a thoroughly grim affair, controlling all phases of life, omitting 
no area of intellectual activity from its dogma down to the smallest 
details of the budget or the press. He even went so far as to draw up a 
new calendar with positivist saints designated for every day in the year. 
His early conviction of the negative character of freedom was society.
Marx’s system too must be mentioned among the religions of 
progress, for “scientific socialism” in its revolutionary form is both 
romantic and eschatological. It attracted millions of workers, not 
by its scientific truth, but by the religious hopes it encouraged and 
the spiritual security it seemed to offer. All the simplifications of the 
Zukunftsstaat derived from concepts that Marx inherited from Hegel 
and never discarded. Even his early categories of “true democracy” 
and of “true humanism” confused religious concepts with political. 
The dialectics of freedom and its final achievement became a sort of 
metaphysical substitute for the theological principles of grace and 
providence. And one can see the religious element in the writings 
of all Marxist political leaders. For instance, August Bebel’s [1840–
1913] language is moving just because of the religious certainty 
engendered by his socialist faith. Across Bebel’s work, religious fer-
vor slowly vanishes in the routine of everyday politics.
Marx’s work shows that on one point at least there was a virtual 
unanimity among the early sociologists. They were all aware that, 
under the conditions of modern life, religion must be merged with 
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revolutionary action. Neither Christian nor political ideals remained 
that could guide the revolutionary masses in their work. These ideals 
had to be created by the revolutionaries themselves. For this reason, 
all modern revolutions have become religious.
Both Proudhon and Bakunin, in contrast to Saint-Simon and 
Comte, sought a radical solution for the religious problem. They 
made the struggle against Christianity one of the main tenets of 
their revolutionary doctrine. In their effort to abolish supernatural 
theology, they tried a new approach—what might be called “the piety 
of heretics.”
 Bakunin, whose position was one of an extreme naturalism, 
declared war on organized religion. He deplored the effects of revo-
lutionary sociology on the institutions of control and discipline. His 
anger was directed chiefly against the categories of original sin, the 
fall, and the corruption of the world. According to Bakunin, such 
principles were solely responsible for the patterns of domination and 
exploitation he found in the world around him—in other words, the 
ideas of authority and obedience were derived from the traditional 
Christian pessimism regarding the nature of man. He believed that 
this was a concept of humanity that distorted its beauty and robbed it 
of its truth, and that such unnatural thinking could result only in the 
universal corruption of rulers and ruled alike. Therefore, Bakunin, 
who saw that all moral values might ultimately be traced to their 
theological origins, challenged Christian dogma by proclaiming the 
radical and absolute goodness of man.24
Proudhon knew that his personal struggle with God was not 
simply a part of a larger struggle against the bourgeoisie. When he 
fought God, he fought him on the spiritual plane; and, because he 
was a man with a genuine sense of the meaning of despair, his revolt 
came close to being a new religious insight. This is quite remarkable 
since he shared many of the general presuppositions of his contem-
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poraries, including the law of progress, and the beliefs that there was 
a logic inherent in social man to which philosophers must submit in 
order not to err on the side of arbitrary subjectivism and that only 
society could safely follow its instincts without fear of falling into 
absolute error. But Proudhon rejected violently the social pantheism 
of the Saint -Simonians and the total immanentism of the positivists. 
He hated the deification of humanity and ridiculed the reintroduc-
tion of mysticism under the guise of love; he resented the subjection 
of the moral world to the authority of custom and the reduction of 
economy to the rules of basic communism. He saw this creed for 
what it was—a religious dogmatism that in its effort to escape from 
freedom would bring more virulent types of authority and exploita-
tion than had ever existed before.
Because Proudhon was opposed to all varieties of domination, he 
assailed the idea of God as a center of meaning from which flowed 
the secular principles of domination and servitude by which the state 
was organized, as well as the idea of the monopoly of academic truth. 
Despite—or because of—his recognition of the hypothesis of an Infi-
nite Being, he rejected the Catholicism of his socialist colleagues and 
considered the Infinite Being as a hostile power against which he 
must struggle to the death.
Proudhon stated that the principle of evil was in God, the prin-
ciple of good in man. The human and the divine were the two rival 
powers who would decide what principle would rule the world. He 
believed that it was man’s duty to conquer God, who, as the enslaving 
principle itself, was man’s enemy, and to erect the principle of human 
goodness in His stead.
Proudhon was vaguely aware of the fact that his battle with 
God would have to reckon with religion, one of the deepest roots of 
human society.25 He knew that religion was a constitutive element 
in the foundation of all organized societies. Therefore, the more 
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he was willing to grant the principle of an Infinite Being, the more 
important he knew it was to destroy the principle of Christian tran-
scendence. When this principle itself had been defeated, he would 
conquer the entire bourgeois world.
Proudhon was wiser than Marx. Of all the social philosophers 
of the nineteenth century, he understood best that revolution was 
total and that it must attack the structure of society at its foundation. 
Convinced that the death of Christianity would provide his own sys-
tem with transcendence, he challenged the Kingdom of God by pro-
claiming the Kingdom of Satan. It was Proudhon who first identified 
the revolutionary struggle with the spreading of the word of Satan.
Only professional historians read Proudhon these days. His ideas 
are no longer alive. But there does remain one echo of his radical 
anti-Christianity, not in the writings of a sociologist, but of a poet, 
Charles Baudelaire [1821–1867], whose enthronement of Satan was 
in the exact pattern of Proudhon’s spiritual class-war. Baudelaire’s 
Satan is the “adoptive father of all those whom God, the Father, in 
his dark anger had chased from the terrestrial paradise. Satan’s king-
dom is Cain’s, the murderer in revolt against the bourgeois Abel who 
warms his belly at the patriarchal fireside.”26 Baudelaire perfectly ex-
pressed the existential meaning of Proudhon’s religious battle when 
he wrote:
Race de Cain, au ciemonte 
Et sur la terre jette Dieu.27
To Proudhon, as to Bakunin, the God of the churches could not be 
the true God. If He were, He could not have borne the misery and 
humiliation of his children. Since God had fled, man himself must 
take up the battle.
It is an interesting confirmation of the modern revolutionary sit-
uation that Proudhon’s greatest opponent should have been a Catho-
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lic philosopher, Juan Donoso Cortes [1809–1853], who recognized 
in his work the embodiment of the religious character of modern 
revolutions—the archenemy, the anti-Christ. He agreed, neverthe-
less, with Proudhon’s estimate of modern liberalism, and he showed 
his appreciation of his adversary’s noble and superior mind when he 
acknowledged him to be the Church’s greatest foe. He wrote:
The revolutions of modern times have an unconquerable 
and destructive force which the revolutions of ancient 
times did not possess; and this force is necessarily 
satanic, since it cannot be divine.28
Just as Satan was a fallen angel, modern societies “fall” from 
grace, rid themselves of the God of Creation, and turn to adoring 
themselves as creators. Philosophers are often not aware of what the 
social scientists find all around them in the modern world—that 
the gods of industrial creation have become the slaves of their own 
works and are destined to be slain by them. Social scientists must 
look upon those religions of progress, which have identified society 
with the meaning of divine providence, as demonic phenomena. 
They are demonic because they believe the powers of man to be abso-
lutely meaningful in themselves, and because they do not recognize 
a frame of reference that transcends the nature of man. The present 
world is demonic by virtue of its power to control nature. And, in the 
final analysis, Satanism and demonism coincide.
All the religions of progress show certain affinities to specific 
types of historical religions. Comte’s religion of humanity applies the 
pattern of the Catholic Church to irenic religion; the Marxist creed 
might be described as social Mohammedanism; and Proudhon has 
been called a Manichean.29 Despite these differences, they all exhibit 
one great distinguishing feature—the merger of revolution with reli-
gion. Religions of progress became the almost inevitable character-
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istic of a world which forfeited its vision of God in order to limit its 
perspectives to man’s historical progress.
Comte and Hegel
Early sociology was a uniquely French manifestation, but it emerged 
as a specific instance of the general philosophic growth of the early 
nineteenth century. The Romantic Movement gave force to many 
of the same elements that are characteristic of this first sociology, 
such as the typical Romantic yearning for a unified spiritual cos-
mos. Romanticism was a complex historical phenomenon—one that 
expressed itself through all areas of the intellectual life, from phi-
losophy and poetry to politics and social action—but, despite radical 
differences between English social reformers, German poets, and 
French novelists, all these Western intellectuals were deeply con-
scious that they lived in an age of revolution. That passion for “seren-
ity” that permeates Romanticism has a distinct relationship to the 
sociologists’ vision of a world without order. The poets who lament 
the fate of the individual in a world growing daily more anonymous 
can be thought of as the obverse side of those men who praised the 
state, the people, the nation, or the race. The period is contradictory 
and yet contains a deep unity. After all, it was the conservative Georg 
Hegel [1770–1831] who every July 14th solemnly lit candles in mem-
ory of the French Revolution. And Romanticism created an affinity 
between two social thinkers of the century: Hegel and Comte. It is 
merely one element in their work, but it plays a substantial part.
Comte and Hegel were the first great philosophers of the post-
Revolutionary age to make history the primary concern of the 
philosopher because it was the bearer of the progress of the human 
mind. They claimed, as scientists, that their knowledge of the mean-
ing of history was objective and that it could be demonstrated by 
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analysis and interpretation. They claimed, as Romantics, that their 
work stood as synthesis of the past and the future. Both were con-
vinced that their respective theories of society could in practice pro-
duce a truly perfect organization; both were outstanding examples of 
the megalomania of modern Romantics for they were the first pagan 
philosophers of the modern world, men who tried to turn religion 
into simply one aspect of a philosophical system that combined the 
metaphysical past with the scientific present. And one of the postu-
lates of Romanticism is that religion is both the expression of pro-
gressive learning and the point of departure for history.
It should be stated here that neither of these thinkers can be clas-
sified as a pure Romantic. In neither case is their major contribu-
tion—Hegel’s idealism or Comte’s system of positivism—essentially 
Romantic in character. But both were deeply affected by that move-
ment because they both were children of the era when intellectuals 
became the elite of the Western world, their status raised by the new 
prestige accorded to the sciences. With their authority resting on this 
prestige, intellectuals became available to all groups—conservative 
or radical. In this sense, Comte and Hegel were among these new 
experts who could trace the line of historical progress with certainty, 
or “hear the grass of necessity growing,” to use Jacob Burckhardt’s 
[1818–1897] contemptuous phrase.30
Comte and Hegel shared more than a connection through 
Romanticism: their philosophical ideas have certain basic similari-
ties. This is particularly impressive since Comte, who began his phil-
osophical career at a date when Hegel had all but completed his, was 
not a student of Hegel. To be sure, he quotes the German philosopher 
in his Positive Polity and also in his Positivist Calendar,31 but it can-
not be maintained that he was seriously influenced by him. Comte 
seems to have known Hegel’s work up to 1842 through a transla-
tion by Gustave D’Eichthal [1804–1886];32 and Hegel, apparently, had 
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some knowledge of Comte’s early work. At any rate, despite the slight 
contact, they had a lively respect for one another.
It may seem surprising that two men, whose conditioning was 
so dissimilar, should have shared such novel and extreme attitudes 
about traditional philosophy. Hegel was a Protestant who began his 
career as a student of theology, became a philosophic idealist, and 
was influenced in his social thought by the unfortunate contempo-
rary political organization of Germany. Comte came from a Catholic 
family, was educated in the sciences, and was greatly influenced by 
the impact of the Revolution on his country. And yet they are alike in 
having broken with traditional philosophy on one important point: 
they made history the concern of the philosopher.
In the post-Renaissance decline of Augustinian philosophy under 
the onslaught of rationalist inquiry, thinkers from Niccolò Machia-
velli [1469–1527] to Adam Smith [1723–1790] characterized the 
domain of history as the study of the relationship between rulers 
and ruled. They felt that this interaction between domination and 
servitude could yield no philosophic meaning for it was simply the 
manifestation of human animality, devoid of values even when it was 
full of guile.
Hegel and Comte broke completely with this way of thinking. 
Both men, shaken by the phenomenon of the French Revolution, 
grasped the idea that a historical event might have a concrete mean-
ing. Consequently, since the absolute mind that judged history made 
history itself the center of philosophy, the historicism of both men 
was distinguished by a union of theory and practice.
Comte used an appropriate term to describe this new approach—
one that is as valid for Hegel’s work as for his own. He called it 
abstract history—that is, the philosophical treatment of history. 
What this means is that from the sum total of individual experi-
ences the philosopher abstracts general trends and recurrent tenden-
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cies. He does this rather than study the infinite variety of individual 
historical events in order to establish a causal interdependence that 
will explain a particular event. Working with such large general 
trends tends to lead one inescapably to the conclusion that there 
is a dynamism that moves unceasingly throughout all history. For 
both Comte and Hegel, this dynamism is the necessary operation of 
the progressing mind, an operation that can neither be stopped nor 
reversed.
Naturally the “abstract histories” of Comte and Hegel differed in 
some ways. A comparison of the way each philosopher treated the 
development of Western philosophy—Comte in the sixth volume 
of his Positive Philosophy, and Hegel in his Phenomenology of the 
Mind—shows that each of them colored his version of the historical 
process to correspond with his own version of the truth. “Abstract 
history” became subjective, partial, and selective. However, both 
men argued that it was the only presupposition upon which scientific 
philosophy could be based since it was the only concept that brought 
together knowledge of the past with the true nature of the whole 
social process. What is most important is that “abstract history” is 
the precondition for that unique and radical method that Comte and 
Hegel discovered independently and called “dialectical.”
In its modern form, the dialectical method gave birth to a new 
type of logic. Both Comte and Hegel became convinced that the 
traditional varieties of logic—the Aristotelian or Scholastic, for 
example—were unfitted for the contents of their new philosophy. A 
dynamic subject required a dynamic logic. Hegel’s system of logic, 
therefore, which moves from affirmation to negation and then to a 
denial of the negation, creating thereby a new affirmation, makes 
possible a coherent system of abstract history. In other words, the 
dialectical method—thesis, antithesis, and synthesis—imitates the 
movement of history itself. Comte’s logic, which was first borrowed 
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from Saint-Simon and later developed by his disciples, is based on a 
dialectic that unfolds within the organic and the critical periods of 
historical thought. An illustration of this logic would be the Law of 
Three Stages. According to Comte, the Mind progresses in a dialec-
tical movement from the theological state, to the metaphysical, and 
ultimately, to the positive, the final and most perfect accomplish-
ment of man’s intellect. At its most primitive, the theological state 
is organic; the metaphysical state is essentially critical; and the 
positive state returns to an organic base on a higher synthetic level. 
Like Saint-Simon, Comte considered the organic state to be typified 
by its singleness of purpose and belief, and its capacity for giving men 
the opportunity to release their most constructive powers because 
they could trust in the truth of their common ideals. In critical ages, 
men suffer deeply; every belief is questioned; every act of faith is 
paralyzed or made passive. This is the negativism that necessarily 
will bring about the renascence of an organic age.
The dialectic developed by the French sociologists is identi-
cal with Hegel’s. For the French, as for the German, the synthesis 
(or organic) integrates and makes positive what first appeared as 
antithesis (or critical). Goethe, incidentally, who was as indifferent 
to Hegel’s thought as he was ignorant of Comte’s, voiced the same 
idea much earlier:
The only and the most profound theme of the history of 
the world and men, to which all other topics are subor-
dinate, is the conflict between belief and unbelief. All 
epochs in which faith prevails, regardless of its symbols, 
are brilliant, uplifting, and productive for contemporaries 
and posterity. All ages, however, in which unbelief main-
tains a precarious victory, even boasts of the illusion of 
success, disappear in the face of posterity because nobody 
likes to be tortured by the knowledge of the sterile.33
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Besides these similarities between the thought of Comte and 
Hegel—that they both believed progress revealed the meaning of 
history, that “abstract history” disclosed the contents of progress, 
and that dialectics was the method by which it might be understood 
scientifically—there are other indications of the depth of the paral-
lels between them that makes us regard them together as symbols of 
their age. One of the most extraordinary is the manner in which both 
dealt with religion. In their early writings, they searched for religious 
truths that would bear out their own philosophical approach and 
rejected that theology that dealt with the concept of the Holy—to 
them an area that was not open to philosophical investigation. Thus, 
the principles of alienation, and of infinite love and suffering, which 
Hegel analyzes, are philosophic categories rather than theologi-
cal. In Hegel’s The Phenomenology of the Mind, for example, there 
is a description of the development of religion from the fetishism 
of primitive societies to that merger of religion and philosophy that 
constituted his own system. This section bears a remarkable resem-
blance to Comte’s presentation of the Law of Three Stages.
But the most significant similarity between Comte and Hegel is 
that both of them were certain that they had successfully integrated 
religion into their philosophies, leaving no place and no function for 
independent religious thought. Hegel never used the term religion 
of humanity, but his entire work might very well have been so titled.
A student of the philosophy of the nineteenth century must 
consider the question why two men of genius, separated by nation, 
tradition, and education should have independently come so close to 
one another’s beliefs. The similarity between the two is not simply 
a psychological or an intellectual accident, but an expression of the 
specific historical situation. The common experience of living in a 
world perpetually in revolution, suspended in possibilities, brought 
from both Comte and Hegel a common intellectual response. The 
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challenge of the times was so acute that a Frenchman and a German 
could simultaneously insist that philosophy had outworn its ancient 
function and must turn elsewhere—that is, to the study of history.
We might call Hegel’s image of himself a prophecy in reverse. 
One of his most famous quotations, usually offered as proof of his 
megalomania, includes the remark that he thought of himself as “the 
last philosopher.” But this was not the statement of a megalomaniac. 
Hegel knew, better than any other contemporary observer, the char-
acter of his own age. His early reflections on the dynamics of the 
economic process and on the inescapable clash between the owners 
of property and the workers anticipated, by a good many years, radi-
cal theories of the historical crisis. The Phenomenology of Mind, for 
instance, contains an analysis of the conflicts between domination 
and servitude that shows an astounding awareness of the potential 
of total revolution, and of the radical changes that would occur in all 
modes of thought and action if the traditional reciprocal relation-
ships among the members of society had passed away.34 He knew 
that the character of his epoch was revolutionary and that his phi-
losophy would be the true summit of all the great contributions to 
Western thought. He brought his philosophy to this perfect state by 
incorporating within it the classical, the Christian, the idealist, and 
the romantic. According to the necessity of his dialectic, the next 
phase of philosophy could only be radical nonphilosophy. If he was 
the last philosopher, he was also, in a sense, the first.
Thus, Hegel’s philosophy recognized in its awareness of the com-
ing of the period of revolutions the grim and unalterable logic of 
dialectics. Naturally, men themselves were nothing but pawns in 
this cosmos. Like Comte, Hegel held that human beings were sim-
ply the servants of advancing progress, obedient missionaries of the 
Mind. He and Comte considered men not the creators of destiny but 
responders to the teleology of history. It should be remembered that 
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when Hegel saw Napoleon at Jena, he called him “The World Spirit 
on horseback.”
One might say that what makes a genuine philosopher is which 
one of the several alternatives he chooses to answer the crisis of his 
time. Despite the effect that the age of revolution had upon both 
Comte and Hegel, there are some startling differences between them. 
Comte understood Mind to be the expansion of scientific methods 
as applied by the natural sciences, while Hegel interpreted Mind as 
the totality of man’s creative spirit. Where Comte suggested a totali-
tarian social organization, Hegel postulated a rational authoritarian 
state administered by philosophically trained civil servants. Both 
men recognized the sociological determinants that lay at the heart of 
all knowledge, but Hegel insisted that, despite historical relativity, all 
knowledge was a manifestation of perennial philosophic tendencies 
(for example, the types of Stoicism and Skepticism in the famous 
chapter, “The Unhappy Conscience,” in the Phenomenology). Per-
haps these instances will indicate the basic difference—Hegel always 
chose the path of contemplation; Comte chose that of scientific 
manipulation. To Hegel, it seemed that the philosopher’s function 
was to understand the development of Mind in all its manifesta-
tions and thereby to preserve the reality of the spirit in the concrete 
historical situation. In his view, philosophy could never change the 
law of historical necessity; it could only reconstruct and perpetu-
ate what the human mind kept alive from each succeeding epoch. 
Philosophy to Hegel was a way of illumination. But Comte chose the 
other alternative. He felt that, if philosophy was made up of knowl-
edge in a state of temporal progress, then the philosopher was called 
upon to direct and assist the transformation required by the dynam-
ics of Mind in conformity with its intellectual, social, and spiritual 
aspects. Comte’s whole creative work, from 1822 to his last book in 
1856, was a gradually expanding philosophy of progress and total 
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organization, a detailed elaboration of the tasks that philosophers 
must assume as scientific administrators, directors, and priests. It 
was through his disciples that the truth of philosophy—the religion 
of progress—would conquer the world.
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Tocqueville: 
Moralist and Sociologist 
I
In January 1935 a century had passed since the publication of the 
first part of Democracy in America.1 The extraordinary success of the 
book, which brought praise and honors to the young writer Alexis 
de Tocqueville [1805–1859] and prepared the way for his political 
career, was due to its concentration on the realities of the times. The 
theoretical and practical formation of modern democratic and lib-
eral society was the burning problem of his epoch. It is therefore 
no accident that Albert Thibaudet [1874–1936], in an essay on Toc-
queville and Arthur comte de Gobineau [1816–1882],2 attributes the 
present lack of interest in Montesquieu [1689–1755] and Tocqueville 
to the breakdown of western liberalism. As a consequence of this 
breakdown, he asserts, the younger generation is interested only in 
those new forms of political organization that lie beyond the tradi-
tions of Anglo-Saxon and French civilization. These remarks by such 
an earnest and scrupulous a political philosopher as Thibaudet lead 
us to consider what the significance of the centenary of Tocqueville’s 
great book may be, apart from the established cultural convention. 
Is his work really only an expression of his historical and political 
situation, and, therefore, has it lost its significance for our times?
Published originally in a slightly different form in Social Research 2 (November 
1935), 405–27.  Republished by permission from Social Research.
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We may question the usual interpretation of Tocqueville as a 
foremost exponent of liberalism, in view of the fact that his book 
was praised by conservatives as well as liberals.3 It appears rather 
that Tocqueville’s thinking does not represent merely the concrete 
intellectual expression of a definite political tendency of the nine-
teenth century. Although he sought to effect a compromise between 
the divergent political groups of his time, his intellectual endeavor 
essentially transcends any immediate political purpose.
To designate Tocqueville as a moralist indicates that it was a 
purely personal need that drove him, the thinking man, liberated 
from scientific and academic traditions, to seek an understanding of 
the social and political situation and his own place in it. But the des-
ignation has a second meaning: in pursuing the consequences of his 
researches, Tocqueville came inevitably upon the problem of human 
nature, and his own distinct idea of man became the presupposi-
tion and goal of his work, as in the cases of Michel de Montaigne 
[1533–1592], Blaise Pascal [1623–1662], Thomas Hobbes [1588–1679], 
and Anthony Ashley Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury [1671–1713]. 
Because he assumed this philosophical attitude, which the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries dubbed that of moralist, Tocqueville’s 
work breaks through the narrow boundaries of political actuality. It 
was not only that he felt grief over the political and social decline of 
the nobility, but much more that he was affected by the problematic 
situation of the forms of personal perfection in moral, intellectual, 
and spiritual life under the new social order. Hence, the changing of 
the old society of estates into a democratic order and the resulting 
transformations of man and his social relations became the center of 
his thinking. As the spiritual hero or great man was the most intense 
concern of his life, Tocqueville’s historical experience led him to per-
ceive the profound connection of the forms of social and personal life 
with the totality of the social structure. These are the reasons why we 
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designate Tocqueville as moralist and sociologist. In his experience, 
there were the elements, preformed, of a new mode of thought—the 
historical and sociological consciousness. Historical consciousness 
means the knowledge of the distinctive character of a constellation 
of political and social forces, conditioned by the past and directed 
toward the future. Sociological consciousness means the under-
standing of the dependence of human existence and its social forms 
on social conditions and the knowledge of the functioning of social 
institutions and of the rules of social activity. All these existential 
and intellectual presuppositions of Tocqueville’s work indicate that a 
summary interpretation of it as liberal in the sense of the nineteenth 
century neglects the philosophical temper of his thinking.
It would not have been surprising if, like Louis de Bonald 
[1754–1840] or Joseph de Maistre [1753–1821], Tocqueville, as a 
representative of the politically vanquished nobility, had espoused 
a traditionalist or counterrevolutionary political theory. On the 
other hand, he might have followed the example of many men of 
his class who followed enthusiastically the new political movement. 
But Tocqueville never became a political partisan, even when he 
accepted the new social and political order and strove to make the 
best of it. His intellectual perspicacity and moral sensitiveness lifted 
him above the plane of the political thinkers of his epoch. He was 
able to understand the unity of the historical process and the inner 
continuity of the revolutionary movement, begun in 1789 and not 
yet finished in 1848. He was one of the first to see that the social 
revolution was the inner consequence of the political democratic 
revolution. The same intellectual and moral vision enabled him to 
understand that the decline of the nobility was an inexorable histori-
cal process begun seven hundred years earlier. Tocqueville was him-
self aware how fruitful the historical perspective of his work was for 
a fundamental insight. In a note,4 he remarks that the place, we may 
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say the sociological place, for important and significant intellectual 
and spiritual achievement is neither within the static framework of a 
corporate society, nor within the dynamic structure of an egalitarian 
democracy. Both are in their varying ways equally conventional. It 
is in periods of transition from a firmly fixed social order to a new 
structure of existence that the conditions are given for many fertile 
insights. We may add that these are the epochs of crisis, when the 
spirit must span the crumbling world like an arch and by the highest 
power of its knowledge arrive at definite insights into the primordial 
phenomena of social life and the intellectual connection of antago-
nistic concepts within a higher spiritual unity.
Tocqueville possessed all the personal qualities necessary to 
envisage the crisis of his epoch. He was intellectually and mor-
ally so detached that he understood in its logical development the 
historical process and the final defeat of his class, and therefore he 
regarded the outcome as providential. Moreover, he was so deeply 
dominated by social morality and the feeling of social justice that 
he proclaimed the process of economic leveling as a presupposition 
of the decent existence of the great masses. Nevertheless, in spite of 
his strong opposition to the nobility as a social class, his family life 
and personal experience enabled him to perceive that freedom could 
exist as a form of personal perfection even within the rigid structure 
and conventions of that order. Quite independently of the political 
commonplaces of his period, he was aware of liberty as a perma-
nent element in social structure, changing its content with varying 
historical and social conditions, and remaining correlative to insti-
tutional forms and order. His thinking brought him inevitably to a 
realistic, positivistic, and historical interpretation of political insti-
tutions since he felt the need of observing the practical application 
of political ideas and their functioning under social and historical 
conditions.5
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His inner experience and his survey of a troubled world consti-
tuted his preparation for his experiences in America, as expressed 
in his Democracy in America. When he stepped on American soil, it 
was with the full consciousness that the world of his fathers was irre-
vocably gone. He was also clearly convinced that democracy was the 
destiny of the Western world. This he accepted not merely because 
he realized the inexorableness of historical development. He went 
farther and asserted that democracy offered the means of develop-
ing the potentialities of the new situation and of bringing out the 
permanent forms of life in the new historical world.
II
This attitude leads Tocqueville to his first basic problem—the nature 
of democracy. He seeks to answer such questions as the following: 
What does democracy look like? How does it function? What posi-
tive forces for the foundation of modern society does it reveal? What 
dangers does it present in the construction of a social order? The first 
section of his book, therefore, is a realistic empirical analysis of the 
political institutions of the United States. But in his interpretation, 
he looks upon American democracy only as an example of the gen-
eral form of modern social and political structure.6 From the obser-
vation of a specific historical form as found in the constitution of the 
United States, he had, therefore, to pass on to general sociological 
concepts, which comprehend the typical events and movements of 
modern democracy. Even in the first part of his work, Tocqueville 
goes beyond mere empirical analysis and attempts to derive some 
general concepts from his realistic observations and the inner logic 
of democratic principles. A result of the combination of deductive 
and inductive methods is that the sociological character of his con-
cepts is not always plainly evident.
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The second part of his book is far from being an analysis of 
American democracy and presents only a few and fairly unimportant 
American illustrations. In this section of his work, it becomes clear 
how heavily the transformations in the political and social structure 
of the Western world weighed upon Tocqueville, and how they cast 
their shadow on his interpretation of American democracy. Yet 
this volume reveals Tocqueville at his most profound. He attempts 
to show the potency of the social structure in fashioning human 
types and to demonstrate what transformation in types of thought, 
forms of emotional response, and moral and intellectual attitudes 
have been brought about by democratic society, as contrasted with a 
world of estates and aristocracy. Just as in practical life he accepts the 
trends toward democracy, so in theory he recognizes the intercon-
nection of all the spheres of human existence. He sees that different 
social structures aim at different forms of realization. Thus, one age 
will strive for fame and military glory in the social sphere, and for 
the contemplative life in the intellectual sphere, while another will 
glorify the civil virtues, human welfare and peace, practical moral-
ity, and social sympathy. But whatever the historical transformation 
of men, the structure of the permanent social functions is always 
realized even though in varying historical constellations.
Tocqueville entered upon his new approach to reality through 
history and the sociological consciousness, in response to the obliga-
tion imposed upon him by the situation of crisis. His work, therefore, 
stands beside the works of Auguste Comte [1798–1857], Edmund 
Burke [1729–1797], Karl Marx [1818–1883], and Jacob Burckhardt 
[1818–1897], as among the first great attempts at a criticism of west-
ern culture on the basis of a new intellectual method, deeply influ-
enced by the political and social situation.
I am aware that this departs from the usual interpretation of 
Tocqueville. In French literature, particularly, Tocqueville’s name 
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appears exclusively in the histories of political theory and works on 
public law and historiography. I do not wish to enter upon a discus-
sion of the classification of Tocqueville’s work, for clearly he must 
be treated in political science and history as well as in sociology.7 I 
desire only to draw attention to the fact that the concepts in Democ-
racy in America involve many difficulties of interpretation, rooted 
in the discrepancy between the content of ideas and their concrete 
literary formulation. Tocqueville was intimately acquainted with 
the great French political and social philosophers of the eighteenth 
century. The influence of Montesquieu, in particular, is evident in 
Tocqueville’s terminology. Nevertheless, the inner content of the 
book and its place within the framework of his complete works, 
including his correspondence and conversations, afford the means 
for a proper interpretation of Tocqueville’s rational and formal 
categories. For example, when at the beginning of Democracy in 
America, he remarks that he considers the equality of conditions a 
characteristic mark of the new world, he is referring not only to the 
political equality of all citizens, but rather to the entire social struc-
ture of capitalist democratic society. Also, he often uses the political 
concept democracy when he means the bourgeois social structure 
of the postrevolutionary world. In other words, the methodological 
difficulty in interpreting Democracy in America consists in the fact 
that while the outward form of his concepts is political, their content 
nearly always refers to a sociological structure or relation. Only in 
his later work did Tocqueville acquire an adequate conceptual form 
for the content of his ideas.
III
Tocqueville traces out the general laws of the democratic movement. 
But he is well aware of the special conditions of the historical form 
of democracy in America. The Pilgrim fathers and the pioneers 
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brought to America the traditions of Anglo-Saxon freedom, a valu-
able heritage from the traditions of the middle class, deriving from 
the later Middle Ages. The struggle of the sects for spiritual liberty 
created a new sense of liberty and voluntary obedience to the law. 
Furthermore, in addition to these tendencies toward liberty, the 
equal conditions of the struggle of life, the promise of a virginal 
world and the common fate of the immigrants created the homoge-
neity and equality of democracy. Hence, it was possible in the United 
States to consider liberty and equality a priori, as organic products of 
the geographical and political situation and the historical heritage. 
In Europe, on the other hand, the situation was just the reverse, for 
there it was absolutism which, before the establishment of democ-
racy, had created by its process of levelling the factual presupposi-
tions for the political stand after the memory of medieval liberty had 
been lost for centuries. Tocqueville is wholly convinced that because 
of this difference in origin, democracy in the United States was cre-
ated by the union of the spirit of religion with the spirit of liberty. His 
personal problem, and the dominant motive of his political career, 
was to help the French democracy to realize this union of religious 
content with the form of liberty.
One must know this spiritual presupposition of Tocqueville 
before one can understand the significance of his grouping of the 
conditions for the perpetuation of democracy in three classes or 
on three levels. The highest and most important level is constituted 
by those conditions that shape the intellectual, moral and spiritual 
content of the nation, and that alone can give character, rhythm, 
and form to political institutions and social life. Therefore, for Toc-
queville, Christian morality, or at least its conventional observance, 
is indispensable to the genuine democratic form.8
Tocqueville finds the second class of conditions necessary for the 
functioning of democracy in the laws, by which he means, above 
T O C Q U E V I L L E :  M O R A L I S T  A N D  S O C I O L O G I S T 413
all, the constitution and the fundamental laws of democracy. He 
sees the greatest menace to democracy in an antagonism between 
these two groups of conditions and the decline of vitality of moral 
forces. The consequence would be that the majority in parliament 
might establish an arbitrary reign, endangering not only the rights 
of minorities, but also the national interests. In this connection, 
Tocqueville quotes Jefferson in a letter to Madison: “The execu-
tive power in our government is not the only, perhaps not even the 
principal object of my solicitude. The tyranny of the legislature is 
really a danger most to be feared and will continue to be so for many 
years to come. The tyranny of the executive will come in its term, 
but at a more distant period.” Tocqueville sees that the danger of 
despotism by a majority is countered in the United States by three 
legislative forms. First, the constitution distributes the lawmaking 
function between the individual states and the federal government. 
The United States cannot use physical force against the states, nor 
are the states able to destroy the fundamental political framework 
of the federal state. The second legislative device for the protection 
of democracy is seen by Tocqueville in the democratic constitutions 
of local and county governments. By virtue of their participation in 
and responsibility for the government of their immediate communi-
ties, citizens are educated in politics and political obligations and in 
the defense of political liberty. The chapters dealing with the town-
ships in Democracy in America are probably the most impressive and 
beautiful section of the first part. Tocqueville treats the township 
with special affection because to him this municipal democracy 
appears to be the root out of which the tree of American democracy 
grew. Here, also, he is influenced by French and other European his-
tory, for the municipalities of Western Europe were the birthplace 
of everything that was to become political liberty and democracy in 
the Western world. Tocqueville notes another important character-
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istic of the township constitution—its existence is in itself sufficient 
to make impossible a bureaucracy administered centrally by either 
the state or the federal government. Thus, Tocqueville sees in the 
existence of these municipal and regional democracies a twofold 
protection against the dangers involved in the new political institu-
tions of America. These little democratic communities will not only 
create a shelter against demagogical majority revolutions, but they 
will also be able to resist the developments of state or federal gov-
ernment in the direction of a centralized political administration. 
The third and most important barrier against the pressure of mass 
democracy Tocqueville finds in the federal judiciary and, above all, 
the Supreme Court. He is well aware that the popular election of 
judges has its dangers, both for justice and for democracy; for this 
reason, his view of the Supreme Court is all the more impressive. By 
virtue of its capacity to determine the constitutionality of legislation 
through interpretation of the spirit of the constitution, the Supreme 
Court becomes the guardian of the constitution, and thus the most 
important factor aside from the president. Hence, Tocqueville terms 
the Supreme Court the aristocratic element in the radical democratic 
order of America. He regards this aristocratic institutional factor as 
the basis for creating, by means of political and legislative institu-
tion, a balance between the constructive and the destructive forces 
of democracy, so long as these institutions remain permeated by the 
moral idealism of the people.
The third class of conditions, which Tocqueville regards as essen-
tial to democracy in America, is the peculiar form of economic labor 
and its spirit in a country that offers such immense possibilities for 
work and gain. The equal interest in profit and the ambition for 
acquisition and its chances create a social homogeneity and a com-
mon interest in prosperity, which democracy is likely to guarantee. 
Tocqueville readily admits that economic tendencies and the spirit 
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engendered by them exert a great influence upon the formation of 
democracy. But on the other hand, he holds fast to a hierarchy of 
social values that condition life to such a degree that he holds in least 
esteem the influence of economic tendencies. Tocqueville did not 
always, however, follow the inner logic of his position that religious 
and moral forces are powerful enough to shape the world. He real-
ized that it was impossible to found the new idea of political freedom 
on that of religious freedom; consequently, he sought to base it on the 
idea of the personal interest of the citizens.
IV
The presuppositions and the direction of Tocqueville’s thought come 
to even clearer expression in the second part of Democracy in Amer-
ica. Here, for the first time in the nineteenth century, the attempt 
is made to show the change in forms of human existence in and 
through the process of social development. In three great chapters, 
Tocqueville treats of the change in forms of intellectual, emotional, 
and ethical life. In this context, he once remarked that he could not 
imagine anything more barren for the human mind than an abstract 
idea. Just as Georg Hegel [1770–1831] sought the concrete concept, 
whereby to comprehend the totality of things, so also Tocqueville 
aimed at comprehending the totality of the social via an interpreta-
tion of political and social reality.
He achieves new insights into that transformation of the emo-
tions of man that has taken place since the abolition of feudal soci-
ety: under feudalism personal relationships within a family were 
determined by social norms, the heir of an estate being considered 
by his relatives as belonging to a higher social stratum, but in mod-
ern society the personal relationships among members of a family 
are shaped by the subjective power of sentiment.9 With equal clarity 
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Tocqueville recognizes how the problem of form in poetry is changed 
by the new psychological interests, and how the close attention to 
the study of individual souls is a result of the change in the social 
structure. He declares—a contention that the sociological analysis 
of literature has since proved—that the pure tale and story is sup-
planted by the psychological novel, which becomes the typical liter-
ary form of the new society. Similarly, Tocqueville notices certain 
striking changes in the realm of intellectual life.10 Thus, he believes 
that the interest in general and abstract concepts in the political and 
moral sciences, and also in history, may be regarded as a result of 
modern democracy, in which not individuality and personal effort 
but general social movements are the forces determining the course 
of history.11 Equally astonishing is the following insight, which is in 
the general direction of the thinking of Hegel and Comte, although 
there is no trace of direct influence: Tocqueville contends that in 
times of a static and feudal structure of society religious thinking 
runs parallel to the forms of social life, and the absolute is thought 
of as transcendent, as a supreme creative God and director of the 
world, but that with the rise of modern democratic mass movements 
a new metaphysical tendency begins, which tends to set this absolute 
into the process of history itself.12 Thus, Tocqueville binds a philoso-
phy of immanence into the sociological structure. The second part 
of Democracy in America moves in the direction of a sociology of 
culture.
V
Among the aphorisms found in Tocqueville’s literary remains, there 
is a remark that every political form contains within the inner logic 
of its principle the tendency toward its own destruction.13 We do not 
know when Tocqueville formulated this idea. It may perhaps have 
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originated while he was writing his Democracy in America. For here, 
by observing the functioning of democratic institutions and by elu-
cidating their possible consequences, he indicates the way whereby 
democracy could lead to a new form of undemocratic domination. 
He sees that this new political form cannot be included under any 
of the earlier concepts of absolutism and despotism since it would 
develop out of the conditions of modern life. The absolutism of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had created the absolute power 
of the crown, at least in theory. But the technical imperfections of 
the state administration and the customs and practices of a society 
organized in estates acted as limitations upon the claim to absolute 
sovereignty. With the destruction of local and corporate administra-
tion and judicial power, democracy started upon a course that made 
possible not only the centralization of political power, but also a 
rationally unified and systematized administration. In politics, the 
general tendency of rational order is toward the creation of a cen-
tralized administrative apparatus that, particularly in the hands of 
a democratic government, is capable of routinizing, directing, and 
fashioning extensive sections of social life. The sociological signifi-
cance of this tendency is seen in a rational domination of society by 
the state and in a new corporate order. In place of the old hereditary 
aristocracy, a new bureaucratic aristocracy arises. The inner bond to 
the state will be either the fear of its unlimited power or the ambi-
tion to become a member of this aristocracy of functionaries.14 To 
this tendency toward rational organization and the leveling process 
of political administration, there corresponds a growing feeling of 
privacy and individualism on the part of citizens. For Tocqueville, 
individualism signifies nothing but subjective egoism. It throws man 
back to the narrowest interests of his private existence and destroys 
all forms of community of spirit. If democracy is not in the position 
to create artificially local and provincial community forms through 
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communal and provincial self-administration, then the centralizing 
tendencies of rational organization will find no hindrance to a rule 
of the majority based on the principle of popular sovereignty; and 
the way will be open for the development of a new form of absolute, 
rational social domination.15
These tendencies naturally are not to be regarded as formal laws 
of development. They grow out of the particular character of the 
individual spheres of life within the general historical and social 
structure. The development of the political organization of a social 
structure is thus always closely related to the particular character 
of all the social and spiritual conditions constituting the historical 
moment. Just as the state makes its first steps toward rationalization 
when new potentialities of political rule are rendered available by the 
combination of a money economy and a new military technique, so 
will new political forms of democracy be crystallized by the interac-
tion of new rational tendencies in the various spheres of life. It must 
be kept in mind that while Tocqueville affirmed the inner logic of 
the development of the different spheres of life and considered their 
possible tendencies as cognizable, he nevertheless believed that there 
were limits to our understanding. Thus, it was not possible to predict 
the final decision that a nation might make concerning its destiny. 
Although no one before Marx had emphasized as strongly as Toc-
queville the determination of the intellectual and emotional life by 
the historical structure of society, Tocqueville was most deeply con-
vinced that in decisions that have to do with the total existence, not 
only individuals but also nations are capable of mastering and break-
ing through the determining forces of their existence. Consequently, 
nothing final can be said about the future of democracy, even though 
there are many signs of a new rational and absolute form of govern-
ment.
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VI
Tocqueville saw clearly also the antagonism between the political 
and economic form of democracy. He noted that the state was in a 
position to make all classes of the population dependent on it as a 
result of the development of financial economy. By state loans and 
state organization of savings banks, the state was able to bring the 
upper and middle classes into such an immediately interested rela-
tionship to itself as to guarantee an effective dependence and par-
ticipation of the citizen in a definite political form of the state.16 Ten 
years before the Communist Manifesto, Tocqueville recognized the 
deep opposition between capitalist economy and political democ-
racy and the tendency of the state to regulate economic affairs. More-
over, he observed how profoundly the new economic system began 
to change and reshape the character of mankind. He described the 
change in general social relationships, such as the relation between 
master and servant in the capitalist and democratic order. With the 
dissolution of the old patriarchal ties, there also disappeared the per-
sonal human bonds of devotion and faithfulness on one hand and 
of paternal care and responsibility on the other. Democracy creates 
a formal principle of equality between master and servant; the cor-
relate of this in the economic sphere is a purely market relationship.17 
In agriculture, a parallel situation has developed in the transforma-
tion of the relationship of manorial lord and tenant to a relationship 
based simply on economic profit. In agriculture, these new politi-
cal tendencies combine to make the ownership of land more mobile. 
This is shown above all in the system of leases that are made only for 
short periods and oriented solely on the possibility of profits. The 
laws of inheritance also take cognizance of the new economic condi-
tions in that they permit the equal division of real property among 
all children and thus further the mobilization of land.
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Tocqueville sees, particularly, the antinomy between the general 
norms of democracy, which formally guarantee to every citizen the 
right and opportunity of advancement, and the social development 
of the new industry, especially of large scale industry. He observes 
that the economic and technical opportunities for large-scale indus-
tries will bring about new agglomerations of capital and create a 
new industrial aristocracy.18 This aristocracy, however, will share 
with the old aristocracy only economic power, and in contrast to the 
latter, will be interested only in economic profit. Tocqueville clearly 
foresees the dangers presented to the social order by such a concen-
tration and collectivization of economic interests, even though he is 
inclined to underestimate it. On the other hand, he sees very clearly 
that the position of the working class in large-scale industries is in 
insoluble contradiction to the idea of democracy. These workers 
will constitute the only class or estate—but a negatively privileged 
one—in this society, which prides itself so much on having abol-
ished the estates. Without savings and without land, the workers are 
dependent upon the economic situation of the market and upon the 
wage offers of the entrepreneur. A crisis will bring them unemploy-
ment and throw them upon public charity. It is at this point that 
the state qua state will become interested in economic problems and 
will intervene in the economic order from the viewpoint of social 
policy. In this way, the control and regulation of industry in general 
becomes one of the most important problems in the tendency toward 
a new absolutism. In the measure in which the individual branches 
of industry combine and organize, their social policies, production 
policies, and economic power become matters of general concern to 
the state. Since the state itself goes into industry, particularly in the 
field of heavy industry, the development of state direction of industry 
opens the way to a new and very effective form of state absolutism—
“Industry leads us, and it in turn will be led by the state.”19 Thus, it is 
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not only the antagonism between democracy and bourgeois society 
that leads to a new transformation of the state. But the powerful eco-
nomic forces toward concentration and rational organization press 
on and pass beyond the boundaries of economic privacy to become a 
problem of general social interest, and so of political importance. In 
addition to these general economic tendencies, Tocqueville sees cer-
tain institutional forces that threaten to undermine the democracy 
of the future.
VII
Tocqueville devoted some penetrating analysis to the relations 
between a democratic social structure and its army. He observed 
here an antagonism between democracy and the immanent ten-
dency of an army, which is parallel to the antagonism revealed in 
capitalist economy. Whereas modern society loves peace and desires 
an unbroken and calculable political policy in the interest of its eco-
nomic system, the interests of a democratic army are directed toward 
war. Tocqueville derives this phenomenon from the social compo-
sition of the class of officers and noncommissioned officers. In an 
aristocratic social structure, military service is a class privilege, and 
military rank is independent of the position of the different groups 
of nobility. In a democracy, on the other hand, where the army does 
not occupy the same social position as in an aristocratic society, the 
social rank of the officer depends on his position in the service, and 
his income derived therefrom. Since advancement during peacetime 
is determined only by length of service, there is always an active spirit 
of unrest among officers that makes them avid for the opportunities 
for distinction and advancement in rank that come with success in 
war. The only counterweight to these political interests of the officers 
is found in the civilian spirit of the soldiers, who receive their mili-
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tary training as part of the system of general military service. Since 
the latter group is always changing, while the officers’ corps remains 
constant—for this is their life career—the military and warlike spirit 
of this core of the army remains a permanent source of danger for 
the foreign policy and peace of a democracy. With astonishingly 
keen insight, Tocqueville foresees that wars will become more rare 
in coming generations in the measure in which economic and politi-
cal factors become interconnected in a democracy. But, on the other 
hand, if a war comes, it will plunge into a common ruin the indis-
solubly interconnected world of modern democracies. It is not only 
the possible unfortunate outcome of such a war that can be so fateful 
for democracy. Any protracted war can undermine and destroy the 
constitution of a liberal democracy, and there is not even any need 
for a military coup by victorious generals. The gradual centralization 
of all the institutions important for life and the conduct of the war, 
combined with the regimentation of the entire population, may even 
under a civil government prove to be a slow transition to a perma-
nent form of modern state slavery. Tocqueville finds analogies for 
such a course only in the late Roman period. In the measure in which 
a modern democracy pursues a rational and peaceful foreign policy 
and in its domestic policy advances toward political and administra-
tive centralization, the restless spirit of the army may make possible a 
military dictatorship. Such a dictatorship will be quite different from 
that of a Caesar or Napoleon. Instead, it will find available a widely 
ramified and thoroughly rationalized administrative system that is 
an obedient instrument in the hands of the existing executive power. 
“I am convinced that in such a case a sort of merging between the 
attitudes of the clerk and soldier will take place. The administrative 
system will take on something of the military spirit and the military 
something of the civilian spirit. The result will be a military govern-
ment, regular, clear, precise, and absolute. The people will take on 
T O C Q U E V I L L E :  M O R A L I S T  A N D  S O C I O L O G I S T 423
the appearance of an army and society of military barracks.”20 Such 
tendencies need not develop under pressure; they may also be the 
result of general apathy and lack of interest, which Tocqueville con-
siders the products of a subjective egoism that has deprived men of 
any sort of communal spirit. The executive power will then without 
any danger make itself master of the constitution. In the following 
phase, it will be relieved of its power by a dictator and thirty men, 
who will take possession of the executive state apparatus. Neither the 
executive nor the dictator can establish anything permanent.21 The 
very reason for the easy success of the dictatorships makes it impos-
sible to believe that they will continue for a long time in power. They 
are able to seize power because none resists their attempt, but they 
will fall also because no one will sustain them in their power. Thus, 
Tocqueville sees in different aspects of modern life parallel tenden-
cies that are pressing on to a new form of absolute sovereignty. In 
the rational centralized order of the political and social world, in the 
technical and economic increase of industrial rationalization, cer-
tain tendencies are arising that point inevitably to a central, unified, 
and standardized regulation of our entire life. In addition to this, 
there is a tremendous danger of the relaxation of the will to freedom 
and its substitution by a dull indifference. Tocqueville is emphatic 
in his warning against this attitude, as this adds subjective elements 
to the objective tendencies toward despotism. In this connection, 
it is worth repeating Tocqueville’s observation that the old expres-
sions of despotism and tyranny are unsuitable for any new form of 
absolutism emerging out of democracy. This new form of absolutism 
will differ from all preceding ones in content and structure. It will 
be the child of modern rationalism, of the leveling process and of 
antagonisms in the economic world under conditions of opposition 
between militarism and democracy. For this reason, Tocqueville 
believes that the only possibility for maintaining democracy lies in 
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citizens’ consciousness of responsibility and their deep love of lib-
erty, finding expression in their political rights. 
VIII
Tocqueville’s idea of freedom leads us to the profoundest part of his 
thought. On the basis of sociological and historical knowledge, he 
ventures into the realm of general and permanent forms of human 
existence. Like Søren Kierkegaard [1813–1855] and Ludwig Feuer-
bach [1804–1872], the ultimate aim of his knowledge is a doctrine of 
man and a theory of social and political existence. It is not by chance 
that this was the inner tendency of his thinking. Ever since the Soph-
ists, we can observe that a time of social change produces a particular 
type of philosophizing. The conditions of human existence and the 
general forms of life become the central problem of thinking and the 
concrete concept the most important need in this intellectual situa-
tion. Only in this light can we understand how it is possible to find in 
Tocqueville’s empirical analysis judgments concerning the value of 
social tendencies and relations for human existence. He was fearful 
of the stunting of mankind through occupational specialization and 
increased technical organization. He foresaw the dissolution and the 
dehumanizing technization of the forms of the economic process 
under a system of rational direction and administration, and the 
devitalization and degradation of labor to merely a dull mechani-
cal exertion of force. He envisaged the approach of a time when the 
state will not only assume the responsibility for social welfare, but 
will also take over the schools and churches, converting them into 
political institutions and the clergy into state officials. Since the state 
will intervene in and fashion the innermost character of man, it will 
limit, stultify, and destroy the general character of human life. It was 
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this danger—the possibility that in the modern democratic world 
man will come to exert a more or less mechanical function in an 
enormous abstract state machine—that determined Tocqueville’s 
idea of freedom. As early as 1836, he wrote to a friend, “I am a liberal 
of a new kind.”22 In Democracy in America, he definitely expressed 
his mistrust of the political liberals, for he was well aware that his 
doctrine of freedom was not compatible with contemporary political 
theories. It is almost symbolic of his inner loneliness and forlornness 
in this world that the gift of his friend John Stuart Mill [1806–1873], 
the first edition of On Liberty, came to him on his deathbed.
Tocqueville knew that every historical and social structure 
produces its own form and specific concept of freedom. From his 
own experience, he knew the very spiritualized form of aristocratic 
freedom, through which personal courage, moral responsibility, and 
spiritual definiteness were realized. But this historical form made 
transparent for him the eternal task of freedom. It is the everlasting 
function of freedom to make possible and guarantee the spiritual, 
moral, and intellectual realization of personal perfection. Freedom 
therefore stands in the service of the highest and ultimate values. It 
is that form of life by and through which the historical man breaks 
through the conditions of his existence and participates in an eter-
nal order. In contrast to the negative concept of freedom of political 
liberalism, Tocqueville’s concept may be designated as one of exis-
tential freedom. That is, whereas the political idea of freedom merely 
sets up a relationship between the state and the individual citizen, 
Tocqueville undertakes the task of showing in a positive way what is 
the function and meaning of freedom in the totality of man’s social 
existence, no matter how various its historical forms may be. His 
gravest concern is that every kind of freedom will be eliminated or 
destroyed in a modern democracy as a result of the growing omnip-
otence of the state. If social justice is a social goal of the modern 
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democratic world, the corresponding existential concepts must be 
personal dignity, responsibility, and virtue as forms of the individual 
realization of the social ideal. Will these ideas, however, be able to 
assert themselves, find their place and preserve their function in a 
world that organizes human existence under the rational and inexo-
rable direction of the state? One hundred years before the despairing 
attitude of Max Weber [1864–1920], Tocqueville raised the identi-
cal question that was the basis of Weber’s work: How will it be pos-
sible in this world to preserve those forms of life in which personal, 
intellectual, and spiritual realization are possible? For Tocqueville, 
the future of democracy is dependent on the balance between these 
forms of intellectual freedom and the institutions of a social demo-
cratic order. Because he is fearful that the weight of order will over-
balance that of freedom in the modern world, he clings all the more 
passionately to his idea of freedom as a permanent form of human 
realization. His optimism concerning democracy is to be explained 
only as a pedagogic and didactic attempt. The actual content of all 
his work is deeply pessimistic as to the future of political and social 
development. 
IX
The analysis of democracy and the investigation of its social prin-
ciples dominated the thinking of Tocqueville even after the great 
work on the American democracy. In his most beautiful book, the 
Mémoires, he has given a penetrating sociological description of the 
political and civil society of the bourgeois monarchy and its parlia-
mentarism. Here we find a profound analysis and characterization 
of the incapacity of the revolutionists of 1848, and also his ideas on 
the different socialist systems and their possibilities. It was in this 
connection that he asked himself whether the idea of private prop-
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erty is really a permanent form of human nature or will be dissolved 
and destroyed by the new social movements. The speech delivered 
in parliament in January 1848 prophesying the coming revolution 
is the most famous of his political career. And the portraits of Louis 
Philippe [1773–1850], Louis-Napoléon [1808–1873], Louis-Eugène 
Cavaignac [1802–1857], and the radicals of the French parliament 
are vivid individual characterizations of different political types.
In studying Niccolò Machiavelli [1469–1527],23 he notes that the 
Florentine democracy of that time was altogether different from 
every type of modern democracy and comparable only to that of 
the ancient world. A particular interest in past and present forms 
of democracy and in the problems of democratic federalism pro-
duced his various remarks and studies on the Swiss democracy. His 
combination of sociological and political insights enabled him to 
prophesy its civil war (Sonderbundskrieg) and to understand the one 
constitutional form of Swiss federalism. The Swiss historian Emil 
Dürr [1883–1934] has praised the profound empirical analysis and 
the acuteness of his political perspicacity in the treatment of Swiss 
democracy.24
Even L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution is dominated by the prob-
lems of the new social structure and its political institutions. It 
was the first introductory volume of a large work planned for three 
volumes and intended to follow the development of the social and 
political organization from the ancien régime to the Empire, and to 
describe the transformation of man in this period.25
In the correspondence with Gobineau, especially in the letters 
reviewing Gobineau’s Inequality of Races, the spiritual attitude of 
Tocqueville finds strong and sublime expression. Not only does he 
reject the content of Gobineau’s book, the conclusions of which he 
regards as questionable, but he revolts particularly against its biolog-
ical materialism and the political consequences. There are the most 
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important differences between the two friends in the interpretation 
of human nature. Gobineau knows man only as a biological being; 
Tocqueville understands man as living in freedom, in every moment 
experiencing the possible perfection of his personality. Against the 
materialistic pessimism and vital heroism of Gobineau, Tocqueville 
sets up confidence in the justice of God and spiritual heroism. 
Nowhere so much as in these letters do we understand how deeply 
Tocqueville was influenced by the spirit of Port-Royal, which taught 
that the greatest tension exists between God and the world and which 
engendered an almost Calvinistic rigor of moral sentiment.
Romain Rolland [1866–1944] has attempted to describe this 
conflict as generational, with Gobineau representing the younger 
generation, which destroyed the liberal ideals of progress, humanity, 
liberty, and justice after the disillusionment of 1848, and opposed 
to them a heroic pessimism. Rolland understands the conflict of 
the friends as a symbol of an eternal movement of the mind. “It is 
one of the perpetual movements of the human pendulum oscillat-
ing between two poles and seeking the point of equilibrium. But the 
pendulum is too strong and always swings beyond this point. But 
this strength itself, these oscillations between the opposite poles are 
but the rhythms of history, the breath of humanity.”26 The metaphor 
Rolland finds for the movement of the mind is very true and impres-
sive. But he forgets that the thinking of the two men takes place in 
different spheres. Gobineau writes as a political thinker and is inter-
ested only in the political consequences of his ideas. In a sociologi-
cal analysis, his work can be correlated with the resentment of the 
vanquished nobility that had to call in question, minimize, and even 
destroy the biological racial status, the vital value of the ruling class, 
in order to justify its own pretensions. Although Tocqueville’s work 
contains the most important concrete political analysis, it is a philo-
sophical one, pointing out the conditions of modern life, the political 
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possibilities, and the place of personal perfection in this world. From 
his view, human life is an incessant striving toward the fulfillment 
of its obligation to state and nation, and an aspiration toward perfec-
tion through spiritual freedom.
This is the legacy of Tocqueville for our times, his actual signifi-
cance for our day. Therefore, it is impossible to dispose of his work 
as part of the historical movement of nineteenth-century liberalism. 
Tocqueville knew very well that his attitude was out of tune with 
his times and that he was sharing the destiny of all thinkers who 
transcend their epoch—solitude and misunderstanding. Repeatedly 
in his letters to different friends are utterances corresponding almost 
literally to a phrase of the aged Johann Wolfgang von Goethe [1749–
1832] to Zelter [1758–1832]: “We are the last of an epoch, which will 
not return so soon.”
These words cannot be interpreted as an expression of a dying 
class. Rather, they present in an arresting form the consciousness of 
the solitude of a spiritual existence combined with an understanding 
of the complexity of human nature and its permanent structural ele-
ments in the midst of the political interests of the different groups of 
his period. Wilhelm Dilthey [1833–1911] wisely considered him the 
greatest political philosopher after Aristotle and Machiavelli.27   
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It is indicative of the profound personality of Alexis de Tocqueville 
[1805–1859] that he and his work have gained in stature and rel-
evance since his death in 1859. In 1959 we remember Tocqueville 
as a philosopher of freedom and as a human being who established 
an image of human integrity in an age of revolution. We do not cel-
ebrate an academic centenary. During the century since his death, 
he has been classified as historian, sociologist, moralist, and political 
scientist, as if his work had been in academic fields, but Tocqueville 
explicitly rejected the idea that he wrote his books as a scholar for the 
promotion of learning.
Tocqueville was born in July 1805, shortly after Napoleon had 
made himself emperor. His family remained true to the revered tra-
dition of the old monarchy. His parents and brothers were proud to 
belong to an old feudal clan of Normandy that had served the kings 
for centuries, and they continued their loyalty to the dynasty dur-
ing the period of revolution. Though the Tocquevilles did not belong 
to the highest ranks of nobility and were of mediocre wealth, they 
were respected and esteemed by all classes of society. Alexis de Toc-
Published originally in a slightly different form under the title, “Tocqueville, 1959,” 
in Social Research 26 (Winter 1959), 449–70. Republished by permission from 
Social Research.
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queville was loved by the voters in his electoral district, who trusted 
him for his integrity.
On his mother’s side, Tocqueville was related to the Noblesse de 
la Robe. The great and brave Guillaume-Chrétien de Lamoignon de 
Malesherbes, his great-grandfather, had been assigned by the Con-
vention to defend Louis XVI [1754–1793] and courageously defied 
the revolutionaries, fully aware that he would die under the guil-
lotine. From both families, Tocqueville learned the relevance of 
authority and freedom for the viability of a body politic.
Of his two main books, De la démocratie en Amérique and 
L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution, the latter was the first volume of 
a grandiose project for a general work on the French Revolution. 
According to Tocqueville, the two books were two aspects of the 
same problem: the place of man in the age of democratic revolutions 
and the standards of democratic social classes. Actually, the problem 
was for him that of human self-interpretation in an age of transfor-
mations. Self-interpretation is a philosophical rather than a scientific 
mode of reflection; for this reason, his friend Gustave de Beaumont 
[1802–1866] was right when he called Tocqueville a philosopher who 
was concerned with the place of man in a world of unceasing revo-
lutions. His basic questions were anthropological, historical, and 
existential. 
A Human Image of Greatness
There are two types of authors: one is as a human personality inferior 
to his books; the other, through the strength of his personality, sur-
passes the literary or philosophical force of his writings. Tocqueville 
belonged to the latter type. He showed, indeed, a potential greatness 
as statesman and a spark of genius as writer and thinker, but his 
work remained fragmentary. His political career as a constructive 
minister was disrupted by the rising tide of a new despotism; his 
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literary career was cut off when he succumbed to the slow destruc-
tion of tuberculosis.
During his short life, Tocqueville, against all odds, realized the 
image of a fearless and free human being. He challenged the reac-
tionary principles of his aristocratic family, disgracing them by his 
liberal-conservative position in politics and, regardless of his reputa-
tion, by his writing. He married an English commoner who was as 
feeble in health as he. With the power of his mind and will he fought 
his physical organism, his society, and the exigencies of political life.
He made it evident that the test of human greatness is the disci-
pline required to be superior to the vagaries of destiny, and gave us an 
unforgettable example of a personality able to hope against hope, to 
have faith in spite of all defeats, and to love life for the sake of unfold-
ing the strength of the mind and its basic potentialities. He was a 
Stoic thinker who blended the attitude of Epictetus [55–135] with 
that of a Christian. In 1959 he is to us a normative image of a human 
being who remained an old-fashioned lover of freedom in a world of 
conformism and servility. To us who are old-fashioned lovers of free-
dom under the shadow of totalitarian imperialism and technological 
standardization, he sets standards of courage and integrity amidst 
threats of new social, economic, and political despotisms.
When he died, he was mourned by the educated classes in all 
the liberal societies of the Western world. He was considered by 
them a liberal in the political and economic sense, as that term 
was understood in the first half of the nineteenth century. This 
classification was appropriate. Though he had joined one of the 
liberal-conservative groups when he was elected to the Chamber 
of Deputies, he remained true to the principle of constitutional 
government—regardless of whether it was monarchical or republi-
can—throughout his career and to the end of his life. He was firmly 
convinced that this pattern of government was the necessary form 
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of politics for all future western societies. The contemporary types 
of despotism, such as that of Louis-Napoléon [1808–1873], he tended 
to regard as mere accidents. Likewise, he shared the faith of the lib-
erals in classical economics, repeatedly contending that the laws of 
economics are eternal, not transitory, and that the radical workers 
should be indoctrinated with the true teachings of classical econom-
ics. Politically and economically, he was in agreement with many 
of his aristocratic and patrician friends and, in particular, with the 
great liberal thinkers in England. Tocqueville took his political and 
economic convictions very seriously. There was a kind of gravity and 
solemnity around him that induced Amantine-Lucile-Aurore Dupin 
aka George Sand [1804–1876] to call him a stuffed shirt. That he was 
an intransigent liberal in an age of revolution may explain why for a 
time his work and personality fell under the eclipse that later shad-
owed the period of liberalism.
This liberalism, however, was just the surface of a man who was 
equipped with creative powers transcending his historical limita-
tions. Like Honoré de Balzac [1799–1850], he had the imagination 
to visualize the merging of economic, social, and technological 
transformations into a total revolution; by reflection on his political 
experiences, he was able to corroborate his vision analytically. He 
succeeded in penetrating the total social situation and in conceiving 
its relevance for and effects on the standards of society. He lived con-
sciously through an epoch that he himself called an age of unceasing 
revolution. To him, a society in the pangs of radical transformations 
offered a unique opportunity to learn the scope and intensity of 
human passions—a conviction that implies both his anthropological 
concerns and his philosophy of history.
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Political Elite in a Democracy
In remembering Tocqueville today, on the centenary of his death, we 
are less interested in him as an historical liberal than as a statesman 
who was probably the first to ask a challenging question that we still 
have not answered: How is it possible to construct a political elite in 
a democratic society?
The French Revolution had destroyed the traditions of a political 
elite as a class of nobles—those who by virtue of pedigree, education, 
and wealth filled the king’s offices in politics and administration and 
had a monopoly of office in the army and navy. Social status gave 
them a fearlessness, independence of judgment, and moral integrity 
that made the best of them the successors of the great politiques of 
the sixteenth century. A few, thinking in terms of political responsi-
bility, were alarmed that the government did not recognize the need 
for reforms of the constitution and of the systems of taxation.
In contrast, Tocqueville’s practical experience as a member of 
the Chamber of Deputies convinced him that democratic govern-
ment had very poor foundations indeed. The majority rule involved 
grave dangers to political planning and continuity of policy. It was 
exposed to the hazards of shifting pluralities that were often the 
result of regional conflicts or vested economic interests. Tocqueville 
was alarmed, in particular, by the banking and commercial interests 
that tried to disguise their concerns as congruent with the welfare 
of the state. He understood this condition of a bourgeois democracy 
as a genuine dilemma of the body politic, and the topic of a political 
elite became a leitmotif of his reflections.
On his second visit to England, in 1835, he compared British, 
French, and Irish nobilities, seeking the image of a normative elite in 
an ideal political structure. He gave a grim description of the vicious 
practices of Anglo-Irish nobles, and condemned their exploitation 
of a poor, humiliated people. To Tocqueville, such behavior was a 
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disgrace to a true nobility. He had praise, however, for the English 
aristocrats. These, he believed, would always prefer the duration of 
political leadership and control to selfish economic advantages. As 
a political realist, he knew that the English nobility had its vested 
interests, as did all other classes. To him, however, the problem was 
how far economic and political advantages were interrelated, or even 
identical.
Even so, his appreciation of the English nobility is subject to 
criticism. Tocqueville himself, in his Letters from England (1835), 
described the unbelievable misery of the working classes in Man-
chester. This is an unforgettably gruesome and somber picture, 
and, in drawing it, he forgot everything of classical economics and 
became Marxist, bluntly stating that the misery of the workers was 
fully explained by the great profits of the manufacturers. The whole 
analysis anticipates Engels’s famous work on The Condition of the 
Working Class in England. There was not the slightest interest in this 
condition among the members of the nobility.
A contrasting background to Tocqueville’s praise of the Eng-
lish nobles as an ideal ruling class was his emphasis on the irre-
sponsible characteristics of the prerevolutionary French nobility. 
He subscribed to the adverse criticism of the French nobles made 
by the Abbé Sieyès [1748–1836] in his powerful pamphlet, What is 
the Third Estate?, which regarded the nobles as characterized by a 
lack of political morality and a greed for economic privileges. They 
had accepted the privileges that the kings had extended to them, 
whereas, in Tocqueville’s opinion, they should have revolted against 
their political degradation and elimination from government. 
They had sold their political birthright for the precarious privilege 
of exploiting their subjects to the utmost. They had a considerable 
amount of responsibility for the revolution, even though a politically 
responsible minority worked feverishly during the years 1787–88 to 
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avert the break in social continuity and to achieve a constitutional 
government through legal reforms. In stressing the irresponsible ele-
ment in the conduct of the French nobles, Tocqueville attempted to 
explain an important cause for the rise of revolutionary resentments.
But he felt strongly that the class that had formerly exercised 
political control had certain great advantages over the new politi-
cians, certain valuable traditions that were absent in the new society. 
The nobles in government had been economically independent, an 
advantage often not possessed by the representatives of the nation in 
a democratic government. The members of the nobility had carried 
on traditions of political wisdom, based on the many and various 
historical situations their forebears had encountered; they remem-
bered the ways of proceeding in certain contexts, and were aware of 
the alternatives of political decisions; they had learned that govern-
ment is art rather than science. The democratic leaders, who were 
expected to represent the regional or occupational interests of their 
constituents, were mere delegates, rather than responsible statesmen 
who gave the authority of their convictions to the nation as a whole. 
The new state had given up the conception of a political elite for the 
rule of majorities and their representatives. This democratic modus 
operandi was producing a rapid ascendancy of bureaucracy in gov-
ernments.
Balzac was the first to understand the power exercised by bureau-
cracies over democratically elected parliaments in the modern age 
of specialization. Tocqueville gained the same conception from 
his experience in politics. He was keenly aware that government 
bureaucrats could not be a political elite. Indeed, when they were 
not directed and controlled by a political elite, they were a danger to 
political constructivism. On the other hand, he recognized the diffi-
culty of building up a political elite when economic power was vested 
in capitalistic enterprise and only indirectly in political organisms. 
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No longer did either landed or capitalistic power create independent 
minds. In an age of revolution, all positions of power were subject to 
pecuniary prejudices.
In this context, he evolved his concept of the attitude appropri-
ate to the responsible statesman. In a world in which everything has 
become a commodity, and the economy has made it a business prop-
osition to increase economic desires, the man who wishes to keep 
his integrity and inner freedom should be ready to withdraw from 
the temptations of the market society. He should escape into a life 
of modesty and asceticism in order to remain independent morally 
and free intellectually. Distance from the labyrinth of the capitalistic 
world will give men the opportunity to be free.
The same rule is valid for a political elite. The new elite will no 
longer be a distinct class, as was the nobility. It will be a communion 
of ascetic people committed and dedicated to the restoration of a 
body politic; it will unite the variety of group interests into a whole 
community that transcends the living, the dead, and the unborn. 
The new elite will take up again the pattern of earlier elites: the tra-
dition of political wisdom, the independence of judgment, and the 
continual reexamination of political prejudices.
In 1847, Tocqueville joined a group that might have developed 
into a party that today we would call Christian Democratic. Its mem-
bers aspired to raise the standards of the working masses materially, 
socially, and intellectually, within the classical capitalistic system. 
This group was not strong enough, however, to cope with the prob-
lems of the social revolution.
Closer to Tocqueville’s conception of what a political elite should 
look like were the revolutionary parties. They presented a new type 
of political intellectual, the first men in French politics who were not 
brought up in the great literary traditions of France. In the past, the 
most antagonistic political groups had an element of unity through 
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their common roots in the great literary past of the nation. The new 
radical intellectuals, living by their political journals and social 
periodicals, were uprooted from and contemptuous of the chain of 
political and moral thought in France and England. But they were 
totally dedicated to their ideas.
Thus, though Tocqueville hated all radical ideas and attitudes, 
he felt that the antirevolutionary classes could learn from the radi-
cals what an elite should look like. He believed that the power of 
a political party rested with the total devotion of its members, its 
will to fight and to conquer. Such will requires discipline, selection, 
and obedience. The conservative and liberal groups, he maintained, 
had the possibilities of establishing such a forceful party. They were 
united by a common concern to maintain freedom and the con-
stitution, regardless of their diverse interests, and they trusted one 
another because all felt that their cause was at stake. This conviction 
gave them the spirit of sacrifice, the discipline, and subordination 
indispensable to counteract radical action. Tocqueville hoped that 
such a response to an emergency situation would create the political 
elite of modern democracy.
He had seen in the United States that a democratic elite is possi-
ble. There he found American patricians in a democratic setting who 
still enjoyed the authority of the founders of the republic; families 
devoted to the commonweal and public office; professional groups, 
such as men of law, ministers, academic people, who enjoyed some 
independence economically and socially. In all groups was a politi-
cal and religious conviction that working for the body politic is a 
responsibility of those who possess wealth, social prestige, and the 
authority of learning.
Tocqueville saw that all these social classes could contribute to 
the formation of a political elite in France. He pointed out the impor-
tance of the legal professions in politics as a dynamic and flexible 
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group. Though he was distressed that the big economic powers had 
infiltrated the political area without contributing to the formation 
of a political elite, he believed that the possibilities of a democratic 
elite could be actualized by the voluntary service of the educated and 
professional classes. They would establish the keen independence, 
the civil courage, and the authority of political tradition that would 
affirm the pattern of democratic leadership in the new society.
The Ethos of Society
Tocqueville often mentioned in his correspondence that political 
institutions as patterns of government were not his primary interest. 
As statesman and “sociologist,” he wanted to observe the function-
ing of the organs of government and administration. It was his genu-
inely political approach that prompted him to ask: What is the state 
of mind of the rulers and ruled? What are their attitudes toward each 
other, and what their habits of heart and belief? He investigated the 
ethos of society pragmatically and philosophically, seeing that the 
basic questions concerned the possibilities of human self-realization 
and endurance. What human beings are willing to achieve and to 
suffer, what common men and women are willing and able to take, is 
of compelling concern to the statesman and to the philosopher in the 
study of human nature. For this reason, his questions were anthro-
pological. What will human beings look like in a rapidly expanding 
democratic world in which equality will prevail over liberty? Where 
will we find political convictions in capitalistic societies? Can we 
raise the intellectual and moral standards of the democratic masses 
without lowering our own standards?
The anthropological perspective of Tocqueville’s thought is one 
aspect of his philosophical quest for the meaning of history. Like 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel [1770–1831] and Auguste Comte 
[1798–1857] and many of his contemporaries, he believed, or tried 
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to believe, that a final meaning is visible in the progress of history. 
He called this evolution “providential history” and endowed it with 
a spiritual halo of Christian convictions. He bravely admitted the 
defeat of his own class as a sign of providence, and he accepted the 
rise of the middle classes as the will of God. The advance of democ-
racy was a providential necessity. In the United States, he had seen 
that democracy and liberty were compatible with each other. He 
was heartened to see the freedoms of the American: the democratic 
freedom that recognizes the interaction of individual and society in 
ordered liberty, the freedom of the Christian who voluntarily under-
stands democracy as a religious way of life, and the freedom of the 
frontiersman in face of nature and man. He was doubtful, however, 
that the well-balanced equilibrium of liberty and democracy, as real-
ized in the United States, could be readily transplanted to Europe. 
Providential history was undergoing a grave test in the revolutionary 
world of the European continent.
In probing his anthropological questions, Tocqueville’s method 
was what I will tentatively call “sociological”—sociological because 
he was not interested in individuals as makers of history. He 
emphatically declared that there are only classes, with their con-
flicts, cooperation, and accommodation. Classes are historical phe-
nomena because society and men are by nature historical. In their 
interaction, historical classes make up the process of history. This is 
a genuinely Marxist statement. Tocqueville was, indeed, a conserva-
tive Marxist. He was conservative because his radical critique of the 
bourgeois society and of its capitalistic system had as its yardstick 
the value attitudes of a past political society, and because the critique 
comes from an aristocratic political class, not from an economic 
proletariat.
In his Democracy in America, he analyzed the changing social 
relationships between the industrial employer and his worker, com-
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paring them with the patriarchal interaction of the manorial lord 
and his serfs and dependent agricultural laborers. The modern 
relationship is a purely contractual arrangement between business 
partners, one of which is unequal to the other. There are no moral 
obligations or human affections. The new industrial lords have estab-
lished a business feudalism, more cruel and exploitative than any-
thing the feudal lords could have imagined.
As a member of the Chamber of Deputies, Tocqueville often 
addressed the bourgeois parties—the representatives of financial 
and banking capital—in this spirit. His life as a statesman and 
parliamentarian gave him ample opportunity to observe the dan-
gerous effect of capitalistic interests on the democratic state. Thus, 
he emphasized that the state is not a machine that has the function 
of satisfying the interests of the rich or of any monopolistic class. 
The state is a political institution—that is, it should unify all special 
interests of the various social classes in a meaningful solidarity of 
the whole body politic. Like Thomas More [1478–1535] and Desid-
erius Erasmus [1466–1536] in the Renaissance, Tocqueville told the 
businessmen of the capitalistic society that the body politic is a moral 
institution and not a tool for exploitation.
Even the body politic has, of course, its economic foundations. 
No state can last if it is not organized around an adequate and equi-
table system of taxation. And Tocqueville’s insight into the economic 
foundations of the modern state in the modern money economy pro-
duced a brilliant thesis on the revolutionary character of the absolute 
state. He saw the absolute state as the result of a revolution in which 
the king liberates himself from constitutional institutions, such as 
estates or parliaments, in order to be free and independent in rais-
ing taxes for his own military or domestic projects. In executing the 
revolution from the top, kings laid the groundwork for the revolu-
tion by the masses from the grass roots.
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Tocqueville emphasized the pressure of economic interests on the 
state. In L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution, his last book, written after 
twelve years of political activity, he discussed in detail the unfair dis-
tribution of taxes and services among the classes. The high ranks of 
society were free from taxation, and the middle classes could escape 
its burden, for they could easily move to the towns when taxes in the 
countryside were overwhelming. People paid taxes according to their 
domicile, regardless of their landed wealth, and taxes in the urban 
areas were less burdensome. Tocqueville thoroughly analyzed the 
budgetary troubles of Louis XVI. The king and his administration 
had inaugurated public works projects in agriculture and industry, 
but they had not covered the costs by appropriate taxation. The result 
was inflation, which increased the discontent of all classes, business 
and consumers alike, and antagonized them against the govern-
ment. It became a unifying revolutionary force, as it has been ever 
since. And while this economic discontent was spreading the spirit 
of radical criticism to all classes, the social and economic situation of 
the peasants became explosive. Tocqueville established this process 
as a natural development in revolutionary behavior.
The peasants carried the main burden of direct and indirect taxa-
tion. In addition, they had to perform services for the nobles who 
owned the landed property. But many nobles no longer lived in the 
countryside; their superintendents administered the land and treated 
the peasants as objects to be exploited. The others, who lived in the 
countryside because they were poor, also lived off the sweat and 
labor of their peasants, who were struggling to earn the rents they 
owed the noble gentlemen. Gone was the patriarchal relationship 
that had established moral bonds and affections of charity between 
the nobles and their dependents on the land. No longer was the right 
of the lords to claim services and receive obedience matched by an 
obligation of responsibility and of charity to the poor. Tocqueville 
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described at length the process of dehumanization that had taken 
place when the nobles became owners of privileges. It was one of 
the causes of the revolution, for the disappearance of traditions of 
reciprocal service destroyed the bonds between rulers and ruled, 
without which no state can last. In his interpretation of this pro-
cess, he coined the term absenteeism of the heart. Thorstein Veblen 
[1857–1929] should have enjoyed the term. It ought to be accepted in 
the dictionary of a leisure class.
Tocqueville discovered a general social rule that is as valid today 
as it was at the time of the French Revolution. This is his thesis that all 
ruling classes indoctrinate the ruled with ideal images of themselves. 
They teach the subjects that the king is their good and benevolent 
father, that the ruling groups are the fair and generous guardians of 
their trust, and that the judges are wise and equitable men who have 
compassion for the poor. The subjects themselves are the dear, good, 
innocent people who, it is ordained, must work for their superiors.
Society lives by such images; they make society work. The imag-
ery is taken for granted by rulers and ruled until the ruled begin to 
be aware of the reality of the social situation. They will then trans-
form the traditional images into counterimages. The patriarchal king 
becomes the tyrant, the nobleman appears as hawk, and the judge as 
slave of the mighty. The rulers, however, still maintain the image of 
the pastoral goodness of the peasant; they continue their games even 
when the peasants are already in a spirit of revolt. Tocqueville was 
shaken by this grim spectacle.
The theory of images and counterimages, established by Toc-
queville and philosophically elaborated by Max Scheler [1874–1928], 
is one of the great discoveries that Tocqueville made in reflecting 
on the rise of the revolutionary spirit. The changes in the adherence 
to and interpretation of images indicate the degree of solidarity in 
social interaction. What the classes think of one another, what posi-
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tive or negative images men have of their superiors and inferiors, is 
a fundamental problem to the statesman and—today—to the social 
scientists who advise him.
The Process of History
Conspicuous in Tocqueville’s analyses is his continuous application 
of the comparative method in history, in order to establish gener-
alizations that could enable him to make articulate the specific 
character of general social phenomena. Long before Max Weber, 
he compared the mediaeval democracy of Florence and its revolu-
tions with the modern trend toward radical democracies. He saw the 
analogy between the Napoleonic Empire and the Roman Republic, 
as democratic despotisms; in both cases, the constitutional institu-
tions remained fictitious. He saw likewise a correspondence between 
bourgeois society under the regime of Louis-Napoléon and that 
under the Roman emperors. “There will be highly sophisticated 
and civilized societies. They will be politically degenerate and leave 
everything to the rulers and to their bureaucracies. There will be no 
will to freedom, no desire to make personal decisions, no dedication 
to the commonwealth.” Thus, Tocqueville visualized the future of a 
formerly free world, tamed by the sweet and soft new despots.
He believed that the period of the absolute state was the happiest 
time of the French monarchy. The kings were then no longer depen-
dent on the feudal nobility and not yet the prisoners of the bourgeoi-
sie. This thesis shows, however, that he never studied the Mémoires of 
Louis Duc de Saint-Simon [1675–1755], which had been published by 
1830. He could have learned from them that the contemporaries of 
Louis XIV called him “the king of vile bourgeoisie” and recognized 
the absolute state as part of the bourgeois revolution.
On all levels of political action, Tocqueville discovered eco-
nomic causes and social motives conditioning behavior patterns. 
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After the June 1848 revolution, he flatly predicted that the imperial 
regime of Louis-Napoléon would come. The bourgeoisie of all ranks 
was shocked by the socialist upheaval and was willing to exchange 
freedom for economic security and prosperity. They, therefore, sup-
ported Louis-Napoléon.
Tocqueville anticipated that the pressures of the modern econ-
omy on the state would increase with the accelerated tempo of capi-
talist development. He found a paradox in this development. The 
liberal societies proclaimed limitation of the powers of the state to 
the barest essentials of social order. At the same time, they assigned 
to the state new areas of legislative and executive power, in order to 
protect their interests against the rising proletariat and foreign busi-
ness competitors. By doing so, they continuously increased what, in 
principle, they wished to weaken.
Tocqueville conceived of the social revolution as a technological 
one. He understood the general bureaucratization on all levels of 
military, judicial, and political administration as the opening of an 
avenue that would lead to all kinds of managerial welfare states and 
new patterns of planned despotism. Thus, he met with the Duc de 
Saint-Simon on the crossroads of the social revolution, where eco-
nomic and technological trends merged. Here, Tocqueville showed 
himself the founder of a sociology of politics, even if he would have 
rejected the classification.
To understand the state as administration was a genuinely socio-
logical conception. L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution was the first 
interpretation of a revolutionary process as a technological revolu-
tion. The elimination of the feudal nobility as a political element in 
the state was possible because the technical and financial necessities 
of the state made bureaucratic administrations indispensable. Toc-
queville recognized that the process of history is in itself revolution-
ary: what appear to be tiny technological inventions often prove to 
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be momentous events that transform the social and political worlds. 
The absolute state as a military and civilian bureaucracy, controlling 
a king as a symbol of political unity, prepares the pattern for the 
modern state. Tocqueville’s analysis of the hierarchical bureaucratic 
institutions and their contact with members of different classes was 
one of the great illuminations and advances in sociological thinking. 
But for him, it was simply the art of politics.
The people retain an indoctrinated respect and affection for the 
ruler and the dynasty, but they are in contact with the state when 
they see the policeman, when the tax collector comes, and when they 
are directed by the organs of government to do or to refrain from 
this or that. The absolute state, as the first stride toward the modern 
rational state, illustrates the rise of bureaucracies in the armies as 
well as in financial and juridical affairs. Through the social revolu-
tion, the remnants of personal relationships, of traditions of author-
ity and loyalty, of camaraderie and friendship are transformed into 
rational relationships among experts who work in a hierarchy of 
offices and assignments. To Tocqueville, the sociologist of politics, 
this aspect of the revolution meant the destruction of independent 
social classes and agencies cooperating with one another for their 
common good. The absolute state, he believed, set the pattern for 
all forthcoming despotic regimes in France. From the welfare state 
that Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot [1727–1781] and the physiocrats 
tried to construct under Louis XVI to the Napoleonic Empire and 
the tyranny of Napoleon’s nephew, he saw a logical and coherent 
development.
For Tocqueville’s conception of the Napoleonic state, we have 
only a detailed outline. A book on Napoleon and the empire was to 
have been the last volume of a comprehensive work on the French 
Revolution, of which the ancien régime was the first. As we see from 
his notes, the final book would have viewed the Napoleonic state 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N450
as the first total state in the modern sense of the word. Through its 
civil and military bureaucracies, the will of the single ruler could 
be achieved with the utmost efficiency. Furthermore, the widespread 
organization of the administration manipulated public opinion in 
such a way as to make the despotism appear to be a democratic insti-
tution. The organization of public opinion through a variety of agen-
cies made it possible to produce a total conformism of the subjects by 
persuasion and threat.
Tocqueville saw these developments as fateful trends in modern 
political and social processes. In the merging of these tendencies, he 
found an answer to his basic question: What are human beings going 
to look like in the new world of democracy and bureaucracy? The 
answer he found was that men will be ruthless gangsters in the eco-
nomic competition for infinite power, and they will be servile and 
shrewd in complying with the wishes of economically strong men. 
Thus, the population will be divided into two parts: one in front of 
the counter, and the other behind it. Those in front of the counter 
will envy the others and will nurse the ideal of becoming experts 
in a tiny area of bureaucratic specialization, frantically seeking jobs 
in the lower or higher ranks of the civil service or the courts of law. 
Here, they will have security and pensions; they can become small 
rentiers and attain the peace of the little man. Everybody on both 
sides of the counter will try to get favors for his family and friends.
This dim prediction was in contradiction to Tocqueville’s origi-
nal belief in providential history, the unfolding of the divine prin-
ciple of Christian religion in the process of the Here and Now. He 
had seen God’s message in the rise of American democracy. In his 
interpretation of the new American society, he strongly emphasized 
the positive elements in the equality that released the productive 
faculties of a great majority of citizens—for themselves and for the 
commonwealth. He was willing to appreciate democracy as a form 
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of progress in the providential control of history; the new political 
pattern, he thought, would be a blessing for most people. Democratic 
political and social conditions would bring about the slow advance of 
the intellectual and cultural standards of modern societies through 
education, political action, and the application of religious ethics to 
the problems of social action—in a necessary relationship between 
freedom and religion. This was the lesson he derived from the United 
States.
He was fully aware that the new democratic societies had to pay 
the price for progress in civilization. The new democratic mankind 
would be civilized on a much wider scale than the small aristocratic 
societies of the past, but necessarily on lower levels. It is characteristic 
of his humanitarian attitude that he considered the positive accom-
plishment of this progress more important than its negative aspect.
But while he affirmed providential history as he found it in the 
United States, he was not certain he could take the same attitude in 
his interpretation of the age of revolution in Europe. What he lived 
through in Europe was very different from what he found in the 
United States. As mentioned, he was born in 1805, at about the time 
Napoleon made himself emperor. He saw the regimes of the Restora-
tion, was a parliamentarian under the monarchy of Louis Philippe 
[1773–1850], experienced the two revolutions of 1848, served as a 
minister in the only republican government of Louis-Napoléon, and 
lived under the new tyranny for eight years. This course of history 
could appear to him only as a dialectic of democratic revolutions in 
which the popular phases were negated by despotic though no less 
revolutionary stages. Could this be the meaning of providence? He 
could not deny that the age of revolution had an ultimate meaning, 
but he came to believe that the social and political institutions that 
would arise from this holocaust might be vastly different from those 
he had supposed.
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For him, the highest human values were the responsibility of the 
individual, the freedom of self-realization, and the right of property, 
ideals that had guided much of the action and suffering of western 
mankind. The new socialist revolutionaries had no conception of 
these norms as relevant to their human and political philosophies. 
Still more explicitly, the new radicals questioned the hypotheses on 
which the traditional value systems were erected.
After July 1848 Tocqueville had the intellectual courage and 
discipline to ask himself whether the socialist revolutionaries might 
not be right. Perhaps the traditional prejudices that had ruled 
the conduct of people for three hundred years would give way to 
new social philosophies. It seemed to Tocqueville that he lived in 
an age of decadence in the perspective of the bourgeois society and 
an age of progress in the view of the working masses. Never had any 
people understood the historical relevance of their own experiences, 
or been able to anticipate the role of these experiences in creating 
new historical frames of reference. There was a time when nobody 
could imagine a world without slaves; nobody foresaw the role of the 
Christian sect in the transformation of the Roman Empire, or pre-
dicted the structure of the feudal society. Men are poorly equipped 
to visualize historical worlds beyond the established pattern of their 
society. Thus, who could affirm with certainty that one pattern of 
social action is absolutely necessary and that new types are impos-
sible to realize?
Men had taken for granted the right of property; it had seemed 
the foundation of Western civilization. But the radical thinkers of 
the socialist revolutions visualized a new civilization in which the 
right of property disappeared and other norms prevailed. Though 
Tocqueville fought against the revolutionaries who attacked the 
bourgeois civilization, the sweep of his historical imagination made 
him able to understand the new conception. Everything was possible 
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in this age of revolutions, which might last for a century. “I am tired 
of trusting the mirages of revolutionary expectations. Perhaps it is 
our destiny to cruise for the rest of our lives the endless sea without 
reaching an unknown destination.”
Thus, after the revolution of 1848, Tocqueville wrestled with his 
philosophy of providential history. Was historical progress and its 
necessity really a truth, revealing the ultimate meaning of a divin-
ity? If history was indeed providential, might it be that in ages of 
revolution, it was impenetrable for those who had suffered defeat? 
Historical evolution appeared to evince the necessity of democratic 
justice for all. But Tocqueville tortured himself with questions. Can 
providence intend to turn democracy into a negative equality of all 
before a despot? Or is slavery a fair enough price for welfare to all? 
The representatives of popular democracies are often tyrants, and, as 
such, they may exterminate the aristocracies of birth, education, and 
wealth. Could socialism be the medium for establishing the equality 
that political democracy had failed to achieve? Tocqueville tried to 
escape into a theory that the necessities he sought in the alternatives 
of history were open and dynamic: it might be that relative autono-
mies of historical trends were subject to the decisions of the political 
agents in the social context of the political structures; that respon-
sible ruling classes would turn the necessary developments into 
social reforms, while revolutionary classes would establish despotic 
regimes. But he knew that this was wishful thinking.
Thus, he began to question the truth of providential history and 
to turn from the philosophy of history to a philosophical anthropol-
ogy. In history, he could now see only various patterns of egalitarian 
regimes—whether party, mob, or Caesaristic tyrannies. He contin-
ued his fealty to providence, but now in revolt and indignation. From 
the God of history, he turned to an unknown divinity, which, beyond 
the horizon of history, should protect the unfolding of human liberty. 
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Tocqueville had taken for granted man’s historicity. He came ulti-
mately to believe that there is an area beyond the historical process, 
where man challenges the God of history in asserting his freedom as 
the essence of human existence.
Patterns in Freedom
In his ten years in the Chamber of Deputies, Tocqueville suffered 
defeats and humiliations because of his unwillingness to adopt the 
techniques and tricks of the political gamblers. He resented the shal-
low mediocrity of the procedures and of the debates, and hated the 
perverse vulgarity and the passions of most of his fellow deputies. 
Dedicated only to the principles of constitutional reform and to the 
firm establishment of political liberty, he was unable to share in the 
petty ambitions and vanities of mediocre parliamentarians, inter-
changeable with one another, who regarded their offices as a busi-
ness proposition rather than as a grave moral obligation. Tocqueville 
blamed himself for his lack of patience with the Chamber, and felt it 
to be a weakness that he was attracted only to men of rare qualities 
of mind and affection like himself. It was possible for him to give 
himself only to those of sincere conviction who shared his search for 
truth beyond all pragmatic and utilitarian purposes. Like Michel de 
Montaigne [1533–1592], he condemned himself as a political failure 
among the politicians, of whom he said: “I honor them because they 
rule the world; they cause me, however, to suffer profound ennui.”
In contrast, there are pages of almost Nietzschean fervor in 
Tocqueville’s description of his coming into his own in the hours of 
danger that began with the 1848 revolution. The situation that the 
nation faced then could not be remedied with the skills and tricks 
of the parliamentary game. Now, when everything was at stake, the 
highest moral qualities were required: courage, unselfish dedication 
to the country, complete disinterestedness.
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He enjoyed the climate of the National Assembly, where he felt 
at ease and relaxed. It was a new experience for him to share value 
attitudes, fighting spirit, and intentions with a majority—a majority 
determined, as he was, to maintain the republic in a constitutional 
pattern and to defeat the radicals and socialists for the sake of free-
dom and human dignity. He maintained that the unfolding of politi-
cal freedom was the only road by which France could be rescued 
from the anarchy of a radical revolution. Anticipating that a socialist 
regime of workers would be a total despotism, he aligned himself 
with the political groups that were striving for Christian democracy; 
that is, for raising the social, moral, and intellectual standards of 
labor within the structure of the capitalist economy. This kind of 
reform was a goal that he considered worth fighting for. “Perhaps 
it was a very attractive goal because the road was dangerous and 
uncertain; for I have a natural inclination to adventures and a spark 
of danger has always appeared to me as the fascination of all human 
action.”
Tocqueville tested his qualifications as statesman in the six months 
of 1849 when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the republican 
government of Louis-Napoléon. Relieved of the constraint he had 
felt as a deputy, he now devoted his energies to constructive work 
as a responsible and independent minister, with elation comparable 
to the feeling he had experienced at the outbreak of the revolution. 
“I breathed more freely than before the catastrophe.” His analytical 
mind did not prevent him from showing resoluteness in action. From 
his memoirs, which were not published before the end of the century, 
it is clear that he thrived under the burden of personal responsibil-
ity, feeling his strength growing with the resistance of the problems 
he had to confront. He enjoyed the techniques of action that his 
aims demanded: placating the heads of the parties in the Chamber 
while following his own convictions, planning diverse possibilities 
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on the moving chessboard, calculating the possible countermoves of 
the foreign powers. The self-realization that he found in construc-
tive political action confirmed his qualifications as a statesman and 
reestablished his self-confidence, after the years of frustration in the 
Chamber. He candidly admitted that he was an ambitious statesman. 
His pure dedication and his disinterestedness would give him, he 
hoped, the position and respect that his attitude deserved.
But he soon learned that neither integrity nor a fundamental 
concern for the whole nation is necessarily adequate for a success-
ful career in an institution in which vested interests prevail. He was 
shocked when the National Assembly voted for the direct choice 
of the president by referendum. This decision made the election of 
Louis-Napoléon certain. As he had anticipated, the ideals of politi-
cal freedom were subordinated to the fears aroused by the threat of 
socialism. A new despotism arose because the bourgeois classes were 
willing to bow to any ruler, however legally questionable, who would 
protect their interests against the masses.
Thereafter, Tocqueville lived as an exile in his own country, still 
an old fashioned lover of political and human freedom. He was cer-
tain that the new despot would not be the founder of a dynasty, but 
he believed that the rule of the tyrant would last a long time, a phase 
of the continuing revolution. 
We did not see the beginning of the great revolution, we 
will not see its end. If I had children, I would frequently 
repeat to them that we live in an age of revolution. That 
implies that we live in a world in which we must be ready 
and prepared for everything; for nobody is certain of his 
destiny. And I still would add that we should not count 
on any possessions of which we could be deprived. We 
should think to acquire the goods which we cannot lose 
but by death; courage, will-power, wisdom, and poise.
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Like Nietzsche, Tocqueville valued the passions, which alone 
accomplish the self-realization of a human being, and proclaimed 
as genuine freedom the spontaneity of human action in the trans-
formation of the world. Like Jean-Paul Sartre [1905–1980] or Albert 
Camus [1913–1960], he maintained that freedom is a constitutive 
element of our very existence. This fundamental attitude, which Toc-
queville cherished throughout his life, makes him even today a norm 
for our own conduct in an age of unceasing revolutions.
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 Jacob Burckhardt: 
Transcending History 
Das schönste Glück des denkenden Menschen ist das 
Erforschliche erforscht zu haben und das Unerforschli-
che ruhig zu verehren. 
[A thinking man’s greatest happiness is to have fathomed 
what can be fathomed and to revere in silence what can-
not be fathomed.]
—Goethe. Maximen und Reflexionen. 1207
The Tyranny of History
An axiom of sociology is that radical trends in human thought pro-
voke equally radical, opposite attitudes. In the field of psychology, 
the radical insistence on a mechanistic and deterministic psychol-
ogy brought forth the violent reaction of William James [1842–1910] 
and Henri Bergson [1859–1941], who sought to vindicate the image 
of the spontaneous human personality. In sociology, we have wit-
nessed time and again the renascence of voluntaristic theories in 
reaction to naturalistic and absolutely deterministic systems. Even 
more illuminating is the case of historiography. For centuries, the 
universities and the academies have been engaged in the study and 
Published originally in a slightly different form in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 6 (December 1945), 225–69. Reproduced with permission of Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd.
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interpretation of history, accumulating vast funds of data, a veritable 
encyclopedia of the past, valuable in many respects. However, very 
early in history, rulers and ruled began to use or rather abuse these 
recollections of the past as a means of justifying their own claims for 
the future. For centuries, individuals and groups had referred their 
needs and hopes to the perennial law of nature that is supposed to 
reflect the divine order in the world of man. The revolutionary peas-
ants of the sixteenth century, the revolting feudal lords of the French 
Fronde [a series of civil wars in France between 1648 and 1653—
Eds.], the armored revolutionists in Oliver Cromwell’s [1599–1658] 
army, all based their claims on the intelligible and unquestioned 
verities of a divine and natural law. With the rise of secular societ-
ies and the development of independent political institutions, these 
ideas began to lose their old potency, making room for the feeling 
that the life of reason develops in the process of time and has no 
perennial being of its own. Since the seventeenth century, scientists 
and philosophers have been fervently proclaiming that truth is the 
daughter of time and that the moderns are superior to the ancients 
because of the tremendous progress of the experimental sciences. 
The idea of progress became the substitute for the tradition of the 
law of nature. It was first hailed by the scientists and humanists as 
the characteristic challenge of the intellectual to the prescientific 
obscurantism of the “dark ages.” These intellectuals were the first 
to assume that the material content of historical time was the steady 
progress of knowledge and civilization. They praised the process of 
history as the most effective element in the growth of intellectual 
and moral enlightenment and regarded their own efforts as decisive 
contributions towards the progress of “Reason.” These ideas were 
eagerly grasped by political and liberal intellectuals, particularly the 
American and the French, who applied them to the pressing social 
problems of their time. They postulated that progress of reason is the 
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true content of the process of time that we call history. They insisted 
that only when we shall have applied the yardsticks of “reason” to 
all social problems and institutions shall we succeed in establishing 
the rule of happiness on earth. History ceased to mean the total-
ity of the past, its deeds and achievements. Instead, its sphere was 
restricted to the development of pragmatic and scientific reason and 
to their realization within social and political institutions. History 
had become the knowledge of those trends that prepare situations 
favorable to the aims of revolutionary groups in modern societies. 
This new philosophy of history is the articulate expression of the 
secular and progressive societies of the modern world, a substitute 
for those past philosophies in which the human world was a part of 
the meaningful and intelligible whole of the universe.
History as the philosophy of progress is an expression of the 
existential attitude of the rising liberal, progressive, and socialist 
movements of the nineteenth century. Whatever may be the shades 
of difference between the rationalistic eschatology of Anne-Robert-
Jacques Turgot [1727–1781] and the Marquis de Condorcet [1743–
1794], the dialectical agnosticism of Georg Hegel [1770–1831], the 
dialectical economism of Karl Marx [1818–1883], the positivism of 
Auguste Comte [1798–1857], and the evolutionism of Herbert Spen-
cer [1820–1903]—they all have four features in common. First, all 
these systems assume to know the rational meaning of history. Sec-
ond, all are positive about the direction and the end toward which 
history is moving; they are sure that meaning and social action coin-
cide in the immanence of the social process. Third, all follow the 
same procedure—they isolate particular tendencies within the uni-
versal whole that serve them as the foundation on which to construct 
the unity of their historical system. They attain order and unity by 
referring human action and thought to an abstract principle that 
lends history the character of a purposeful and moving spectacle. 
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Philosophies and religions, states and mores, economic systems and 
moral systems appear as manifestations of the same principle in the 
various stages of history. They all seem to emanate from the universal 
principle. History thus becomes a sort of philosophical totalitarian-
ism that forces all the actions and thoughts of man into a predestined 
pattern. Finally, all these systems agree on the merely instrumental 
role of the individual in this process of history. They all postulate this 
anonymous and blind destiny; it does not matter much whether they 
call it absolute mind, forces of production, or spirit of positivism. 
In all these systems, man is an instrument and a blind tool of those 
enigmatic meanings that rule the historical process. Man exists only 
in his functional relationship to those abstract principles. He is the 
puppet in a show. These systems testify to the rise of new societies 
and of new types of behavior in the mobile world of technical effi-
ciency. Some of those thinkers who were witnesses of the emergence 
of this new world were aware of its implications. Reflecting on the 
modernity of the “overcrowded” music of Ludwig van Beethoven 
[1770–1827], Johann Wolfgang von Goethe [1749–1832] regards it as 
a characteristic manifestation of the “new century.”
Today everything is “ultra.” Everything is radical in 
thought and action. Nobody knows himself any more, 
nobody cares for the elements that constitute his sphere 
of life, nobody thinks of the materials of his work. We 
have lost the spontaneity of our way of life; irrational 
ways of conduct are abundant. Young men are stirred 
much too early in life and are then carried away by the 
maelstrom of the times. The world admires wealth and 
mobility. People are eager to compete for these goals. The 
different civilizations strain to surpass each other in the 
building of railroads, docks, and other facilities of com-
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munication. This must eventually lead to a state of uni-
versal mediocrity. Indeed, this is the century of the quick 
mind, of the alert, smart and practical man. These men 
are equipped with a certain cleverness and deem them-
selves superior to the crowd though they themselves are 
incapable of the highest and most sublime achievements. 
Let us persevere as much as possible in the spirit in which 
we have been brought up. We and a few others shall be 
the last of a period that will not return very soon.1
Alexis de Tocqueville [1805–1859] describes his times in similar 
terms. “We belong to a moral and intellectual family that is disap-
pearing.”2
However, not all contemporaries of the “new times” accepted it 
in the spirit of elegiac resignation. Søren Kierkegaard3 was the first 
to open the attack on the systems of Hegel and Marx. To him these 
pseudotheologies were death traps threatening the very existence 
of the spontaneous human being. Socrates and Christ are the true 
images of the real and complete person as against the outward man 
whose existence assumes meaning only in terms of his institutions, 
churches, states, and societies. Kierkegaard raised his voice to protest 
against the degradation and dehumanization of man to which these 
modern philosophies of blind and arbitrary fatalism had subjected 
him. He ardently desired to save and restore the spiritual person, the 
human being that comes into its own as living in the actual Christ, 
not the Christ of the churches. Friedrich Nietzsche [1844–1900] had 
taken up this attack on historicism. He was not concerned with the 
defense of the Christian person; he fought for the survival of the 
independent and creative personality. He hated the adoration of 
progress and viewed with disgust the optimism of a mechanistic and 
rationalistic philosophy that left no place for the powerful and self-
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responsible individual. He stormed the fortresses of history in order 
to liberate man from the paralyzing influence of historical compla-
cency and fatalism.
This situation brought into existence what may be called the spe-
cific German contribution to sociology—the interpretative sociology 
of Max Weber [1864–1920], Georg Simmel [1858–1918], and Ernst 
Troeltsch [1865–1923]. These efforts, different in scope and power, 
have one common purpose. They refute the absolute determinism 
and the abstract necessity of Marx’s dialectical philosophy of his-
tory. Working as empirical scientists, these men investigated a vari-
ety of historical situations and made it evident that human actions 
and decisions cannot be imputed to the workings of an anonymous 
historical law. On the contrary, human choices and final decisions 
in social action can only be understood as expressing fundamental 
needs of the human constitution. These sociologists strive to replace 
the systems of historical dogmatism by a theory of social conduct 
and social action that unites psychological and sociological elements 
in order to come as near as possible to a science of the human consti-
tution in the concrete world of history.
However, all these men failed to conquer the spirit of historicism. 
The case of the sociologists is most illuminating. They attacked most 
violently one system, but they took for granted the hypothesis on 
which all these systems are built. They accepted the positivistic ver-
sion of the immanent necessity of history—namely, the absolute rela-
tivity of all ideas and conceptions to their historical situations. These 
scholars did much to discredit the position of Marx, but they did not 
destroy it. They refined and made more relative the absolute histori-
cism of the past. They questioned the modern eschatological visions 
of the end of history and substituted for it the endless relativity of 
each situation. Against the optimism and fatalism of their times, 
they summoned their enlightened contemporaries to a sober pes-
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simism. But they did not break the chains of historical immanentism 
and fatalism.
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche succeeded where the sociologists 
failed. They had broken the chains of modern historicism. However, 
this positive statement must be qualified. If one may speak of their 
emancipation, it must be added that it was a merely personal free-
dom. They were undoubtedly the bitterest critics of their times. This 
opposition, or rather enmity, is a constitutive and relevant element 
of their vision. But it was a vision of despair. They could formulate 
their positive ends only in the negative terms of revolt and despair. 
There remained the unresolved tension within the mind that is free 
only to reflect on a historical situation which is unchangeable and 
inescapable so that the terms and concepts in which these new ideas 
were expressed still bear the stigma of the “illness of the times.”
There was one man who succeeded more than all the others in 
the battle against the tyranny of history. He transcended histori-
cism because he was never in revolt or despair. This man was Jacob 
Burckhardt [1818–1897]. He was a professor of history and art in his 
native Basel.4 He was proud to be a citizen of one of the last poleis in 
the world, although this pride was somewhat tinged with irony—for 
it was obvious that new social strata were gradually wresting con-
trol from the hands of the patrician élite to which the Burckhardts, 
ministers, and professors, had belonged for almost two hundred 
years. Except for a short interruption at the School of Engineering in 
Zürich, Jacob Burckhardt spent all his professional life as a teacher in 
his native university and in the adult education courses in that city. 
He had made up his mind that his native city was the only spot in 
the world where he could think and teach whatever he liked without 
being obliged to comply with the political whims of governments or 
public opinion. He refused all calls to German chairs, including one 
to Berlin as successor to Leopold von Ranke [1795–1886]. He was 
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free of academic vanities and ambitions and desired no more than to 
be an independent thinker and a good teacher. He abstained from all 
political activity, not because he lived in an ivory tower, but because 
he felt that one had to make a choice between politics and scholar-
ship. He had started as a liberal journalist who believed that the hope 
of a free society could be realized by careful steering between the 
Scylla of brutal absolutism and the Charybdis of fanatical radical-
ism. In 1845, he had experienced the revolt of the radical national-
ists in Lucerne—with tempestuous mass meetings, riots, and armed 
storm troops. This experience had broken his faith in the future of 
the liberal movement. Since those days, he had not ceased to warn 
his radical and revolutionary friends in Germany that the masses 
they were arousing would quickly push them aside and establish 
their own rule that would not be liberal at all. They would, on the 
contrary, defeat the moderate and educated liberalism of the middle 
classes. Burckhardt had given up politics because he could not see 
the means of remedying a situation that was to lead in a dangerous 
direction, very obvious to him. He summarized his experience in a 
letter to Gottfried Kinkel [1815–1882]:
The term liberty sounds beautiful and perfect. However, 
no one should be permitted to speak about it who has not 
faced the possible slavery which may be brought about by 
the pressure of the mob and who has not had the experi-
ence of civil rebellion. Nothing is more pitiable than a 
government which is subject to the intrigues of so-called 
liberal clubs, of pressure groups and political profiteers. I 
know too much history to expect from the despotism of 
the masses anything but the rule of violence which will 
extinguish all these liberties.5
J AC O B  B U R C K H A R D T 467
Burckhardt rejected the reproach of his revolutionary friends that 
he wanted to live as a luxurious Epicurean, an amused onlooker and 
esthete.
It does not make much difference whether I do or do not 
serve liberty and the state; they will not lose very much 
if I abstain. No state is built by such men as I. As long 
as I live, however, I will be kindly and cooperate with 
my fellow men. I will try to be a sincere and honest pri-
vate man. . . . With society at large, I have no longer any 
direct contact. I cannot but view with irony any social 
institution unless it have a specific purpose. . . . All of 
you do not know as yet what the “people” is and how 
easily it is transformed into a barbarian mob. You still 
do not realize what tyranny will be imposed upon the 
mind on the assumption that education is the secret ally 
of capital which must be destroyed. I am afraid that the 
intellectuals are fools if they believe that they can control 
the movement. The latter will emerge as a natural catas-
trophe. . . . I should like to experience no more of these 
times, had I not a duty therein, for I wish to help rescue 
as much as lies within my limited power. . . . We may all 
go under. I will at least choose the cause for which I shall 
go under—namely, the culture of old Europe.6
Jacob Burckhardt’s personal problem was the question of the 
responsibility of the scholar in a time of revolutionary change. He 
felt that it was his duty to work for the preservation of intellectual 
standards and to establish a tradition of that intellectual heritage 
that might help to build a new world after the revolutionary deluge 
has subsided. He lived in Basel like a stoic or epicurean philosopher 
in the Roman Empire or like Tocqueville during a similar period 
of revolutionary stress. But Burckhardt did not choose this life of 
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a modest teacher in a small Swiss town in the spirit of a grave and 
rigid asceticism. It was his way of avoiding the social requirements 
of the academic life; yet, it is an exemplary life of quiet, ironical ser-
vice—the ideal life of the ideal scholar. It is the purpose of this article 
to analyze and to interpret how he succeeded in this enterprise. 
Burckhardt’s name is familiar to all students of Nietzsche.7 When 
Nietzsche came to teach in Basel, he was already an independent 
and original scholar. He was longing for the friendship of the man 
whose conception of history and particularly whose attitude toward 
modernity had so much affinity with his own. However, Nietzsche 
never succeeded in overcoming the benevolent distance of the older 
man. In spite of their common admiration for Arthur Schopenhauer 
[1788–1860] and their love of Hellas, Burckhardt could not give 
Nietzsche the friendship Nietzsche desired. Burckhardt disliked the 
romantic character and was suspicious of a man who could be an 
ardent follower of the indecent magician of Tribschen, Richard Wag-
ner [1813–1883]. He was shocked by Nietzsche’s Teutonic radicalism 
and watched with uneasiness his inclination toward despotism and 
absolutism. Nevertheless, Nietzsche was among the few who knew 
during his lifetime that Burckhardt was more than a professor or a 
historian, that he was indeed a prophet and a sage.
The professional historians of the time had no appreciation what-
soever for the original and unique character of Jacob Burckhardt’s 
ideas. Those historians who were nationalists or liberals could not 
forgive Burckhardt his frankly expressed misgivings with respect to 
the development of the centralized national state and his unpleasant 
predictions about a future of revolutions, world wars, and tyrannies. 
It was a common practice to belittle his political insight and praise 
the “nobility of his vision” and the “perfection of his prose.” This 
was a polite way of disregarding Burckhardt’s specific contribution 
to historical thought.8
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Only two writers seemed to have grasped the original and new 
character of Burckhardt’s contribution to historical scholarship. One 
was Wilhelm Dilthey [1833–1911],9 who was later to follow in many 
ways the suggestion contained in Burckhardt’s The Civilization of the 
Renaissance in Italy. The other author is an anonymous American 
who reviewed the American translation of Burckhardt’s study of the 
Renaissance in the New York Herald of October 1, 1878.10
Both reviewers wonder why the Civilization of the Renaissance 
in Italy is labeled the work of an “historian.” Both agree on the defi-
nition of a true historian as a scientist who analyzes social causa-
tion, and it is obvious to them that Burckhardt is not interested in 
this approach. Both critics rightly state that he analyzes the diverse 
aspects of a situation only to the extent that they point to a specific 
character that integrates the variety of individual attitudes and 
achievements.
Both emphasize that Burckhardt interprets this situation in the 
context of Western civilization as a period of transition that fulfills a 
specific function in this whole. The American author is more articu-
late. He shows that this period of transition is a period of decline 
similar to that of the Roman Empire in its last stages. He does not 
seem to be aware that Burckhardt’s first book dealt exactly with the 
decay of the pagan and the rise of the Christian commonwealth.11 
The book on the Renaissance describes the decline of the medieval 
world and the dawn of modern civilization with its specific modes 
of thinking and feeling. The anonymous reviewer rightly points 
out that Burckhardt connects and confronts this situation with the 
present. That is, he is interested in the genesis of the modern period 
because he is gravely concerned with contemporary modernity and 
its problematic character. The critic feels that Burckhardt wishes to 
give an objective and comprehensive picture of an epoch whose neg-
ative and destructive elements are only too clear both to Burckhardt 
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and to the anonymous writer. The reviewer himself predicts that the 
antagonistic elements of modern civilization will necessarily bring 
into being a reaction, a new synthesis that will meet the challenge 
of the disintegrating modern world. He seems to relish Burckhardt’s 
lucid understanding of the decadent state of the contemporary scene. 
Burckhardt’s study of the Renaissance is both a careful reading of 
history and a personal document of great value. “Never were the 
aspects of human life presented in forms so manifold and in hues so 
particolored as in the kaleidoscope which Burckhardt holds to the 
eye of the reader and slowly turns in his hand.”  Indeed, the anon-
ymous reviewer could not have used a better image for describing 
the specific character of Burckhardt’s historical work than that of 
“kaleidoscope.” This is exactly what Burckhardt succeeds in doing. 
 He cuts vertical lines through the Italian society of the fifteenth cen-
tury and analyzes the new attitudes and patterns of behavior such 
as the cultivation of the individual self, and the resulting objectifi-
cation of its societal relationships and its attitude to nature. He is 
aware of the larger consequences of the separation of state and soci-
ety and of the general trend toward secularization. He interprets the 
variety of these phenomena as indicating the emergence of a new 
type of man, self-reliant and pragmatic, rational and brutal, disil-
lusioned and sympathetic, hard and humble. This new man comes 
into existence in the urban and secular centers of modern society, 
both in tyrant-states and democratic states. The reviewer is aware 
that this is primarily an investigation of human nature as it unfolds 
in the historical world. It is an empirical work with philosophical 
intent, if it is philosophical to wonder at the scope of human action 
and suffering. Burckhardt’s historical work is reminiscent of what 
an English critic once praised as an outstanding feature of Goethe’s 
vision—panoramic ability, a term that corresponds exactly to the 
“kaleidoscope” of which the anonymous American reviewer speaks. 
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Burckhardt practiced this new method of research in all his histori-
cal studies and particularly in his Reflections on History, a series of 
lectures published posthumously and containing a ripe summary of 
his philosophy of history.12
The Method
At the very beginning of his reflections, Burckhardt warns that he 
does not intend to contribute to the epistemological and technical 
discussion of history as a scientific discipline. He considers the situ-
ation of academic historiography to be as critical as that of the con-
temporary life of which it is a product. In Burckhardt’s view, modern 
historiography suffers from rapidly expanding specialization and 
the unending accumulation of data. Consequently, political history 
is very uncertain in both its criteria and conclusions. Political his-
tory must continuously be revised and corrected. The specialized 
historian has lost all initiative to refer his special field of knowledge 
to a higher and greater whole. He is helpless before the true problem 
of the historian—interpreting his individual facts with reference 
to a structure or a whole. And only within such a context can the 
historian understand and make clear the significance of individual 
actions or events. This is the most important and most serious draw-
back of the historian as a specialist. Burckhardt learned from Goethe 
that we can grasp the universal only in the individual and concrete 
phenomenon. He realized that every individual fact has a specific 
form or morphe, which is the universal element in the concrete; 
Goethe’s theory of form, an anticipation of the fundamental thesis of 
the Gestalt-School, is basic to Burckhardt’s critique of modern spe-
cialization. Burckhardt is not a romantic. Specialization cannot be 
stopped. However, we must remain lovers of the whole and attempt 
to understand the unity beneath the variety. Burckhardt’s reflections 
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are addressed to the open-minded people who still desire to under-
stand this strange phenomenon of man in the world of history. He 
warns that modern historiography is beset by many dangers. Subjec-
tive interests, provincialism, and narrow patriotism are jeopardizing 
all efforts to arrive at objective truth. A source of particularly grave 
harm to genuine scientific research is the vainglory of the modern 
progressive spirit. The typical modern believes that the whole past 
was a mere prelude to our time, which is the consummation of the 
historical process. Burckhardt warns that we must rid ourselves of 
this parochial vanity if we wish to understand, even if only in a very 
fragmentary way, the riddle of life that we call history.
In his reflections on history, Burckhardt presents a hypothesis 
that questions all that his contemporaries, whether historians or 
philosophers of history, took for granted. For Burckhardt, history 
is the life of man in the world; this fragment is the field of study 
beyond whose limits he refuses to venture. We know nothing about 
the transcendental or immanent meaning of history. We can only 
present observations and reflections on the way human beings act 
and are acted upon. We have no knowledge of a divine providence, 
nor can we take for granted the grandiose generalizations of the 
philosophers who “hear the grass of necessity growing.” Burckhardt 
refuses to consider origins, climate, and race. Anthropologists are 
forced to make and to change too many hypotheses. He doubts if the 
very process of evolution can teach us anything about the phenom-
ena themselves.
This life of history, always unfolding between an origin and an 
end, in continuous movement and change, is the material to which 
Burckhardt applies his new historical method. This limited field of 
research forces Burckhardt to define the general task of the historian 
and the means of achieving it. “The task of history as a whole is to 
show its twin aspects, distinct yet identical, proceeding from the fact 
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that, first, the spiritual has a historical aspect under which it appears 
as change . . . and that, secondly, every event has a spiritual aspect 
by which it partakes of immortality.” In this sense, Burckhardt con-
ceives of history as historicity, as the eternal present and the presence 
of the eternal. It is Burckhardt’s concern to evoke the memory of 
the past as a spiritual continuum, and he believes that the study of 
the historical aspects of the spiritual sphere is the most fascinating 
of themes. This definition of the task of the historian is in itself a 
historical fact. Burckhardt believes that beginning with the wars of 
1864, 1866, and 1870, the world will witness an era of wars and crises, 
of growing and accelerating catastrophe, against which all that we 
know of European history will seem petty and insignificant indeed. 
In this situation, it must be the duty of the responsible historian to 
protect those values that may be preserved and cultivated even in 
the face of catastrophe. Burckhardt is not an idealist; he knows that 
the orders of a single barbarian chieftain can in one stroke dispose 
of the most precious men and spiritual goods. Still, the historian 
must help to safeguard the traditions of this heritage and cultivate 
the consciousness of the eternal present in times of conflagration. 
As historical human beings, the historians must pay tribute to the 
antinomies of life that are “the main phenomenon of history.” This 
“main phenomenon” is the interaction of power and spirit in social 
institutions and their continuous revision, reform, and revolution by 
the ideal forces of the spirit. This is the fundamental fact of historic-
ity. All human beings are subject to these fateful transformations. 
It is inevitable that we suffer this being in history. However, we are 
also capable of transcending our fate through contemplation. Burck-
hardt is of the opinion that only the spirit of contemplation can save 
human beings from the danger of being completely conditioned in 
the situation of history. We are able to attain objective knowledge 
because we share an identical human constitution, whatever the 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N474
kaleidoscope of human appearances under the pressure of diver-
gent conditions. We can achieve this “objectivity” and “panoramic 
ability” only if we rid ourselves of the fears and interests of the self 
through acts of contemplation. Burckhardt never mentions that this 
was the genuine philosophical attitude of the ancients. They were 
capable of genuine and liberating philosophical reflection because 
they loved the illumination of knowledge more than their own needs 
and sorrows. Burckhardt wishes to open his students’ minds to 
the proposition that the highest human condition is the pursuit of 
life in the disinterested spirit of sympathetic understanding. Only 
such personal purification can make transparent the intellectual 
and moral aspects of human action. This procedure will allow us 
to appreciate correctly and with the moderation of scientific insight 
the price human societies must pay for the realization of some of 
their values and the destruction of others. This, Burckhardt says, is 
a “pathological” approach, pathological in the twofold sense that it 
involves in all its concreteness the dignity and the misery of human 
existence. This method Burckhardt names “history of civilization.” 
He is aware that this term is ambiguous and imprecise. Burckhardt is 
not interested in the accumulation of data on cultural achievements 
and products; he does not care for “antiquities.” He is only inter-
ested in one aspect of history. He wishes to describe, to the extent 
that these data express the working of the mind of historical man, 
the phenomena of human self-realization. He takes up the study of 
man as the central theme of history in a new and precarious situa-
tion. We are ignorant of the objective meaning of the process that 
we call history. If there is something like a divine providence, it is 
hidden, and we have not heard the word of redemption. We are only 
capable of wondering at this strange and fascinating existence that 
we experience in life, of wondering at man in his elevation and in 
his suffering. Human history is to Jacob Burckhardt passio humana. 
J AC O B  B U R C K H A R D T 475
Man is no longer protected by a divine grace; he is not sheltered in 
an all-embracing stream of the universe; he is alone with the powers 
of his reason and spirit and with his own passions in a concrete situ-
ation in the historical world. Only through disinterested contempla-
tion can we hope to understand the wonderful character of this life 
that transcends itself in the very immanence of existence.
Contemplation is a right, a duty, and a necessity. It is a right of 
our “higher pragmatism” to understand the place where we are and 
the velocity of the contemporary dynamics in which we have been 
living since the French Revolution; it is a duty if we are to preserve 
the heritage of the mind in times of radical change; it is a necessity 
to establish inner independence and spiritual freedom in times of 
universal determination and pressure against the individual. For 
this reason, the contemplation of history that Burckhardt teaches 
is a method of transcending history in order to establish freedom. 
From this point of view, his effort is parallel to the work of William 
James [1842–1910]. James achieved in the field of psychology what 
Burckhardt did for history: he reopened the avenue toward the cre-
ative and spontaneous freedom of the human personality in times 
of general determinism. Burckhardt was able to master his “pan-
oramic ability” because he used categories that were different from 
those of the political historians. He rejects chronological evolution. 
He directs his attention to the invariable factors in history. These 
factors can merely indicate fundamental tendencies and basic needs 
of the human being. This is precisely Burckhardt’s problem: to clas-
sify and to describe the recurrent, typical, and invariable patterns 
of human and social behavior that constitute a human situation in 
historical time. With his unfailing sensitivity, Dilthey understood 
that Burckhardt’s generalizations have nothing in common with the 
statistical classifications of the natural sciences. Burckhardt main-
tained a humanistic distrust of the power of abstract conceptions to 
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recreate the living whole of a concrete human phenomenon. Dilthey 
defined lucidly the frame of reference of Burckhardt’s generaliza-
tions. Burckhardt’s general conceptions, Dilthey writes, refer to 
the identity and the dynamic unity of the human being; they are 
categories of historical and social morphology. They present general 
modes of existence that appear in changing concatenations in all 
human situations and in all human phenomena. These categories 
Burckhardt applied only to the most unquestioned source materi-
als, to documents of the highest objectivity that disclose something 
about the inner life of men placed in a concrete historical situation, 
presenting typical attitudes and modes of expression of a variety of 
human standards in their individual concreteness. This unity of the 
individual and of the general in the existence of historical man is the 
central theme of Burckhardt’s historical writings. He was not satis-
fied with the term kulturgeschichtlich. What he proposed, and to a 
large extent achieved, is a historical sociology centered around the 
passio humana.
Historical Sociology
Dilthey clearly understood that Burckhardt’s so-called “history of 
civilization” is a phenomenological description of the human situ-
ation in a historical setting. This study of human intentions and 
attitudes is related to a frame of reference constituted by the inter-
dependent structure of invariables that indicate specific acts and 
intentions. Unfortunately, Burckhardt has described them as social 
institutions: state, religion, culture. He intends to say that human 
conduct and social action can be attributed to certain acts that 
express basic needs and intentions. These acts are power, devotion, 
and creative intelligence. They are the fundamentals of the spheres of 
politics, religion, and culture. They are interdependent and antago-
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nistic at the same time. They are antinomies and yet a continuous 
unity. The concatenation of their forces establishes the frame of ref-
erence for every historical situation. There may be epochs in which 
the one or the other invariable prevails. But we cannot imagine any 
period that cannot be referred to this fundamental structure. This 
scheme did not remain a mere theory. Burckhardt tested its produc-
tivity in all his historical works. They all start with an analysis of the 
political institutions within which and in relation to which all social 
and cultural acts attain their specific, positive or negative, signifi-
cance. It is even intimated, to cite one case, that the political institu-
tions of the Renaissance have made possible and bred the modern 
secular and competitive individual, in tyrannies as well as in demo-
cratic states.
For Burckhardt, the political sphere is the primary phenomenon 
of history. It is the synthesis of the brute force of physical or collective 
superiority with the “sound force” of creative reason. This is a long 
and terrible process. Burckhardt, a scholar of the historical school, 
rejects all contract theories of the state. Physical force and violence 
are certainly the primary factors in the origin of the state. However, 
once established, the state is, in Burckhardt’s terms, “the abdication 
of the individual,” a formulation reminiscent of the seventeenth or 
eighteenth century rather than of the romanticism of the historical 
school. The climate of moral and political enlightenment pervades 
the work of Burckhardt in many respects; it is, if we take the formu-
lation with a grain of salt, the revolt of the lucid and clear reasoning 
of the moralist against the romantic transfiguration of history. There 
is still another element implied in this analysis of the foundations 
of the state. It is a sober Machiavellian realism. The foundations of 
the state are irrational—it is the imposition of physical superiority 
of individuals or of collectivities upon the physically weaker, who 
are often the better, the nobler, the more cultured. Burckhardt states 
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frequently that the institution of the body politic that makes possible 
the shift from brute force to meaningful strength, lawfulness, and 
morality can arise only on the basis of this irrational explosion of 
power. Burckhardt’s recurrent emphasis on this terrible and cruel 
primacy of the state in all societal relationships is a reaction against 
the “unverifiable optimism” that assumes that society is the primary 
phenomenon, and the state is merely the protector of law. “Men are 
quite different.” We must take for granted that the dark forces of 
violence are at play wherever we establish enduring social institu-
tions. We must be content if the established state can function as 
trustee and guardian of law and security. The basis of the expand-
ing power of our political institutions is the inseparable unity of 
fear and greed. It is the fundamental manifestation of human vital-
ity that strives for law and security in order to cast off the feeling 
of insecurity and of the inexhaustible thirst for power. Burckhardt 
described this phenomenon as a primary empirical fact, the basis 
of all social action. He shudders, but he does not wish to escape this 
reality. He simply evaluates it negatively. “Power is evil in itself.” This 
is not an expression of a simple moralism. Burckhardt is too realis-
tic an observer not to be aware that matter and spirit, freedom and 
authority, power and spirit are interrelated antinomies. However, it 
seems that the formulation of this thesis is incorrect and needs a 
careful reexamination. He speaks of the power of an institution, not 
of an individual potency, of accumulation and of the agglomeration 
of individual desires and needs into a collective and abstract self-
ishness that becomes an end in itself because of the never-ending 
pressure of the mutually supporting individuals who constitute the 
collective force. This abstract and autonomous desire to expand and 
to grow is the natural egotism of the individual whose sole end is the 
enjoyment of his brute power. Burckhardt elevated it to a position of 
social dignity as the basis of collective existence. Whatever religion 
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or morality may teach to the contrary, this right to egotism is taken 
for granted. This is a dangerous precedent for all social and moral 
obligations. For the state has no absolute value nor has it the status of 
an a priori. When the state is permitted to dispense with the moral 
law, crime, terror, and violence will spread throughout society. The 
state will unleash the natural demons of the human race in all politi-
cal and societal relationships. In his definition of collective power, 
Burckhardt formulates a secularized version of the idea of “original 
sin.” Burckhardt bravely accepts the pessimistic doctrine without 
the comforts of transcendental hope. This stand made it possible for 
Burckhardt to reject the optimism of Hegel and Ranke regarding the 
logic, harmony, and spiritual meaning inherent in the process of his-
tory. Modern historians and philosophers of progress are too eager 
to forget the terrible price mankind has to pay for all the spiritual 
values that emerged under the stimulus of the state. It is always wise 
to remember the paradox of historical life—that good things can 
come from evil origins and evil may be the consequence of the best 
deeds. Burckhardt calls the complex of basic acts upon which states 
are founded, “power.” And power is to him “evil in itself.” Power 
indicates the abstract and autonomous pressure of a collectivity that 
expands for its own sake without purpose or direction. However, 
there is a different type of power, the radiant strength of the indi-
vidual that Burckhardt calls “historical greatness.” His treatment of 
this theme shows the careful and perspicacious observer who inves-
tigates the strata and attitudes that determine and establish great-
ness in history. He stresses the point that what we call “historical 
greatness” is a sociological phenomenon. It presupposes two things: 
a qualified man and a society in need of saviors. There may be times 
in which great men are abundant for tasks to which society does not 
attach any value, and there may be other times that are in need of 
a specific salvation and cannot find the man for the task. There is 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N480
no preestablished harmony between historical periods and genius. 
However, where this meeting does take place, it is a kind of “holy 
wedding” between man and the historical process. The sociological 
condition for the recognition of a great man is a disrupted society 
in which the fundamentals of life are questioned and his leadership 
needed to recover social unity and help others achieve meaningful 
lives. These leaders possess certain recurrent qualifications: a fanati-
cal will, a concentration of all energies, the vision of a universal idea 
of salvation on a political, social, or religious plane, and the subtle 
control of all details of action. These general faculties may meet with 
the requirements of a group when the prospective great man suc-
ceeds in discovering the cause or the principle, the devotion to which 
will reestablish the self-reliance and faith of the society in question.
“Great men” are always exceptions, never the highest products of 
normalcy. Whether they destroy or build (and it is sometimes diffi-
cult to determine the significance of their deeds), they are the “whips 
of destiny.”
As in the analysis of political power, Burckhardt, in his reflec-
tions on the rôle of “great men” in history, insists that the lust for 
power is the main incentive for greatness. However, it must merge 
with an ideal of political, social, or religious perfection, the devotion 
to which makes possible the emergence of “historical greatness.”
Burckhardt considers the existence of “great men” in history an 
indispensable fact. It is as indispensable as the demonic acts upon 
which the body politic is founded. However, it is not a fact that we 
should praise enthusiastically. These men can accomplish their mis-
sion only when they are equipped with a hardness of soul that enables 
them to exploit all chances of success and with strength that will 
enable them to endure the adversities and misfortunes that may fall 
upon the keen and daring revolutionist, whether he be the founder 
of a political commonwealth or of a religion. 
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There is only one exception that meets with Burckhardt’s approval:
Greatness of soul does not occur frequently among the 
great men of history. It comes into existence when men 
are able to renounce advantages in favor of moral goods 
and to practice self-restraint by virtue of inner kindness, 
not for the sake of prudence. Political greatness, however, 
must be selfish and must exploit all advantages. . . . We 
cannot require greatness of soul a priori, because the great 
man in politics appears as the exception, not as the ideal 
image. . . . It would be desirable if the great man would 
betray a conscious awareness of his relation to the spiritual 
and cultural forces of his times. . . . Such men will achieve 
a sublimity of genius and will enjoy the true understand-
ing of their historical significance during their lives. Such 
a man was Caesar.
Greatness of soul may be perfect if a political leader possesses 
grace of character and a lasting contempt of death, the will to recon-
cile, and a grain of kindness.
Burckhardt recapitulates the theory of power on the plane of 
individual potency. To achieve a harmonious and just life, the sound 
force of creative reason must merge with the forces of brute power. 
Burckhardt insists on the thesis that the great men who survive as 
ideal images are of great value for mankind and, in particular, for 
their nations. They often give them a pathos and a dignity that spread 
to all strata of society. They raise the standards of a people by their 
very normality and comfort them in times of emergency.
Burckhardt presented this as a sociological thesis and discusses at 
length the contemporary efforts to belittle the role of the “great man” 
in history. “Contemporaries believe that if people will only mind 
their own business political morality will improve of itself and his-
tory will be purged of the crimes of the ‘great men.’ These optimists 
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forget that the common people too are greedy and envious and when 
resisted tend to turn to collective violence.” He sees everywhere a 
trend toward centralized and rationalized organization that will 
lower standards and spread general mediocrity.
In contrast to this trend, Burckhardt sees the recurrent desire for 
leaders and great men in the political field. He recalls that France 
was longing for a great man in 1848 and was eventually satisfied with 
Louis-Napoléon [1808–1873], who was an adventurer and a crook. 
He predicts that the social conflicts of the time will create situations 
of emergency in which people will cry for “great men” and will find 
them among people who correspond to their tastes.
He writes to a friend:
 [March 12, 1883] There will be no monarchy in 
France. History now runs differently than in the past. 
The change from democracy to an authoritarian regime 
no longer takes place through the tyranny of one man. 
He could easily be disposed of by dynamite. The new tyr-
anny will be the domination of a military corporation. 
These fellows will apply means which the most terrible 
despot of the past could not have imagined.
 [April 13, 1882] For a long time I have been aware 
that we are driving toward the alternative of complete 
democracy and absolute despotism without right and 
law. This despotic regime will not be practiced any longer 
by dynasties. They are too soft and kind-hearted. The new 
tyrannies will be in the hands of military commandos 
which will call themselves republican. I am still reluctant 
to imagine a world the rulers of which will be completely 
indifferent to law, well-being, profitable labor, industry, 
credit, etc., and will govern with absolute brutality.
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He visualizes the “great men” of the revolutionary military cor-
porations as men with the talents of noncommissioned officers. That 
is how “historical greatness” will look when the conflict between 
capital and labor on the continent enters its more violent stages. 
Burckhardt’s analysis of the phenomenon of power in its diverse 
aspects have made clear that there is an invariable “power” directed 
toward establishing enduring social institutions and stabilizing 
deeds of conquest and usurpation into legal property. This invariable 
meets with the requirements of another invariable that Burckhardt 
calls “culture.” He defines the term as describing all free and spon-
taneous acts arising out of the material and ideal needs of man—it is 
the sphere of human independence and of freedom. In sociological 
terminology, it is the sphere of society, the opposite of coercive power 
and of the pressure of systematized violence that is embodied in the 
state.
These two invariables condition each other all the time. The state 
conditions culture where the body politic prevails, and culture con-
ditions the state when society is the stronger. Burckhardt’s analysis 
of these interacting invariables is a valuable contribution to histori-
cal sociology. It is his thesis that even in a democratic city-state such 
as Athens, not to speak of the rigid institutions of ancient Egypt, the 
scope and the direction of the cultural acts were determined or, at 
least, influenced by the political structure. The political institutions 
of Egypt were a hindrance to any emergence of independent and per-
sonal thought, imagination, or feeling. They favored training in tech-
nical skill and professional efficiency. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that ancient Egypt made so distinguished a contribution to math-
ematics, astronomy, and medicine—science that can be divorced 
from the personality of the scientist. Even in democratic Athens, the 
political structure imposed so many social obligations and conven-
tions upon the citizen that this initiative was greatly restricted.
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Political societies stimulate and appreciate technical learning and 
skills in applied knowledge. Societies that are released from political 
obligations, like those of the Hellenistic world, the Roman Empire, 
or the absolutistic states between the Renaissance and the French 
Revolution, are favorable to the idle curiosity of contemplation and 
to reflection on the fundamentals of life that have no direct bearing 
upon practical tasks.
The conflict between the invariable trend toward individual inde-
pendence and the opposite invariable of enduring order in politics is 
a constant theme of Burckhardt’s thought. In his historical studies, 
the diverse aspects of this conflict and the types of conquest are thor-
oughly analyzed. The conquest of freedom as against the pressure 
of changing determinants is the vital problem of his thinking and 
teaching. Burckhardt states as an empirical fact of human conduct 
what Aristotle had postulated as a philosopher—that freedom as a 
true good is a mean between license and submission. Burckhardt 
was a young man when he wrote to one of his radical friends that 
even the revolutionary leader, if he wishes to succeed, must learn 
to think and act with moderation. In Burckhardt’s history of Greek 
civilization, this problem plays a decisive role. Cleon and Alcibiades 
are presented as men who turned institutions of political liberty into 
tools of their selfish ambitions. Through their vanity and greed, they 
have upset the delicate balance that Pericles achieved through devo-
tion to the cause of the Athenian democracy.
In Burckhardt’s studies of the Renaissance, Pietro Aretino [1492–
1556] plays the role of the perfect villain. Aretino wasted his great 
gifts in the pursuit of the most vulgar pleasures. As his counterim-
age, Burckhardt presents the lucid and pure character of Vittorino 
da Feltre [1378–1446]. He was surrounded by the temptations of the 
courts and could have accumulated wealth and honors. But he was 
careful to preserve his independence in his devotion to his school 
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and to his students. He succeeded in convincing the princes that 
it is the highest privilege of the intelligent ruler to grant all gifted 
children an opportunity to study. He succeeded in recruiting half 
of his student body from among the gifted poor. This devotion to 
a cause Burckhardt praises as an example of true independence 
under the most adverse conditions of a tyrannical state. Burckhardt 
constantly returns to the problem of the independent personality 
and the means of securing such independence in a world of social 
and political pressure. He describes the attitudes of the Greek and 
Hellenistic philosophers, from Socrates to the Cynics, Epicureans, 
and Stoics, as identical in spite of their metaphysical differences. 
The central problem of their philosophies is the concern with intel-
lectual independence and spontaneity and the search for the means 
whereby they can be realized in a world of pressure and of philo-
sophical emptiness. Their asceticism anticipates the withdrawal of 
the last philosophical pagans and of the early eremites who escaped 
the degradation of their societies to achieve spiritual liberty and 
intellectual independence.
This emphasis on the independent personality leads us into the 
center of Burckhardt’s human philosophy. Despite the inescap-
able historicity of human destiny, the reality of freedom always 
remains as a challenge and source of wonder. Human beings 
devote their lives and sacrifice themselves for values, ideas, and 
principles through which they achieve freedom. They know too 
that these ideal goods are subject to social pressure and change. 
Nevertheless, they devote themselves unconditionally to condi-
tioned values and causes. This seems to Burckhardt the miraculous 
element in human fate. For this is what man is, after all: an enig-
matic and wonderful being capable of the noble and sublime as 
well as of the degrading and the cruel. This voluntary obedience 
to the summum bonum establishes freedom. Next to this conquest 
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of freedom as an absolute truth, there is a second absolute social 
truth—namely, the royal right of civilizations to conquer the barbar-
ians. But Burckhardt immediately questions his own certainty. “It 
is questionable indeed whether the conquered barbarians can ever 
become completely civilized, whether they will not always remain 
what they are!”
Although Burckhardt admits that the political frame of reference 
conditions primarily the sphere of society, he devotes much effort 
to the analysis of the impact of society-culture on political institu-
tions. This is for him the crux of the problem of the crisis of modern 
civilization and of human independence. He takes for granted that 
society and the political institutions are two indispensable invari-
ables in the historical constitution of man. He sees that the trend of 
events on the European continent leads to a situation in which the 
interdependent action of the two invariables is destroyed. It is the 
paradox of modern life that the same societies that boast of their 
civil rights and their freedom from the power of the state are, on the 
other hand, eager to see the state in control of all the functions of 
society. Burckhardt defined the state as the “abdication of the indi-
vidual.” As for the future, he predicts the rise of a political Leviathan 
that will bring about the abdication both of the individual and of 
society. More than any other philosopher or historian of the nine-
teenth century, Burckhardt saw the coming of the totalitarian state. 
Burckhardt was certain that the European society of his time was 
drifting in the direction of a new tyranny: when society is paralyzed 
by social conflicts, it is forced to expand the powers of the state to an 
undreamt-of degree. Furthermore, technical and economic condi-
tions are extremely favorable to the increase of the organized power 
of the state. This was the future of European society, as Burckhardt 
saw it, in the midst of the optimistic nineteenth century. The tyrant 
state will prevail for a long time, although finally there will be a new 
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effort of the “ideal forces” to reestablish freedom and the dignity of 
the individual person.
Logically, Burckhardt could have limited his constellation of 
the invariables to the dichotomy of power and spirit. He singles out 
the religious invariable as an independent factor separate from the 
church. He speaks of the church as a stabilizing force in society, 
thus bringing it close to the state. And he is moved to make this 
assumption based on the experience of the Christian churches that 
have attempted to establish and enforce a monopoly of the truth. 
However, he says, “All religions claim to be as eternal as the visible 
world and each of them possesses an enduring human significance 
that may partly justify the claim. . . . Every higher religion is per-
haps relatively eternal. . . . All ecclesiastical institutions elaborate the 
spiritual vision of the founders into a dogmatic system and establish 
its validity by virtue of the authority of the church.”
Burckhardt sees the primary phenomenon of religion as an 
invariable in contrast with the sociological phenomenon of religious 
institutions. The sources of this “primary phenomenon” are the need 
of overcoming the finiteness and the fragmentary character of the 
human person and the devotion to a larger whole. This awareness of 
a spiritual element in human nature as the lasting source of religious 
acts makes Burckhardt insist on the thesis that religion and the quest 
for meaning are the roots of every civilization.
Granted the eternity of the religious intention, he refuses to 
admit the eternity of any ecclesiastical institution. Every religion 
originates in history and is subject to the destiny of a historical phe-
nomenon that becomes a social institution. Religions become entan-
gled in relationships of power and of vested interests, in particular, 
as interacting and interdependent with the body politic. Therefore, 
religions are both historical and eternal at the same time. The his-
toricity of religion does not mean an evolution of this invariable. 
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The diverse types of religion—such as supernatural-transcendental, 
mystical-pantheistic, magical-ritualistic—correspond to different 
depths of the religious experience and have affinities to different 
types of societies. The development and the diffusion of religions 
are primarily sociological phenomena. The material content of the 
religious message and the moment of its success are determined by 
the social conditions of the respective groups, in particular, by the 
character of the elite. For it is the elite that ultimately decides on the 
positive or negative appreciation of a religious doctrine, the masses 
easily yielding because they cannot resist when a firm and deter-
mined conviction faces their own gloomy, unsettled, and nihilistic 
opinions. Burckhardt’s analyses of the sociological implications of 
Mohammed’s religion are a model of sociological realism at its best. 
This religion is a “terrible simplification” of Jewish and Christian 
ideas, intended to satisfy the needs of predatory tribes at the low-
est cultural level. Burckhardt similarly subjected some of the para-
doxical aspects of the Reformation to a sociological analysis. It is the 
paradox of the Reformation that it was originally intended to set free 
the religious inwardness of the individual and actually delivered the 
moral and spiritual forces of man to the political powers. In terms 
similar to those used by John Neville Figgis [1866–1919] and Georges 
de Lagarde [1898–1967], Burckhardt pointed out the fatal affinity of 
Martin Luther [1483–1546] to Niccolò Machiavelli [1469–1527] and 
his tragic success in the unconscious promotion of modern secular-
ization. Finally, he remarks that the Reformation was supported by 
those groups that had reason to expect to benefit by the unloosening 
of the spiritual and secular ties.
Burckhardt’s most important contribution to a sociology of 
religion is the analysis of the conditions under which the Christian 
Church became a part of the Roman Empire. The persecutions under 
Diocletian [244–311] had the positive effect of uniting the conflicting 
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Christian sects into one strong hierarchical body. It was this well-
functioning body with its strict and rigid organization that made 
it attractive to Constantine the Great [272–337] as the power best 
fitted to take over the administration of the empire. Furthermore, 
among the competing religions, the Christian denomination was 
in possession of an intelligible and simple message of salvation 
that appealed to many social and religious needs. Burckhardt ana-
lyzed this turning point in the history of the Church: first, it was 
the unique opportunity to spread the Gospel among the pagans and 
the barbarian tribes; second, it was a great opportunity to merge the 
ancient civilization into the new religion; third, it was the terrible 
temptation faced by the church to get involved with the state and its 
lust for power.
The change from an ascetic and otherworldly religion to a politi-
cal institution jeopardized the true message of Christianity—that 
is, the conquest of life and the establishment of spiritual freedom 
through the ascetic life. Franz Overbeck [1837–1905] and Karl Barth 
[1886–1968] have taken up Burckhardt’s suggestions regarding 
monasticism and asceticism as the true meaning of the Gospel.
Burckhardt believed that only through separation from power 
could the genuine spirit of religion be reborn. Only then will religion 
again be a manifestation of the urge for freedom and an ideal power 
capable of making its own contribution toward the rebuilding of the 
world.
Burckhardt takes for granted that religion is a fundamental act of 
the human constitution; it is interdependent with the invariables of 
power and culture. Wherever and whenever religions arise, they are 
bound to limit the scope and the volume of cultural activities. This 
can be a positive or a negative consequence of the religious expan-
sion. It can be negative, if we assume that human potentialities are 
completely absorbed and suppressed; it can be positive, if we assume 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N490
that that which is frustrated in a religious civilization is “destined” 
to be reborn in future societies as naive and spontaneous human cre-
ativity. The impact of religion will always be positive as an indispens-
able condition for the arts and for poetry. Religion is the only source 
of the deepest and the simplest truth about the whole; through its 
absorption in the arts, religion has delivered the souls of men from 
fear and superstition and gives them an intelligible idea of the tre-
mendous and overwhelming power of the spirit.
The careful and considered weighing of the positive and negative 
effects of the invariables in human action dictates moderation in all 
theories about the “necessity” of historical events. Nevertheless, we 
encounter the term necessity quite often in the writings of this most 
violent critic of the philosophy of history of Georg Hegel [1770–1831]. 
The Reformation was “necessary”; the modern mind is termed nec-
essary; the House of Borgia [1455–1672] is dubbed “necessary,” etc. 
On the other hand, Burckhardt ridicules the historians who hear “the 
grass of necessity growing.” Through his empirical investigations, he 
questions the belief that each moment possesses a relative necessity, as 
a preparation for the next stage in the historical process. “Vulgar is the 
delusion that acts of terrorism and lawlessness can be justified as his-
torical necessities in the name of expected results.” In each moment 
there are accidents, errors, and personal guilt that cannot be removed. 
There were great potential religious forces in Italy at the time of the 
German Reformation; but the Italians did not have the “chance.”
What is the meaning of these contradictory statements? Revolu-
tionary changes like the Renaissance or the Reformation must evade 
in detail and in general philosophical deductions regarding their ori-
gins and their evolution. There always remains a riddle because we 
are never capable of learning all the relevant facts. We can speak of 
necessities only in a hypothetical form. Burckhardt speaks of “neces-
sity” as the diagonal in the concatenations of conditions in a specific 
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situation. In this empirical sense, necessities mean tendencies that 
probably will prevail when we succeed in measuring correctly the 
strength and reality of the constituents of the social structure.
A general reflection on Burckhardt’s conceptions is in place. 
Burckhardt was a student of Hegel, Ranke, Schopenhauer, and Edu-
ard von Hartmann [1842–1906]. He never uses their terms in a strict 
philosophical sense. He feels that what he has to say is “untimely” and 
goes beyond the limits of academic thought. For this reason, we must 
never take his words too literally; we must read him with a grain 
of salt. Burckhardt ascribes revolutionary power to the spontaneous 
and independent spirit that freely criticizes the established institu-
tions from the point of view of absolute values. This intellectual free-
dom makes possible social change. While Max Weber [1864–1920] 
described this invariable as a “historical” form of modern pragmatic 
rationalism, Burckhardt is well aware that the revolutionary action 
of reason has two aspects. It can produce social change and it can 
“conquer earthly things.” It is historical and transhistorical at the 
same time. It makes possible the transcendence of man’s historical 
self because all acts of knowledge and of spiritual insight attain an 
objective stand beyond the flux of time. A close study of Burckhardt’s 
works can easily demonstrate that he always identifies the ideal and 
the spiritual forces as the powers that enable man to become free in 
a world of general determination.
Burckhardt states that the deepest ground of all religion and 
knowledge is the conquest of “earthly things.” Conquest of the 
“earthly things” is the end of human perfection. Burckhardt’s teach-
ings will give the modern student who is bewildered by the pressure 
of history the intellectual instruments to transcend the limits of his-
toricism. Burckhardt does not recommend any specific doctrine; he 
practices the intellectual discipline of the ancients. He is convinced 
that contemplation will make men free.
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However, in his inexorable realism he does not forget that this 
freedom cannot be practiced outside of an established social order 
the foundations of which are cemented with violence and force. Fac-
ing this antinomy, he asks the question to which the agnostic has no 
answer: “Perhaps both the man who aims at the free and spontane-
ous acts of culture and the man who strives for power are but blind 
instruments in the service of a third unknown power.”
Burckhardt presents his reader with many such antinomies that 
seem to be reconciled in the lives of individual men. For this reason, 
one may say that Burckhardt’s historical sociology is an empirical 
science with philosophical intent.
History and the Arts
There is still another avenue leading to the transcendence of history. 
Burckhardt opened this road in his writings on art and the history of 
art.13 His approach and his intentions in these writings are parallel to 
those he applied to the study of history. He is mainly concerned with 
giving his students scientific instruments for the intelligent interpre-
tation of works of art, dwelling on those aspects of art that can be 
communicated. In these studies, the works of art are interpreted as 
the ideal expression of a historical situation, as the unending effort 
of the human generations in the sequence of time to interpret their 
being in time and space in symbols and images. The analysis of form 
occupies an important part in these studies, but his main task is to 
make the reader and student aware that all these works of art mani-
fest certain aspects of human nature and have some bearing on the 
understanding of man’s existence in the world.
As in his historical studies, so in his studies of art, Burckhardt 
does not care much for anecdotes and dates. Just as in his reflections 
on history, he subjected the generalizations of the philosophers to a 
sound skeptical scrutiny; he is equally suspicious of the theories of 
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the “experts” on aesthetics. Burckhardt, the historian of art, teaches 
that we encounter the riddle of life, which is the historical existence 
of man, in the ineffable mystery of the great works of art. Through 
specialized research, we may conquer some of the secrets of nature; 
we shall never lift the veil of the living spirit residing in the perfect 
achievements of the great artists. This is neither defeatism nor irra-
tionalism. It simply means that the definitions of the philosophers 
are most inadequate means of grasping the living totality of a work 
of art. The scholar can only describe the constituent elements of the 
beautiful work of art and the criteria of its perfection.
The arts and their history should be taught as an important ele-
ment of education and of the interpretation of the self in space and 
time. The arts are a most powerful factor as a historical phenomenon 
and an effective and constructive force in the lives of societies. In 
their highest accomplishments, they disclose the paradox of perfec-
tion and absolute value in spite of human finiteness in history. Burck-
hardt insists on the unique character of the plastic and literary arts. 
In terms similar to those employed by Henri Bergson, he describes 
the “spiritual surplus” that comes into existence in the course of any 
material activity. “This spiritual surplus becomes conscious thought 
and reflection in the work of art.” Burckhardt elaborates:
Before man himself realizes it, there has awakened in him 
a need totally different from that which led him to begin 
his work. It is this new need which continues to grow and 
make itself felt. This new need which we may identify with 
the platonic eros can be demonstrated most evidently in 
the works of art. They constitute a reality of their own, a 
second creation. . . . They arise from mysterious vibra-
tions communicated to the soul. What is released by 
those vibrations has ceased to be individual and temporal 
and has become symbolically significant and immortal.
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Burckhardt is striving to arouse in the responsible teacher who is 
concerned with the growth of an individual person an awareness of 
the ultimate perspectives of art. Precisely for this reason, Burckhardt 
wishes to give the student the measuring rods that will enable him 
to recognize what is truly original, powerful, and great in art. This 
training will shape the student’s whole outlook and his philosophy of 
life. Only through such training can we be prepared for that “blessed 
hour” of illuminating experience in which we understand the unity 
and the wholeness of a great work of art. It can help us understand 
the sphere of art as the realm of pure and disinterested contempla-
tion. It may teach us that the arts are not synonymous with enter-
tainment and relaxation. They are not substitutes for happiness, and 
yet they sometimes do transfigure the highest moments of human 
experience and can make transparent and lucid the confusing and 
unintelligible destinies of man in the world.
More than in his historical studies, Burckhardt in his works on 
art praises the “otherwise extremely unpleasant nineteenth century” 
for having made possible the objective understanding of ancient and 
foreign works of art. This is not a small achievement. It contrasted 
with those centuries that appreciated only art that complied with 
the values of their own specific historical situation. The Renaissance 
and Baroque had no understanding for the positive value of the 
Gothic arts; the moderns care little for Baroque art. With the break-
down of political, religious, and social monopolies during the nine-
teenth century, an avenue was opened that permitted the approach 
to a variety of artistic experiences. Modern open-mindedness made 
it possible to visualize three different aspects of the works of art: 
we can understand them as expressing an individual situation; we 
may appreciate them as a timeless revelation of the human mind in 
time; and, eventually, we can recognize them as the very phenomena 
through which men may achieve a mode of knowledge far superior 
J AC O B  B U R C K H A R D T 495
to the technical discoveries of the sciences and the insights of phi-
losophy.
The modern unbiased eagerness to understand the diversity of 
expressions, forms, and patterns in all civilizations has had positive 
effects on the very being of man. It has enlarged the horizon of our 
thinking and raised the level of our experiences. The very fascination 
of beauty in the work of art releases in the understanding person an 
unrest leading from the finite and imperfect to the true and perfect 
being. Burckhardt believes that the teaching of the history of art is 
capable of transforming the individual, widening his understanding, 
and increasing the powers that make it possible to live in historical 
time and to transcend it in the eternal present of the spirit. Under the 
precarious conditions that are the artist’s lot in the modern world, 
the study of art can demonstrate the power of the desire to achieve 
works of beauty despite unfavorable social conditions. The teacher 
can point out the nature of the artistic intention in every type of civi-
lization and its ability to overcome social contempt or indifference. 
In contrast to the mobility and the revolutionary dynamics of the 
nineteenth century, Burckhardt’s reflections on the meaning of art 
establish a sphere of contemplation unknown to the past. We learn to 
take the historicity of art and of man for granted, understanding the 
pluralistic eternity of artistic accomplishments and the diverse strata 
of artistic expression as various modes of interpreting the world. I n 
his art studies, Burckhardt is the true teacher educating his reader to 
understand the works of art as means of communicating knowledge 
about the truth of the whole.
There is a profound similarity between Burckhardt’s concep-
tion of the task of historiography and art study. In his conception, 
history is concerned with the study of civilization. For the study of 
art, he coined the rather awkward term, systematic history of art. 
What he actually practiced was the sociological analysis of artistic 
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forms and changing patterns. He took for granted that art has an 
autonomous existence but regarded it as his own task to study the 
impact of societal relationships on these autonomous problems. 
“Perhaps I am disenchanting the history of art. . . . I wish to concen-
trate on the prose elements in the arts.” His sober realism revolted 
against a purely idealistic or spiritual treatment of the works of art. 
There are societal relationships between the artist and the collec-
tor that may be highly relevant for the problems of the artist and 
their solution. The sense of glory and of social prestige originating 
in the illegitimate governments of the Italian Renaissance and their 
regard for the power of public opinion makes it possible to explain 
the monumental intentions of the Italian architects. The inclinations 
and preferences of the collectors whether they belonged to the nobil-
ity, to the patricians, or to the wealthy middle classes, had bearing 
on the artistic production, influencing and changing the techni-
cal and material problems of the artist. Burckhardt’s essays on the 
collector, on the portrait, and on the altar-piece are unsurpassed 
models of this sociological approach toward art. It is the great merit 
of these studies that they make clear different strata of depth in 
the history of the arts. Burckhardt is clear-sighted enough to real-
ize that the formal and technical problems with which the artist is 
forced to grapple are as relevant a determining factor as his socio-
logical position. His conception of the systematic and sociological 
treatment of the arts points exactly to this problem of connecting 
the historical situation of the artistic and technical problems with 
the social situation of artist and collector and of elucidating the 
transhistoricity of the work of art. The focusing element in this 
science of art remains the interrelationship and interdependence 
between the changing contents and the perennial forms of art. As 
in the historical life of man, Burckhardt assumes in the history of 
art, too, the existence of recurrent and invariable trends and inten-
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tions that appear in the patterns of specific forms. Their contact 
and merging with the technical problems produce the changes in 
the development of the arts. However, Burckhardt strongly assumes 
that the conditions of the external and internal world remain only 
incentives to the artistic intention. “The small pattern of a form is 
the germ of the sublime and great form, not the wonderful vision of 
the artist.” Burckhardt taught his students that they must first know 
what the artist was able to express in a given historical situation with 
its technical, material, and artistic problems. Only when these ques-
tions are cleared, can we approach the problems of the historicity 
and transhistoricity of the works of art.
Burckhardt discriminates very carefully between the diverse lev-
els of art. There are art products whose purpose is solely to entertain; 
there are works of art that represent the accomplishments of a style. 
The great and rare works of perfection are beyond these general 
levels of artistic achievements. In a very formal sense, all works of 
art are, as objects of human thought and imagination, historical. 
What Burckhardt calls “historical immortality” is attributed only to 
works of art that bear the mark of greatness. He defines this term as 
indicating an achievement that is irreplaceable and unique. It is the 
manifestation of a human personality that succeeds in unifying a 
variety of experiences with an integrating intelligence and imagina-
tion. Burckhardt is quite positive that the greatness of artists or poets 
may be defined only in moral terms. There are many men of genius 
in all ways of life. Most of them spend their gifts without true devo-
tion to a cause. Burckhardt refuses to concede greatness in an artist 
of the outstanding craftsmanship of Andrea del Sarto [1486–1530] 
because of his miserable character. He praises Raphael [1483–1520]: 
“Raphael’s supreme personal quality is not of esthetic, but of moral 
quality: his overwhelming integrity and the iron will he put in his 
efforts to conquer the highest perfection he could possibly grasp. . . . 
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He was never satisfied with his achievements.” He praises Rubens 
[1577–1640] in the same terms. His greatness is described as a never-
ending education and cultivation of the self, the sincere and naive 
pursuit of his work in spite of all worldly distractions and complete 
independence in his work. “There was much of happiness in his life . . . 
and he left much happiness to posterity.”
These men are truly great. And this is the only greatness that 
Burckhardt considers sublime and normative, in contrast to which 
historical greatness is a manifestation of the exceptional and the 
abnormal. These men are great because they devoted their lives to 
ideal creation and applied their tremendous energies and moral 
will to its realization. The quest for greatness in the sphere of art 
corresponds to the quest for wisdom in the sphere of history as an 
indispensable condition for the transcendence of history.
Burckhardt states frequently that even in the sphere of the arts 
greatness is never a purely esthetic or formal category. His analyses 
of esthetic phenomena have clarified the diversity and hierarchy of 
the human attitudes that find expression in the works of art. How-
ever, the very core of Burckhardt’s aesthetic conceptions is contained 
in his studies of Renaissance culture. It is Raphael, Burckhardt main-
tains, who is the creator of the specific pattern of modern beauty. His 
work has become the modern image of perfection through harmony. 
“Raphael lives in a world crowded by holy, mythical, secular charac-
ters of an ideal order which the artist seems to have fashioned with 
a sort of immediate ease. . . . Raphael alone was able to realize great 
spiritual powers!” Burckhardt’s praise of Raphael has often been 
wrongly interpreted as an epigonic classicism. For Burckhardt, he is 
the artist who established the image of “sublime humanity.” He gave 
expression to the individual personality that succeeds in conquering 
the “earthly things” by virtue of his moral and intellectual power, 
transforming the contradictory and antagonistic elements of life into 
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a wholistic and meaningful order and context. He is historical and 
modern in so far as he achieves this monumental living unity on 
the small basis of his moderate and harmonious subjectivity. In the 
past, the artist simply had to reproduce a universal order that was 
valid and taken for granted. Esthetic perfection had no autonomous 
or particular significance; it was merely an element of religious or 
philosophical contemplation. Raphael was the first to create an artis-
tic cosmos that was his personal universe. This personal achievement 
of beauty has a profound moral and spiritual significance. Therefore, 
Burckhardt assumes that Raphael’s work is the triumph not of an 
epigonic, but of a normative classicism. It is the purest and simplest 
conquest of life through the self-redemption of man by virtue of 
contemplation and imagination. It establishes in the plastic arts an 
invariable normative classicism that is an expression of the pure and 
normal life at its highest. His work is transhistorical in the formal 
sense and perennial as an expression of the conquest of life.
Burckhardt’s praise of Raphaelian classicism can be fully 
understood only when seen against his judgement of Michelangelo 
[1475–1564]. Michelangelo is the modern artist kat’exochen [par 
excellence—Eds.]. To find himself he must oppose tradition, classical 
and Christian myths, and the conventions of style. He is always rest-
less, straining to discover new and unheard of possibilities of repre-
senting the human body. In his relations with others, he is arbitrary, 
violent, and imposing. He represents the other pole of modernity—
the radical, the immoderate element. Raphael is his counterimage, 
the rational, reconciled, and harmonious personality.
In Michelangelo, with his density and tension, is mirrored the self-
dramatization of the modern epoch amidst the insoluble conflicts in 
which it is caught. Michelangelo aims at the most naturalistic, physi-
ological realism; at the same time, he aspires to express the superhu-
man that he embodies in excessive attitudes, violent movements, and 
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exaggerated positions. That which was later to degenerate to mere 
vulgarity and perversity appears in Michelangelo as “restrained 
monstrosity.” It is the opposite of Raphael’s “sublime humanity.” 
Raphael gives expression to the invariable of disinterested and pure 
rationality; Michelangelo tells the story of modern man caught in 
the coils of his own irrational desires and unable to transcend his-
tory. “Michelangelo has neglected all the beautiful attitudes of the 
soul. There is not much in his work that can be cherished among 
the highest human values.” Burckhardt concedes the grandeur of 
Michelangelo’s genius, but it is the grandeur of a violent, radical, torn 
soul, incapable of achieving balance and harmony. His work remains 
the manifestation of a problematic human situation, a record of a 
tragic period in human history, like Euripides’s [480–406 BC] dra-
mas. Raphael and Aeschylus [525–456 BC] mirror their times, but 
they also transcend their historical moment, whereas Euripides and 
Michelangelo merely express it. Burckhardt’s approach to works of 
art is always determined by this question whether its author has suc-
ceeded in transcending historicity or has merely given expression to 
it. He praises Rubens for the same reasons as those he mentions in 
his apotheosis of Raphael. Rubens is the last expression of a world of 
plenitude and nobility, a man who succeeded in merging the multi-
tudinous images that threatened to overwhelm him into a harmoni-
ous cosmos, over which he was master.
Burckhardt’s art studies are sometimes regarded as guidebooks. 
Indeed they are, but not guides for the amateur and collector; they 
are really guides to the sublime and perfect life. To Burckhardt, the 
world of forms discloses a variety of basic human tendencies and 
intentions whose value is measured by the horizon they embrace. 
The arts have relevance for him only in terms of the search for and 
the achievement of wisdom. The arts are modes of human knowl-
edge, the ultimate aim of which is to help man transcend his his-
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torical perspective, to make his life more transparent, to see it in the 
light of that magic that appears real because it is conquered by the 
ideal powers of natural reason and balanced wisdom.
It is not an accident that the man who has extolled the greatness 
of Raphael and Rubens should speak in the last pages of his Cice-
rone with the purest admiration of Claude Lorrain [1600–1682]: “His 
work radiates an ineffable enchantment. . . . Claude, a candid soul 
of sublime integrity, turns to nature for comfort. In his work reality 
and ideality seem to coincide as the highest grace, merging nature 
and mind.” Johann Wolfgang von Goethe [1749–1832] spoke of the 
great French painter in almost the same terms: “There you have a 
complete man who thought and felt nobly. In his soul dwelt a world 
that we do not encounter often in the outer world. His paintings pos-
sess the highest truth, but not a trace of reality. He knows the real 
world thoroughly in all its details, but he uses them merely as tools 
for expressing the world of his beautiful soul. This is the true ideality: 
to use reality in such a way that the truth of the imagination creates 
the illusion of reality.”
Like Goethe, Burckhardt was of the opinion that the highest 
achievement of art is not tragic and dramatic genius, but elevated 
normalcy and wise moderation. These are the human presupposi-
tions for the transcendence of history and of “earthly things”; this 
is not a monopoly of the scholar or the artist. It is possible wher-
ever a pure and candid soul devotes himself to the contemplative 
and imaginative understanding of the wonder of human existence 
in the world. Homer remains for Burckhardt the greatest poet and 
Goethe’s “Nausikaa” fragment—the superb expression of this spirit 
of “sublime humanity” in an ugly and blasé civilization.
There remains one utterance that contains the core of Burck-
hardt’s teaching. He is speaking of Luca della Robbia [1400–1482]. 
We know that his work is not the highest artistic achievement. How-
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ever, it “is perfect beauty of a kind. He teaches us to understand the 
soul of the fifteenth century at its most beautiful. Naturalism is his 
presupposition, but he presents it with a simplicity, graciousness, and 
tenderness, which brings him close to the sublime style. What may 
seem to us a religious expression is only the manifestation of a pro-
foundly peaceful, serene, and unsentimental humanity.”
This is indeed the secret key to the transcendence of history: to 
devote one’s highest efforts to the task of making life transparent 
through imaginative contemplation. Burckhardt’s interpretation of 
the function of the arts opens an avenue to the conquest of historicity.
Philosophy of Man in the World of History
Burckhardt’s pioneering work in historical and cultural sociology 
questioned and made evident the problematic presuppositions of 
contemporary philosophies of history. He insisted on the scientific 
and empirical character of his work. Nevertheless, this work implies 
a philosophy of its own, as the positive verification of the theories 
that he refuted by his empirical research. Burckhardt referred to his 
point of view as “sound skepticism.” This must be explained. It is not 
“debunking.” It is the sober realism of empirical investigation that 
disregards all hypotheses of anthropology and of theology. As stu-
dents of history, Burckhardt asserts, we do not have knowledge of the 
origins and the end of history. There is no immanent and no tran-
scendent meaning of history of which we are aware. The origins are 
dark and uncertain; the field of investigation is only the life of man 
in the higher civilizations. It is a continuous and mobile process. 
“This is the whole, the great and serious whole that we call history.” 
It is the continuity and interdependent action of mankind. The pro-
cess may appear as evolution or as a cyclical movement; it is subordi-
nate to the movement of the whole. The life of mankind is a whole in 
which every individual exists not for his own sake, but for the sake of 
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the past and all the future. This statement is the more remarkable, 
since the author was an opponent of the dehumanizing evolutionism 
that regards each moment merely as the preparation for the next. 
Burckhardt insists on the eternity of the present. He admits that the 
single historical moment does possess a functional meaning within 
the context of the “higher necessity,” but what can we know of this 
“great and serious whole” and its necessity after we have rejected the 
intellectualism of the philosophies of progress? The answer is that 
this “whole” is as ineffable as the genuine work of art. This primary 
philosophical attitude in the face of man’s life in the world is as ratio-
nal and intelligible as the “sound skepticism” of which Burckhardt 
was so fond. This whole of history is an open and dynamic unity of 
antinomies. The life of mankind is a continuous development of 
antagonistic tendencies. Cooperation and strife, the power of vitality 
and liberation through “sound reason,” are intertwined in the 
dynamic whole. In this context, our responsibilities for the whole 
can only mean that our choice of a way of life is only one element in 
the totality of this whole. There is a universal solidarity of suffering 
and of intellectual responsibility for the whole of mankind; this is 
the logical interpretation of Burckhardt’s statement on the “higher 
necessity.” For life is growth and development, however painful it 
may be. We are life; we eventually decide on the standards and the 
horizons of this life of the whole. Human beings make history 
through acting and being acted on, through imposing on fellow men 
and restricting their movements. History as a whole can mean only 
the revelation of the grandeur and misery of man under the determi-
nations of his surroundings; it can mean only the never-ending 
dynamics of the evil and sound forces of man, their interaction, and 
their effects in shaping the spontaneous action of the human mind. 
To achieve a true understanding of the human situation in history, 
we must be aware of the enduring antinomies in human life, the 
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antagonistic forces of vitality and mind, of the “material” and “high-
er” interests. Social life can take place only when these forces achieve 
a synthesis and a provisional equilibrium. Civilizations can develop 
only within the institutions of a body politic. No state has ever been 
founded, except through usurpation; no great power has ever been 
established except through crime. Only when the “sound forces” of 
man are added to the brute force of violence can power shift to 
strength, law, and order. These cruel, bloody, and man devouring 
foundations of civilization make possible the security and continuity 
of social action without which no material and intellectual achieve-
ments are possible. This Machiavellian realism is one aspect of 
Burckhardt’s sound skepticism. Usurpation is the foundation of 
social institutions. A secure social life will never be possible without 
the element of coercive force. Burckhardt ridicules the idealist 
assumption that a regime built on violence, lies, and terror cannot 
last. “As if states were ever built on anything else but on these evil 
forces.” The political institutions are the frame of every civilization. 
For this reason, Burckhardt opens all his historical studies with an 
analysis of the political institutions within which human conduct 
and human civilization take place. He considers this dilemma of 
civilization from all angles: the highest civilizations are built upon 
the despair and the cries of the conquered and its ground is fertilized 
with the blood and sweat of its subjects. This brings him to the con-
clusion that “Satanas” (he adds: “in Christian terminology, but not 
in Christian spirit”) is the ruler of the world. Violence and coercion 
show the demoniac selfishness of man who is driven by greed and 
fear. The original state is only the systematization of violence. In this 
sense, Burckhardt declares power to be “evil in itself.” Power, how-
ever, must be distinguished from potency, which is a genuine ele-
ment of greatness. In the “great man,” vital power appears from the 
beginning as intellectual concentration and control of the will, 
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directed toward a positive cause. But power is evil as the abstract 
accumulation of collective pressure that cannot control its urge 
toward expansion and encroachment upon others because desires 
and greed are infinite and inexhaustible. These powers are at the 
basis of civilization. It is the characteristic feature of human inertia 
to forget these dark origins of all culture after law and order have 
done their work of humanization. Good results do not eliminate the 
antinomies of human life; they cannot justify crimes and terror. We 
must never forget the terrible price mankind had to pay for establish-
ing some bases of civilization. No rationalization makes it possible to 
remove perennial evil from the balance sheet of history. It is the 
dehumanizing attitude of the moderns to refer the whole historical 
process to themselves and to take the past for granted as the prepara-
tion of their own perfection. Burckhardt rejects this attitude. It is a 
scientific observation that throughout history the powers of evil have 
created positive and good things, and good intentions and actions 
have made possible the rise of dark and evil forces. Political history 
is the history of irrational and demoniac forces at work. Burckhardt 
draws the conclusion that we should not esteem this life more highly 
than it deserves. This attitude should not be confused with pessi-
mism. As a true skeptic and realist, Burckhardt investigates all 
aspects of human phenomena. He is aware that in the antinomies of 
life, the evils of power have a lasting function in history. Evil power 
may rule for a long time, it may devastate civilization and sometimes 
extinguish the power of the spirit, but there will always be those who 
will be ready to meet the challenge of power with the quiet heroism 
of devotion to the values in which they believe. We must be cautious 
in interpreting this statement. It does not mean that the life of man-
kind is an equilibrium that is reestablished over and over again in 
the perennial interaction between the forces of evil and the “sound 
forces” of reason and spirit. Burckhardt does not imply that there is 
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such harmony and order. He simply states that the pressure of war, 
revolution, and tyranny, the radical patterns of violence, sometimes 
make possible the reality of heroism, martyrdom, and righteousness 
which otherwise would not easily come to the fore. Goodness and 
greatness of soul, intellectual illumination and wisdom can coexist 
with the forces of evil and of wickedness. Sublime works of art can 
thrive on the “foul ground” of criminal and nihilistic politics, as 
happened in some states during the Italian Renaissance and in Ath-
ens in Socrates’s time. Burckhardt seems to be astonished again and 
again by this coexistence of grandeur and misery in the life of man 
in the world. His theory of the antinomies in the structure of man’s 
life in history has been fully verified in our time by the heroes and 
martyrs who resisted the Nazis and Fascists in spite of imminent 
torture and death. There have been outbursts of courage and defi-
ance in our time that must raise our faith in human dignity, but also 
deepen our humility when we consider the cruelty and bestiality that 
provoked these acts of human grandeur. The intellectual discipline 
of Burckhardt’s candid realism shows still another aspect that we 
may call the Epicurean as opposed to the Machiavellian. Not this or 
that social type, but man proper is Burckhardt’s main concern. It is 
the deep love of man and the admiration of human potentialities 
that ultimately was behind his efforts to reestablish the image of man 
in a world unprotected by divine power and driven by the forces of 
nature; it is man capable of the highest intellectual sublimity and the 
most delicate tenderness and, at the same time, the possible embodi-
ment of bestiality and greed.
He establishes as the center of human grandeur the uncondi-
tioned devotion to a cause that is conditioned in its historicity. This 
is not an expression of nihilism.14 Burckhardt believes in the posi-
tive potentiality of man to live up to obligations and norms that can 
appear only in historical forms. Burckhardt takes the historicity of 
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man for granted because he believes him capable of making the his-
torical disguises transparent and becoming aware of the elements of 
truth, goodness, and beauty. In this, Burckhardt follows the ways of 
ancient philosophy. The thoughtful man can endure the awareness of 
the continuous changes and historicity of the mind. They are at the 
surface and do not touch the very essence of truth and value. We are 
capable of realizing true insight and the hint of the absolute within 
the perspective that is given in the historicity of our situation. This is 
enough to support the positivity of our being in devoting our efforts 
to a larger whole.
Burckhardt’s teaching points to man’s possibilities of establish-
ing truth and objective knowledge about the human world if we 
break away from the narrow interests of our historical position. 
The aim of his guidebooks—through the labyrinth of historicity 
and the paradise of wisdom and of art—is to vindicate the idea of 
truth and knowledge in order to give human beings the opportu-
nity to establish intellectual freedom and independence in a world 
in which men are increasingly surrounded by determinations. He 
reestablishes the dignity of contemplation in a rapidly expanding 
political world. He knows that we transcend the world of history and 
of its conditions when we rediscover the ancient way of contempla-
tion. In the very acts of knowledge, we learn to control ourselves and 
establish distance towards the flux of time as well as to evaluate the 
process of history and its relevance for our being. This contempla-
tion of man in the world is a responsibility. It involves the continuity 
of the mind. It proclaims the human right to establish freedom in 
the midst of universal dependence; it is also a necessity, if we are to 
clarify our own stand in the unending revolution of modern times. 
Objective thought makes clear the unwise limitation of all subjective 
approaches. It makes possible a true appreciation and calculation of 
the price men have to pay for all their achievements in the world 
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of history. Burckhardt calls himself an “epigonus of humanitas.” As 
such, he has taken up the torch of ancient wisdom and has lighted 
it to clear the dark fatalism of modern history and to overcome the 
historicism of modern collectivities. Like the Hellenistic epigoni, 
the Stoics and Epicureans, Burckhardt withdraws from the align-
ments of societal relationships and embraces human personality as 
opposed to its institutions. In this attempt, Burckhardt reflects upon 
being and the ranks of being and the differences of basic attitudes as 
indispensable elements of a comprehensive study of man.
This study of man in the world of history is for Burckhardt not a 
logical postulate. It is an existential attitude of a modern man who 
still feels himself a part of the whole. It is the attitude of a natural 
spontaneity and completeness that strives for independence. It is the 
brave and candid awareness of the loneliness of man in the world 
of history—awareness that in the secular modern world the thinker 
who investigates human conduct can only describe a variety of types 
of human grandeur and misery. It is the sublime necessity of the 
modern mind that it cannot take for granted the idea of a divine 
providence or any metaphysical theory of human nature. Only from 
the study of man in his historical world can we learn what and who 
we are, what we are striving for, and what are our successes and frus-
trations.
This is the philosophical implication of Burckhardt’s historical 
sociology; it describes the phenomena that constitute the grandeur 
and misery of man and that disclose the perennial transcendence of 
man in the immanence of his being in the world. Burckhardt knew 
well indeed that his attitude was itself the result of a specific histori-
cal situation that had arisen in the Renaissance. In a remarkable pas-
sage of his Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, Burckhardt quotes 
Pico della Mirandola [1463–1494], showing that the study of man 
in his concreteness can come into existence only when the religious 
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belief in a divine guidance is gone. He quotes from Pico’s Oratio de 
Hominis Dignitate: “Said God to Adam: I have placed you in the cen-
ter of the world so that you may easily survey and inspect all that is 
around you. I created you a being neither celestial nor earthly, neither 
mortal nor immortal, so that you may be your own free creator and 
conqueror. You can degenerate into a beast or elevate yourself into a 
god-like being.” This is precisely the origin of the modern situation. 
Burckhardt’s conception of the meaning of man in the world must 
be understood in this context. Burckhardt described the character of 
his own work in terms almost identical to those in which Pico had 
stated the function of a philosophical science of man in the Renais-
sance.
In our precarious and strange existence, we spontane-
ously limit ourselves to knowledge of man as such, to the 
knowledge of the empirical human race as we encounter 
it in the world and in history. . . . Are the three epochs 
of the world like the three day-times in the riddle of the 
Sphinx? Rather are they the continuous metempsycho-
sis of the acting and suffering man through numberless 
disguises. Men in quest of genuine wisdom desire to illu-
minate all these changes and to cast away all partiality 
for specific periods, the more so, the more they are aware 
of human frailty. . . . As soon as we have understood that 
there never have been “golden” and “happy” epochs, 
nor ever will be, we shall break loose from the roman-
tic transfiguration of any past, we shall rid ourselves of 
the unwise despair of the present and cease to indulge 
in wishful hopes regarding the future. We recognize in 
the contemplation of history one of the noblest concerns 
of man.
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History as a whole is the passio humana. This study of man’s 
greatness and humility may be a source of modest happiness in times 
of cataclysm. “There is happiness in the performance of acts of con-
templation, in turning backward to preserve the heritage of the past, 
in turning cheerfully and serenely towards the future in a period in 
which one can easily fall victim to the pressure of material forces.” 
Burckhardt was aware of the philosophical implications of his work. 
He knew that his presentation of the passio humana must raise many 
questions of a metaphysical and spiritual nature. Burckhardt was a 
modest and humble worker in the human universe which was to him 
both a labyrinth and a paradise. Whatever else may be the value of 
his guides to human historicity, there cannot be any doubt that they 
are windows to eternity. Burckhardt’s life work was one long search 
for a stand “outside” the world in order to endure the human situa-
tion “within” the historical world. For this reason, he did not revolt, 
and he was not in despair. He was well aware that his teaching would 
help people to conquer “earthly things” without taking refuge in a 
religious belief, as did the ancient teachings of self-redemption. His 
teaching of the passio humana is a guide to the transcendence of 
continuously changing historical life and the sympathetic under-
standing of all manifestations of human self-realizations.
Like Arnold J. Toynbee [1889–1975], Burckhardt did not plead a 
return to classical or Christian ways of thinking or existence. How-
ever, it was an axiom of his analyses of religion that religion is the very 
root of civilization, and its limitations can only be transcended by a 
final effort of the ideal and spiritual powers of man. He was deeply 
convinced that after the new tyrannies have undergone a series of 
world wars, there will be an ultimate effort of the ideal and spiritual 
powers that will break the chains of dehumanizing slavery. This is not 
romantic idealism; it is the conviction that there are requirements of 
the human constitution that cannot be neglected without destroying 
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the very character of man. Like Rainer Maria Rilke [1875–1926],15 
Burckhardt knew that there is Unum Necessarium which is still hid-
den and whose reappearance cannot be forced. He did not wait for it, 
and he did not need it personally. As a sociologist, he predicted the 
renaissance of the intellectual and spiritual powers in order to meet 
the challenges of a world of absolute determinations and to reestab-
lish the dignity and independence of man.
Francis Bacon [1561–1626] had inaugurated the modern epoch 
with a philosophy that taught man to control nature and establish 
“the rule of man.” At the end of this epoch, we find a human phi-
losophy that makes it possible to control history and to reestablish 
the dignity and humility of man in his historical immortality while 
surrounded by the threats of nihilism and the all-devouring forces of 
totalitarianism in the social world.
Historiography of Crisis 
Historical sociology is a rather recent science. Burckhardt’s histori-
cal sociology may be described as a historiography of crisis. There 
are situations in history when the main concern shifts from the 
analysis of the general process to the empirical description of a single 
situation as a comprehensive kaleidoscope of the human universe. 
Tacitus [56–120] had developed a pattern of history that was revived 
by Burckhardt. Tacitus’s work bears the imprint of the rule of tyr-
anny under which he lived. Burckhardt predicted the forthcoming 
tyrannies of the totalitarian regimes. The actual and predictable 
realities of despotism produced the same reaction in the ancient and 
the modern historian. Both took their tragic times for granted; both 
served the spirit by carrying on the intellectual and moral heritage 
of the past, guarding those traditions that future generations will 
need when barbarian despotism will be gone. Both historians cre-
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ated a scientific pattern of historical sociology that analyzes types 
of human conduct and action in a specific situation. Tacitus lived 
through the period of Domitian [51–96]; Burckhardt anticipated in 
his vision the militaristic and radical despotisms of the twentieth-
century totalitarian regimes. Both were resigned to the fact that 
intellectuals could not change the social institutions. Both endured 
the historical process as an inescapable fate. They did not attempt to 
escape the social careers that their respective societies offered them. 
Tacitus, the son of a provincial middle-class family, was eager to 
follow the traditional pattern of the administrative career, as it was 
the custom for a student of Law. Burckhardt, the son of a patrician 
family of Protestant ministers and professors, entered the academic 
career. These modest adjustments of the two historians did not inter-
fere with their existential attitude toward their moral allegiances 
and intellectual obligations. This existential attitude meant that in 
a terroristic situation, in a despotic or revolutionary regime, it is the 
task of the scholar to preserve the meaning of humanitas. He can do 
that by collecting and describing the human phenomena that con-
stitute the positive meaning of human existence or indicating what 
can happen with man under the degrading influence of such condi-
tions. In tyrannies and revolutions, the formula of Lucretius [99–55 
BC], “Vitaï lampada tradunt,” imposes a terrific responsibility on the 
intellectual. In such situations, the intellectual, if he is to remain true 
to his calling, is forced to live outside the social situation. In such 
situations, he will cry with Seneca [4 BC–65 AD]: The house is burn-
ing!—and he will attempt to save it. In times of great emergency, the 
scholar will discover that his work is not primarily concerned with 
technical, logical, or methodological problems. He will realize that 
questions and approaches that have no final bearing on the intel-
lectual growth and the illumination of the human mind are not the 
fundamental and crucial task of the scholar. In a situation of grave 
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emergency, the intellectual will not deal any longer with the tricks 
and the refined techniques of his specific field. He will refer his field 
of investigation to fundamental human needs and concerns.
Scholars have sometimes rightly refused to classify the works of 
such authors as historical, referring to them as moralists. However, 
this is a very poor alternative. These men are not concerned with 
moral conduct, nor are they interested in social causation. Tacitus 
is primarily concerned with a variety of characters as they appear 
in a specific situation. He comments ironically on the archaic pat-
tern of Roman chronological historiography that describes the 
annual accomplishments of the magistrates. This is a revolt against 
the pragmatic historians who reluctantly acknowledged the mean-
ingful transformation of Rome into the Principate. This critical 
attitude indicates a consciousness that there is no immanent reason 
and significance in the political machine of the Roman Empire. It 
was merely a tremendously efficient, anonymous machine, which 
became possible because the republic had lost its aristocratic respon-
sibilities and submitted itself to two groups of exploiting racketeers: 
the nobles and the knights. The military despotism supported by the 
middle classes had established a legal and administrative order for 
these unpolitical groups. Tacitus did not idealize the dead republic, 
nor did he praise the “new order.” Thoughtful and intelligent men 
knew too well the price they had to pay for social and economic 
progress. The price was the slow but continuous destruction of the 
educated and cultured classes of the old republican nobility. Here, 
again, there was no romantic longing. Tacitus understood with a 
bitter clarity that with the destruction of those classes, intellectual 
independence and spiritual bravery were eliminated from the scene. 
The new ruling elite was the product of despotic regimes: rackets 
of informers, adventurers, profiteers, bankers, and businessmen. 
Teaching and education became a business too. Students were taught 
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the most refined and sophisticated techniques of public speaking—
but these were tricks, not convictions, dramatic gestures, not tragic 
spirit. In spite of its legal and economic security, the Rome in which 
Tacitus lived was a world of inner decay. Thus far, it may seem as 
though Tacitus’s work is historical—a study of the fall and decline 
of the Roman nobility. However, this would be a superficial view 
of his work. Tacitus uses his critique of the archaic pattern of the 
chronological report as a means of discrediting pragmatic history 
and all philosophies or theologies of history. He presents a variety of 
human experiences and a diversity of human attitudes in face of an 
established tyranny. It is not a political accusation of the regime; it 
is the heartbreaking and breathtaking vision of what human beings 
are capable of under the conditions of a despotic regime. It is his 
explicit purpose to report the corruptibility and misery of man when 
a spark of a better future is visible in the attempts of Nerva [30–98] 
and Trajan [53–117] to reestablish a constitution. Tacitus presents 
historical personalities as social types who are molded by their insti-
tutions. The imperial court is the focusing center of the informers, 
the businessmen, the courtiers, the political generals who regard the 
empire as an opportunity for exploitation and a career. There is the 
society of the newly rich: bankers, merchantmen from Italy and the 
provinces who have no interest in politics and are only concerned 
with economic success. Tacitus does not indulge in wrath or despair. 
There are still other types of human conduct that come to the fore 
in this situation. There are the military and civil officers, generals 
and judges who cling to the traditions and virtues that had made 
Rome great. It is to their credit that the inner and external peace is 
preserved and that the legal and administrative machinery of the 
empire works fairly well. It is due to their quiet perseverance that this 
world retains some sort of continuity. They remain true to the tradi-
tions of service and devotion to the Republic, paying no attention to 
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the tyrant in power. Gnaeus Julius Agricola [40–93] is supposed to 
be a pattern of living virtue in a world of vice. However, Tacitus is 
not completely convinced that this is the final form of perfection in 
a despotic world. There are remarks in The Agricola that show that 
Tacitus is not sure that it is possible to live an immaculate life in a 
world of license and terror and not to be co-responsible for the mur-
derous acts of the tyrants. Agricola was a member of the senate, and 
he did not resist the rules of Domitian who ordered the senate to kill 
the brave and opposing members of this body. Tacitus knows well 
that the man of action, the citizen or the statesman, cannot indulge 
in an attitude of moderation and reconciliation in the radical situ-
ation of despotism. He is dimly aware that there is a sociological 
rule that decent and moral characters are forced into taking up the 
struggle for the principles of radical justice and equity only when 
the extreme opposites of arbitrariness and expediency are practiced 
by the tyrants. He entertains no illusions about the workings of this 
dialectic; it is possible to interpret the essay on Agricola as a defense 
rather than a praise of his father-in-law.
Tacitus’s panoramic picture of the world of tyrants would not 
be complete if it had not included those men who refused to adjust 
themselves to this decadent social order. There are the political 
escapists (i.e., the members of the republican nobility who could 
not be induced to enter the imperial senate). They had withdrawn 
into privacy. They knew well that every tyrant would understand 
this act of nonconformism as an inimical revolutionary gesture. In 
a despotic regime, one yields or one faces confiscation of property, 
exile, and death. The defeated elite knew very well that there was no 
chance of victory for a revolt; nevertheless, they resisted. It was a 
moral attitude without any political bearing. They preferred death 
to an ignominious life, exile to servile behavior. This transforma-
tion of a supercilious and licentious elite into a nobility of moral and 
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spiritual character is the positive reaction to extreme moral degrada-
tion. There is still another type of conduct originating under the rule 
of despots: the Stoic martyrs are the last type of human perfection 
that Tacitus describes. He does not speak of “the” intellectuals as a 
social group. The professors and literati made the best of the new 
situation. There were, naturally, only a select few who accomplished 
the highest perfection. They were the lay philosophers, like Seneca, 
and philosophical-minded laymen whose convictions were trans-
formed into a religious faith. It is the only case in history where it 
is permitted to speak of philosophical martyrs. They suffered and 
gladly submitted to death as the ultimate refuge of independence 
and self-determination. They died for the sake of the human dig-
nity that could eventually be vindicated only through suicide. They 
sacrificed their lives in order to remain true to the ideals of human 
integrity and decency. This philosophical religion was so widespread 
that wives joined their husbands, parents their sons, children their 
parents, friends each other, in voluntary suicide.
Tacitus presents a typology of human patterns of conduct in the 
concrete historical situation of a government of tyrants. There is no 
meaning in the flux of time that we call history, nor is there a divine 
providence embracing the human world. There are to be found at 
the same place and in the same moment wickedness and sublim-
ity, meanness and heroism, refined cruelty and simple spirituality, 
sophisticated systems of terrorism and the commonsense belief in 
the dignity of man. These antinomies of human attitudes coexist in 
the radical situation of terrorism and despotism.
Tacitus’s phenomenological presentation shows that a situation 
of violence makes possible the highest and the lowest potentialities 
of man. Men obviously need the severest stimuli, the blows of war, 
revolution, and despotism, in order to realize their highest and low-
est potentialities in the here and now of the radical situation. There 
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is no sheltering salvation and no celestial reward for the virtuous; 
there is no comfort of redemption, but the ineffable wonder of man’s 
living in the world. To be humiliated and to humiliate, to control and 
be controlled, to act and be acted upon—this is man’s grandeur and 
misery. There is no meaning in the immanent process of history, no 
divine providence, no all-embracing and protecting reason. There is 
only the hell and the heaven of man’s conduct. This is passio humana. 
Tacitus, the author, was a best seller at the courts of the absolu-
tistic rulers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He taught 
them how to make servants obedient, how to organize an efficient 
secret police. Washington and Jefferson studied Tacitus carefully as 
a lasting witness of the degradation and corruption of man under the 
regime of tyrants.
The sociological study of man in history was not resumed until 
Jacob Burckhardt. Burckhardt developed his historical sociology 
under conditions very similar to those under which Tacitus lived and 
worked. Analogous conditions in the lives of the two historians pro-
duced a similar vision of historical man. In Burckhardt’s time, the 
religious meaning of the Christian philosophy of life had vanished; 
the philosophical claims to have discovered the immanent meaning 
of history could not be verified by empirical research. The kaleido-
scope of the variety and diversity of human attitudes and behavior 
patterns appeared to be more meaningful than the causal investiga-
tion in a chronological order. Burckhardt was terrified by the vision 
of the forthcoming radical tyrannies of the twentieth century and the 
prospect of a universal lowering of human standards and the aboli-
tion of human independence. This vision determined Burckhardt’s 
humanistic efforts. In his historical studies, he did not present man 
in the situation of despotism in the political sense of the word. He 
selected periods of transition and crisis or catastrophe that have the 
same bearing on human conduct and human thinking. In times of 
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radical change, men are no longer guided by principles and values 
that are taken for granted and that establish the natural evidence of 
a common way of life in a secure civilization. A general agreement 
on a set of moral and social principles makes for the continuity of 
a society—the antithesis of the revolutionary situation, which takes 
nothing for granted but the power and the determination to elimi-
nate the opposing groups or individuals. In these emergencies, man 
will behave as in the situations of despotism. He remains alone with 
himself; he is free to make his choice for good or evil. Burckhardt 
selected the periods of transition from the pagan to the Christian 
and from the Christian to the secular modern world in order to 
show how in these unguided and unprotected periods men have to 
rely on themselves and to decide what path they choose to follow in 
face of the shattered fragments of a hollowed scale of values. It was 
Burckhardt’s main task to point out how man meets himself in meet-
ing nature, his fellow men, and the pressure of political institutions. 
Thus, his work and the work of Tacitus follow the same pattern. They 
establish a frame of reference within which the human person can 
move and act. This frame of reference dominates the picture of his-
tory. Within this historical frame, a variety of human attitudes and 
ways of living is possible. Pietro Aretina and Vittorino da Feltre, the 
noble and wise pagans in their country retreats and the radical and 
fanatical organizers of the Christianized Empire, the individual and 
collective tyrannies of Athens and Greece and the free personalities 
of the philosophers—they all present a panorama of the highest and 
lowest achievements of human conduct, of passio humana.
Burckhardt never mentions Tacitus as a forerunner of his own 
method and philosophy; he did not care very much for the Romans. 
Although Tacitus’s works accompanied the young Burckhardt on his 
first voyage to Italy, he refers to this author only once. In the historical 
perspective, their affinity becomes conspicuous. Burckhardt himself 
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was aware that his mode of living and thinking was nearest to that 
of the ancient philosophers and historians; he, who repudiated so 
proudly the grandiose generalizations of Hegel, the intolerable syn-
thesis of power politics and Christian theodicy of Ranke, and the 
narrow pragmatism of the contemporary political historians, could 
find his ancestors only in the ancient world.
Explicitly, he claimed Thucydides as the ancestor of his own soci-
ological-historical (kulturgeschichtlich) method. He feels himself the 
kin of Thucydides [460–395 BC] for three reasons. First, the Greek 
historian had broken with his ancestral mythos just as Burckhardt 
had relinquished Christian theology and the philosophies of prog-
ress. Both men were in full agreement that it is possible to investi-
gate historical catastrophe with the highest degree of evidence and 
objectivity. Burckhardt praises Thucydides’s skillful and cautious 
conceptions of general tendencies, the interaction of which estab-
lishes historical necessity. He admires Thucydides’s success in mak-
ing transparent and intelligible the causes and motives that brought 
about the debacle of Athens. They are evident for the common man as 
well as for the educated because Thucydides refers individual actions 
and situations to the general rules of human behavior in specific 
situations. Thucydides’s reflections on the identity of human nature 
and its radical and unrestrained possibilities in situations of crisis 
and catastrophe anticipate Burckhardt’s “pathological” hypotheses. 
Second, Burckhardt regards the introduction and the first book 
of Thucydides’s history as the source of his method. Thucydides 
compares typical situations and trends of development that have 
occurred in different parts of Greece at different times and sub-
sumes these individual facts and actions under general concepts that 
enabled the historian to recognize general tendencies in individual 
actions, ideas, and desires. Burckhardt mentions, in particular, how 
Thucydides has made possible the sociological treatment of the 
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migration trends, the analysis of the foundations of poleis, and the 
impact of economic and technological problems on domestic and 
foreign policies.
Third, Thucydides analyzed the inner structure of a situation of 
catastrophe as Burckhardt did in all historical works. Burckhardt is 
well aware that Thucydides writes the story of a political decay, not 
of the transition between different civilizations. Burckhardt is deeply 
struck by these first strides toward a comparative sociological method 
and by the insistence of the Greek author on the identity of human 
nature in the changing kaleidoscope of the historical world. This is 
the reason that Burckhardt insists on proclaiming Thucydides as the 
ancestor of his method in spite of his being a political historian.
Thucydides is more than the ancestor of Burckhardt’s method. 
He has established the true image of scholarship in times of emer-
gency. He does not comfort the Athenians; he serves no interest 
except the search for historical truth. His book was composed not for 
the applause of his contemporaries, but as a “possession for all time.” 
It will not serve the narrow pragmatism of practical and utilitarian 
men who read history to learn how to behave in order to be success-
ful. Thucydides strives for what Burckhardt has called the “higher 
pragmatism.” He enlightened his contemporaries and later future 
generations so that they will remember this situation in analogous 
cases and will be able to make them transparent by the careful refer-
ence to the human constitution and its requirements.
It is indicative of the close affinity between Burckhardt and 
Thucydides that the latter has described almost in the same words the 
intention of his own writing and teaching. “Not to become shrewder 
for the next time, but wise forever,” is Burckhardt’s credo. It cor-
responds completely to the great master’s “possession for all time.” 
This correspondence makes evident Burckhardt’s affinity with the 
classical world. The Greek tradition was the most precious good of 
J AC O B  B U R C K H A R D T 521
the intellectual heritage which he labored to preserve for the future. 
It was the only civilization in which human beings had learned to act 
and to suffer as free and independent beings, and to transcend the 
narrow desires and needs of the individual. Finally, his civilization 
has made possible a way of life where human reason succeeded in 
making transparent the wonder of human existence and in becom-
ing wise. Burckhardt carried on this heritage, and his own life is an 
image of the wise man: independent, serene, superior to history.16
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Modern German sociology cannot be thought of without the funda-
mental work of Ferdinand Tönnies [1855–1936]. There were trends 
toward sociology during the nineteenth century, in Karl Marx 
[1818–1883] and Albert Schäffle [1831–1903], particularly, but they 
combined sociology with the philosophy of history. It was the great 
achievement of Tönnies to free sociology from this combination and 
to establish it as a social science of its own. And it is an acknowledg-
ment of the particular character of his work that a few days before his 
death, in honor of his eightieth birthday, he received a book contain-
ing contributions from scholars in Greece, Japan, Italy, Netherlands, 
England, and Switzerland as well as the German essays.1 The impor-
tance and appreciation of his work in the United States are evident 
in the contributions of Franz Boas [1858–1942] and Pitirim Sorokin 
[1889–1968]. And the contributions are not confined to sociologists. 
Historians, such as Friedrich Meinicke [1862–1954], and philoso-
phers, such as Karl Löwith [1897–1973] and Herman Schmalenbach 
[1885–1950], point out the philosophical implications of his thought. 
But this common esteem must not deceive us on the influence of 
Published originally in a slightly different form under the title, “In Memoriam Fer-
dinand Tönnies (1855-1936),” in Social Research 3 (August 1936), 441–62.  Repub-
lished by permission from Social Research. 
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his work. Though his sociological concepts have not been neglected 
either by Max Weber [1864–1920] or by Alfred Vierkandt [1867–
1953] and the younger generation (the most outstanding evidence 
is Schmalenbach’s supplement of Tönnies’s categories Gemeinschaft 
and Gesellschaft by the concept of league or Bund),2 neither formal 
nor historical sociology has followed the direction and suggestions 
of his work. Hence, we may say that he dwelt in solitude, even in the 
last epoch of his glory under the German democracy. Although he 
suggested a genuine type of sociological thinking, why was he not 
able to create a sociological school?
He was solitary when he published the first edition of Gemein-
schaft und Gesellschaft in 1887, with the subtitle Communism and 
Socialism as Empirical Forms of Culture. It was the first attempt at 
separating the transhistorical and historical elements within the 
social structure. He gave an analysis of the social process from the 
agrarian communism of the early historical periods to the modern 
capitalistic society, pointing out the elements of socialism implicit in 
this type of society. But he pushed through the realm of history and 
discovered in community and society transhistorical sociological 
categories correlated to the historical social concepts of communism 
and socialism. Both represent general types of social structure. The 
social ties of community are shaped by natural and emotional rela-
tionships, which integrate social existence. Hence, this sociological 
structure is based upon mutual sympathy and interdependence. The 
general type of society means a social structure that combines private 
and isolated individuals in a collectivity with utilitarian means-end 
relationships. Tönnies was the first to see and formulate this tension 
between the historical and the transhistorical within sociological 
concepts. Later on, he characterized the epistemological structure 
of his concepts as ideal types, in the sense of Max Weber, but first 
he emphasized the transhistorical character of sociological concepts.
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This stimulating book did not impress anyone when it was pub-
lished in 1887. Indeed, the general trend of German thought did 
not accept the sociological approach. Die Gesellschaftswissenschaft: 
Ein Kritischer Versuch [1859], the famous pamphlet against sociol-
ogy by Heinrich von Treitschke [1834–1896], indicates emphatically 
the academic opposition to autonomous social sciences, which were 
believed to belong to political science. On the other hand, there were 
some productive trends toward genuine sociological methods in the 
historical school of economics, in Gustav von Schmoller [1838–1917] 
and Adolf Wagner [1835–1917], especially. In jurisprudence, Otto 
von Gierke [1841–1921], like Henry Maine [1822–1888] and Fred-
eric William Maitland [1850–1906] in England, created a new type 
of sociological approach toward law by his Genossenschafts theory. 
Tönnies was profoundly influenced by the first two volumes of this 
work,3 published some years before Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. 
Gierke represented a trend of thinking similar to Tönnies’s. Gierke’s 
profound analysis of the rationalized modern society based upon 
capitalism and upon the rational social philosophy of the law of 
nature led him to a description of other types of social organization. 
These types of association, however, are not linked up by utilitarian 
ends but have to be understood from within. Hence, it is no accident 
that later on, in his criticism of the first draft of the German Civil 
Code, Gierke accepted Tönnies’s concept of community as opposed 
to the Romanistic and rationalized type of society that was at the 
basis of this plan.
This is only one example of how the disintegrating tendencies of 
modern industrial society created a general trend toward sociologi-
cal thinking, quite independent of political questions and regardless 
of the status of sociology as a science. The question of what has hap-
pened to man and his social existence became the true intellectual 
expression of a situation of social unrest and uneasiness. A critical 
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attitude toward the modern social structure joined the conservative 
Gierke and the progressive Tönnies in analyzing the trends of social 
dynamics and the general lines of a new social order. But because 
these sociological trends influenced the methods of economics, 
political science, and jurisprudence, there was no appreciation for 
Tönnies’s attempt to establish sociology as a particular science.
Without being discouraged, Tönnies began to approach the 
problems of social life by a descriptive method that he later called 
“empirical sociology.” Using statistical methods, he analyzed the 
most important trends in the moral affairs of life (such as marriage, 
crime, and suicide) in various social structures, emphasizing dif-
ferences in behavior patterns in the country and in small and large 
cities. He pursued this type of empirical sociological description 
throughout his life and enriched the methods of social statistics by 
some new correlation concepts.
Not until twenty-five years after the first edition of Gemeinschaft 
und Gesellschaft could he publish a new and revised edition. This 
book had a great success, but this too was due to a misunderstand-
ing. It was the time of the rising youth movement, especially among 
students, and they greeted Tönnies’s book as a scientific expression 
of their own antirationalistic feelings and their enthusiasm for the 
vital powers of life. Many years later, he was even reproached by col-
leagues for having preferred the idea of community to that of society 
and for having neglected to create objective sociological concepts. 
Anyone who knows the work of Tönnies will be astonished by this 
misunderstanding. Almost no one in his epoch was so strong a ratio-
nalist and scientist as he, and nothing was stranger to his mind than 
the emotional drive and the irrationalism of the youth movement.
But what is perhaps more astonishing is the profound lack of com-
prehension for his work among the socialist intellectuals. Tönnies 
not only accepted socialism as the logical outcome implicit in the 
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social presuppositions of modern society, but he also accepted the 
economic and sociological ideas of Marx and integrated them into 
his work. However, his sociological approach transformed the ideas 
and suggestions of Marx into a new structure of thinking, strange to 
the followers of Marx, and it may be that his approach was so strange 
and subjective that no one was willing to follow his way of think-
ing. Throughout the nineteenth century, sociology and sociological 
method were correlated with the social movement of labor and with 
the social problems involved in the disorganizing forces of industrial 
society, so that conservatives and progressives had the same criti-
cal starting point in the production of a new scientific view toward 
social life. The fundamental trend of Tönnies’s sociological thought 
can be found in the early writings of Marx—in the idea of genuine 
democracy, later the idea of a classless society, a concept similar to 
Tönnies’s idea of community, the coincidence of public and private 
life as in the ancient Greek polis.
And Gierke’s Genossenschafts theory can be understood only as 
an attempt to conquer the atomistic and individualistic social theory 
of modern rationalized and capitalistic society by an organic theory 
of autonomous social groups as opposed to the mechanical theories 
of some western sociologists. Also, Émile Durkheim [1858–1917], 
who reviewed Tönnies’s book, gave a striking example of the identity 
of intellectual movements in the same historical moment.4 In his De 
la Division du Travail Social (1893), Durkheim described two types 
of social structure, designating as mechanical the social organiza-
tion of the primitives, and as organic the rational modern structure 
with its social differentiation and stratification. Sorokin has pointed 
out that Durkheim used the concepts of Tönnies reversely, but he 
does not explain the causes of this difference.5 It is based upon Dur-
kheim’s positivistic idealism, according to which the growing inter-
dependence of modern social life will produce an organic solidarity 
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of mankind opposed to the mechanical relationships in primitive 
societies. In contrast to Durkheim, Tönnies emphasized that the 
rational means-end relationships of modern society are mechani-
cal, while the community integrates the individuals into an organic 
structure, with all its members held together by common transutili-
tarian values. Hence, the work of Tönnies is not isolated in the his-
torical trend of social thought but is specific in its individual form.
Tönnies himself declared that it was his opposition to the Dar-
winist sociology of Herbert Spencer [1820–1903] that became the 
starting point of his sociological work. He agreed that we have to 
analyze the historical process as sociologists, but he denied the one-
sidedness of Spencer’s analysis of the different strata of life and their 
dynamics. What Tönnies was striving for was a genuine understand-
ing of the different types of social structure and the inner ties of the 
different behavior patterns. They are the product of human nature 
in its development. And when he spoke of will-relationships as the 
basis of community and society, the term was not quite correct. His 
“essential will” (Wesenwille) and “arbitrary will” (Kürwille) are con-
ceptions of two different aspects of the totality of human nature. The 
one is characterized by the prevalence of the transrational elements 
in the structure of man, the other by the priority of reason. But he 
misunderstood the epistemological structure of these concepts when 
he called them “psychological.” They represent the genuine type of 
phenomenological description (in the sense of Edmund Husserl 
[1859–1938]), a kind of social phenomenology avant la lettre. This 
means that at the basis of his sociological analysis was a philosophi-
cal knowledge of human nature. It is no accident that as a heading for 
the chapter treating the forms of will, he chose Benedictus Spinoza’s 
[1632–1677] Voluntas atque intellectus unum et idem sunt. This is the 
typical presupposition of the social philosophers of the seventeenth 
century. And for scholars he greatly admired, he knew no higher 
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praise than to compare them with Thomas Hobbes [1588–1679], 
Hugo Grotius [1583–1645], and Samuel von Pufendorf [1632–1694]. 
Thus, in his sociological thinking, the types of social behavior pat-
terns may change in respect to the shifting conditions of life and 
the different types of social structure, but human nature is one and 
the same throughout the change in the historical process. Therefore, 
sociology has to discover the permanent and natural trends of social 
relationships. And Tönnies emphatically pointed out that the dif-
ferent types of community and society may exist in the same social 
structure in different degrees. In his last book, Geist der Neuzeit, he 
applied his concepts to the process of western history. He called this 
sociological interpretation “applied sociology,” as subordinated to 
theoretical sociology. Here, he reveals the wealth and the fertility of 
his sociological concepts, in combining the structural concepts of 
community and society with the formal concepts of social relations, 
groups, and associations. In correlating the strata of economic, polit-
ical, and intellectual life to the general sociological ideas of individu-
alism, domination, and associations, he analyzed the social function 
of these types of behavior throughout the different historical shapes 
and contents.
These types of behavior express the original social phenomena 
(Urphänomene), based upon the essence of human nature, and they 
recur throughout the historical process in various shapes and with 
different contents. This trend of thinking is fundamental to Tönnies’s 
whole work, from Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft to the Geist der 
Neuzeit. It is the attempt to integrate the anthropological, economic, 
and historical knowledge of his time into a system of sociological 
concepts and to break through the world of institutions and orga-
nizations in order to understand them as types of social behavior. 
They realize the different functions of human nature and represent 
as a whole the unity and complexity of human existence. In contrast 
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to the radical agnosticism and nominalism of Max Weber, the socio-
logical work of Tönnies is based upon a philosophical assumption 
concerning human nature, a starting point that links his work to the 
great philosophers of the law of nature. It is the meaning of his soci-
ology to discover in empirical analysis the general traits of human 
nature, whatever may be the shifting forms of the historical types 
of social relations. The passionate scientific rationalism of Tönnies 
fought strongly against religion and theology, but he accepted the 
secularized basis of the law of nature, identifying nature, will, and 
reason as the unity of human existence, although in a changing con-
stellation of its elements. His broke through historicism and relativ-
ism toward a natural system of social behavior patterns. A conception 
of sociology as the modern scientific type of the law of nature—this 
was the specific character of his work, and it was this that created the 
isolation of his thought. His work was really an untimely meditation, 
for no one of the sociologists who pursued his concepts was able to 
accept the philosophical background of his sociological approach. 
The analytical trend in all sciences had destroyed the scientific truth 
of his ideas on human nature and had dissolved it into a bundle of 
relations, which no science was capable of integrating to unity. This 
is the cause of his strange solitude in the midst of the praise and 
glory by which he was surrounded in the German democracy. The 
combination of the scientific achievements of the nineteenth century 
with the spirit of the social rationalism of the seventeenth century 
and the existential vitality of his Frisian temperament symbolizes 
the strength of his mind in spite of the disintegrated and abstract 
trends of the scientific methods of his time.
Tönnies developed the basic ideas found in Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft in all his later books and essays. In his studies on folk-
ways, he analyzed the organs and the expressions of the community 
structure, and their change as conditioned by the social process, 
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and the same approach to an understanding of the typical forms of 
society led him to his researches on public opinion, progress, and 
religion.6 The fundamental trend of his thinking is evident in the 
different strata of his intellectual experiences (Bildungserlebnisse): 
Marxism, law of nature, and romanticism.
In the presentation and the analysis of the modern social process 
and the relations between capital and labor, he followed the ideas 
Marx had developed in Das Kapital. And throughout his work, in 
describing the structure of either community or society, he acknowl-
edged the basic ideas of historical materialism as the most efficient 
method of explaining the social process. He accepted historical mate-
rialism in the rather simple interpretation that the dynamics of the 
economic stratum determines the shape of political institutions and 
the types of intellectual and spiritual life but that there is a mutuality 
between the strata that constitute social existence. This agreement 
with the fundamental ideas of Marx does not, however, make Tön-
nies a Marxist. Nothing is more characteristic of his thinking than 
his transformation of these ideas. Repeatedly, in introducing the 
basic ideas of historical materialism, he started with the remark that 
Friedrich Schiller [1759–1805], the idealistic thinker and poet, knew 
well that the spiritual and intellectual development of man depends 
on his material and economic existence. And he often quoted Schil-
ler’s famous letter to Christian, Duke of Augustenburg [1798–1869], 
to wit, that man first needs food before he can progress to higher 
and more spiritual activities, that the masses are forced to be inter-
ested first in their economic and material aims. Thus, he understood 
the economic sphere as neither an historical nor an abstract iso-
lated denominator of the total social life, but as the natural basis of 
social existence. This is the empirical sociological concept of anxiety 
as one natural type of social self-conservation. As an organic and 
natural function, it is one pillar that supports the house of man and 
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has to be integrated into the frame of human existence. This is the 
peculiar character of Tönnies’s interpretation of Marx: to accept the 
overwhelming importance of the economic trend in social life, but 
to treat the economic behavior patterns as a natural function of life. 
His sociological concepts were of a kind to destroy the economic 
entity and to dissolve it into natural social relations. While Marx 
made human nature economic, Tönnies made the economic realm 
natural. It is to Tönnies’s merit that he called attention to the com-
bination of historicism and the law of nature within the structure of 
Marx’s work.
Whatever was the influence of Marx on Tönnies, the kernel of 
his thought can be understood only from his affinity to Thomas 
Hobbes [1588–1679] and the secularized type of the law of nature. 
Throughout his life, he worked at the publication of unknown works 
of Hobbes and at an edition of his letters.7 He hoped to revive the 
ideas of this great social philosopher, who had been the first to give 
a sociological analysis of the growing capitalistic society.8 Tönnies 
was the first to point out that the political works of Hobbes con-
tain a genuine sociological theory of modern society based on an 
abstract rational law of nature. This natural law has to be correlated 
to the revolutionary dynamics of modern industrial society and is 
its outstanding intellectual expression. The theory endeavors to ana-
lyze the modern body politic as a rational collective will, integrat-
ing the variety of atomic individual wills and utilitarian ends into 
an order of peace, security, and reason based upon common con-
sent and obedience. Social behavior patterns are linked by utilitar-
ian means -end relationships. Hence, contracts and conventions are 
the types of these modern social relations, and rational conventions, 
instead of the folkways of a community, determine the prestige of 
social groups. Hobbes’s strongly individualistic and secularized con-
ception of the law of nature is distinguished from the theological and 
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metaphysical law of nature of the continent. Tönnies contended that 
Hobbes’s sociological approach was historical because his descrip-
tion was valid only for modern industrial and rational society, not 
for the Middle Ages, for large parts of the ancient world, or for the 
primitives. It is an achievement of Tönnies to have seen these limita-
tions in the social philosophy of Hobbes. Since Tönnies accepted the 
general type of law of nature as sociology, he denied that the ratio-
nal type is the unique one. He suggested that the rational theory of 
modern society should be completed by a law of nature concerning 
community (Gemeinschaftsnaturrecht). The basis of the sociological 
theory would be not the struggle of man but sympathy, mutual tol-
eration, and peacefulness. This presupposition involves some conse-
quences for the social norms in this system. There is a correlation of 
social rights and duties, the responsibility of each member to another 
corresponding to his function in the social body, with justice under-
stood as the adequate distribution of common rights instead of the 
formal justice of a society of exchange. This means the coincidence 
of morals and law, and leads to socialism as the realization of the 
norms of community. Tönnies was particularly interested in the 
sociological theory implicit in the law of nature. It represented the 
great attempt to break through the relativism of the historical world 
and to establish a system of general concepts of social relations. This 
system is not a nominalistic classification but an empirical formula 
of the radiations and stratifications of human nature. The individual 
and particular trend in Tönnies’s sociological thinking was to rees-
tablish the social philosophy of the law of nature with the means of 
nineteenth-century sciences.
These two elements of Tönnies’s thought, Hobbes and Marx, law 
of nature and historical materialism, have been newly observed by 
Raymond Aron [1905–1983] in his excellent presentation of modern 
German sociology.9 But the complex character of his work can be 
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understood only in the light of a third element. In the famous preface 
to the first edition of Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Tönnies declared 
that his book was influenced by Marx, Otto von Gierke [1841–1921], 
Henry Maine [1822–1888], and Lewis Henry Morgan [1818–1881]. In 
addition to these, he mentioned also Johann Jakob Bachofen [1815–
1887] as one who had profoundly influenced and impressed his 
thinking. Bachofen in Das Mutterrecht (1861) was the first to analyze 
the interrelationships between the economic conditions of primitive 
agrarian civilizations and those of the matriarchal social order. But 
this was only one aspect of Bachofen’s work. Tönnies was impressed 
much more by another achievement of this scholar. Throughout his 
work, Tönnies developed the basic ideas of Bachofen concerning the 
shaping powers of mother-relations for the foundation of the social 
order and for a general type of human behavior patterns. Tönnies’s 
chief distinction between real and organic life (community) and ideal 
and mechanical social structure (society) took Bachofen’s definitions 
of mother-right and father-right as patterns. And Tönnies’s pro-
found analysis of the organic natural relations between mother and 
child, man and wife, brothers and sisters, and of the social behavior 
patterns deriving from these relationships—natural distance, piety, 
devotion, and brotherhood—corresponds to the deepest intentions 
of Bachofen.10 Tönnies declared that “[t]he family’s roots are invis-
ible, metaphysical, as if from under the earth it were descended from 
a common ancestor.”11 And he used the same approach to organic 
social processes when he affirmed and accepted the definition of a 
nation (Volk) by Adam Heinrich Müller [1779–1829] as the unity of 
past and future families in the present generation.
All these ideas are genuine romantic concepts. But nothing 
would be more absurd than to call Tönnies a romantic. He described 
and analyzed the natural organic processes that create a type of 
social behavior quite different in their sociological relevancy from 
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the purely rational means-end relationships, and he affirmed their 
general social value. But his own thought was independent and 
beyond the dynamics of these emotional processes; it was the imper-
turbable will of rational knowledge. This attitude of knowing and 
understanding the social ties produced by natural and emotional 
forces is quite opposite to that of a romantic, who expresses these 
emotional trends but does not explain and understand them. And 
in contrast to the genuine trend of romanticism, he saw clearly that 
the social types and forms of community, and their modes of human 
self-realization—such as folkways, religion, and poetry—are cor-
related with definite social conditions and shift with them. These 
categories, however, are not historical but sociological. Repeatedly 
he emphasized that his concepts were general sociological concepts 
of transhistorical character. The manifestations of community and 
society may coexist in the same social structure. Even an individual 
institution like the family may be a combination of both elements. 
This is the reason for the ambiguity of these types of sociological 
concepts, which are at once both historical and transhistorical. In 
Max Weber’s sociology, especially in the chapters on the types of 
domination, we have to examine carefully the methodological dif-
ficulties of this type of sociological conception. If one agrees with 
Tönnies, that life is historical in every moment and stratum of its 
process, then the introduction of sociological concepts transcend-
ing the realm of history presupposes some ideas on the continuity 
of human nature, ideas that cannot be empirical. Hence, Tönnies’s 
sociological concepts are based upon the philosophical idea of the 
constancy of human nature within the shifting conditions of its 
strata.
Because his thinking grew from these presuppositions, he could 
regard the organic social relations in time (clan, family, nation) and 
in space (neighborhood, small cities) not only as primitive and his-
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torical but also as containing general permanent elements of human 
existence. Therefore, their destruction, or their stunted development, 
in the modern social structure and in rationalized industrial society 
is a question of their empirical forms, not of their essential char-
acter. In his different inquiries into the typical social forces within 
the community—mores, folkways, religion—he explained that their 
transformation into societal forms is a necessary and inevitable 
achievement of the rationalized will relations that are the result of 
industrial society and of social conditions in the modern large cit-
ies.12 This is more transformation than destruction. Nevertheless, 
Tönnies considered the dissolution and transformation of the ties of 
community to be a tragic necessity. But the logic of his philosophical 
presuppositions led him to believe that within the rational modern 
society new types of transrational social relations are growing. This 
modern society, in the logical consequences of its conditions, leads 
to socialism, whatever may be the concrete form of its realization. 
The process will destroy all the traditional types of organic social 
relations and their expressions in the intellectual and spiritual forms 
of life. There is indeed the strongest radical rationalism in his con-
viction that this process will dissolve the historical background of 
Western civilization. The Greek and Roman heritage and the Chris-
tian faith are in decline and will fall with the transition to socialism. 
The progressive power of enlightened scientific consciousness will 
destroy the transrational organic forms of devotion and creed and 
will create a scientific ethics as the spiritual basis of social life. This 
will be a synthesis between elements of community and of society. 
Also in the economic sphere of industrial society, there are growing 
social institutions, such as associations of producers and consumers, 
that combine the structural elements of community and society in 
a development toward new types of social organization. Therefore, 
the epoch of transition may produce a series of catastrophes that will 
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shake Western civilization. In the long run, the realization of social-
ism will construct new types of common relationships because the 
new social order will transform the will-relations of man that are at 
the basis of the social behavior patterns.
Gabriel Marcel [1889–1973] is wrong in calling Tönnies’s position 
a cultural pessimism.13 It is rather the melancholy optimism of a pas-
sionate rationalist. But, in agreement with Herman Schmalenbach14 
and Gerhard Colm [1897–1968],15 Marcel suggests an important 
problem. He sees clearly the limitations and boundaries of Tönnies’s 
concept of community. Organic relations, such as the family, types 
of patriarchalism and religious attitudes based upon the experiences 
of natural devotion in the mother-relation, are not the only type of 
community. Spiritual ties create quite another type of community, 
which may be represented by the Platonic Academy, Epicurus’s gar-
dens, the early Christian communities, and some types of sects.
This development from community through society to a new 
community is not a sociological revival of the dialectics of Hegel and 
Marx. Tönnies understood the historical process as the evolution 
and development of reason, in combination and correlation with the 
organic and emotional elements of human nature. This is a way of 
slow progress, but it is a continuous growth toward the perfection of 
human life. Hence, his approach was neither dialectical nor romantic 
and can be compared only with the social philosophy of the seven-
teenth century law of nature. The transrational16 is part of the unity 
of human nature and has to be understood. “Thinking man must be 
able to know the unconscious creative power in social and individual 
mind and find reason not only in formal discursive thinking.”17 This 
unity of reason, will, and nature and their complexity is the most 
characteristic trend in the thought of Tönnies.
There is another passage that points out clearly his comprehen-
sive idea of reason and his critical conception of reason in society. 
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“The more we become free from mores and in mores, the more we 
need a conscious ethics, in other words a knowledge of what makes 
man genuine man: self-affirmation of reason. And therefore reason 
must cease to be an essentially analytical power. It must develop to 
the cheerful and vital healing force of the community. Then only 
will it be the supreme power of man.”18 This remark signifies clearly 
the basic position of Tönnies. Human nature as social existence may 
appear in different constellations and orders, but it is always one 
and essentially the same. Only from this presupposition do we get 
a full understanding of his individual achievement. He attempted 
to integrate the historical, economic, and psychological knowledge 
of the nineteenth century into a system of sociological concepts and 
categories that constitute the empirical realm of the social develop-
ment of human nature. And he dissolved the pressure of institutions 
and organizations into concepts of social relationships—sociology as 
the dynamic and scientific type of a modern law of nature.
Here, the circle is closing. We may understand the causes of 
his solitude. The nineteenth century had broken the strength and 
vitality of the belief in a law of nature. It had developed two dif-
ferent trends of thinking: one scientific-positivistic and the other 
historical-romantic. They represented the growing tension and the 
antagonisms within the intellectual and spiritual structure of man. 
While the scientific type of thinking tried to analyze the complexity 
of life by abstracting and isolating the different strata of life and cre-
ating nominalistic entities, the historical way of thinking discovered 
only relativism and contingency. Neither approach was capable of a 
comprehensive understanding of the complexity of social existence, 
since neither contained any integrating principle. Neither of them 
allowed a genuine understanding of Tönnies.
The strong unity and completeness of his thinking were strange 
to his contemporaries. Nothing can prove this better than an analysis 
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of his literary style. Although he had studied the social sciences and 
philosophy, his writing does not suggest the influence of anyone or of 
any definite type of scientific terminology. His writing is rich in new 
and imaginative words pointing out the creative power of his syn-
thetic mind in uniting experience and thought. On the other hand, 
we find also strange and rational expressions comparable to those 
of the philosophers of the seventeenth century. Indeed, intellectu-
ally, he was a son of that century, representing the strongest tension 
between radical rationalism and a consciousness of the transrational 
powers in man. This passion for a scientific rationalism integrated 
all the elements of his inheritance. It is no accident that he was the 
descendant of Frisian farmers. The Frisians near the Danish border 
were almost the only German peasants who had never been serfs or 
served in manorial dependence. In his emphasis on the sociological 
structure of community, he tried to found an intellectual tradition 
for the permanent values implicit in these types of social behavior. 
This unity and tension between the highest standard of scientific 
rationalism and the knowledge of the transrational powers in the 
shaping of social ties created a rich understanding of the variety 
and the potentialities of social relationships, and suggests a general 
theory of social existence as a basis of the development of human 
nature.
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16
 Some Aspects of the Legacy 
of Durkheim 
Of those thinkers who, in the history of sociology, have given new 
directions and perspectives to a discipline in the making, only Émile 
Durkheim [1858–1917] organized a school made up of the creative 
minds of a younger generation who were able to carry sociology for-
ward. Vilfredo Pareto [1848–1923] contributed to depth sociology, 
Georg Simmel [1858–1918] to the epistemology of sociology, and Max 
Weber [1864–1920] to the development of sociology as comparative 
history—the ideas of these men were constructive and far-reaching, 
but they did not train students to continue and to expand their work.
Durkheim conceived of sociology as a new method, a scientific 
device for demonstrating the forces of attraction and coercion 
exerted by collective representations in all fields of thinking, feel-
ing, and conduct. The method was revolutionary in that it rigorously 
applied scientific principles to the study of the concrete situation of 
man, and attempted to find rules that would enable sociologists to 
discover the laws of social behavior in typical situations found in life. 
The method found both enemies and enthusiastic disciples.
 
Published originally in a slightly different form in Emile Durkheim, 1858–1917, ed. 
Kurt H. Wolff (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1960), 247–66. Republished 
by permission from Frank Salomon.
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N546
The enemies fell into two groups: the first was composed of repre-
sentatives of traditional social science—historians who relied on the 
guesswork of subjective interpretation, and psychologists who were 
concerned with the behavior of individuals. The second consisted 
of theologians and metaphysicians, who repudiated a science that 
rejected all ontological or spiritual assumptions to explain the natu-
ral process of human coexistence in social institutions. Among Dur-
kheim’s followers were students of philosophy who were attracted 
by a concrete theory and a philosophy of immanence; students of 
psychology who were convinced that the collective representations 
conceived by Durkheim provided the necessary complement to indi-
vidual representations; and historians and social scientists who, in 
an age of mass societies, understood the value of discovering scien-
tific rules, of setting up classifications of social phenomena, of devel-
oping quantitative methods, and of making morphological studies. 
These followers became members of a new school in sociology: the 
Durkheim School.
Durkheim’s students were fascinated by his passionate belief in 
the efficiency of his method. They were attracted by his platonic love 
of finding higher truths in a search shared with his students: for 
Durkheim, dedication to his disciples was one with dedication to his 
cause. The common enterprise, Durkheim’s students felt, was in the 
French humanistic tradition.
Durkheim hoped that his theoretical studies might help to raise 
human and social standards. He believed in scientific enlighten-
ment. He knew of human suffering, of death and coercion; and he 
was grimly aware of the inertia of society that results from the false 
security of its prejudices. He believed in the potential blessings of 
solidarity, in spite of the trends of his time toward new patterns of 
despotism. He was convinced that science could give men courage to 
condition and control their world.
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The work carried on by Durkheim with his students has left as 
its monuments L’Année sociologique and the many publications of 
his students. Our awareness of Durkheim’s greatness increases when 
we examine his ideas as they were applied by his disciples. When 
we study his Le suicide, we should also consult Les Causes de suicide 
by Maurice Halbwachs [1877–1945].1 In the thirty years between 
the two books, there had been improvements in the discipline of 
statistics and marked social and economic changes, but Halbwachs 
retained the general pattern of Durkheim’s method. The reader of 
Les règles de la méthod sociologique and Les forms élémentaires de la 
vie religieuse should also study Marcel Mauss [1872–1950] and his 
theory of total sociology. Mauss presented his theory in an address 
on sociology and psychology, Rapports réels et pratiques de la psy-
chologie et de la sociologie (1924), and in the book, Essai sur le don: 
Forme et raison de l’échange dans les sociétés archaïques (1923)2—one 
of the few great pieces in the field of total sociology.
Many remarkable men in the fields of economics and sociology 
have been students of Durkheim’s; they have worked in the areas of 
social organization, legal and moral institutions, sociology of reli-
gion, statistics, technology, theory of civilization, social psychology, 
and cultural anthropology. In cooperating with the master, these 
men became the builders of the first series of L’Année sociologique, 
which, between 1896 and 1913, served to express Durkheim’s spirit. 
The volumes of this periodical make exciting reading for the histo-
rian of ideas and for the student of sociology. For seventeen years, 
Durkheim and his group collected literature from all the fields that 
were concerned with the problems of man in his social aspects. The 
twelve volumes that resulted reflect the sociology of the time, con-
taining analyses of the works of Lester F. Ward [1841–1913], Albion 
W. Small [1854–1926], Georg Simmel, and Ferdinand Tönnies [1855–
1936]. The masters of the English and American schools of cultural 
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anthropology were subjected to methodological and substantive cri-
tiques, and the German literature in the areas of economics, social 
history, moral statistics, and the social organization of the family 
was explored.
In compiling material for L’Année sociologique, Durkheim 
directed his students to do specialized research. He was convinced 
that the main task of the sociologist was to penetrate the diverse areas 
of social action and thought. He knew that methods do not develop 
in a vacuum and that problems entail their own specific methods 
according to the requirements of the fields in which they occur. For 
this reason, he urged his fellow workers to gain a thorough knowl-
edge of specific areas. Marcel Mauss, Robert Hertz [1881–1915], and 
Henri Hubert [1872–1927] became experts in the large field of reli-
gion, where they made studies of cult, ritual, prayer, and dogma. In 
social economics, François Simiand [1873–1935] and Halbwachs 
specialized in making comparative studies of the family budgets of 
workers in Europe and the United States; Simiand also studied the 
sociological aspects of the setting of prices and the distribution of 
economic goods.
The Durkheim group used the literature in all of these fields as 
a testing ground for applying and verifying their method. From 
authors in the humanities and the social sciences, they learned what 
the substantive problems of their disciplines were, and they mea-
sured the value of their works according to the contributions they 
made to sociology. They found some whose ideas made it possible 
to form sociological hypotheses, and others who disregarded socio-
logical methods entirely but who would have profited from applying 
them in their work. They were convinced that, unless these methods 
were used, no comprehensive analysis of social facts was possible; 
and in their critical evaluations, they stressed the problems of com-
parative methods.
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Durkheim and other contributors to the L’Année sociologique were 
concerned with constructing classifications that were sufficiently 
flexible and dynamic to accommodate the infinite variety of human 
social situations. They remembered the dictum that Durkheim had 
expressed in the preface to the first volume of their periodical: Only 
a thorough acquaintance with the humanities, psychology, and the 
social sciences would enable sociologists to develop a general theory 
of civilization. They advanced the methods of social-functional and 
social causal analysis, although they were not always careful to dis-
tinguish their specific characteristics.
In 1908, Durkheim announced that in the future the periodical 
would appear only every third year. He pointed out that contributors 
had become so dedicated to their assignments that many of them 
had had to neglect their own work. 
This was especially true of Marcel Mauss. Although Mauss 
directed the publication’s section on religion, his articles also con-
tributed a great deal to general theory. He worked constantly to 
devise new classifications for the study of religion and to reorganize 
the field. Thus, when new material on totemism appeared, he found 
it necessary to form a new subdivision. He also had some noteworthy 
ideas on the classification of myths. In addition, he wrote a number 
of illuminating pages on the sociological evolution of prayer from a 
collective to an individual phenomenon.
Mauss enjoyed a unique relation with Durkheim, who was his 
uncle as well as his master. As a young man, he worked with him 
on the final versions of Le suicide and Les forms élémentaires de la 
vie religieuse. The latter appeared at the same time as Totemism and 
Exogamy by Sir James Frazer [1854–1941],3 and Durkheim and Mauss 
wrote a comparative analysis of the two studies, which showed the 
differences between the theories of totemism of the two men. This 
analysis was Durkheim’s final statement concerning the relevance 
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of totemism in explaining the social organization of the Austra-
lian tribes. In his most important books, Mauss often paid tribute 
to the inspiration that he had received from Durkheim, giving him 
the credit for the work that he himself did in sociology—work that 
turned a method of research into a theory of total sociology. 
One article written jointly by Durkheim and Mauss in 1901 was 
of special importance to both of them. It is “De quelques formes 
primitives de classification,”4 a contribution to the study of collective 
representations, and the foundation of a sociology of knowledge and 
religion. The authors explain that the patterns of logic that operate 
among the Australian tribes are the result of their having experienced 
the divisions of their own tribal organization. Durkheim and Mauss 
reject Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s [1857–1939] idea of prelogical thinking 
and develop a theory that demonstrates that logical patterns reflect 
social experiences. According to them, the Australians constructed 
concepts of genera and species from the social reality of phratries 
and clans. The modes of social cohesion, such as homogeneity and 
hierarchy, were transferred, in a logical sequence, to the categories 
of the mind. The bonds that united all beings were conceived of as 
social bonds.
The collective representations that give cohesion to society are, 
at the same time, collective affections. For this reason, logical and 
affective categories merge; value attitudes and logical procedures are 
intertwined. The Australians, for example, divide everything into 
sacred and profane, pure and impure. They conceive of a whole, for 
example, as a dual structure of positive and negative elements.
Collective representations are the basis for classifying the world, 
which is a totality of the divine and the demonic, and men, who are 
part of this totality. Man is by nature sociocentric: society is the cen-
ter of all early conceptions of nature. The Sioux and Zuni Indians, 
the early Greeks, and others held that their land was the center of the 
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world; they referred to other parts only in relation to themselves. The 
primary dualism of the social world—typified by the divisions into 
we and they, Greeks and barbarians, friends and enemies, and I and 
thou—is reflected in early conceptual systems. Durkheim and Mauss 
went so far as to assert that all diversities in primitive classifications 
could be explained on the basis of physiological differences.
This study by Durkheim and Mauss was the first effort ever made 
to conceive the social phenomenon as a totality in which the physi-
ological, psychological, and social elements in the constitution of 
man in society are interdependent and interact with one another. 
The authors themselves noted that this discovery was the beginning 
of a new road—one that implied the possibility of error. Ultimately, it 
led to the idea of total sociology. For Mauss, it became the basis of his 
Essai sur le don, a masterpiece of analysis and synthesis in scientific 
sociology, in which he shows that exchange in primitive societies 
consists more frequently in reciprocal gifts than in economic trans-
actions. Such gifts have a much more important function in archaic 
societies than in our own. Primitive exchange is a total social fact; at 
one and the same time, it has social and religious, magical and eco-
nomic, utilitarian and sentimental, and legal and moral significance. 
In many of the societies found among the Indians of the American 
Northwest, and in many of those in Alaska, New Zealand, and Aus-
tralia, the nobles or the whole tribe offered gifts to other groups on 
all solemn public and private occasions. Usually, gifts of equal value 
were exchanged simultaneously by both parties. Or, if the second 
group reciprocated later, the gifts they rendered had to be more pre-
cious than the ones they received earlier—in order to pay interest, 
as it were. These ceremonies had still other functions: to establish 
publicly the claim of a group or family to a title or privilege, and 
to surpass a rival in generosity or crush him under the burden of 
overwhelming obligations.
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The goal of this exchange of gifts is social prestige rather than 
economic advantage. The leitmotiv of Mauss’s work is that giving-
receiving and rendering are the main patterns of behavior by which 
lasting human peace can be established and the possibilities of 
humaneness in the routine of economic or political institutions can 
be maintained. It is a universal pattern all over the world, one that 
transcends the artificial distinction between primitive and histori-
cal societies. Mauss gave proof that people everywhere are moved 
by the same desires for power, prestige, and social position, and by 
the fear of losing all three. For this reason, they offer gifts to one 
another, and it does not matter whether the giving is called presen-
tation, potlatch, or contract. Mauss opens our eyes to the fact that 
in its everyday routine and on its great occasions—both public (the 
making of peace, the declaration of war, the punishing of an outlaw, 
the readmission of a repentant sinner) and private (birth, marriage, 
death)—the life of man is a series of rituals. The rituals in which 
gifts are exchanged are the bonds that make for the integration of 
the diverse interests, tensions, and affections that are indispensable 
factors in the coexistence of human beings with, for, or against one 
another. Rituals are more than habits since they are accompanied by 
the ambiguity of our affections. Gifts can be received and given with 
goodwill and friendship or with fear and resentment. They can be 
the expression of pride or humility, despair, or ambition. The Ger-
man sich revanchieren, which means both “to return a gift or favor” 
and “to take revenge,” preserves this ambiguity.5
Mauss did not share Durkheim’s gloomy view of capitalist society. 
Rather, he saw in capitalism corporate elements that created mutual 
responsibilities for both management and labor, and transformed 
the revolutionary relationship between these classes into a variety 
of exchanges that were made in the spirit of giving, receiving, and 
rendering.
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Essai sur le don found its counterpart in theory in the previous-
ly mentioned address on sociology and psychology that Mauss de-
livered in 1924, seven years after Durkheim’s death. In this paper, 
he refers to specific Durkheimian investigations leading to a theory 
of the totality of social facts and the rules of total sociology. Mauss 
begins his speech by insisting on a point on which psychologists 
and sociologists agree: they share the attitude of the scientist and 
employ a method that is experimental and empirical but have dif-
ferent subject matters. Psychology is concerned with the individu-
al conscience, sociology with the natural history of man in society 
and the manifestations of the conscience collective. However, both 
sciences are, according to Mauss, part of a larger complex that he 
calls anthropology—a combination of the sciences dealing with 
man as a living, conscious, and social being. It was Mauss’s convic-
tion that the cooperation of psychologists, biologists, and sociolo-
gists could create a sociology developed as a theory of the totality of 
social facts.
In logical sequence, the elements of total sociology are (1) social 
morphology, (2) mass phenomena, (3) social facts, and (4), collective 
representations, affections, and recollections. Social morphology—a 
term coined by Durkheim in 1900 to designate a classification that 
he added to a new division in social research—is the original sphere 
of the study of man in a social perspective. It deals with the relation 
between social behavior, collective representations and affections, 
and the substratum of group life. Substratum refers to the material 
and external conditions under which societies live. As they change, 
according to Durkheim’s theory, so do intellectual, social, and emo-
tional factors. Collectivities create specific modes of behavior and 
action in order to establish a sensible way of meeting and controlling 
their life conditions. In penetrating and organizing their substrata, 
they build up intelligible and subjectively meaningful social contexts.
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Mauss pays particular attention to the substrata that are com-
posed of climatic and geographic conditions, analyzing their pres-
ence or absence within particular political frontiers, and determining 
the effect they have on the size and density of the population and 
the system of communication that is used. And in his essay on the 
seasonal variations found in Eskimo societies, “Essai sur les varia-
tions saisonnières des sociétés eskimos,”6 which he subtitled “Étude 
de morphologie sociale,” he demonstrates the truth of the theory 
concerning the effect of the substratum on the way of life of the col-
lectivity. The scientist, Mauss says, is not bound to apply quantitative 
methods only; the thorough qualitative analysis of phenomena can 
be equally evident and conclusive. Thus, in a paper that is as pene-
trating and comprehensive as the work on the gift, Mauss introduces 
the possibility of describing phenomena completely. Dwelling briefly 
on what is constant in Eskimo behavior throughout the year, Mauss 
analyzes the different substrata of the winter and summer settle-
ments and the different ways of life that each presents: the religious 
and legal norms operative during the winter when the population is 
concentrated in a small area vary from those of the summer when 
the population is widely dispersed.
The second of Mauss’s divisions of total sociology, mass phenom-
ena, designates a subject matter that requires statistical treatment. The 
quantitative measurement of social traits is, indeed, fundamental to 
the scientific explanation of all societies, whether modern or archaic. It 
is concerned, among other things, with birth and mortality rates and 
the movement of populations—both under ordinary circumstances 
and under the pressure of war, famine, or revolution. Durkheim’s Le 
suicide is a famous example and model of the use of statistical methods.
Social facts, the third division, deals with the total complex of 
such historical phenomena as traditions, mores, habits, rituals, lan-
guage, religion, art, technology, philosophy, and poetry. 
S O M E  A S PE C T S  O F  T H E  L E G AC Y  O F  D U R K H E I M 555
The last, but most important, division is the study of collective rep-
resentations, affections, and recollections. The study consists of two 
parts: the collection and systematization of the ideas that constitute 
the collective representations, and the examination of the collective 
behavior patterns that correspond to these representations. Societies 
are united more closely by common ideas and values—economic, 
religious, or political—than by the pressures of the substratum that 
is studied by social morphology. Mauss states emphatically that the 
explanation of collective representations and affections is the task of 
the sociologist, not the psychologist; for the sociologist can penetrate 
to the deep layers of social cohesion that emerge from the density 
and intensity of the collective recollections and affections. This pen-
etration is valuable to the sociological analysis of social and histori-
cal time, an analysis that is of importance to the political scientists 
and sociologists who study revolutions.
In constructing the rules of total sociology in this fourfold pro-
gram, Mauss followed Durkheim’s suggestions and expanded his 
investigations. In addition, he saw the significance of physiology 
for sociology, a consideration that Durkheim had ignored. Mauss’s 
investigations concerning the techniques used in performing cer-
tain physical activities have provided new insights for the theoretical 
sociologist, the teacher of physical education, and the health officer. 
In his early life, Mauss had observed variations in the techniques 
used in swimming, and during the First World War, he had stud-
ied the various ways in which soldiers in different armies walked 
and marched. These observations prompted him to inquire into the 
extent to which collective norms produced such variations. He found 
that they were indeed conditioned by the social norms of the educa-
tion promulgated by specific institutions, and that the techniques of 
marching, jumping, and running used by the different armies were 
the result of authoritarian decisions. His investigation uncovered 
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further examples of collective education, such as girls educated in 
convents often walk with closed fists. In addition, he sought to deter-
mine the influence of motion pictures on the techniques of bodily 
activity. While convalescing in a hospital, he noticed that the nurses 
had a peculiar way of walking, which he could not account for until 
he realized that they were copying the manner of walking of Ameri-
can movie stars. Many other physical mannerisms can also be attrib-
uted to the influence of the motion picture.
The techniques of the body are socially conditioned habits; 
these habits produce our social nature (an idea first established by 
Michel de Montaigne [1533–1592]) and demonstrate the reality of 
the human being as a totality in which physiological, psychological, 
and sociological elements merge. Mauss defined a technique as a tra-
ditional, efficient act. Techniques form a part of magical, religious, 
and symbolic behavior. There can be no technique without a means 
of transmitting it, such as tradition.
Mauss and his disciples disagreed with Durkheim’s definition of 
the relationship between the sociologist and the psychologist. Dur-
kheim had been a student of Théodule-Armand Ribot [1839–1916] 
and Wilhelm Wundt [1832–1920], but he maintained that psychology 
could not contribute to the solution of the problems of the collectiv-
ity. Mauss, however, specified three ways in which the psychologist 
can be of value to the sociologist.
First, the psychologist’s concept of mental vigor and weakness 
(this is related to tough and tender-mindedness of William James 
[1842–1910]) is implicit in the sociologist’s idea of anomie. Mauss 
contributed a case study of anomie—or, more particularly, of thana-
tomania. Among the Maori, individuals have been known to aban-
don the will to live and subsequently to die, not because of any 
physical ailment or act of suicide, but simply because of the pres-
sure of collective recriminations. Such a phenomenon presents a 
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problem to the sociologist. But since it is centered in an individual’s 
conscience, the psychologist can help the sociologist understand the 
social origins of the phenomenon.
Second, sociologists apply the category of psychosis, and they 
need the enlightenment that psychiatrists can provide concern-
ing hallucinations, the frenzy of the vendetta, the amok (common 
among Polynesians and Malayans), and so on. Mauss had the oppor-
tunity of witnessing the collective hysteria that swept over Europe 
after 1933.
Third, the psychologist can help the sociologist in his study of the 
symbol-constructing activity of the mind. Mauss could not admit 
the validity of such a claim in its entirety, however, for he saw that 
the activities of the collective conscience are more symbolic than are 
those of the individual mind. Indeed, one of the characteristic fea-
tures of the social fact is its symbolic aspect. Furthermore, the notion 
of the symbol is a sociological conception derived from the study 
of religion, law, language, and politics. Durkheim and his students 
demonstrated that one communicates through symbols. Therefore, 
although they are ambiguous in their meanings, symbols are easily 
identified with verities.
Mythical and moral symbols are the manifestations of the effects 
of the conscience collective. They permanently influence the behav-
ior both of the group and of the individuals who compose it. Here, 
Mauss saw another meeting ground for the psychologist and the 
sociologist. And, in this case, Durkheim would not have objected, for 
he had explicitly stated that the individual, as part of the whole and 
in performing his social roles, retains various possibilities for real-
izing himself. Within the limits set by social coercion, human beings 
are astoundingly alert to loopholes that enable them to indulge their 
subjective interests. Most individuals are fifth columnists within the 
conscience collective.
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The work of another of Durkheim’s disciples, Maurice Halb-
wachs, demonstrates the lasting value and the constructive truth of 
Durkheim’s greatest book, Le suicide, which appeared in 1896. Halb-
wachs published his own Les causes du suicide in 1930. A generation 
had elapsed between the two works, new material had been collected, 
and new refinements in statistical methods had been developed. But, 
in spite of all this, Durkheim’s theses remained valid. Halbwachs 
verified and amended them but did not change their basic concep-
tions. Durkheim’s book opened with some chapters on methodol-
ogy that demonstrated that nonsociological factors were irrelevant 
to a sociological explanation of suicide rates. Halbwachs praised the 
sound methodology of the master, who had refused to be concerned 
with the subjective motivations of the individuals who committed 
suicide. Motives, he argued, are either subjective ideological con-
structs or arbitrary definitions laid down by the police or by coro-
ners. He rejected any concern with them as unscientific.
According to Durkheim’s fundamental conception, suicide and 
crime are normal social facts. They become pathological only when 
they increase at an accelerated tempo. Furthermore, they are sub-
ject to causal investigation, and there is a basic correlation between 
tendencies to suicide and other social patterns. Durkheim made the 
profound observation that every group and society has a specific 
scale of values founded on the evaluation of life and death. Military 
and commercial societies differ in the evaluations that they make, as 
do spiritual and secular societies, and industrial-urban and agricul-
tural-preindustrial ones.
The social causes of suicidal tendencies can be derived from the 
diverse social roles that men play in the total social context. Men 
live in domestic, religious, professional, social, political, and occu-
pational groupings that condition them positively and negatively. 
Durkheim showed that the suicide rate varies inversely with the 
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degree to which these collective bodies are internally integrated. The 
more the rules of these groups disintegrate, the more the individual 
detaches himself from them. His goals and aspirations prevail over 
those of the group; the individual ego becomes stronger than the 
social ego.
Egoistic suicide results, then, from the excessive individualism or 
egoism that is caused by the deficient authority of a conscience col-
lective that is disintegrating. For Durkheim, man is dual. He aspires 
to be safe, protected, and obedient, and is therefore willing to sub-
mit to the moral coercion exerted by society. At the same time, he 
desires to unfold his personality; thus, he revolts against the neces-
sity of conforming with the collective imperatives. For this reason, 
societies are dual, as the individual human being is, and are both 
shelter and barracks, waiting room and prison. This duality emerges 
because civilized men are concerned with more than satisfying their 
organic needs. Moreover, the life of society is a process in which the 
vital forces are constantly being organized on behalf of social needs. 
The roles of art, science, morality, and religion, however, transcend 
the lowest level of social control and establish the higher level of 
social institutions. The influence of society is paramount in educa-
tion, which is the socialization of man, the process by which society 
arouses the sentiments of sympathy and solidarity so as to fashion 
the young in its image and inculcate in them taken-for-granted 
beliefs and convictions concerning the good, the beautiful, and the 
true. Education is the socialization of man on the basis of the ideals 
of the older generations of society.
Durkheim’s view of man is Machiavellian: man’s greed, lusts, and 
needs are infinite, and they must be controlled. Niccolò Machiavelli 
[1469–1527] made the state the humanizing agency; Durkheim made 
it the moral authority of the conscience collective. Society must set 
the goal for the group and invent the modes of social relations by 
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which human urges and passions are channeled and directed in a 
way that is favorable to the whole.
If society loses its regulating vitality, anomie arises. This state 
is further heightened by the passions that are unleashed when men 
are denied discipline and social authority. Such a situation promotes 
anomie suicide, which differs from egoistic suicide. The latter results 
from the release of radical self-centeredness that occurs when the 
social bonds and collective obligations have grown so weak they 
have lost the power to act as integrating forces. Anomic suicide, on 
the other hand, results when there are no social imperatives because 
there is no collective integration, a situation that leaves men suffer-
ing and forlorn.
Despite their differences, both egoistic and anomic suicides spring 
from the fact that society is not present in the necessary amounts in 
the individual egos. But this absence is not the same in the two cases. 
In egoistic suicide, the collective power is not sufficiently attractive 
and constructive to appeal to the vital and strong individual so that 
he is deprived of goals and directions. In the society in which there 
is a high incidence of anomic suicide, no creative strength comes 
from the collectivity. In the social roles he is supposed to perform, 
the individual does not receive moral direction and meaning from a 
constructive conscience collective, and men are exposed to passions 
within themselves that are not channeled by common goals and val-
ues. Egoistic and anomic suicides do not occur in the same human 
groups. Egoistic suicide prevails in the professional and intellec-
tual worlds; anomic suicide prevails in the worlds of industry and 
finance, among workers and managers alike. Indeed, Durkheim saw 
a definite correlation between anomic suicide and the free capital-
istic society with its grim and unregulated competition, its crises 
and depressions; for him, this kind of human tragedy expressed the 
moral vacuum of the contemporary economic and social world.
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Before discussing Durkheim’s third category of suicide—altruis-
tic—it is important to understand his general definition of the phe-
nomenon and the way in which Halbwachs modified it. Durkheim 
defined a suicide as a death that results—directly or indirectly—from 
an act accomplished by the victim who has full knowledge of what 
the result will be. Durkheim did not say that it is an act committed 
with the intention of killing oneself, and this was consistent with his 
belief that “motives” are not relevant for the scientist. Furthermore, 
the definition he did not choose would have excluded many acts, 
which he wished to include.
Halbwachs suggested a modified version. For him, a suicide is 
a death that results from an act committed by the victim with the 
intention of causing his own death. It is an act of which society dis-
approves, although the conscience collective does approve of certain 
suicides of expiation. This modification contains an implicit criti-
cism of Durkheim’s conception of altruistic suicide. According to 
Durkheim, this third type results from an individual’s total identi-
fication with the commands of the collectivity, as when men die as 
heroes for their country in war, or permit themselves to be killed as 
sacrificial victims or as martyrs for their creeds when they have been 
forced to convert to the religion of a majority.
Halbwachs saw that Durkheim was victimized by his own 
definition, which made it possible to identify as suicides acts that 
are incompatible. For this reason, Halbwachs made a distinction 
between sacrifice and suicide. He defined sacrifice as a death that 
results from an act based on the decisions and duties emanating 
from the conscience collective. Such an act involves the volition of the 
sacrificial victim and his recognition of an obligation to the values 
of the collectivity: a human being who sacrifices himself for the sake 
of his platoon or becomes a martyr for his convictions meets death 
voluntarily because he is fulfilling his obligation to the collective 
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institutions to which he belongs. Halbwachs reserves the term sui-
cide to designate the voluntary act of a person emancipating himself 
from the bonds of the collectivity.
This distinction forced Halbwachs to reflect on the ambiguous 
attitudes that societies disclose in their judgments on death. They 
condemn suicide, but they strongly approve of it under certain 
circumstances. This means that, strictly speaking, there is no such 
thing as suicide as such: there are only types of suicide. Halbwachs 
distinguishes three: the expiatory, the imprecatory, and the disillu-
sioned.
Expiatory suicide may result from a homicide or from sins com-
mitted against the social codes of honor in business or in the mili-
tary or medical professions. The expiatory suicide kills himself in 
an act of self-condemnation and atonement. The imprecatory type, 
illustrated by Anna Karenina’s suicide, is inspired by defiance of the 
collectivity. Here, an individual’s killing herself is an act against 
society. Anna hates society’s hypocrisy and collective judgment; she 
is disgusted with life. She kills herself in defiance of a group that has 
no understanding of the sufferings of a human being; she disputes 
the right of the collective conscience to act as a moral authority. In 
the case of the suicide that results from disillusionment, the cause 
is a profound disenchantment with the place of man in society, the 
consequence of the victim’s not receiving from the collective struc-
tures the protection and guidance he needs. Halbwachs’s critique 
of Durkheim’s conception of altruistic suicide is valuable and con-
structive. In addition, Halbwachs’s methods were more refined, for 
he applied microsociological devices that made Durkheim’s broad 
generalizations specific. Durkheim had worked largely with national 
data, while Halbwachs made greater use of regional figures in draw-
ing comparisons of the social facts in metropolitan, urban, and rural 
areas.
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Halbwachs’s reexamination of religion as a protective collective 
force confirmed Durkheim’s thesis concerning the integrating power 
of Catholicism and the disintegrating tendency in Protestantism. 
Halbwachs’s figures on Jewish suicides show a rapid increase all over 
Europe between 1891 and 1900; in Amsterdam, for instance, the 
Jewish suicide rate between 1905 and 1914 was the highest of all reli-
gious groups. In general, the suicide rates of various religious groups 
depend on the faith confessed, but they are also determined, in part, 
by social conditions. Thus, one must know whether a religious group 
is a majority or a minority, whether it is urban or rural, and whether 
it is politically conservative, liberal, or radical. For instance, there is a 
rather high suicide rate among Catholics when they are isolated and 
dispersed, but it becomes lower when they live in compact enclaves.
Halbwachs discovered an aspect of Catholic suicides that Dur-
kheim had not realized: he found an exact correspondence between 
the number of mixed marriages and the suicide rate among Catho-
lics. Mixed marriages are an index of Catholic disintegration; and 
in proportion to their increase, the Catholic suicide rate grows. Hal-
bwachs refined Durkheim’s thesis on Catholicism as an integrative 
force. Although the customs of Catholicism are religious customs, 
it is as customs that they are of interest to the sociologist; for it is 
as customs that they secure the unity of the group—through the 
authority of traditions and the traditions of authority. Catholicism 
is more than an ecclesiastical institution: it is a way of life, a pattern 
of civilization. Religious and traditionalist motives merge with the 
mores of the people; Catholic peasant societies are often identical 
in France, Italy, and the countries of Central Europe. Halbwachs 
concluded that it is not the religious unity of the Catholics, but the 
social cohesion produced by their traditions, habits, and customs, 
that explains why their suicide rate is lower than that of urban and 
Protestant milieus.
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In this discussion, “rural” and “urban” refer not to geographic 
areas but to segments of the social structure. The high suicide rate 
among the urban population cannot be explained by assuming that 
city dwellers are more morbid; actually, native urban inhabitants 
are relatively secure. Rather, the high overall suicide rate of the city 
derives from the large number of maladjusted persons, who, after 
they have migrated from the country to the town or from the town to 
the metropolis, have found the ways of life and the patterns of work, 
sociability, and entertainment completely bewildering—a situation 
that produces anomie suicide.
One of the most impressive among Halbwachs’s contributions is 
his reexamination of Durkheim’s theory of the protective character 
of the family. Durkheim’s thesis, he found, had remained valid: the 
husband is more protected than the wife, and the widower more than 
the widow. Halbwachs added the observation that as the number of 
children increases, the protective force exercised by the integrated 
family grows.
Halbwachs praised Durkheim for his keen analysis of the future 
of the family. Durkheim had foreseen that what had been the struc-
ture of the family for the last three hundred years was going to 
change because of changes in technology and morals. The technolog-
ical revolution would free individual members of the family from the 
obligation to contribute to its maintenance; the disappearance of the 
moral and spiritual meaning of the family—together with its func-
tion as the model of sympathy, intimacy, and mutual responsibil-
ity—would come about, he predicted, with the transfer of allegiances 
and affections to the collective institutions of totalitarian societies.
Halbwachs accepted Durkheim’s statement that the suicide rate is 
lower in time of war and political crisis, but he modified his analysis 
of the causes that explain this reduction. Durkheim believed that 
war and crisis stir the collective affections that unify and integrate 
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otherwise antagonistic groups. Halbwachs did not reject this thesis 
but added his own observation that wars and crises produce a gen-
eral simplification of all patterns of life. The limitations placed on 
all societal relationships and social intercourse by a common danger 
restrict the possibilities of suicide. When the shadow of death threat-
ens the whole community, the tendency to suicide in the individual 
is reduced.
Although Durkheim’s theory of anomic suicide refers specifically 
to the nineteenth century, it is confirmed by Halbwachs’s analysis of 
the phenomenon in modern capitalist society; the analysis also sub-
stantiates Durkheim’s prediction that economic institutions would 
undergo a transformation, and that, possibly, new patterns of ano-
mie would emerge. Halbwachs points out, however, that Durkheim 
should have connected the higher suicide rate with the rapid indus-
trialization that was taking place in Germany and France during the 
second half of the nineteenth century rather than with capitalism 
in general. Halbwachs makes a distinction between the industrial 
expansion and the financial expansion of Germany and France; he 
shows that, because it was new and revolutionary, it was the former 
that created maladjustment on all levels of society—a maladjust-
ment that necessitated physiological, psychological, intellectual, and 
moral changes, and contributed to a rise in the suicide rate.
Halbwachs does well to stress the importance of the particular 
character of this period: the suicide rate decreased when dynamic 
capitalism became relatively stable before the First World War, and 
again following the postwar inflation. He corrects Durkheim when 
he observes that the suicide rate increases in the depression that 
follows an economic crisis rather than during the crisis itself. Dur-
kheim’s conviction was that capitalistic societies lack the regulatory 
powers of the conscience collective, and, for this reason, anomic sui-
cide has become a feature of modern social pathology.
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Halbwachs modifies Durkheim’s prediction concerning the 
anomic state of modern economic societies; for, he maintains, as 
capitalism develops into a rationally planned society, capitalist and 
socialist elements merge. Therefore, it becomes possible to inject 
notions of government-planning and state interference into free 
economic institutions, so that governments are given the power to 
control crises and unemployment and to regulate segments of the 
economy. Halbwachs foresees the general trend to be toward a cor-
porate capitalism that permits the use of socialist devices. Such a 
development would entail the reexamination of anomie and anomic 
suicide.
The new corporate state of society envisioned by Halbwachs is 
not, however, the corporate society in which Durkheim had seen the 
solution to the moral problem of capitalism. On the contrary, it is 
characterized by the tendency toward a new monopolistic capital-
ism, with all the political and moral implications of such a system. 
Halbwachs saw the trend of the economy moving toward a state of 
affairs which Durkheim could not have foreseen, but he did not real-
ize that this new type of social organization, with its mammoth insti-
tutions and its total rationalization of social behavior, would create 
new patterns of anomie suicide, and that social stereotypes and the 
production of technological patterns of culture would throw surviv-
ing human beings into total anomie in a world that had become a 
vacuum ruled by the norms of anonymous efficiency.
Finally, to Halbwachs goes the credit for reconciling the sociolo-
gist’s position on suicide with that of the psychiatrist—who too often 
assigned pathological suicides to himself and normal ones to the 
sociologist. Actually, the interaction of the two disciplines is indis-
pensable for both theoretical and practical purposes.
Halbwachs saw that there is a reciprocal relationship between 
anomie and neurosis. All social catastrophes—such as loss of a loved 
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one, economic failure, continuous lack of success, cultural and social 
displacement, exile, and disgrace—produce déclassés: men who 
are removed from their accustomed groups and are discriminated 
against by the codes of honor or the conscience collective of those 
groups. This feeling of being outside the social framework—a frame-
work that has been taken for granted—produces a consciousness of 
isolation and loneliness; and men who become aware of solitude in a 
social vacuum are driven to suicide.
Durkheim did not see that because social facts cause anxieties 
and depressions it is necessary to use sociological method in psy-
chiatry. Halbwachs and some of his contemporary psychiatrists did. 
Anarchy in the sphere of values and chaos in moral codes create ano-
mie as a social condition of suicide, but the elements of depression 
and insecurity and other pathological features are never absent. Hal-
bwachs held that no neurotic is adapted to his social environment, 
and that every mental illness is an element of social disequilibrium 
and must be explained by the interpenetration of social and organic 
causes.
One of the greatest French psychiatrists, Charles Blondel [1876–
1939], was a sociologist because he was a psychiatrist. He wrote:
What we call “will” exists merely by the fact that systems 
of collective imperatives are present in the individual 
conscience. When we do not conform in our conduct to 
the collective duties, our will has to justify our behavior 
before society. The very presence of collective represen-
tations suffices to turn our activities into acts of will. 
We human beings are within ourselves and outside 
ourselves. So are the reasons for the different patterns 
of suicide. They can be caused by external coercion and 
by psychic inner causes, the two most of the time being 
interdependent.7
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This synthesizing procedure, which analyzes both the sociologi-
cal aspects of neuroses and the pathological aspects of social catas-
trophes, marks genuine progress beyond Durkheim. It constitutes 
another of the achievements of his disciples in developing his method 
into a theory of the totality of social facts.
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17
Max Weber’s Methodology 
The writings of Max Weber [1864–1920], because of their unusual 
range, seem disparate and lacking in unity. His early treatises on the 
history of commercial and Roman agrarian law were followed by an 
analysis of contemporary problems of agrarian politics in East Ger-
many. A passing interest in banking legislation and banking poli-
tics gave way in turn to active participation in the movements that 
centered around the opening of the Evangelisch-Sozialer Kongress 
and the early political activities of Friedrich Naumann [1860–1919]. 
After an illness that incapacitated Weber for five years, he turned 
his attention to an altogether new field of inquiry, and during the 
remainder of his life was preoccupied with the epistemological prob-
lems of the empirical historical and social sciences, slowly evolving 
the methodological principles of his formal system of sociology. 
At the same time, he began his historical works on the economic 
ethic of Protestantism, which were not designated as a “sociology 
of religion” until the final stages of composition. In the meantime, 
there had appeared in the third edition of the Handwörterbuch der 
Staatswissenschaften his article dealing with agrarian conditions in 
antiquity, in effect, a comprehensive analysis in sociological terms of 
Published originally in a slightly different form in Social Research 1 (May 1934), 
147–68.  Republished by permission from Social Research.
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the ancient world viewed from the perspective of the crucial social 
problems of the immediate present.
His various administrative and editorial connections in the 
scholarly world involved him in numerous occasional works, such 
as the report on the nature of the social system in primitive Ger-
many, the methodological introduction to a joint research project 
sponsored by the Verein für Sozialpolitik on the problems of selec-
tion and adaptation (Berufswahl und Berufsschicksal der Arbeiter-
schaff der geschlossenen Grossindustrie), and, in connection with the 
latter, the work on the psychophysics of industrial labor. His essays 
on Prussian legislation in regard to entail [a predetermined order 
of succession of a property or office—Eds.] reveal his intense inter-
est in those problems of East German colonization that he had dealt 
with in his youth. His activities as editor of the Archiv für Sozial-
wissenschaft und Sozialpolitik and his participation in the founding 
of the German Gesellschaft für Soziologie continually brought him 
to grips with new factual and methodological problems relating to 
the social sciences. In the period after 1908, he resumed his earlier 
studies in the field of religious sociology, enlarging the scope of his 
inquiry to include the Asiatic world religions and ancient Judaism. 
At the same time, as coeditor of a new collective work, the Grun-
driss der Sozialökonomiki, he sketched the preliminary outlines for 
a comprehensive sociological treatise on Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 
During the war, he wrote a series of political pamphlets and essays; 
he also contributed heavily to the discussion of the democratic and 
parliamentary features of the new German constitution.
Confronted with writings of such phenomenal range and diver-
sity, the student of Max Weber’s work is apt to be bewildered in his 
search for some underlying and integrating principle. Even among 
Weber’s closest intellectual associates, there has been marked dif-
ference of opinion as to the essential trend and emphasis of his het-
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erogeneous writings. Ernst Troeltsch [1865–1923], for example, in 
his “In Memoriam” tribute, declared that Weber, for all his impres-
sive work as a scientific thinker, was at heart a statesman who had 
assumed the responsibilities of political leadership out of a sense of 
service to his countrymen. On the other hand, and with far more 
justification, Karl Jaspers [1883–1969] insisted that Weber was pri-
marily a philosopher, in fact, the only philosopher of his age. Pro-
vided the term is understood in the sense in which it was used by the 
pre -Socratic schools in Greece, as the man who is swayed by an inner 
compulsion to grasp the meaning of life and to impart this secret to 
his fellow citizens, then Weber was unquestionably a philosopher: 
akin in spirit to the cryptic Heraclitus [c. 535–c. 475].
At the very outset of his career, Weber formulated the premises 
and objectives of his scientific work. His inaugural address, deliv-
ered at Freiburg in 1895 under the title “Der Nationalstaat und die 
Volkswirtschaftspolitik,” offered a precise analysis of the state of sci-
ence and politics at the moment when he first entered the lists as 
an active participant. Two years earlier, he had made a systematic 
study of the various types of agricultural labor existing in Germany, 
and the next year in connection with his research for the Verein für 
Sozialpolitik had analyzed the basic changes that were taking place 
among the agricultural laborers of East Elbe. The remarkable wealth 
of observation, no less than the penetrating interpretation, displayed 
in this analysis won the acclaim of Georg Friedrich Knapp [1842–
1926]: “The predominant feeling aroused by this work is the sense 
that our knowledge is antiquated and that we must begin to learn all 
over again.” Both pieces of research were combined in the inaugural 
address of 1895, which in addition extended the analysis to include 
the analogous situation in West Prussia.
According to Weber’s analysis, the Gutsherrschaften [a form of 
manorial system developed in Northeast Germany, under which the 
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peasants rendered services to the lord in return for their land—Social 
Research Eds.] of East Elbe had not benefited from the general transi-
tion to full capitalism (Hochkapitalismus). The cultivation of beets 
and the more widespread use of agricultural machinery were merely 
the technical manifestations of the radical economic transformation 
that with undiminishing force was disrupting the traditional rural 
system of agrarian labor hitherto prevailing among the Instleute. 
[Agricultural laborers on the large estates in the eastern provinces 
of Prussia. Engaged with their families for a long term of service, 
they are paid partly in money, partly in kind, and in addition are 
allowed to cultivate a piece of land belonging to the estate.—Social 
Research Eds.] These agricultural laborers, accustomed to identify-
ing their own interests with the profits and prosperity accruing to 
the Gutsherrschaft economy, were being displaced, as a result of the 
shift to a money economy, by cheaper wage workers from Poland and 
Russia and in the process were reduced to a proletarian level. For the 
first time, there emerged a class antagonism between the owner of 
the manor and the agricultural laborer. Similarly, in West Prussia, 
the disappearance of the German day laborers from the more fertile 
estates was paralleled by an increase in the number of Poles to be 
found in the villages of less fertile estates.
Whether from an economic, a social, or a political point of view, 
this transformation was of primary significance. It not only revealed 
the penetration of rationalistic, capitalistic forms of enterprise into 
the rural economy, but at the same time furnished disturbing proof 
of the ability of comparatively backward groups like the migratory 
laborers from Poland to displace the more advanced Germans. It 
indicated further that the migration of the German peasants to the 
cities was inspired less by the allurements of urban civilization than 
by their own craving for independence. From the political angle, the 
transformation was doubly significant: the presence of large groups 
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of Slavic immigrants was a distinct liability from the point of view 
of the military defense of eastern Germany; and in the second place, 
the position of dominance in Prussia was transferred into the hands 
of commercially minded entrepreneurs at a time when new forces 
and new methods were needed in the task of political renovation.
In interpreting the broader significance of this economic revo-
lution in eastern Germany, Weber brought to bear a rich historical 
perspective. At a time when his intellectual contemporaries were 
evading the entire subject, he forcefully pointed out the tragedy 
implicit in the incomplete work of Otto von Bismarck [1815–1898]. 
While “the Iron Chancellor” had erected the framework of a new 
and unified nation-state, the foundations on which the political edi-
fice rested had been undermined by the economic currents released 
in the course of the transition to Hochkapitalismus. And neither Bis-
marck nor the Prussian Junkers had been endowed with the insight 
or the political resourcefulness to cope with the new problem. Dis-
heartened by the tragic situation confronting the nation, Weber 
ruminated on the question as to which social class was destined to 
assume the political leadership of the future. But as he turned suc-
cessively to the “satiated” economic groups that comprised the upper 
minority, and then to the petty bourgeoisie, and finally to the prole-
tariat, he was unable to detect in any of them even the rudiments of 
a capacity for political leadership:
   The disturbing element in the situation which confronts 
us is that while the bourgeois classes as bearers of the 
power interests of the nation seem to be withering, there 
is no evidence to indicate that the working classes are in 
any sense qualified to replace them. . . . In our cradles 
we were visited with the most grievous curse that history 
can impose upon a generation: the cruel fate of being 
political epigoni. 
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Weber’s saturnine views on the state of contemporary affairs 
in Germany had a great deal to do with determining his premises 
regarding the proper content of political economy. In defining the 
scope and essential emphasis of the new discipline, which he des-
ignated as Volkswirtschaftspolitik, he maintained that the misery 
of the masses, however intense, is a less compelling consideration 
in determining the ultimate aim of Volkswirtschaftspolitik than is 
the responsibility felt toward history by the individual who sees his 
fellow countrymen in such a desperate state. For under such circum-
stances, the political education of the nation must claim precedence 
over all other aims that Volkswirtschaftspolitik or Volkswirtschafts-
lehre might set itself:
   Alternately in this discipline the technical economic 
problem of the production of goods, and the problem of 
the distribution of goods, that is to say the problem of 
social justice, have been played up as the true criteria of 
value . . . and above both has towered, time and again, 
the realization that a science dealing with man, and such 
is the case with political economy, must focus on the 
nature of man as bred out of the economic environment 
in which he lives.
Thus, the immediate political situation Weber experienced at 
the outset of his intellectual career was responsible for his selec-
tion of the criteria of value that should be observed in the analysis 
of economic and social-political activity. In his general approach, 
Weber set himself squarely against the historical school of national 
economy and the Socialists of the Chair (Katheder-Sozialisten), who 
maintained that it was possible to derive from the economy itself the 
norms necessary for the ordering of the social process. But however 
strongly Weber’s intellectual system may have been conditioned by 
the broader situation of the moment in Germany, its epistemological 
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foundations must be correlated with his own individual personality. 
For the peculiarity of his political economy lies in the fact that it is 
concerned not with laws of economics, not with homo economicus, 
but with the concrete personality of man as it manifests itself in 
particular historical situations. This type of approach is followed 
through not only in the various categories of political economy but 
also to an equal degree in the categories of all cultural and intellec-
tual history, where it might prove most pertinent. Cultural history 
maximizes the objective impersonal forces at play and thus tends to 
blot out the individual except as a strand in a larger pattern of cul-
ture. Intellectual history is concerned with man only from its own 
specialized angle. But the science of society as formulated by Weber 
emphasized laying bare the qualitative existence of concrete histori-
cal individuals living under particular sets of economic and social 
conditions.
By qualitative existence Weber meant an existence that is capable 
of developing for itself some inner meaning and significance. Mean-
ing and significance attach to an existence when the individual is 
accorded respect in the social world, or, on a more spiritual and intel-
lectual plane, derives his sense of worthiness from the consciousness 
of being a participant in some Sinnzusammenhang—that is, in some 
purposive scheme of things. Without some kind of freedom, quali-
tative existence, for Weber, is impossible; since this conception of 
freedom with its obvious connotations from existential philosophy 
is the fundamental basis of Weber’s sociology, certain metaphysical 
overtones are to be detected.
The particular form in which Weber worked out his science of 
society emphasized the interplay between this original metaphysical 
consciousness and the environmental forces with which it collides. 
In the modern setting, ideals of human freedom find themselves 
confronted with a capitalistic society, saturated with rationalism in 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N578
all of its spheres. The clash between ideal standards and concrete 
realities posed the crucial question of Weber’s sociological inquiries, 
namely, how man—that is, man conceived as molded by the passions 
and tensions of a lofty human soul—still finds a place for himself in 
the modern world. This is Weber’s philosophical point of departure, 
as articulated in the inaugural address delivered at Freiburg in 1895 
and as expressed time after time in his subsequent writings. It was 
of the utmost significance in the formulation of his interpretative 
sociology (verstehende Soziologie).
II
The existential philosophy that supplied Weber with his initial prem-
ises found its logically developed culmination in the body of works 
dealing with the theory of science. These constitute one of the most 
important inquiries into the problems of empiric cultural sciences 
during the final third of the nineteenth century in Germany. These 
works, which by 1900 had come to be accepted as the most authori-
tative statement in the field of epistemology, are indispensable to an 
understanding of Weber’s sociology.
Along with Wilhelm Dilthey [1833–1911], Georg Simmel [1858–
1918], Wilhelm Windelband [1848–1915], and Heinrich Rickert 
[1863–1936], Weber set out to transform the historical and social sci-
ences into empiric, scientific disciplines. These scholars proceeded 
from quite different philosophical premises, but their undertakings 
had in common a lofty earnestness of purpose. From one point of 
view, they may be said to have emerged in response to the void caused 
by the collapse of the traditional metaphysical systems, particularly 
the Hegelian that had exerted an influence on the intellectual and 
moral sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), even in their formulation 
of concepts. From another point of view, they may be said to have 
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arisen as a counteroffensive against the encroachments of the natu-
ral sciences. Scientific laws and mathematical relationships that had 
produced such fruitful results in the field of natural science were 
threatening to subject the Geisteswissenschaften to a methodological 
apparatus that was altogether alien and unsuited to types of inquiry 
where intellectual and moral values were involved. In the face of 
the widespread contention that the Geisteswissenschaften could not 
aspire to the status of real science, except in so far as they took over 
the methods of the natural sciences, Wilhelm Dilthey set himself 
the ambitious task of reconstituting the suspect disciplines on a new 
psychological basis compounded of experience and understanding 
(Verstehen) and of building them in strictly intellectual and moral 
terms, without recourse to irrelevancies borrowed from the natural 
sciences. In conception, Dilthey’s pioneer efforts were titanic, pro-
pelled as they were by his personal sense of despair at the spectacle 
of spiritual and intellectual disintegration from which western Euro-
pean culture was suffering. In their total effect, however, they were 
abortive, in the sense that from Dilthey’s philosophical premises, it 
was not feasible to derive a sure methodological foundation for the 
individual sciences that dealt with intellectual and moral relation-
ships. Although on occasion Weber engaged in critical tilts with 
Dilthey and his school, he remained well outside their influence. He 
was far more indebted to Rickert, who in his systematic formulations 
as to the different methods pursued by the natural sciences and the 
Geisteswissenschaften in the building of concepts, supplied the key 
for much of Weber’s own work of this type in the field of social sci-
ences. This indebtedness Weber explicitly recognized when he said 
that he conceived his own task as that of proving the applicability of 
Rickert’s theses to sociological inquiry.
The heated controversy over the epistemological foundations of 
science bulked as large in the social sciences as elsewhere. It was a 
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particularly acrimonious point of controversy whether political 
economy was a natural science or a Geisteswissenschaft. Even the lead-
ers of the historical school of economics insisted that it was their task 
to discover the natural laws of human activity without going beyond 
the economy itself, and from these laws to derive reality. Wilhelm 
Georg Friedrich Roscher [1817–1894], in his own peculiar way, had 
built his conceptual system with elements of positive Christian piety, 
an organismic theory of recurring cycles and certain extracts from 
Hegelian logic. Weber, in his scientific-logical writings, addressed 
the question whether historical and social scientific disciplines are 
properly classified as science. His works on Roscher and Karl Gustav 
Adolf Knies [1821–1898] pointed out those metaphysical elements 
in their concept building that stood in the way of a strictly empiric 
social science. According to Weber, in building their concepts, both 
of these outstanding exponents of the historical school of economics 
revealed unmistakable traces of the emanatistic logic of Hegel, and 
in the significance that they attached to certain ideas of free will and 
irrationality their metaphysical attachments became all too obvious. 
Weber’s trenchant attack upon the metaphysical preconceptions of 
the historical school is of the utmost significance as revealing his 
initial position.1 Citing examples from Paul Hinneberg [1862–1934], 
Friedrich Meinecke [1862–1954], and Heinrich von Treistschke 
[1834–1896], Weber observed:
    One encounters in them again and again the unpre-
dictability of personal behavior, which is a consequence 
of freedom, interpreted, either explicitly or implicitly, as 
a peculiar dignity of man and therefore of history, while 
the creative significance of the personality in action is 
contrasted with the mechanical causality governing the 
processes of Nature. . . . At the bottom of these state-
ments, all of which elevate the ars ignorandi caveat to the 
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dignity of a central methodological principle, there is to 
be found the strange premise that the value of a science, 
or of its subject matter, corresponds to those very things 
we cannot know about it in the concrete or the gen-
eral. If this were so the distinguishing characteristic of 
human behavior would be that it was incapable of being 
explained and, consequently, of being understood.2
He continued:
   The ‘freer’ the decision to act—that is, the more this 
decision is a response to its ‘own’ reflections rather than 
to ‘external pressures or irresistible effects’—the more 
completely, ceteris paribus, the motivations involved in 
the decision may be fitted into the categories, end and 
means; so much the more adequate will be the rational 
analysis of these motivations and under given conditions 
their integration into a scheme of rational activity; all 
the greater therefore is the role which . . . monological 
knowledge plays, and all the more fixed is the relation-
ship between the former and the means . . . but the greater 
the freedom of action—that is, the further removed from 
the processes of nature—the more there comes into play, 
finally, the conception of a personality that finds self-
realization in the constant attunement of its inner being 
to certain ultimate values and life meanings; through 
the medium of an action these values and meanings are 
transformed into aims and purposes, and in the process 
this action becomes teleological and rational. Con-
sequently there is less and less place for the romantic-
naturalistic conception of personality which, proceeding 
in the opposite direction, searches out the ethos of the 
personality in the dank, fallow subsoil of human, or 
rather animal, life. From such romantic obscurantism, 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N582
with its indiscriminate attempts to immure the freedom 
of the will in the dark recesses of the natural world, ema-
nates that mystery of personality as invoked occasionally 
by Treitschke and more frequently by many of his fellow 
romantics. For the purposes of historical analysis human 
personality is not a mystery; on the contrary it is the 
one and only ‘comprehensible’ which can be explained. 
Under no circumstances—even where the possibility 
of rational explanation ceases—are human actions and 
conduct more irrational . . . than is each and every indi-
vidual process as such. But these actions and conduct are 
raised far above the irrationality of the purely natural in 
all cases where rational interpretation is possible.3
These statements are thoroughly characteristic of the basic set 
of premises from which Weber proceeded in his scientific-logical 
studies. From the attack on the romantic irrationalism of German 
historiography emerged not only a definite conception of man but, 
at the same time, a sense as to what phases of the human personality 
are legitimate objects of scientific analysis and interpretation. The 
historian and the social scientist discover man in given objective 
situations, in which he plays either an active or a passive role. How 
he conducts himself is determined on the one hand by his interests, 
his sets of values, and his decisions; on the other, by the impersonal 
factors in the given situation. What he does and what he tolerates is 
built around his definite concrete evaluations and aims, be they on a 
material or an ideal plane. Therefore, since the behavior and conduct 
of the human being is oriented in terms of motives that lend them-
selves to explanation and comprehension, the personality, because it 
is inextricably set in this particular context of meanings and aims, 
becomes an object of rational inquiry.
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This penetrating criticism of the epistemological principles of the 
historical school of economics could not have been made without a 
clearly formulated set of premises as to the boundaries and limita-
tions of an empiric social science—that is, of a social science freed 
from metaphysical and dogmatic entanglements. Weber assumed 
at the outset that no individual science is capable of furnishing an 
authentic “copy” of reality. The utmost that can be accomplished 
by such sciences, either in the historical or the social disciplines, is, 
through reasoned thought, to bring order into the ceaseless flux of 
the real world. The principles of classification, by which this order 
is to be achieved, cannot, however, draw upon reality, but must be 
imposed by the scientist himself.
Where does the scientist who engages in such inquiries derive his 
methodological principles? Weber answers—from his existence as a 
participant in the culture. In so far as he feels that his own life has 
meaning—that is, if he conducts his life according to a set of ultimate 
values—he becomes interested in those elements of reality that have 
a bearing on these values. Thus, from the infinite manifold con-
fronting him, particular features emerge as significant and calling 
for investigation. Moreover, according to Weber, “the set of values, 
to which the scientist relates the subjects of inquiry, may determine 
his conception (Auffassung) of an entire cultural epoch, not only 
establishing which phenomena are of value but also distinguishing 
between those that have significance and those that do not—between 
the ‘important’ and the ‘unimportant.’”4 Thus, for example, whereas 
Jacob Burckhardt [1818–1897], proceeding from the ideal concep-
tion of an aristocratic-aesthetic man, emphasized those tendencies 
in the Renaissance that served to substantiate his particular set of 
inner values, later historians threw their emphasis on those features 
of Renaissance culture that were equally characteristic of the Middle 
Ages.
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From the very outset of his scholarly career, Weber held that in 
his evaluation of social structures the crucial consideration was the 
question of “the particular human type to which these structures, 
whether through external or internal (motive) selection, offered the 
optimal chance of gaining the ascendancy.” With the aid of this 
practical-ethical criterion, he chose from the reality of his times, as 
well as from the historical processes that produced his times, the 
most significant elements “related to value” (wertbezogen), to use 
Rickert’s terminology. These elements he found primarily in the 
forces of the capitalistic system and in the rationalism that pervaded 
all spheres of life. Of course, it is possible to imagine epochs in which 
these value relationships become utterly devoid of significance and 
disappear as fields of scientific inquiry, making way for some new 
or revived approach to reality. For in its flow to unknown ends, the 
stream of the historical-social world assumes ever new configura-
tions, creating in turn new perspectives from which to examine the 
infinite multiplicity of motivation-patterns and the interweaving of 
man’s efforts to order his life: ever new interrelationships are discov-
ered that lie outside the ken of other epochs, whether of the past or 
the future.
Despite that, thus conceived, the starting point of knowledge is 
both subjective and ephemeral, empiric sciences of reality cannot, 
according to Weber, proceed from any other. What is required to 
make them sciences in the true sense of the word? “Only what is 
explained in terms of causality,” replies Weber, “is scientifically 
worked out.” All meaningful human activity and conduct can be 
causally explained. As already noted, meaning for Weber is “sub-
jectively intended meaning” (subjectiv gemeinter Sinn), not objec-
tive, metaphysical meaning. Regarding the latter, the individual 
social sciences have nothing to say. Instead, they must understand 
meaning as being imposed on reality by man through his attempts 
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to orient his life in terms of realizing those purposes, values, and 
aims that seem valuable to him. Reality, so interpreted, is the pro-
cess of creating meaning, and the science of reality therefore is the 
understanding of such meaning patterns (Sinnzusammenhang). For 
a social science that aspires to be a science of reality, Weber pre-
scribes three objectives: first, it must understand the peculiarities of 
the historical and social present; second, it must furnish an inter-
pretation (Wertinterpretation) of the interrelationships between the 
component elements and of their significance for the culture; and, 
finally, it must understand, by a process of causal interpretation, why 
its essential elements have come about in the particular way they 
have rather than in some alternative way.5
To Weber, understanding is synonymous with the discovery of 
causal interrelationships, or in other words, with the imputation 
(Zurechnung) of concrete results to concrete causes. This is the 
essence of the scientific method and must be recognized as such 
even by those who have a radically different emotional and intel-
lectual make up. For it is not essential to accept the particular values 
that happen to be assumed. The only sine qua non of the scientific 
approach is the rational acceptance of the truth that these premises, 
if true, must unfold along one line and only one line and must lead 
to one precise imputation and to no other.
This particular type of causal analysis constituted for Weber 
the essential characteristic of the social sciences. “The question of 
causality, where the individuality of a phenomenon is involved, is a 
question involving not laws, but concrete causal interrelationships; 
not a question of the category under which the phenomenon should 
be subsumed, but a question of the individual concatenation (Kon-
stellation) which must have caused it: it is a question of imputation.”6 
Social sciences are methodologically distinguished from the natural 
sciences. The end goal of knowledge in the natural sciences is the 
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formulation of laws on the basis of classified facts. The social sciences 
are preoccupied with individual patterns of concatenation, and thus 
the general laws and norms of causal sequence are merely a means to 
understanding. As Weber points out, such general laws and norms 
are indispensable for concrete imputation in the understanding of 
reality. “Imputation cannot be understood without a knowledge of 
the regularity of causal interrelationships.”7
Such regularities cannot be deduced from concepts. They are 
rules of experience that, given a certain set of conditions or objec-
tives, construct in a rationally adequate manner a typical course of 
action. Practical activities of all kinds are undertaken on the pre-
supposition that under a given set of circumstances certain causal 
sequences can be taken more or less for granted. The military chief 
of staff, for example, with the knowledge he possesses of the general 
strategic situation at the moment and of the objectives the enemy is 
aiming at, can visualize what course of action his antagonist must 
follow if he seeks to achieve these objectives. This same type of causal 
calculation is normally resorted to, likewise, in all political and eco-
nomic pursuits as a means of anticipating a course of action.
Economic science, in the logical construction of its laws, affords 
the classic example of adequately erected causal interrelationships, 
which—under given conditions (such as a money economy) and 
given objectives (such as profit making)—can proceed in only one 
rational manner. “All economic laws are causal interrelationships 
expressed as rules which are adequate for the interrelationships.”8 
In such cases, the category of objective possibility is valid; that is, by 
proceeding according to the rules of experience and by construct-
ing these rules in the proper rational way, it is possible that events 
will transpire in conformity with the rules. These constructions are 
not hypotheses but merely aids toward forming hypotheses. They 
provide no copy of the real world, being technically constructed 
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concepts, intended merely to serve as fixed points of reference for 
measuring the extent of the divergence therefrom of the individual 
imputations. Weber calls such conceptual constructs “ideal types.”
In the social and historical sciences, these ideal types are the logi-
cal approaches to reality, in the sense that Weber conceives the func-
tion of the empiric sciences of reality as that of bringing order into 
the empiric world through the power of thought. The ideal type—as 
for example, city-economy, capitalism, imperialism, feudalism—is, 
to quote Weber, in the nature of “an ideal boundary concept, by ref-
erence to which reality is measured with a view to clarifying cer-
tain significant phases of its empiric makeup; an ideal concept with 
which reality is compared. Such concepts are creations, in which we 
construct interrelationships by drawing upon the category of objec-
tive possibility.”9
Such “genetic concepts” are constructed from elements of reality 
in the intellectual and religious sphere as well as in the political and 
social, resulting in such ideal types as Christianity, liberalism, social-
ism, and the like. Although the construction of ideal types becomes 
progressively more difficult as the content of these concepts comes to 
coincide with the ideals and norms by which the investigator regu-
lates his own personal conduct, they are not, however, to be dispensed 
with in the analysis of intellectual movements and religious trends. 
Their value as aids toward comprehending concrete causal relation-
ships consists in the fact that, provided they are constructed purpose-
fully, they serve to enhance the clarity and incisiveness with which 
individual causes are imputed. The actual motivations in a particular 
case and the individual processes of causation are far less elusive when 
the divergence in each instance is measured from a fictitious ideal 
type than when one relies on an immediate and direct interpretation.
The discovery of the ideal type opened the way to a strenuous 
offensive against conceptual realism in all its forms. It engendered 
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an intense resistance against trying to derive an understanding of 
external reality through the reality of concepts. Scientific insight into 
the structure of the applied means and of the technical processes of 
understanding and into the precise delimitation between a concept 
of reality and reality itself requires a highly perfected scientific and 
intellectual discipline. At the same time, it requires a clear distinc-
tion between scientific construct and the subject of investigation. But 
such self-awareness depends also on an abandonment of all types of 
metaphysical, religious, and theological standards, and norms. Only 
rarely does one see such a clear and penetrating glimpse of a mind 
aware of the conditions, limitations, and potentialities under which 
it operates. And only a man of the extraordinary intellectual power 
and spiritual majesty of Max Weber would have had the capacity to 
articulate in enduring form such an instant of spiritual awareness. 
His struggles to free scientific methodology from value judgments 
throw a flood of light upon the intellectual milieu in which the new 
scientific theories were first evolved.
The social sciences from their earliest days, more than any other 
branch of science, had dealt with questions of practical politics and 
of organized social life. They were forced to pass judgment on mea-
sures of statecraft, legislative actions, and political decisions. The 
criteria that governed these judgments were not questioned so long 
as the aims of the state in whose services the economic sciences had 
originated were generally recognized and accepted. And when these 
sciences had abandoned their practical functions, the possibility of 
a dichotomy between value judgments and empiric analysis of real-
ity was precluded by two sets of premises. The first held that, inas-
much as economic and social evolution proceeds according to the 
laws of nature, being and value are identical. The second held that 
inasmuch as a single principle of evolution governs economic reality, 
the genetic and the normative are one.10
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The historical school of economics and the Socialists of the Chair 
were the first to try to discover immanent moral judgments in the 
process of economic unfolding and to establish in scientific terms a 
basis for the just ordering of social and economic institutions. More-
over, according to Gustav von Schmoller [1838–1917], there existed, 
despite national boundaries and the diversity of religious customs, 
a general agreement in all periods and among all peoples as to the 
nature of social justice. He was also inclined to assume the iden-
tity of ethical and cultural values. Against this naive saddling of the 
social sciences with ultimate values that their exponents professed to 
discover in and to deduce from science, Weber bluntly retorted that 
under no circumstances can the investigation of reality and the work 
of the sciences of reality substantiate ideals, evaluations, and norms 
in scientific terms.
With deadly earnestness, Weber repeatedly pointed out the 
extreme seriousness of the spiritual dilemma at hand: 
It is the fate of a cultural epoch which has eaten of the 
tree of knowledge to be aware that however completely 
we may investigate history we cannot read its real 
meaning, and that we must be content therefore to cre-
ate our own sense of history; that our Weltanschauung 
can never be the product of the progressive knowledge 
of experience, and that thus the highest ideals and those 
which move us most deeply, work themselves out perma-
nently only through conflict with rival ideals which are 
quite as sacred to other individuals as ours are to us.11  
 
Time after time, he set out with the greatest vehemence to proclaim 
and bring about a complete divorce between the empiric sciences 
and practical ideals. “We know no ideals which can be demonstrated 
in scientific terms. To be sure, it is only the more arduous a task to 
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draw them from one’s own breast in a period of culture which is so 
subjective. But we have no fool’s paradise and no streets of gold to 
offer, either in this world or the next, either in thought or in action; 
and it is a stigma of our dignity as men that the peace of our souls 
shall never be as great as the peace of him who dreams of such a 
paradise.”12
The scientific labors involved in the rational knowledge, expla-
nation, and understanding of nature and of society had drawn one 
after another of the realms of the divine order into the cold light 
of causal and mathematical analysis and had robbed the world of 
the security hitherto afforded by the idea of universal creation. This 
intellectual rationalization was accompanied by the disintegration 
of the Christian ethic that for almost two thousand years had been 
accepted throughout the Occident as the ultimate norm of human 
conduct. In its place, there appeared a multitude of value-claims and 
sets of norms: old scales of values crumbled and new ones were set 
up. The situation that Dilthey anticipated on his seventieth birth-
day had come to pass. Casting about sorrowfully for the intellectual 
means to transcend the dilemma, he asked, “Where are to be found 
the instruments for surmounting the spiritual chaos which threatens 
to engulf us?”
Weber would have replied that such instruments do not exist. His 
silence regarding the role of philosophy in his own age should most 
probably be interpreted as an indication of his belief that in such 
an intellectual dilemma the value of a philosophy that aspires to be 
more than epistemology is highly problematical. Empirical sciences, 
on the other hand, at such a juncture of intellectual history are in a 
particularly advantageous position—by reason of the fact that being 
free from all deeply rooted and axiomatic religious and metaphysical 
traditions they are conscious of the subjective nature of their evalu-
ations—to gaze upon unadorned reality in a way denied to epochs 
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that enjoy security and the sense of a meaning in life. Therefore, 
Weber was rightfully acclaimed as the philosopher of the time and 
his interpretative sociology as the empiric presentation and adequate 
expression of the prevailing metaphysical sterility and religious apa-
thy. Following the empiric approach to reality, Weber perceived a 
manifold of values, discrete and mutually exclusive, at least in their 
significance. There are the values of life; erotic, political, and artistic 
values; the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount. All these sets of 
values are in a state of relentless strife with one another—as deadly 
as the conflict “between God and devil.”
Weber repeatedly emphasized the tension between political and 
ethical decisions. In his inaugural address, he pointed out to the 
Socialists of the Chair that the man who is active in politics must 
place national ideals and realistic considerations of statecraft above 
personal ethical values; throughout his later writings, he revealed 
the divergence between norms of ethics and those of political activ-
ity. His investigations in the field of practical politics disclosed two 
contrasted types of ethical behavior: the one that emanates from 
inner convictions (Gesinnungsethik) and the one based on a sense 
of responsibility (Verantwortungsethik). In the case of the former, 
the individual is determined to realize his ethical ideals at any cost; 
loyalty in the service of these ultimate ideals is for him the criterion 
of his own integrity; nor is he given to asking himself whether per-
chance his behavior may not discredit the ideal or at least seriously 
delay its fulfillment. In the second type, the individual gauges the 
possible consequences of his action, ponders what effect it may have 
upon the ideal, and searches diligently for an opportunity to make 
the ideal operative: for him, success is an ever-relevant consideration. 
But the question of which of these alternative types of ethical behav-
ior should be followed cannot be determined on scientific grounds, 
or indeed in any rational manner.
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All human activity collides incessantly with ultimate decisions 
which in themselves cannot be carried through. 
In almost every single important decision by living 
beings, spheres of value cross and become interlaced. The 
leveling process of ‘every-day life,’ in the literal sense of 
that term, consists precisely in this, that the man who 
participates in it is not aware of this—in part psychologi-
cally, in part pragmatically conditioned—entanglement 
of mutually antagonistic values; and above all in the fact 
that he does not desire to be conscious that he is evading 
the choice between God and devil as well as his own final 
decision as to which of the colliding values is ruled over 
by the former, and which by the latter. Distasteful as it 
may be from the point of view of human self-assurance, 
the inevitable fruit of the tree of knowledge is nothing 
else than this: to be aware of these antagonisms and thus 
to be forced to see that every single important action 
no less than life in its entirety—provided it is not to 
drift along as a natural process but is to be consciously 
pursued—represents a concatenation of final decisions 
through which the soul, as conceived by Plato, chooses its 
own fate, that is to say selects the meaning of its existence 
and activity. Indeed the most egregious misapprehen-
sion that at recurring intervals has befallen the aims of 
those who have emphasized this collision of values is the 
characterization of such interpretations as ‘relativism.’ 
For a relativistic view of life proceeds from a diametri-
cally opposite conception as to the relationships between 
the various spheres of value and to be carried through 
intelligently in logical form calls for a very particularly 
contrived type of organismic metaphysics.13
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Nothing can show more clearly than this passage the meaning of 
the struggle that Weber carried on with such vehement intensity for 
the liberation of the sciences of reality from value judgments. The 
existential choice between God and devil is the only one that still 
ensures man a sense of dignity. But for Weber, a sense of dignity 
means man’s consciousness of being, in the midst of intellectual and 
religious chaos, the one and only stage for an activity that through the 
decisions it makes imbues existence with an awareness of ultimate 
values. We confer meaning on life. Thus, as the truly disinherited 
sons of God, forced to struggle continuously in order to uphold this 
human dignity of ours, we find the guarantee of human existence 
only in the possibility of being able to determine our destiny through 
the agency of personality, which functions as a unit of practical deci-
sion. There is a kind of negative theology in this heroism. For the 
questions of why man proves true to himself, why these decisions 
between conflicting values are so important, remain obscure; and 
Weber veils the question in silence. The meaning of this silence must 
be conjectured with extreme caution. Even though the place of God 
remains vacant, all these decisions are in the last analysis meaning-
ful only in so far as they serve absolute values.
Does science lose its value because its tasks are thus limited and 
because it must foreswear all pretensions to erecting norms of practi-
cal and ethical conduct? Tolstoy would have characterized a science 
thus limited as meaningless, since it would offer no guidance as to 
how we should live. In this respect, Weber’s mind, accustomed to 
think of the sense of moral responsibility as governing activity, saw 
more clearly and deeply. A science of reality that deals with human 
activity may not be able, it is true, to prescribe what we should do, 
but it can make us more intelligently aware of what we want to do 
and, with particular ideals in mind, must want to do. For toward 
the understanding of human activity, science is capable of determin-
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ing: first, the appropriateness of the means in relation to a given end; 
second, the adequacy of the ends in relation to a given concatenation 
of working interrelationships; and, finally, the unintended conse-
quences and by-products of every human action or, in other words, 
the question as to what “the realization of a desired end will cost in 
terms of the presumably inevitable destruction of other values.”14
If the sciences are in a position thus to stimulate self-awareness 
and intellectual discipline, they are serving, according to Weber, 
moral forces. For they intensify the realization that all activity and 
non-activity invariably entails an alignment on the side of certain 
particular values, a repudiation of others.15 Furthermore, they may 
diffuse a clearer conception of what man must wish if he desires to 
realize particular ideals or, in other words, the consequences that 
the realization of the ideal may have in the form of by products that 
are often inconsistent with the ideals themselves. Thus, for instance, 
although socialism has set itself the ideal of establishing a realm of 
freedom, it may conceivably discover that the only means whereby 
it can realize, and at the same time perpetuate, the ideal of a homo-
geneous community is by a set of institutions involving a complete 
abnegation of freedom. The sciences can likewise throw light on 
the ultimate criteria of ideals and norms by which individuals are 
guided, and thus help us to live in more conscious attunement with 
those ideals. This consciousness is not an end in itself, however, but 
valuable only as a stimulus to action and decision. Therefore, in con-
clusion, the sciences may be said to be in the service of moral forces. 
Through the power of conscious responsibility, they are able to ele-
vate decisions from the dank and gross levels of being to the plane 
where Jacob wrestles with the angel—that is to say, to the realm of 
ultimate self-expression of the human personality that lights up the 
deepest recesses of existence.
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Max Weber’s Sociology 
I
In 1901, a pupil of Max Weber [1864–1920] demonstrated that the 
majority of industrial establishments in Baden were under the 
direction of Protestants. The Catholics, on the other hand, were but 
poorly represented among the industrial leaders in comparison with 
their percentage of the population.1 This dissertation provided the 
external impetus to Max Weber’s work in the sociology of religion, 
which revolves mainly around the problem of the relations between 
capitalism and evangelical Christianity.
The force of the ties between politics and religion had already 
become known to Max Weber from the cultural policy of the Prus-
sian government. At the eighth Evangelical-social Congress, he 
had spoken on the “purely external and purely formal bureaucratic 
religious spirit” fostered in Prussia ever since Robert von Puttkamer 
[1828–1900]. Both contemporary political questions and Weber’s uni-
versal historical knowledge impressed upon him the formative and 
determining influences of religion on the practical conduct of life. 
Was there a direct line between the drab and soberly rational every-
day existence of capitalism and the forces of the Christian spirit? In 
his early investigations of agricultural conditions, Max Weber had 
Published originally in a slightly different form in Social Research 2 (February 
1935), 60–73.  Republished by permission from Social Research. 
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already indicated the significance of the idea of “freedom” as one of 
the most powerful of the motivating factors of human activity, and 
he strongly emphasized the determining force of ideological factors 
together with economic, social, and political factors. The exposition 
of this principle continues the work of Karl Marx [1818–1883], while 
providing a fruitful and significant modification.
Unscrupulous striving for gain and greed for money, property, 
and economic goods existed at all times. Every historical epoch 
knew the irrational capitalism of adventurers, traders, and war 
profiteers. How was it, however, that the acquisition of money, in 
itself and for itself, came to be regarded as a moral duty? Such a con-
ception would have appeared absurd to the aristocratic and feudal 
classes and degrading to any Greek or Roman freeman. How did the 
entrepreneur come to believe that his desire for profits was a moral 
obligation? In this connection, Martin Luther’s [1483–1546] hostil-
ity to Catholic asceticism is of the greatest significance for all con-
fessions of the Protestant churches. Luther’s conception of “calling” 
(Beruf) attached a specific dignity to all secular and worldly activity 
and gave to all daily activity a moral and religiously divine sanctity. 
The monastery was demolished, but the whole world now became a 
monastery. Nevertheless, there is yet no connection between genuine 
Lutheranism and the capitalist spirit. The spirit of capitalism is to be 
understood only as a product of Calvin’s gloomy doctrine of predes-
tination and its resulting rules of life and conduct. In Calvin’s Deus 
absconditus, only the terrible majesty of God is preserved without 
the characteristics of goodness, love and creation. Through His Maj-
esty, all human souls, even before birth, are predestined without 
question either to heaven or to hell. This doctrine of predestination 
became the power that regulated the general everyday life of Calvin-
ists. For there is only one single means whereby to assure one’s self 
of the state of grace and that is through adherence to one’s calling. 
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Unceasing devotion to work, the most minute and conscientious ful-
filling of duty, restlessly successful activity for the glory of God—
only these can lead to the certainty of belonging to the elect and 
the saved. Permeating the letters of Oliver Cromwell [1599–1658] is 
the motif that suffering obedience is more carnal and sinful than 
worldly activity. God demands from us activity, rational worldly 
constructions, and no moods or feelings. To the Puritan, accumula-
tion of money served as a sign of grace. He is not to spend it for mere 
pleasure but rather for the glory of God, which means for new busi-
ness enterprises. Like the medieval monasteries, the Puritan entre-
preneurs could not escape from the inner logic of their position. The 
rational disciplining of life, the hostility to worldly and sensuous 
culture, the deepest mistrust of all those human ties that rest upon 
irrational feelings, all these served to force the occupational calling 
into the center of their life activity and made them look upon it as 
service of God. Since this logic demanded, however, that all profits 
in turn be used for more work, the accumulation of capital became 
almost an end in itself. Some time or other, the religious roots of this 
spirit would be torn away, but the accumulation of money, the call-
ing, produced an autonomous and self-generating kind of activity. 
“The Puritan wanted to be an occupational being (Berufsmensch), 
we must be so.” “The care for worldly goods was to be only like a 
thin coat on the shoulders of the pious and could be cast aside at any 
time. But this coat was destined to become a hard steel casing.”2 This 
represents the connection between the doctrine of predestination 
and worldly asceticism. This spirit together with its related doctrine 
of economic ethics became a condition for the development of that 
rational economic power that dominates modern life with increasing 
oppressiveness.
In an epoch that aimed to deduce all intellectual and spiritual 
relationships from material interests, this discovery of Max Weber’s 
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took on the greatest and most revolutionary significance. It spurred 
Weber to further research into the economic ethics of the great 
Asiatic world religions and Judaism. If Western Puritanism had 
provided a basis for the possibility of a rational industrial and eco-
nomic organization, then the question arose whether the religious 
structures in Asia constituted a force that prevented the emergence 
of such economic forms of life. And it appeared that there were all 
kinds of ritualistic and religious restrictions that, despite highly 
significant commercial and finance-capitalistic forces, did not make 
possible the development of a continuously rational, industrial pro-
duction system. The very religious tendencies of the Jews, which 
Weber brought forth in opposition to Werner Sombart’s [1863–1941] 
interpretation of Jewish participation in modern capitalism, are in 
themselves proof of this thesis. The sanctified religious life of the 
Jews was never realized through or in their occupation but always 
outside their daily work, in prayer, in the study of the sacred litera-
ture, and in the ritual life—religious attitudes far removed from a 
worldly asceticism.
Whereas in these researches Max Weber revealed the influ-
ence of religious attitudes upon the economic activity of everyday 
life, in his continuation of these studies, especially in the section of 
his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft dealing with sociology of religion, 
he showed the development of religious ideas within definite social 
groups and the influence of social conditions upon certain religious 
ideas and institutions. Max Weber thus described the relationship 
between Confucianism and the forms of life and consciousness of 
a literary bureaucracy and the social ethics of the older Islam as an 
expression of a warlike aristocracy. He discovered the significance 
of aristocratic and proletarian intellectual classes for the content of 
certain religions of salvation, and in this connection he disproved 
the theory of Friedrich Nietzsche [1844–1900] that the sources of 
M A X  W E B E R ’ S  S O C I O L O G Y 601
these religions are to be found in the resentment of the pariahs. The 
intellectual classes of the nobility, who were the carriers of Bud-
dhism, did not share in such resentment. Weber showed the pecu-
liar significance of the Hebrew prophets for the continued existence 
of the Jews as a religious group, even after their political state had 
been destroyed, and he tied up the pariah existence of the Jews after 
the Exile with their religious consciousness. Despite the close con-
nection of the spheres of religion with those of social life, the reli-
gious spontaneity of the former cannot be ultimately deduced from 
social relations. The content and character of religious ideas can be 
explained only from the internal laws of the religious sphere and 
religious needs. “Interests (material and ideal) and not ideas govern 
the immediate acts of man. But the ‘world views’ created by ideas 
have often served as switchmen to set the limits within which the 
dynamics of interests move activity.”3 The incomparable grandeur 
of the “economic ethics of the world religions,” encompassing Prot-
estantism and Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism, Confucianism 
and Taoism, rests not only on the universal conception and the keen 
and illuminating power of Weber’s ideas, but also particularly on 
the compactness and intensity of the sections on Puritanism and the 
ancient Hebrew prophets. One must go very far back in the literature 
of German cultural and intellectual history to find anything compa-
rable. Wilhelm Dilthey’s [1833–1911] justly famous Weltanschauung 
und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation is, in 
comparison with Weber’s work, lacking in clarity of formulation and 
pale in its description. Only the work of Leopold von Ranke [1795–
1886] is as realistic and as intense as these works of Weber. Ranke’s 
Christian humanism, however, was able to harmonize reality with 
the strained tension in his faith. All history ultimately rests peace-
fully in the hand of God; every epoch stands in immediate relation 
to God. The opposite view is found in Max Weber. His investigations 
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showed him that not every epoch stood in this immediate relation 
to God. He knew that the force of the Christian charisma, which, 
through the religious heroism of the English sectarians, had revolu-
tionized the entire life of the West, had disappeared. He knew that it 
was still manifest only in very limited circles and in individual souls. 
There was increasingly less room for religious charisma in the ratio-
nally standardized and rigid form of modern culture, in a time when 
the advance of rational sciences removed the magic spell from more 
and more aspects of organic and social life. The power of expression 
in his treatment of Puritan leaders and the prophets, such as John 
Bunyan [1628–1688] and Oliver Cromwell, George Fox [1624–1691] 
and John Milton [1608–1674], as well as the biblical prophets Isaiah 
and Jeremiah, bears witness to the influence on Max Weber of these 
heroes and agents of the divine pneuma with the greatness of their 
solitude and their calling. They were heroes in the literal sense of 
people whose lives were completely imbued with their calling.
In times of increasing rationalism and as a result of a growing 
lack of understanding for the greatness of this type of humanity 
there remained only the task to preserve at least the knowledge of 
this transforming power of religious charisma. The tension between 
the rational everyday life and the life of such religious heroes was not 
to be neglected but was rather to be sustained. Just because Weber 
knew what real religious charisma meant, he insisted that his own 
age was characterized by the reign of everyday life, and he looked 
with disgust at the need of contemporary intellectuals to mimic reli-
gious feeling. 
All this renders conditions unfavorable for the emer-
gence of serious communal religious feeling carried by 
intellectuals. The need of literary and distinguished aca-
demic circles or coffee-house intellectuals for including 
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‘religious’ emotions among the collection of their sources 
of sensation and objects of discussion . . . might appear 
as a sign of widespread ‘religious interest,’ but it does not 
alter the fact that no new religion has ever emerged from 
such needs of intellectuals and their chatter and that 
fashion will also finally eradicate . . . this subject of con-
versation and journalism.4 
No one fought more passionately than Max Weber for rational 
knowledge as opposed to all those kinds of sentimental, moralistic, 
and intellectualistic knowledge that served merely to secure peace 
of mind and were provisional in character. The best road to genuine 
knowledge was by way of radical doubt. Weber was deeply conscious, 
however, that there are problems that are beyond immediate scien-
tific approach. Although human reason was able to penetrate deeply 
into the knowledge of life, there was still an impenetrable mystery 
that surrounded it all.5 It was, however, a commandment of human 
existence to preserve this mystery. He knew that man’s profoundest 
struggles, decisions, and evaluations lie beyond the realm of ratio-
nal knowledge. They are the product of the totality of his existence. 
Just as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe [1749–1832] maintained a 
middle position between the forward pressure of knowledge and the 
calm reverence of the unsearchable, so Max Weber also knew the 
bounds between the world of knowledge and that of the unsearch-
able mystery of life. But unlike Goethe, there was no balanced har-
mony between the two in Weber. This radical tension between the 
two that is evident in the thought of Max Weber clearly reveals the 
intellectual and spiritual development of the nineteenth century. 
For Goethe, it was still possible to harmonize knowledge and faith 
within natural religion and pantheism. Weber could only recognize 
in knowledge and faith (or better perhaps, instead of faith, knowl-
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edge of the final superrational or irrational order) the extreme poles 
of modern human existence. To endure this tension and not break 
under it was the task that he set for the simple and sober heroism of 
modern man. The fulfilment of this demand under the conditions 
of modern life was possible only through unconditional service to a 
cause, to an impersonal ideal.
II
The foundation of the empirical sciences of reality on a theory of 
knowledge and the religio-sociological discovery of the significance 
of Puritanism for the origins of the capitalistic spirit provided the 
bases for the conception of Weber’s most important sociological 
work. Another preparatory study, however, must be mentioned in 
this connection. The Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum6 is an impor-
tant part of Max Weber’s work, and it is largely taken over in his 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft.7 This study of agrarian relations is really 
a sociological investigation of the whole ancient social world and 
not only of agriculture. It considers what types of capitalism were 
developed in the ancient world and what hindrances there were to 
the emergence of a modern, rational, industrial capitalism. Through 
his knowledge of universal historical materials and through the 
keenness of his construction of ideal types, Weber developed the 
various forms of sociologically relevant types of cities: the military 
city, the aristocratic city, the guild city, the patrician city, the ple-
beian city, etc. And from the ideal type—feudalism—he developed 
various types of feudal aristocratic rule. He always adopted the 
viewpoint of attempting to explain through these instruments of 
knowledge the individual and historically different types of social 
structure and, above all, to bring out clearly the elements preventing 
or favoring the development of a rational industrial capitalism. This 
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method also contributed a great deal toward the explanation of the 
decline of the ancient world. The very absence of a rational industrial 
capitalism and the supremacy of a commercial capitalism oriented 
purely on political chance, together with the increasing pacification 
of the world and the growing importance of a state military and 
bureaucracy with their resulting financial needs, must have brought 
about the most critical results—namely, the impossibility of finding 
a permanent source for the fiscal needs under the relatively under-
developed rationality of the economic system. The state apparatus 
had become too extensive and costly to be supported by the social 
and economic forces of the Empire. Together with a series of quite 
different tendencies, these were the causes of a decisive political and 
economic transformation of the Empire.
Out of these three great phases of Weber’s work—the method-
ological studies, the sociology of religion, and the sociology of ancient 
society—grew his last great work, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. This 
grandiose work of empirical sociology has remained a torso, exter-
nally because of the death of the author, yet also fragmentary and 
unfinishable in its very nature, like the process of historical life itself. 
For every form, and in a scientific sense this means every attempt 
at systematization, cannot do without dogmatic or metaphysical or 
philosophical-historical presuppositions. But Weber rejected these, 
as we have seen from his theoretical studies. Value judgments cre-
ate the points of reference for the construction of sociological ideal 
types, but not for the combination of these into one comprehensive 
system. Every attack at Weber’s lack of system, therefore, is meaning-
less, since Weber, by his fundamental theory of knowledge, rejected 
such a desire, and he repeatedly gave utterance to this view expressis 
verbis. In order to undermine this absence of system, therefore, it 
would be necessary to attack the logical foundations of his sociology, 
and not his sociology as such.
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Another motive for the fragmentary form of this sociology is 
derived from the content that Weber gave to his sociology of under-
standing (verstehende Soziologie). He operates entirely without the 
concept of society. “Sociology is defined as a science which aims to 
understand clearly social behavior and thus give a causal explana-
tion of its course and results.”8 Only human behavior is open to 
interpretation, and it matters not if this behavior is oriented around 
the attitudes of other human beings, social relations, or individually 
recognized commands and norms. Natural events can only be laid 
down as facts, but human behavior is capable of meaningful expla-
nation. Only human behavior is determined by motives. These may 
be rational, purposeful, valuational, or emotional—and, therefore, 
from the “subjectively intended” meaning, intelligible. Social behav-
ior, therefore, is human behavior related to the attitudes of other 
individuals. It may be unique or stereotyped, become integrated into 
social attitudes or remain amorphous, become institutionalized and 
assume a traditionalist character, or be organized into social forces. 
Sociology is interested in all those forms of the endless possibilities 
of human activities and relationships that reveal typical recurrences 
and present general empirically grounded developments. Socio-
logical laws are possible only in the sense that they are conceptual 
formulations of such typical recurrences of human activity in the 
form of ideal types. Man occupies the central position in Weber’s 
work because man is the bearer of all meaning. There is always the 
recurrent note that man can give meaning to his life only by his 
activity. For this reason, there are no institutions, or forces, or social 
forms that are not to be realized in human activity whether it be 
of purposes, values, or feelings. Thus, Weber’s sociology destroys all 
the collectivistic concepts with which history and political science 
had operated and that always contained some latent dogmatic value 
judgments and presuppositions. Weber’s destruction of conceptual 
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realism in his ideal types parallels his destruction of collectivistic 
concepts in favor of sociological categories of man-to-man relations. 
Following from this, all values, norms, and moral commands exist, 
for this sociology, exclusively as maxims, ideas of value and ideas of 
norms, as chance that guides the activity of man. The category of 
chance plays a decisive role in Weber’s sociology of understanding. It 
expresses the idea that with the knowledge of given conditions—that 
is, knowledge of the typical attitudes of definite human groups—
only one particular course of action, and not another, is necessary 
for the attainment of the goal. Such an insight provides a certain 
assurance of success of individual activity in the field of the objec-
tively possible. Such a category, therefore, is formal and technical in 
character. In a certain sense, it serves the variegated technique of 
life. Since life runs its course in various spheres and since economics 
and politics, religion and art, and science and technology each has 
its own orders that, in concrete historical situations, are swallowed 
up in a web of manifold motivations, an endless number of possible 
sociological categories and concepts exists. This is another reason for 
the fragmentary character of Max Weber’s sociology.
Max Weber always protested that his sociological concepts and 
their casuistry did not represent an attempt to divide up reality into 
pigeon holes, as is so often the case in the works of formal sociology. 
It is an idle task to attempt to comprehend the endless stream of real-
ity in such schematic arrangements. The aim of Weber’s concepts is 
merely to present what sociological characteristics are revealed by 
any historical phenomenon.
The sociology of understanding, as an aid to the knowledge of 
concrete and individual relationships, became very fruitful and sig-
nificant for the knowledge of the connections between the individual 
orders of life. Weber called his work “economics and the social orders 
and forces,” and he sought to clarify their relations. In his theoretical 
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studies, Weber pointed out that the sphere of economic life cannot 
be explained only in terms of immanent and internal development. 
Events in the political and religious spheres may often be more relevant 
to economics and may either further or retard tendencies in economic 
development. On the other hand, the structure and character of an 
economic order serve as conditions for political life and penetrate into 
the innermost forms of our personal life. Since he studied both the 
economic relevancy of all events of social life and how far economic 
forms served to create definite constellations and conditions for the 
political and social orders, his work reveals a characteristic fluidity 
of presentation without any point of equilibrium. Everywhere and 
always, the motifs are swallowed up in an endless sequence, and it 
is only the particularly chosen point of scientific interest that weaves 
together all the relevant links into one unified whole. The individual 
ideally typical constructions and the fundamental sociological cat-
egories of economic life are thus formed on the basis of the cultural 
significance of modern capitalism. Not through ideographic con-
cepts, but through Weber’s sociological ideal types, is it possible to 
understand unequivocally what were the conditions for the origins 
of capitalism in the West and what were the necessary conditions 
created by the modern state, modern bureaucracy, and the various 
forms of Western rationalism. Weber succeeds in developing the 
types of capitalistic orientation of industry and presenting the par-
ticular structure of modern rationalism oriented around chances of 
profits. For its origin and development, however, certain political 
and legal conditions were necessary. Weber takes up the monetary 
system and policy of the modern state as a condition for the modern 
economic order and the significance of political organizations for 
the economic system. In a corresponding way, his juridical sociology 
was concerned with the significance of the formal characteristics 
of modern law for capitalistic rationalism and, above all, with the 
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importance of juristic rationalism for the peculiarities of the politi-
cal and administrative structure of the modern European world. 
It is not only modern capitalism that is characteristic of the West. 
Rational science, classes, parties, cities, and the modern rationalistic 
structure of the state—all these are peculiar to the West. For this 
reason, the sociological categories in “Typen der Herrschaft” (Types 
of Ruling) in his juridical sociology and in chapters on sociology of 
religion in his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft all serve to contrast the 
various typical forms and constructions of Western rationalism with 
the tendencies of rationalist thought in Asia, above all in India and 
China.
By extending the aims of knowledge beyond the confines of 
the relationships between economics and the great social forces of 
state, religion, and law, this sociology took on a most comprehensive 
aspect. It represents the first grand attempt to realize an empirical 
sociology of the forms of rationalism and its interacting influences 
on the emotional and irrational attitudes of Western man. His inves-
tigations into the sociology of religion also sufficiently demonstrated 
to him the enormous role of modern rationalism in the emergence 
of the reformed religions and how it continued its influence in Tri-
dentine Catholicism and the Counter Reformation. Parallel with and 
in immediate relation with this rationalization of consciousness, 
however, came a deepening and an inward turn toward the irratio-
nal religious attitudes and also to the emotional life, such as never 
existed in the Middle Ages. Corresponding events occurred in politi-
cal life in the legitimization of the power of sovereignty. The chapter 
on “Nation” is a most instructive example of the necessary increasing 
irrationality of the legitimacy of the state in mass democracies and 
the increasing depersonalized bureaucracy. Here are actual prob-
lems that will occupy the attention of several generations, for they 
are only indicated by Weber and need extended individual study.
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Characteristically, these concepts developed by Weber proceed 
from a certain formal abstractness to a relatively concrete and 
individual fullness. The fundamental concepts of the first part of 
his sociology, especially, border closely on the categories of formal 
sociology, while the later sections, above all the fragments of the 
second and the third parts, reveal concepts with a strong historical 
and concrete content. To go into the various stages and forms of the 
concepts of ideal types in Weber would lead us too far afield here, 
and beyond the limits of a general introduction to his work. Only 
so much need be indicated, that wherever the sociological catego-
ries are developed in their purest form—such as “traditionalism,” 
“charismatism,” “secularization of the charisma”—they signify basic 
sociological phenomena, actual tendencies of activity that are struc-
turally possible here or there or at any time. Tradition and charisma 
determined exclusively the motives of action in the prerationalist 
epochs. Tradition and custom are the ruling forces of routine daily 
life in all integrated epochs. The charisma of religions and political 
leaders and heroes, born out of need and enthusiasm, is the revolu-
tionary force in such epochs.
The dominant role of these categories in the work of Weber is 
no mere accident. Tradition and economic daily life stand in polar 
position to charisma. Charisma as a sociological category signifies 
not a value judgment, but merely that quality of appearing as leader 
because of extraordinary achievements that must be legitimized by 
verification before his followers. The concept, therefore, is wholly 
independent of whether or not the individual is accorded “objective” 
greatness.
If our activity, however, gives meaning to history, then Weber 
must be rightly interpreted as maintaining that charisma, as “intro-
duction of meaning” (Einbruch von Sinn), effects a revolutionary 
transformation and progress of man not only in the external institu-
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tions of the world, but also in the inner being of man. Reason also 
has worked as a revolutionary force, internally as intellectualization, 
externally as a transformation and reorganization of the entire order 
of living in the modern world. But this very new form of daily exis-
tence—no longer traditional, but dynamic, and oriented toward the 
rationalistic chances of modern economy, and increasingly rationally 
organized and institutionalized—makes all the more problematic 
the revolutionary power of charisma as one of the external forces of 
bringing human greatness into view. “The charismatic transfigura-
tion of ‘reason’ is the final form which charisma has taken on its 
fateful road.”9 The prospect, like the general character of Weber’s 
sociology, is one of somber character. It appears that the rationalistic 
existence of modern man completely crushes the possibilities for 
greatness and charismatic leadership.
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Max Weber’s Political Ideas 
I
Max Weber always emphasized that he belonged to the historical 
school of political economy. He always accorded respectful treat-
ment to Gustav von Schmoller [1838–1917], his teacher, even when 
he openly opposed him. At the same time, he also always pointed out 
the fundamental importance of the work of Karl Marx [1818–1883] 
for all modern social, economic, and sociological investigation. No 
one has analyzed the work of Marx more dispassionately, yet at the 
same time more critically, than Weber. There are, of course, many 
points of contact between Weber and Marx both in their thought 
and in their scientific understanding. They looked upon capitalism 
as a historical phenomenon of the modern world and not as a natu-
rally given form of economic life or as a form of economic organiza-
tion of long standing as described in the works of Karl Julius Beloch 
[1854–1929], Robert von Pöhlmann [1852–1914], and even Eduard 
Meyer [1855–1930]. These writers presented a modernized version 
of ancient history in which ancient industrial life is described as a 
capitalistic order with all the terminology of modern economy. For 
both Marx and Weber, the specifically modern character of our pres-
ent economy was of the greatest scientific importance. They realized 
Published originally in a slightly different form in Social Research 2 (August 1935), 
368–84.  Republished by permission from Social Research. 
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that this tremendous force of modern life had determined, in a far-
reaching way, the fate of the Western world. In devoting themselves 
to the study of this subject, they were conscious of its bearing upon 
the picture of man that dominated their own standard of values and 
in this way determined their scientific interests. For both Weber and 
Marx, the existential point of departure for their scientific interests 
was a definite idea of man. 
Despite very strong inner contacts, however, the works of Weber 
and Marx appear antagonistic to each other. For this, the differ-
ent historical situations, intellectual and spiritual conditions of 
existence, and the characters of the two men are responsible. The 
powerful influence of the political revolutions of the first half of the 
nineteenth century is revealed in the works of Reinhold Niebuhr 
[1892–1971], Alexis de Tocqueville [1805–1859], and Jacob Burck-
hardt [1818–1897]. The structure of Marx’s work, too, is inconceivable 
without taking into account the influence of the modern revolutions 
on his work. But this is not what makes Marx unique. What gives the 
work of Marx its characteristic importance is its combination of the 
sociological interpretation of revolution with Georg Hegel’s [1770–
1831] philosophy of history and its radical conclusions deduced from 
economic analysis of the world situation. Moreover, Marx represents 
the first great example of the interaction of revolutionary fanaticism 
with the striving for scientific knowledge. All previous revolution-
ary ideologists had oriented themselves around the eternal ideals of 
justice and divine order. Even in a secularized form, they still clung 
to the concepts of Christian natural law. Marx, for the first time, 
attempts to determine revolutionary developments from the spirit 
of scientific knowledge and thus makes them take on the character 
of necessity. This combination of scientific spirit with political and 
revolutionary pathos was extremely fruitful in positing the ques-
tion: What makes men revolt? At the same time it also set up certain 
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limitations to knowledge. In a dogmatic historical and social theory, 
reality can appear only in a distorted form.
Because of Marx’s negative critique of social theories, he could 
never enter scientifically into all the manifold and unique aspects 
of reality and human institutions. In his view, no norms could be 
derived from the fundamental political assumptions of such theo-
ries. The “politicization” of scientific research, in which the work of 
Marx occupies a central position, came into being with the alliance of 
intellectual classes and unprivileged masses, who needed an intellec-
tual orientation for their political aspirations. In a modern rational 
society, this could only be accomplished within the field of scien-
tific research. The history of Western culture reveals the influence 
of this phenomenon in all fields of intellectual and literary activity. 
This is shown not only in the general decline in level but also in the 
change in importance attached to the concept of truth and in the 
ethos of intellectual and spiritual work. The path from Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon [1809–1865] to Georges Sorel [1847–1922] indicates clearly 
enough the significance of this “politicization” of the spirit.
All the constructive elements in Weber’s system stand in sharp 
contrast to the structure of the work of Marx. Precisely because 
Weber himself was most deeply a politically conscious individual, 
he always opposed most passionately the subordination of scientific 
learning to politics, particularly from the lecture platforms of uni-
versities. He was politically minded in a sense diametrically opposed 
to that of Marx. Marx was oriented toward a revolutionary utopia 
beyond all reality that, therefore, permitted only a partial knowl-
edge of empirical reality. Max Weber’s political thought was that of 
a Niccolò Machiavelli [1469–1527] or a Tocqueville. It was that of a 
practical statesman, faced with concrete tasks in concrete situations, 
whose activity is governed by the knowledge of the means whereby 
he can attain his goal. Weber’s ideal types and the content of his soci-
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ology represent the fully conscious theoretical modes of thought and 
attitudes of a man possessed of political and social responsibilities, 
who is always confronted with concrete decisions and who is always 
forced to adapt the methods and aims of his activity to the constella-
tion of the given historical situation.
A complete absence of illusion marks all great theoretical works 
on politics that were written by persons engaged in active political 
affairs as a sort of reflection upon their life activity, above all, such 
works as Machiavelli’s The Prince, Tocqueville’s L’Ancien Régime 
et la Révolution, and the Mémoires of Louis Duc de Saint-Simon 
[1675–1755]. Only the individual engaged in governing—the political 
technician—can come to view all the forces and motives of human 
activity as constellations of interests, whether they are of a material, 
class, or ideal nature. He sees all around him activity of individuals 
and groups of individuals motivated by the most realistic goals and 
often very irrational emotions that he must know how to direct and 
utilize. For him, all impulses of political and social activity, whether 
characterized by the noblest feelings or by the basest desires, are 
facts, free of value judgments. He must utilize them all in the same 
way, whenever he is confronted with them. The exercise of political 
power is the most perfect school for disillusionment from the world 
of human activity and for laying bare the motives by which human 
activity is directed.
In this sense, the inner structure of the work of Max Weber is 
political even though he actually never possessed political power. 
Few men were so equipped to possess and exercise such power, but 
fate denied him the realization of this decisive phase of his talent. 
But from the peculiar force of the theoretical realization of this 
political character there emerged a sociological work that takes its 
place beside the greatest political works, above all, beside that of 
Machiavelli. He who is only a technician or artist of politics takes 
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a cynical and frivolous attitude toward the terrifying character of 
these insights into politics. Both Machiavelli and Weber, however, 
possessed such a passionate love for their city and their people, and 
such a complete inner identification with their destiny that they 
brought to bear all their devotion and self-sacrificing service mor-
ally to transcend this disenchantment of the universe that came to 
them from their knowledge of reality. Weber’s pathos is national. The 
existence of his people and his nation is for him an absolute value for 
his own existence. Precisely because of this feeling he finds the age in 
which he is forced to live as one of epigones.
All political institutions, including that of the state, are, for 
Weber, nothing but a means to insure and increase the world power 
and position of Germany. His measure of the value of constitutional 
institutions consists in how far they are able to bring forth men with 
the qualities of leadership necessary for such a task. He also evalu-
ates all political and social orders according to the human types they 
produce. His uncompromising struggle against the Germany of the 
prewar period rested upon the belief that the political and social insti-
tutions allowed for neither the emergence of political leaders nor for 
free and autonomous individuals of independent opinions. His bitter 
struggle against a legal administration that protected strikebreakers 
was prompted not by economic motives or particular sympathies but 
by a belief that such decisions trampled upon the sense of honor of 
the workers and desecrated their human rights and feelings. A state 
that, in the case of its army, fostered the cultivation of the spirit of 
camaraderie and honor would be unable to tolerate such a situation.
Marx and Weber differ in type of political attitude. This also 
involves quite different possibilities of scientific knowledge. Marx, 
with his revolutionary and fundamentally utopian position, was 
forced to be dogmatic and bound by his philosophy of history and 
thus shut himself off from an all-embracing and many-sided knowl-
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edge of reality. Weber, thanks to his keen theoretical soberness, on 
the one hand, and his profound theoretical consciousness of the vital 
political temperament within him, on the other, was able to achieve a 
universal comprehension of reality, the like of which had never been 
undertaken before him. In Weber, much more than in Nietzsche and 
Marx, and more than in Machiavelli precisely because Weber was 
more universal, the disenchantment of the world is completed. 
As much as Weber recognized the positive influence of Marx, he, 
nevertheless, emphatically rejected his materialist philosophy of his-
tory and the one-sided character of his sociological interpretation. 
Precisely because he strove for a radical comprehension of reality, 
he found himself forced to distinguish as sharply between empirical 
and historico-philosophical elucidation and explanation as between 
interpretive and normative attitudes. A consideration of reality, 
without metaphysical, religious, or political dogmatism, revealed to 
him, however, that the chain of causes leads “at times from techni-
cal to economic and political fields and at times from political to 
religious and then economic fields. There is no point of equilibrium 
at any place. And that not infrequent version of historical materi-
alism whereby the ‘economic’ factor represents something ‘final’ in 
the series of causes, this view is to my mind scientifically completely 
discredited.”1 Not even economic events as such can be explained by 
purely economic motives alone.2 They are always codetermined by 
political, geographic, cultural, and religious causes. Weber repeat-
edly asserted his fundamental position in connection with the rela-
tion of religion and economics, particularly in the introduction to 
his sociology of religion.3
Weber’s view of reality, therefore, forbade him to adhere to any 
philosophy of history. As a sociologist and as a scientist, he refused to 
speak of the “meaning” of historical development or to understand 
the meaning of world history. “It is . . . a fundamental fact of all his-
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tory that the ultimate result of political activity often, nay regularly, 
stands in a completely inadequate and often even paradoxical rela-
tion to its original meanings.”4 As a grand example of such a paradox, 
he pointed to the ideals of piety of the Puritans that were directed 
toward a sanctification of personal life. The mundane asceticism and 
the church discipline of the sects developed, however, that type of 
the rationally acting “man of calling” without whom the economic 
spirit of capitalism—a world most distant from the spirit of God and 
one of calculation and coldness—would never have been possible. 
In the same paradoxical fashion, the human and fundamental right, 
springing from the deepest spiritual anguish of the sects struggling 
for liberty of conscience, created the “preparatory conditions for the 
free reign of capitalist utilization of property and human beings.”5 
The general tendencies of the historical process, moreover, 
revealed to him the influence of “chance” and its often-incalculable 
significance. The fulfilment of the prophecy of Isaiah on the salva-
tion of Jerusalem, historically an “accident,” created the impregnable 
foundation for the position of Jahweh and the prophets in Israel.6 
This observation of the “accidental” in the combination of series of 
historical causes always recurs in the work of Weber. This insight 
into the deep irrationality of history and economic life7 left him 
speechless and prevented him from offering a rationalistic or intel-
lectualistic interpretation of the historical process. If he had been a 
rationalist in the manner of the humanism of Voltaire [1694–1778], 
politics and history would have seemed to him nothing but a most 
ridiculous play of human stupidity and baseness. But Weber never 
drew such consequences from his view of history.
He constantly felt himself attracted to the poetic conceptions of 
reality found in Leo Tolstoy [1828–1910] and Fyodor Dostoyevsky 
[1821–1881]. Ever anew, he studied their works for the forms assumed 
by the various aspects and normative attitudes of history. Weber’s 
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plan to write a book on Tolstoy after the completion of his scientific 
work was never realized, so the following remarks are based merely 
on scattered references and expressions in his biography by Mari-
anne Weber [1870–1954]. In War and Peace, above all, Tolstoy pre-
sented one of the grandest and most tragic epochs of modern history. 
In the pale light of his religiously colored presentation, the historical 
“heroes,” Napoléon Bonaparte [1769–1821] and Mikhail Kututsov 
[1745–1813], Tsar Alexander I [1777–1825] and his courtiers, all 
appear as rouged actors in a tragedy of the Baroque. The world of 
history is but a transparent world of pretense in which human failing 
and earthly vanity are laid bare in all their emptiness. The marks 
of deepest earnestness that this picture of history revealed and by 
which the measure of Christian ethics was applied to the political 
and historical world appealed to Weber. But Weber could not iden-
tify himself with this Russian genius. In his very being, he was forced 
to reject such a disparagement of history. Although he never spoke 
of the meaning of history, he always spoke with pathos and emo-
tion concerning the course of history. From the days of his inaugural 
address in Freiburg, he always spoke warningly and with exhorta-
tion and passion of a people’s “responsibility before history.” What 
could this formula mean to him?
From his observation of reality, Weber came to recognize conflict 
as the generator and master of all life, not only externally but also spiri-
tually and inwardly. In his innermost being, Weber was militant and 
political. He was aware of all the diabolical forces that political activ-
ity necessarily engendered. He recognized that all forms of military 
and heroic life, their feeling of honor and dignity, are irreconcilably in 
conflict with the radicalism of the Christian ethics of brotherly love, 
as found in the Sermon on the Mount. Whoever subscribed to a life of 
this world’s political order, or who joined the warrior class, must, 
therefore, transgress other values such as those of Christian ethics. 
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He saw this conflict clearly and had sufficient courage to endure it 
and not be overcome by the pressure of its tension. This spiritual 
conflict between two hostile orders of values, the decision for or 
against definite norms, the service that men assumed on behalf of 
one or the other system of values, all these gave man dignity and 
personality. This struggle alone makes existence meaningful. Life 
and history are nothing but stages of the realization of such services 
for values that men assumed only to give meaning to themselves. He 
found such heroism in history, irrespective of the systems of values 
to which men dedicated themselves. This applies to an individual 
as well as to a people. In the case of the latter, “responsibility before 
history” signifies keeping political power so available and strong that 
it is in the position to preserve, protect, and develop those values out 
of which and for which it lives. At the basis of this picture of history 
is a sort of negative theology of history.
All modern philosophy of history from Nicolas de Condorcet 
[1743–1794] to Georg Hegel [1770–1831] and Karl Marx [1818–1883] 
was a theory of progress and carried the function of providing a 
pseudoreligious legitimization of the course of history. After the 
destruction by modern natural science of the religious world picture 
and the religious disenchantment of nature as creation, the attempt 
was made to salvage the divine and the absolute as the principle of 
historical development and give to history a pathos and importance 
that neither antiquity nor Christianity ever recognized. “The neces-
sity for the idea of progress appeared when the need arose to provide 
a secular and objective ‘meaning’ for the course of human destiny, 
stripped of its religious content.”8 Political, historical, and social 
scientific investigations have finally rendered it impossible for this 
form of philosophy of history to regard itself as a science. The divine 
element, first ejected from nature, now was taken out of the process 
of history. Weber’s empirical sociology of understanding is at the 
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opposite pole of every modern philosophy of history. The historical 
process has no apparent objective meaning, and one can speak of 
progress only in a technical sense or from the point of view of subjec-
tive values. But every realization of meaning stands in the service of 
superior forces. Weber, however, is silent regarding these. 
The following might represent an adequate interpretation of what 
history meant for him and what he meant by what we have called 
negative philosophy of history: The place of God is empty and aban-
doned, but all know of Him. For His sake, the world becomes the 
world stage and the scene of all those struggles for the realization 
of meaning and the fashioning of meaningful lives. Even though we 
have lost His name we struggle amid the night and darkness of life 
for His return and for the coming of His kingdom. This, then, is 
the real meaning of history for both the individual and the life of 
nations—to be stages in this realization, in a final and highest sense. 
II
This interpretation of the historico-theoretical presuppositions 
upon which Max Weber’s sociology rests can be substantiated by an 
investigation of his idea of freedom. He measured reality with the 
following gauge: What human types become representative groups 
both from the viewpoint of the development of classes of political 
leaders and also from the viewpoint of “old and eternal human ide-
als”? Thus, he speaks vaguely, and only by allusion, of the passionate 
“urge to liberty” that pressed the proletarianized German peasants 
into the cities. This was a feeling that had nothing to do with the 
declining economic or political doctrine of liberalism, free compe-
tition, or laissez-faire economics. The concrete content of his con-
ception of freedom is expressed more clearly in his attitude toward 
socialism than in these allusions. From his youth, Weber fought for 
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the social and cultural uplifting of the working classes. He admired 
the proletarian movement so long as it possessed the strength to 
feel conscious of itself as a cultural movement. The way of radical 
opposition that it assumed, however, he considered dangerous and 
foolish. He considered the economic theories of Marxism outmoded 
as a result of social developments—in particular, the bureaucratiza-
tion of industrial societies. He considered the class of peasants, petty 
bourgeoisie, officials, and ever increasing number of administrative 
workers as a great bar to a proletarian revolution in Central Europe. 
These political considerations, however, did not yet provide absolute 
criteria for evaluation. His scientific insight showed him the eco-
nomic costs, in the sense of technical rationalization, of an ethically 
oriented socialism and how, therefore, the desired goals of higher 
standards of living and higher cultural levels might easily become 
converted into the opposite. Even these facts would perhaps not have 
prevented him from becoming a socialist had he only recognized the 
binding character of its ideals. This, however, he found impossible. 
Like no one in his epoch, he foresaw what human consequences a 
socialist community would entail and what the dominant human 
types in such a society would be.
At the Verein für Sozialpolitik in 1909, Weber ardently opposed 
the growing tendency toward plans for state socialist and munici-
pal socialist organization. Because he saw that it was impossible to 
hold back the development of increased technical rationalization, he 
always felt it incumbent upon him to warn others about the signifi-
cance of every new step in the direction of further intensive organi-
zation of society.
 This passion for bureaucratization . . . is a desperate one. 
. . . We are in the midst of a development in which the 
world will come to know of nothing further than such 
systematized individuals. The central problem, therefore, 
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is not how we can more greatly further and hasten this 
process but rather what we have to set up against this 
machinery to keep a portion of humanity free from this 
parceling of the soul and from this supremacy of ideals of 
bureaucratic life.9 
In the closing section of his agrarian history of antiquity, written 
shortly before this address, he makes this point even more clearly.
His intellectual passion was not directed against the thesis that the 
epoch of capitalism will at some time end. No one, not even a social-
ist, saw more clearly into the merciless and cruel struggle going on 
within the economic system of so-called peaceful competition. But 
he saw that in overcoming this social order, whether by revolution-
ary socialism or state intervention, society would only become more 
technically bureaucratized and socially mechanized and that man 
would become more and more of an administrator and functionary. 
This sort of future was simply intolerable in the light of his ideals.
For Weber, the human individual took on greatness and worth 
only in so far as he was able by conscious decisions to preserve 
his personality amidst the irrationality of the world and amidst 
the struggle between the forces and demons of the order of life. 
This was the meaning of liberty: the possibility of intellectual and 
spiritual struggle and the development therefrom of a spiritual and 
unadorned heroism that would in turn bring forth true humanity. 
However, the more the world became thoroughly and rationally 
organized and individuals assigned their position and function, the 
more likelihood there was that in a world so organized, the elements 
of spiritual dynamics—struggle and risk of the soul—would gradu-
ally die out and no longer be comprehended nor experienced. No 
one can, indeed, penetrate into the darkness of the future, but Weber 
spoke with painful anxiety of the men of the coming epochs. 
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No one yet knows who will live in that future abode and 
if at the end of this enormous development new prophets 
might not arise or a powerful regeneration of old thoughts 
and ideals might not come about. Or else perhaps if none 
of these come to pass there might be a mechanical pet-
rifaction embellished with a sort of convulsive attitude 
of self-importance. For these ‘last men’ of this cultural 
development the dictum would become realized: ‘experts 
without spirit, sensualists without heart; with the false 
illusion that in this emptiness a stage of humanity never 
before realized has at last been attained.’10
This deep inner anxiety for the preservation of the values of moral 
and spiritual heroism and freedom as the only means of allowing for 
its realization also accounted for the profound inner emotion that 
Weber experienced as a result of the Russian Revolution of 1905. 
His “Zur Beurteilung der gegenwärtigen politischen Entwicklung 
Russlands” and his “Russlands Übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalis-
mus,”11 despite their contemporary character, are still of fundamental 
importance for the problems of the sociology of the Russian intelli-
gentsia. They also reveal clearly and plainly the place and meaning 
of Weber’s idea of freedom. The struggle for the “inalienable rights of 
man” in the era of full capitalism is not liberalism but the desperate 
attempt to check the deadening centralization and bureaucratiza-
tion by limiting and restricting them. These iron poles of increasing 
organization of state and private industries, with the accompanying 
increase of groups of state or private administrative officials, served 
only to convert this world into a new Egyptian bureaucratic state. 
The Russian Revolution occurs amid such conditions and, standing 
as it does at the point of intersection between the struggling rational-
izing and liberating tendencies, it assumed the highest importance 
for Weber.
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     Those who live in constant anxiety that there might be 
too much democracy and individualism in the world and 
not enough authority, aristocracy and prestige of posi-
tion or the like, may rest calmly. Only too well has his-
tory provided that the trees of democratic individualism 
do not grow to the sky. History, according to all experi-
ence, ever anew and inexorably produces aristocracy and 
authority, to which all who find this necessary, either for 
themselves or for ‘the people,’ can cling. If it is a question 
only of the ‘material conditions’ and the constellation of 
interests, ‘created’ either directly or indirectly by them, 
then any sober consideration must lead to the conclusion 
that all economic indications point in the direction of an 
increasing lack of freedom. It is altogether ridiculous to 
ascribe to this present day full capitalism, as it is now 
being imported into Russia and as it exists in America—
to this ‘inevitability’ of our economic development—any 
elective affinity with ‘democracy’ or even with ‘freedom’ 
in any sense. The question is only how it is at all possible 
for all these things to exist permanently under its domi-
nation. They exist only when there is the determined will 
of a nation not to allow itself to be governed like a herd 
of sheep. We are ‘individualists’ and adherents of ‘demo-
cratic institutions,’ ‘against the current’ of material con-
stellations. He who wants to be a weather vane for the 
general tendencies of future development will abandon 
these old fashioned ideals as soon as possible.12
✴    ✴    ✴
     But time urges us on ‘to act as long as it is day.’ What-
ever inalienable spheres of personality and freedom will 
not be acquired now, in the course of the next generations 
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while the economic and spiritual ‘revolution,’ the much 
abused ‘anarchy’ of production and the equally abused 
‘subjectivism’ still remain unbroken, by the individual of 
the broad masses who becomes self reliant through these 
and only through these, will perhaps never be acquired 
when the world comes to a full development and reaches 
a point of intellectual saturation. That is as far as we, with 
our weak eyes, are able to pierce through the impenetra-
ble haze of the future of mankind. . . . ‘Thousands of years 
must have passed before you came into life and many 
more thousands of years wait silently to see what you 
will begin to do with this life of yours.’ This cry, which 
Carlyle’s passionate faith in personality called to every 
new individual, can be applied, without exaggeration, to 
the present situation in the United States and to that of 
Russia, as it is in part now and as it will most probably be 
within another generation.13
This pathos for freedom reveals the deepest content of Max 
Weber’s idea of man. To be a person, means to live a spiritual exis-
tence. This, in turn, signifies an indissolubility of will and spirit 
within the totality of man as a unit of decision. Only in freedom 
can man realize the intellectual and spiritual acts of autonomous 
decision, which are the primary constituents of his personality. Only 
the man who wrestles with the angel, who stands in daily need and 
danger of self-formation, can realize himself as man. It is not free-
dom from, but freedom for the realization of these values that consti-
tutes man’s service. This is the most onerous obligation and burden 
but also the only thing that gives man worth. It is the realm where 
human heroism is realized. Because Weber’s thoughts and feelings 
were majestic, his idea of man could be nothing but majestic and 
exalted.
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Weber’s idea of man and freedom, therefore, was not related to 
any historical form of liberalism. For all political doctrines, aris-
ing out of concrete situations or in opposition to them, always, by 
necessity, rigidly place these situations in the foreground, and they 
never comprehend the totality of a given problem of political theory 
or social ethics. It is true that all existence appears only as concrete 
historical existence. But it is also true that the layers of this “histori-
cal existence” of intellectual and spiritual phenomena are, from the 
standpoint of the realization of ultimate principles and from that 
of the fundamental phenomena of man’s moral existence, of vary-
ing density and purity. This is Weber’s concern. It is a fundamental, 
heroic attitude toward the world. The struggle for freedom is an eter-
nal form of human existence. It is a struggle for one of the forms of 
human perfection that is constantly being surrendered: a struggle for 
the self-molding and self-realization of personality. This form of life 
can find various concrete expressions in various historical situations: 
as prophet, Protestant, sectarian, mystic, revolutionary, or anarchist. 
But it always remains an eternal symbol of the spiritual apprehen-
sion of man. It alone enables man to cope with the tension of the 
demands of the spirit; it alone gives him strength to live without illu-
sions concerning the course of the world and, yet, to give affirmation 
to life in order to be able to cope with it.
Alexis de Tocqueville called himself a liberal d’une espèce nou-
velle almost one hundred years before Max Weber. He knew that the 
content of his conception of freedom, derived from the tension of 
existence, had nothing in common with contemporary doctrines 
and that he would remain solitary and alien to his epoch. The per-
sonalities and works of Weber and Tocqueville are alike in this 
respect and, for this reason, there is a common character to both 
their methods and their sociological insight into the spheres of 
politics. Above all, however, they stand together because both were 
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men not of their times; although they could interpret their own age 
with understanding, they were men of greater stature than their age 
and, penetrating into the realm of history, they were able to perceive 
eternal and moral phenomena. For this reason, they remain solitary 
figures in time, but always new in every spiritual awakening. By their 
personalities and their work, they testify to an eternal element of 
human greatness. They can dispense with the approval and consent 
of their age, for they hand on the never extinguished torch of human 
existence. “They also serve, who only stand and wait,” said John Mil-
ton [1608–1674], and he surely knew.
Weber found his ideals old fashioned in his times and felt himself 
surrounded by loneliness. Just as he could not adhere to the social-
ist movement, so he also rejected completely the youth movement 
centered in Stefan George [1868–1933]. Nevertheless, he had much 
in common with the poet in his criticism of the age. The cult of per-
sonality, negative self-reflection, uprooted thought without founda-
tion, which destroys the deepest basis of human existence and runs 
its course in a vacuum—all these phenomena seemed also to Weber 
symptoms of disease and elements of spiritual and psychic decom-
position. But he could see genuine salvation neither in the “Maximin 
cult” of the poet nor in the religious veneration accorded to George 
by his pupils. To him, as to his Puritans, every attempt to deify the 
earthly straying man was “idolatry” and a cowardly flight from indi-
vidual responsibility in favor of absolutist authority. For his stern and 
heroic attitude, such a personal surrender of freedom and individual 
will for inner decision seemed a flight from the terrifying aspect of 
life. He always affirmed a personal attachment to a charismatic lead-
ership, but never at the cost of a sacrificium intellectus. Therefore, to 
Weber, the harshness and severity of George’s curse upon the entire 
age seemed merciless and unjust, quite apart from his criticism of 
George’s romantic misunderstanding of both history and reality.
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Weber must thus stand alone, revealed in his works. These, how-
ever, cannot provide us with either religious serenity or secure meta-
physical shelter. There is no joyous promise either at the beginning 
or at the end of his work. The situation of his time hardly made this 
possible. But his existence and his work bear witness to something 
that, in the spiritual condition of the epoch, was more than any mes-
sage. It was the fact that human greatness is not extinguished and 
that heroes are possible even in the gray and barren everyday exis-
tence of modern life. The figure of Weber and his work remain as a 
call to greatness and heroism. Not to a romantic irrational heroism 
that sacrifices itself amidst the delirium of self-decomposition, but a 
holy and sober heroism that grows out of the contradictions of life 
and out of the strength of knowledge of the suffering, greatness, and 
pangs of the spirit, and that can, without illusion, understand man’s 
existence and activity and yet not become cynical. Only great moral 
power and an ever-flowing stream of human purity make it possible 
to bear the weight of the tremendous force of such disillusioning 
knowledge. This provided the secret source of strength of the man, 
which reverently we dare not touch. 
M A X  W E B E R ’ S  P O L I T I C A L  I D E A S 631
Notes 
1. Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1924), 456.
2. Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1925), 
169.
3. Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, 2nd ed. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1922), 1:240ff.
4. Gesammelte Politische Schriften (Munich: Drei masken verlag, 
1921), 437.
5. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1924), 817.
6. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 243.
7. Ibid., 60.
8. Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, 33.
9. Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik, 414.
10. Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, 1:203ff.
11. Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, (Tübingen: J. C. B. 
Mohr, 1911–23), vol. 22, first supplement, and vol. 23, first supple-
ment.
12. Zur russischen Revolution von 1905, vol. 10 of Max Weber  




The Place of Alfred Weber’s 
Kultursoziologie in Social Thought 
Alfred Weber [1868–1958], although influenced by the sociological 
work of Max Weber [1864–1920], takes a very personal approach to 
a sociological synthesis of the historical process.1 Kultursoziologie is 
the outcome of twenty-five years of Alfred Weber’s concentration on 
the subject.2 Since he first formulated his sociological concept of cul-
ture,3 his work has been a series of attempts to clarify the theoreti-
cal problems involved and to apply his theoretical tools to specific 
historical subjects.4 These studies constitute the background for the 
present comprehensive work that tries to suggest a new sociological 
approach to the historical process.
The work comprehends the whole process of history, from primi-
tive societies to the revolutionary movements taking place today in 
all spheres of life. After a general survey of primitive societies, he 
analyzes very carefully the social and historical structures of China 
and India and gives a sociological interpretation of the civilizations 
around the Mediterranean that influenced the origins of Greek 
thought and feeling. His analyses of ancient Persia, Babylonia, Egypt, 
Israel, and Greece show a high degree of intellectual understanding 
as well as an intuitive penetration of these cultures. The suggestive 
Published originally in a slightly different form in Social Research 3 (November 
1936), 494–500.  Republished by permission from Social Research. 
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analysis of the Russian world reveals the continuity of its revolution-
ary evolution, and his description of the structural transformation 
of Japanese society and its interrelations with the Western world is 
an interesting attempt in the realm of sociological forecasts. And his 
interpretations of the Western past—the decline of Roman civiliza-
tion, feudalism, the rise and growth of industrial society with all the 
implications involved—reveal Weber as a sociologist who has expe-
rienced the historical process as one stratum of our own present life.
The presentation of this universal process is not based upon any 
dogmatic presuppositions; hence, there is no attempt to find a unity 
in the evolution of mankind. The empirical analysis shows only dif-
ferent historical structures. Whatever the general trends of inter-
relationships in the economic, technical, or cultural spheres, the 
individual patterns of culture develop within their own gestalts. This 
presupposition of the structural character of the historical process is 
not theoretical or metaphysical but, like Gestalt psychology itself, is 
based on concrete and empirical observation. In fact, it was in oppo-
sition to the dogmatism of the first epoch of sociology that Alfred 
Weber’s work developed. Sociology from Auguste Comte [1798–
1857] to Herbert Spencer [1820–1903] was an attempt to synthesize 
empirical analyses of historical institutions with a metaphysical dog-
matism concerning the dynamics of history—a philosophy of prog-
ress in different varieties. Alfred Weber’s work attempts a new and 
different synthesis. He frees the historical process of metaphysical 
dogmatisms, but there is another metaphysical element in his own 
conception, radically different from that of the earlier sociological 
school. Repeatedly, he objects to the assumption that underlies the 
affirmations of this school concerning the meaning of the historical 
process as a whole—that is, the assumption that there is a hypostasis 
of one or another sphere of the historical process. What we must 
know is not the meaning of the historical process but the different 
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types of human development and their revelation of the constant 
elements of human existence. Thus arises Weber’s chief distinction 
between the social process (Gesellschaftsprozess), the process of civi-
lization (Zivilisationsprozess), and the process of culture (Kulturbe-
wegung).
Weber often emphasizes that his conceptions do not dissolve the 
unity of historical life into a sum of various abstractions. Instead, the 
abstractions signify the different forces that constitute social life as 
a whole. His fundamental sociological concepts are concerned with 
the three primary phenomena that constitute social life: order, dom-
ination, and meaning. These phenomena are realized in historical 
forms because life can only be thought of as historical. Within the 
historical forms of the general social attitudes, they are transhistori-
cal because life is always transcending itself. Georg Simmel’s [1858–
1918] assertion that life is more life and more than life is at the basis 
of Weber’s approach. In the Pensées of Blaise Pascal [1623–1662], we 
find the same idea, almost in the same formulation.
In terms of this threefold dynamics of life, social process has to 
be defined as the general social trend, at the basis of instincts and 
will-impulses, toward order, domination, and social integration in 
the economic and political sphere. In the evolution of this process, 
a limited variety of forms and types of social organization may be 
found that recur throughout history whenever the formal structure 
of the situation is the same or similar—for example, the general 
types of stabilization, disintegration, transformation, and crisis. 
The process of civilization, however, in contrast to this dynamics 
of will underlying the social process, is based upon the continu-
ity and irreversible progress of reason. Civilization represents the 
human effort to conquer the world of nature and culture by means 
of intelligence in the spheres of technology, science, and planning. 
The role of reason in civilization was overemphasized by Comte and 
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the positivists as the general denominator of the historical process; 
Karl Marx [1818–1883] combined it with the economic process as the 
primary force and dynamics of history. Social process and civiliza-
tion together constitute the elements of circulation and progress that 
earlier sociological schools had developed. Culture, in distinction to 
social process and civilization, is based on the realization of spirit, 
on philosophical and emotional self-realization. Certainly, this too 
depends on the potentialities of development in a given moment. But 
at the same time, its responses reveal the creative power of human 
thought and soul. Hence, Weber emphasizes the spontaneity and 
creativeness that are inherent in culture. Whatever may be the limi-
tations of human behavior patterns as they are revealed in the social 
process and in civilization, in culture they find freedom and spon-
taneity. Thus, there is no place in Weber’s sociology for any kind of 
determinism, and he declares that it was in combating an economic 
and biological determinism that the idea of his Kultursoziologie 
arose.
This basis grounds any examination of the relationship between 
history and sociology in Weber’s work. He recognized Wilhelm 
Dilthey’s [1833–1911] radical insight into the historical character of 
life, but he approaches the historical world with general sociologi-
cal concepts. Within the variety of historical experiences, he finds 
types of social behavior patterns, typical attitudes, and recurring 
situations of growth, revolution, and decline—typical patterns of 
conduct within the individual constellations of historical conditions. 
This interpretation of history as the indissoluble unity of general 
human attitudes and their particular realizations makes clear the 
title of Weber’s book. Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie means 
the conquering of isolated interpretations of historical causation and 
abstract sociological approaches. Universal sociological concepts are 
so abstract and empty that they have to be corrected by individual 
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concepts adequate to the various historical realizations. Max Weber’s 
work, especially the chapter on the types of domination in Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft, reveals the problematic character of sociological 
concepts applied to the material of history; Alfred Weber chooses 
the opposite method and presents his material historically and not 
systematically.
This endeavor expresses a new attitude of thinking, breaking 
through both the historicism and the sociologism of the past and 
revealing a new wealth of human experience and thought. What-
ever the shifting powers in the process of history, they reveal in their 
particular character the constant elements of human existence. In 
the dynamics of the historical process, we are able to understand 
the development of the different functions of human nature that 
realizes itself only in historical situations. Alfred Weber’s distinc-
tion between social process, civilization, and culture signifies the 
elasticity and tension of human life. Between the mechanical reac-
tions of social responses and the spontaneity and creative power of 
mind, there are many interrelationships in the historical process. 
The merit of Alfred Weber is his emphasis on this interrelationship; 
here, we find the individual character of his work. It is a function of 
his approach to prepare the way for a science of man, the empirical 
part of a philosophy of existence.
Thus, we can understand the transhistorical and transsociologi-
cal character of certain of Weber’s concepts that attempt to create a 
new type of sociological ideas. The concept of primary constellation 
(Anfangskonstellation), for example, is to be interpreted as the coin-
cidence of a series of conditions and situations that shape the charac-
ter of a nation. Unfortunately, no Western language can adequately 
translate the admirable Greek term kairos, the creative power of a 
historical situation. Weber’s term attempts a translation, although 
in a very limited sense. He gives many examples showing that a situ-
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ation of crisis may shape the national character for centuries. Thus, 
the difference in the developments of magical cultures is determined 
by the historical moment when military strength was imposed on 
their peoples, and by the character of the conquerors. In the same 
way, we can discover in the different basic revolutions the elements 
that have shaped the national characters throughout the Western 
world. And Weber’s historical entelechy is no metaphysical concept 
but a term signifying there are elements that cannot be dissolved, in 
spite of the different conditions and causations of a national char-
acter. Whatever the factors determining this national character, it 
becomes a power of its own, integrating the variable and constant 
elements into a social-shaping force. 
Within the variety of historical institutions, the kaleidoscope 
of conditions can be analyzed; typical attitudes and structures can 
be discovered. With this combination of historical and sociological 
concepts, it is even possible to forecast those potentialities of human 
spontaneity and creativeness that have a chance to be developed or 
will be prevented by a given set of conditions. The limitations of 
sociological knowledge must be kept in mind, however. Every genu-
ine sociological analysis deals with the topography of the conditions 
that make possible the development of human nature, but Weber 
knows very well the limitations of these empirical methods. The 
value of his approach is in its trend toward a very concrete analysis 
but with full consciousness of the metaphysical problems involved. 
Hence, it is symptomatic that we repeatedly find the term immanent 
transcendence, characterizing the dynamics of the historical and 
sociological process. It signifies the fact that spiritual and ultimate 
values are immanent within the process of history, not existing in a 
dualistic abstract realm beyond human life; they are interwoven in 
human conduct itself, and it is they that create man’s unique power 
of transcending mechanical responses to the conditions of environ-
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ment in the direction of a free and creative spirit. In Alfred Weber’s 
new sociological approach, this is the philosophical background.
A review cannot examine the evidence for the different particu-
lar analyses in this book. Weber himself states the imperfection and 
imperfectibility of his undertaking and, particularly, the weakness 
of the interpretation of modern times. But the scientific heroism of 
his approach must be emphasized. Weber had the moral courage to 
finish this book, knowing very well its weaknesses and imperfec-
tions. He is an impressive example of the fact that there are situations 
in scientific thinking in which the work of pioneers is more fruitful 
than specialized perfection. As pioneers open the woods and break 
through the wilderness, so Weber pushes through the tangled mys-
teries of history with his sociological concepts, finding new perspec-
tives on the intricacies of social causations and conditions.
This moral quality of the book is especially significant in an 
epoch of growing intellectual mechanization. And equally worthy of 
example is the discrimination that enables Weber to know the bor-
ders of empirical analysis and the starting point of ontological prob-
lems. Throughout the book, he does not leave the empirical method, 
but he knows very well that the mechanical responses represented 
by social actions are never able to explain the complexity of social 
dynamics. He is aware that his own empirical analysis is based upon 
and constantly recurs to a metaphysical position. His concept of 
immanent transcendence itself reveals his work to be the sociologi-
cal and historical aspect of a philosophy of life and existence; hence, 
his work has to be correlated with this type of philosophy. Because 
he is so excellent a scholar, he reaches the intellectual discipline and 
modesty that are the characteristics of outstanding thinkers. 
The shaken world of modern crisis produces ever anew types of 
thought that attempt through creative intelligence to integrate the 
variety of scientific experiences. It is a sociological law that situations 
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of crisis and transformation give especial opportunity to develop 
such responses of the human mind, the only integrating force in the 
disintegrating world. There is today a danger that the spontaneity 
and the creative potentialities of human nature will be destroyed by 
the growing processes of mechanization and social planning, and 
this outstanding synthesis of Alfred Weber’s is a positive response 
to that challenge. This approach to the problem of modern civili-
zation and culture is distinctly European; it cannot be a natural 
American approach. The book is a representative document of one 
of the greatest epochs of transformation. It presents the unity and 
tension between the analytical and the synthetic qualities of modern 
thinking, combining the analytical achievements in the social sci-
ences with the recognition of their borders, and the knowledge of 
the different historical structures with Weber’s individual spontane-
ous imagination. This work matured not in twenty-five years but in 
twenty-five hundred; it has made the heritage of the Western past a 
living possession, not a pile of dead material. Even Weber’s under-
standing of the constant and variable elements of social behavior 
patterns is not only an individual merit but is the achievement of two 
centuries of social and historical thought in the west, an achieve-
ment well worth preserving.
And it is no accident that within the same half decade other works 
were published, notably those by Arnold Toynbee [1889–1975]5 and 
Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy [1888–1973],6 that represent the same 
trend of thinking and similar methods. All these works are alike in 
their attempts to free the sociological method from the abstract and 
isolating thought of positivism, and to combine the historical and 
the sociological approach in a new unity of social thinking. Toyn-
bee’s criticism of the categories of race and environment is based on 
his realization that the historical process can never be understood 
with such abstract denominators. His new categories, particularly 
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“challenges and responses,” are historical as well as sociological. The 
most important similarity between his work and Weber’s is to be 
found in his challenge to any mechanical interpretation of the social 
process and in his emphasis on the spontaneous and creative vitality 
of man. Rosenstock-Huessy reveals the complex structure of revolu-
tion as a sociological phenomenon. He points out very clearly the 
interrelationship of the different strata in the dynamics of history 
and the unity of the constant and variable elements in the crisis of 
revolution.
Hence, we may say that Alfred Weber’s work is an expression 
of the general revolt against the spirit of sociological positivism. It 
is an attempt to free sociology from the abstract rationalism of the 
social sciences and to discover new categories and methods capable 
of embracing the complex totality of life.
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Charles Péguy and the 
Calling of Israel 
I
At last, a small volume of essays and poems by Charles Péguy 
[1873–1914] has been published in an English translation.1 Charles 
Péguy is almost unknown in America. His works have received 
little attention in the English-speaking countries, where the intel-
lectual and spiritual movements of modern France have not been 
considered as important as similar movements in Germany. The 
newly published translation introduces a thinker whose person-
ality may become an image of spiritual heroism to the youth of 
postwar Europe.
Charles Péguy, born in Orléans, the town of Joan of Arc, was 
proud to have descended from a long line of workers and peasants. 
Because of his unusual intellectual gifts, he succeeded in getting the 
best scholarships in high school and college. He was an outstand-
ing student at the École Normale Supérieure but did not take his 
degree. In 1899, he joined the Socialist Party and opened a Socialist 
bookshop. In the following year, however, he revolted against the 
party and from that time was completely independent of all formal 
allegiances and affiliations. He founded the Cahiers de la Quinzaine, 
a fortnightly in which he and a number of friends dealt with the 
Published originally in a slightly different form in Jewish Frontier 10 (July 1943), 
19–24. Republished by permission from Ameinu: Liberal Values, Progressive Israel. 
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philosophical, moral, and religious aspects of the social and political 
problems of the time. Most of his own writings appeared in this peri-
odical. His influence grew steadily and spread beyond all party lines. 
Auguste-Maurice  Barrès [1862–1923] and André Suarès [née  Isaac 
Félix Suarès (1868–1948)] were as much affected by the power of 
Péguy as were Jacques Maritain [1882–1973] and Henri Bergson 
[1859–1941]. Emmanuel Mounier [1905–1950] and the social Catho-
lics in France have gratefully acknowledged what they owe to Péguy. 
When the war broke out in 1914, he volunteered for the front. He was 
killed in action on September 5, 1914, the first day of the first Battle 
of the Marne. A short time before the war he wrote: “Blessed are 
those who died in great battles, stretched out on the ground in the 
face of God. Blessed are those who died in a just war. Blessed is the 
wheat that is ripe and the wheat that is gathered in sheaves.”
What was the power that radiated from this man, and what is the 
significance of his work? Barrès once told how he had tried to per-
suade Péguy that it was right to use the established political and intel-
lectual institutions to gain security for his own family and to extend 
the influence of his ideas. Péguy was indignant. He answered that 
his task could be performed only in the solitude of absolute indepen-
dence. Like some of the Christian humanists of the sixteenth century, 
Péguy believed that there are moments in the history of man when 
people who have a vocation must renounce established social pat-
terns and well-organized institutions in order to reestablish, in their 
very modes of living and thinking, the lost intensity of life. Desider-
ius Erasmus [1466–1536] called this vocation “the quest for Christian 
Liberty.” Péguy’s 1ife and work were conceived in the tradition of this 
humanism. He cast the purity and power of his personality in the 
battle for freedom, challenging all social and ecclesiastical institu-
tions. This eagerness to fight for the unity of the human personality 
and the uncompromising pursuit of this goal constitute the gran-
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deur of his achievement. “We have never betrayed the spirit,” was the 
guiding star of Péguy’s life. He never ceased repeating that we shall 
be capable of experiencing the fullness of the spiritual and temporal 
life only if we have the purity and integrity to search for perfections 
qua perfections. He was puzzled when people spoke of his “philoso-
phy.” He was firmly convinced that his was a very humble task: to 
reestablish the innocence and the good conscience of common sense. 
Péguy believed that we are completely misled by our scientific type 
of education and have forgotten that all great and important verities 
are simple and unsophisticated. This was his vocation: to blend the 
social problems of the bourgeois world with the humanistic problem 
of reestablishing the dignity and completeness of the free man and 
citizen. Péguy was keenly aware that there is evil in the world, and 
he was convinced that man is sometimes capable of victory over it. 
Finally, he was certain that if we are to find remedies for our deficien-
cies and faults, we can find them only through our participation in 
a spiritual order. For three centuries, humanism and the religious 
spirit had been separated because of an artificial and pseudoscientific 
way of thinking. In his own life, he struggled again to merge these 
two major heritages of European civilization. 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century, it was only natu-
ral for an independent-minded, sensitive young European to revolt 
against the established patterns of society. Most people labeled this 
negative attitude socialism, a term that covered many different ideas. 
Péguy’s socialism certainly had little in common with Karl Marx’s 
[1818–1883] Prussian conception of the class struggle. Péguy’s social-
ism sprang from a pious devotion to the old-fashioned virtues of 
the common people, the workers, the peasants, and the craftsmen 
of France. They had inherited a faith in the dignity and honor of 
labor; they were proud of achieving perfection as a personal vic-
tory over brute matter. Poverty was their destiny. But it was a noble 
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simplicity, a sober and clean way of life. This was an asceticism with-
out rigor and compulsion; it was the wisdom of common sense 
and of moderation, an awareness of the essential purposes and 
possibilities of life. This was a pattern of life that came closest to 
the military ideal that Péguy cherished as another aspect of his posi-
tive belief in the “blessing of poverty.” Comradeship and friendship, 
authority and obedience, discipline and courage, are best realized in 
the ascetic nobility of the soldier who is not confused and hampered 
by the temptations and seductions of the secular life of the modern 
bourgeoisie. The poor man and the soldier are the two dominating 
images of Péguy’s socialism.
Péguy draws a sharp distinction between the poverty of his 
socialism and the misery of the worker in capitalist society. It is 
the modern capitalistic bourgeoisie that killed the ethos of labor 
that had made poverty a productive and positive virtue of the work-
ing people. The bourgeoisie transformed the productive worker into 
an object of exploitation, a servant of the all-powerful machine. 
This is misery, degrading and dehumanizing, because it eliminates 
honor, meaning, and personality from the life of the workers. The 
world of the modern bourgeoisie is the world of abstract money 
institutions. Money rules everything, Péguy repeats again and again. 
Avarice and venality are the psychological products of this world of 
moral disintegration. In the past, common bonds united patron and 
worker, manorial lord and peasant. They shared in some common 
work and in common responsibilities. Today, the common people 
are left alone, alone with the misery of an empty and meaningless 
life. The ruling classes no longer have any responsibilities and obli-
gations toward the common people; there is no longer any unity 
among all groups of the community.
Most conspicuous is this breakdown of common ties and social 
obligations in the sphere of scholarship and learning. According 
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to Péguy, the modern intellectuals constitute a class by themselves 
and are ruled by their vested interests. They have become techni-
cians and experts, functionaries and employees. Gone is the old zeal 
of the learned to preserve and to carry on the moral and spiritual 
standards of society as a whole. Péguy’s searching analyses of the 
position of the intellectual in the modem world present another 
aspect of his struggle for the socialism of the pure and decent life. 
Péguy is alarmed about the perspectives of the bourgeois world. The 
learned will become completely involved in the web of institutions 
that serve the economic and social interests of the ruling class. They 
will be hired in order to develop scientific devices for building up 
the most efficient and formidable institutions of power. They will 
establish the most advanced society history has ever known, but it 
will be a society in which we will know more and more about less 
and less. In the face of this danger, Péguy is determined to teach the 
young to rediscover the essentials, the “basic verities.” This is the 
only way to bring back into existence man in his purity and intensity, 
in his dignity and humility, standing bareheaded under the thunders 
of God. Péguy is convinced that the establishment of socialism in 
this world deserves the full heroism of human integrity, but first, we 
must learn that socialism is not an end in itself. The secular salvation 
of a humanistic socialism is not enough if it is not simultaneously 
directed toward spiritual salvation.
II
Throughout his work, Péguy refers to the Dreyfus affair [1894–1906, 
after Captain Alfred Dreyfus (1859–1935)] as having opened his 
eyes to the incentives and motives of human action in the modem 
world. He often reiterates that it is a great privilege to live in times 
of such crises. They question and break the habits and patterns of 
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an established society. Crises are the articulations of the historical 
process. They force men to face the fundamental issues and the basic 
decisions that seldom appear in their radical severity when obscured 
by the mechanisms of well-established habits and patterns of con-
duct. Crises test the vitality and strength of human institutions. 
Such institutions as states and churches will survive only when the 
belief in their positive value as a genuine way of life is not shaken by 
their failures and their unfulfilled promises. Péguy calls these beliefs 
mystiques, including under that term not only religious beliefs, but 
political and social beliefs as well. There is a socialist and democratic 
mystique just as there was a republican mystique and a Jewish and 
Christian mystique, in the Dreyfus affair. No institution can endure 
without such a mystique, the presence of which is understood by its 
members as a way of life, an integrating and vital power in building 
up human lives. For this very “mysticism,” people have given and 
are giving their lives. Whether the “mysticism” refers to democracy 
or to religion does not matter. What matters only is that the belief 
is intelligible and reasonable, not irrational and arbitrary. All the 
institutions that now seem matter-of-fact and banal, like the ballot, 
free speech, and free worship, have been established by the anony-
mous heroism of unknown believers. This living spirit of democratic 
justice and of liberal purity constituted the mystique of the Dreyfus 
affair.
However, the creative power of mystique is killed by the vested 
interests of political and social institutions. In all spheres of life, the 
“mystical” beliefs are intertwined with the interests of the political, 
social, or ecclesiastical institutions. Principles and ideals, however 
lofty their aims, become involved in the conflicts and competitions 
of the secular world. That is what Péguy calls politique. All mystique 
ends in politique. Péguy experienced the operation of this cruel law 
in the Dreyfus affair. He broke with Jean Juarès [1859–1914] and the 
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Socialist Party when he felt that they betrayed the republican mys-
tique and exploited their victory for spoils. As Péguy neatly put it: 
“Republican mystique means to die for democracy, politique to live 
off it.” 
III
If history is ruled by this dialectical movement of mystique and poli-
tique, one can find little meaning in those philosophies of history that 
are based on the concept of “progress.” History is a human concern. 
Rise and decline, growth and decay, consummation and death, are 
natural categories of history. It is impossible to prove that the price 
we pay for our victories in eliminating obstacles is worthwhile. 
Péguy flatly refused to recognize the category of progress as a valid 
concept of history. There are Plato [c. 428–c. 348 BC], René Descartes 
[1596–1650], and Henri Bergson [1859–1941], but there is no progres-
sive movement leading from one to another. What matters is not the 
fact of victory and conquest, but the unconditional devotion to truth, 
the heroic effort to reexamine time and again established concepts in 
the light of new experiences and the vision that makes it possible to 
grasp a variety of worlds in the diverse aspects of the universe. All 
political, social, and religious beliefs are subject to the law of decay, 
to the metamorphosis into “politics.” Péguy’s insistence on this law 
of history indicates his basic concern—the effort to realize the fullest 
and richest perfection of human potentialities in the unconditional 
and spontaneous pursuit of ideal goods. The true ideal goods are 
those that bring salvation from the evil that is part of and in the 
world. Salvation can be temporal, a revolution in the social and secu-
lar sphere. Péguy, however, was imbued with the messianic aware-
ness that temporal salvation is meaningful only when referring to 
spiritual salvation. Péguy’s socialism and republicanism are different 
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aspects of the same ardent desire to work for remedying evil in the 
world. His vigorous effort was directed toward the clarification of 
this issue in the modern world. The temporal revolution of socialism 
is possible only as the secular aspect of the spiritual revolution. No 
humanist revolution can be effective without a spiritual renascence. 
The Kingdom of God will be realized fully in ourselves only in so 
far as we have succeeded to establish its reflection in the terrestrial 
city. From his youth, Péguy was preoccupied with the mystery and 
the destiny of Joan of Arc. For Péguy, Joan of Arc is the greatest saint 
because only she succeeded in connecting the two responsibilities of 
secular and spiritual salvation. The secular revolution is the human-
istic effort. It can materialize only when carried on by the mysticism 
of justice as the norm of living equity among men. But justice cannot 
be comprehended except as flowing from the source of divine order. 
Throughout his work, Péguy returns to the problem of the interac-
tion of grace and nature. Like Erasmus, he invites his followers to 
dare the highest efforts in order to become worthy of enjoying divine 
grace. Grace is not the result of an irrational Will of the Divinity. It 
comes into being in the cooperation between the highest devotion 
and abandonment of man to the divine and the embracing and bless-
ing countermove of God.
In 1914, Péguy wrote: “The tree of grace and the tree of nature 
have intertwined their trunks in solemn knots; they have con-
founded their fraternal destiny to such extent that it is the same 
essence and the same being.” This theory of grace makes it evident 
that humanistic heroism will be complete only when merged with 
the obligations imposed upon man participating in a spiritual order. 
In an unforgettable passage, Péguy points to the gap between Greek 
humanistic heroism and Jewish-Christian faith. Homer’s heroes 
looked at their gods with an envy mixed with contempt—with envy 
because these gods had nothing to desire, with contempt because 
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they missed the intensity of human lives with their tensions, 
victories, defeats, risks, and adventures. That is the superiority of the 
heroic effort over ready-made perfection without combat and effort. 
It is the great merit of the spiritual religions that they made possible 
the knowledge of the human world as referring to and materializing 
the potentialities of a spiritual universe. Because of this, they sur-
passed and superseded the credo of classical heroism. The vision of 
a spiritual universe made it possible to deepen the mood of expecta-
tion into a basic attitude of hope and the subjective feelings of sym-
pathy into an objective and universal habitus of love. The striving 
for salvation and the recurrent clarification of the issues of redemp-
tion that are involved in this messianic longing are the criteria for 
man’s intermediate position between the world of nature and the 
world of God. Péguy passionately presented the thesis that salvation 
is not a definite fact. It is a continuous process in which hope and 
faith support the never-ceasing efforts of man to establish salvation 
here and now. The true spiritual salvation can come only when the 
temporal salvation has made transparent the final and spiritual need 
for the Kingdom of God. In the final analysis, true humanism and 
true religion cannot be separated. For the final conquest of evil, God 
and man need each other in the mutual cooperation between heroic 
effort and embracing grace.
IV
The process of salvation is not yet completed. The mission of the 
saviors is only too often defeated by the inertia of man, caught in 
the web of the institutions he has created. However, where there is 
dire need, saviors will arise and again to take up the work of sal-
vation. Here is the lasting place and the perennial function of the 
Hebrew religion in the scale of Péguy’s catholicity. Time and again, 
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the Jews have produced the prophets and the wise men who have 
forced their reluctant nation to recognize its wickedness and heed 
the call to temporal and spiritual salvation. Holiness is not enough 
if it remains in the sphere of personal perfection. What is at stake is 
the salvation of the whole community, of the whole city. Reference to 
the commands of the Eternal Being is necessary to any achievement 
in the secular world. There still is and will be evil and injustice in 
the world. They arouse our indignation and spur us to revolt because 
we live under the commandments of an eternal order. This was the 
vision of the Hebrew prophets and sages; even today, it remains the 
guiding star of Jewish destiny. No Gentile in the modern world has 
praised the Hebrews for this recurrent contribution to the salvation 
of man here and now as did Péguy in the forty pages of his Notre 
Jeunesse, in which he analyzed the elements that shared in the vic-
tory of the Dreyfus affair.
What is it that fascinates Péguy in the Hebrew religion? He is pro-
foundly impressed by the paradoxical unity of unrest and patience, 
which he considered the unique quality of Jewish character. The 
Jews have been harassed for centuries; yet, they have survived. This 
is their secret and their lasting fascination for Péguy. Jewish his-
tory explains the constant patience of the Jews; they will always find 
life bearable and will try to convince others that it could be worse. 
They will examine all aspects of a situation until they find in it some 
meaning and positive value. This patience is full of a sublime mel-
ancholy; it is the sadness of a group that is invested with the dignity 
of suffering for the sake of God. But this patience is accompanied by 
a continuous unrest that springs from the presence of the eternal in 
their critical awareness of the wrongs of man. For Péguy, the Jews 
are unique human beings who have never been completely corrupted 
by the establishments of the world. They are always prepared to fold 
their tents and start on another forty-year sojourn in the desert. It is 
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true that the average Jew is an average human being. The ambitions 
of the contemporary Jew are very modest:
The whole policy of Israel is to make no noise in the world, 
to purchase peace with prudent silence. Israel wishes to 
be forgotten. It still has so many smarting bruises . . . 
not a square inch of its skin that does not smart with 
pain, that is not full of old bruises, old contusions, dull 
pain, the memory of dull pain, scars, wounds, lacerations 
from the East or from the West. This people bears its own 
battle scars and those of all the other races. . . . But the 
whole mystique of Israel demands that it should pursue 
its resounding and painful mission. Hence extraordi-
nary lacerations, the most painful of inner antagonisms 
between mystique and politique. A people of merchants, 
and at the same time a people of prophets.
These reflections on the meaning of Jewish history and the mys-
tery of the Jewish character lead to those unforgettable pages in which 
Péguy draws the portrait of his friend Bernard Lazare [1865–1903], 
the French Jewish writer who was in the forefront of the struggle 
for Dreyfus. The Dreyfus family treated Lazare like a professional 
advocate who is paid for his services, a kind of adviser in the shrewd 
tricks of politics. Reverently, Péguy searches for the words that will 
evoke the image of the beloved friend. 
I am going to paint the picture of Bernard Lazare. It can-
not be denied that he had elements of saintliness. And 
when I speak of saintliness I am not guilty of speaking 
in metaphors. He had a gentleness, a goodness, a mysti-
cal tenderness, an evenness of disposition, an experience 
of bitterness and ingratitude, a perfect capacity to digest 
bitterness and ingratitude, a goodness that could not be 
outdone, a perfectly enlightened goodness of an unbe-
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lievable profundity. He lived and died a martyr. He was a 
prophet. It was quite right that he should be buried pre-
maturely in silence and neglect. In a calculated silence. 
In complete neglect.  
    He was dead before he died. And again, Israel pur-
sued its eternal destiny in the most secular way. . . . I was 
his only friend during his last years. He had a genius 
for friendship, a mystical loyalty and attachment which 
is the heart of friendship. This was possible because he 
remained ever loyal to himself. Many politiques betray, 
devour, absorb their mystiques. It is rare enough that 
mystics do not betray themselves. Of course, his athe-
ism was very sincere. He was a positivist, scientifically 
minded, intellectually modern in all respects. However, 
beneath all this was a heart sensitive to the faintest vibra-
tion of Jewish misery. His heart was bleeding in all the 
ghettos of the world—perhaps most in the broken, dif-
fused ones like Paris—bleeding in Rumania, in Turkey, 
in Algeria, in America, in Hungary, wherever Jews are 
persecuted, that is, in a certain sense, everywhere. His 
heart was bleeding in the Orient and Occident. Our 
mighty ones did not see, did not like to see that he was 
the Prophet, the Jew, the leader; but the poorest Ruma-
nian peddler knew it, felt his spiritual power. He was in 
a state of constant tension, in a state of tension that was 
imposed upon him by commandments more than fifty 
centuries old. He carried the load of a race and the weight 
of a world on his shoulders. His heart was devoured by 
fire, by the burning of his race; he was consumed by the 
flame of his people. A fire in his soul, a burning mind and 
the burning coal on the prophetic lips.
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    I have never seen a Jew so disinterested, so indiffer-
ent to the law of retaliation. He did not intend to render 
precisely the good for the evil, but certainly the just for 
the unjust. . . . He had a secret, intimate sympathy with 
every manifestation of spiritual power. His hatred of the 
state and of the secular institutions of power correspond 
exactly to his love of and devotion to the power of the 
spiritual. He could not stand the fact that the temporal 
institutions interfered with the purity of the spiritual. 
What a paradox! The professional atheist who made the 
eternal Word re-echo with a power and sweetness that 
cannot be imagined. I still see him on his bed—the athe-
ist trembling with the Word of God. In his very death 
the whole weight of his people rested on his shoulders. 
I have never seen a human being so burdened with an 
eternal responsibility. He felt himself as responsible for 
his people as we feel for our immediate family.
The image of this prophet in the guise of a journalist pervades 
the whole work of Péguy and appears where you would never expect 
it. In his reflections on Aloysius Gonzaga, S. J. [1568–1591], Péguy 
established the four elements of the human spirit in the modern 
world. They are the Greek, the French, the Christian, the Jewish. 
Let us be the heirs of the Hebrew way of life as far as 
we can, as far as we will and sometimes even a little bit 
more. Let us carry on the heritage of the ancient Jews in 
co-operation with the modern Jews, at least with some 
among the contemporary ones. A few of them are par-
ticularly qualified to represent the nobility, devotion and 
dignity of the temporal eternity of this incomparable  
race. . . . Let us learn that the temporal salvation of 
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humanity demands an unaccountable price, that the sur-
vival of a race, that the secular and temporal survival of 
a race, that the indefatigable and continuous survival of 
a race through all the storms of the ages, that the mainte-
nance of a race is an accomplishment and a task demand-
ing the highest price, that the temporal and terrestrial 
immortality of a chosen group, that its maintenance and 
secular immortality is an end and a task requiring an 
immense price. I dedicate these paragraphs to Bernard 
Lazare whose memory I shall piously treasure and con-
vey to future generations.
It would be erroneous to call these glowing pages “philosemitic” 
or to apply to them some other political label. They are, in a strict 
sense, philosophical. They suggest a mode of existence that is indis-
pensable for the perpetual regeneration and the continuing salva-
tion of the world. The Greeks and the Romans ceased to exist many 
centuries ago. Their spirit, the spirit of the secular city and of the Pax 
Romana, will live on as long as the classics remain an element of our 
educational tradition and are not confined to philologists and histo-
rians. In recurrent renascences, the classical tradition has reawak-
ened in us the awareness of the interdependence of liberty and 
reminded us that we can enjoy the fruits of peace and justice only 
if we are willing to defend them with arms. If we are today capable 
of being republicans and citizens, it is because of the legacy of civic 
heroism that the ancients have bequeathed to the Western world. In 
the modern world, the French—the French above all—have carried 
on this tradition. Péguy has experienced the richness and fullness of 
his very existence as a product of the traditions of the classical world. 
As a Frenchman, he was able to blend the heritage of the classical 
past and the Christian faith with the regional virtues of the peasant 
and the worker. The Christian element is the invitation to bear the 
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cross and the humility of the ultimate sacrifice; the Jewish element 
is the incorruptible thirst for God’s justice in the secular world, the 
never-ending combat for the indissoluble unity of the spiritual and 
the temporal in human life.
These categories are by no means historical concepts. They rep-
resent the different elements and attitudes of the Eternal Presence 
in the human process of self-realization. For Péguy, there is no his-
tory in the sense that philosophers of the nineteenth century con-
ceived it—i.e., history as a process in which an objective meaning 
of life becomes visible and understood. He recognizes the recur-
ring dichotomy of mystique and politique. But always there is the 
Eternal Presence, the opportunity to transcend the historical situ-
ation, to grasp the eternal in the flux of time. The four categories 
of the Hebrew, the Christian, the French, and the Classic are the 
irreducible elements of Péguy’s philosophy of the present. In Péguy’s 
own highly unique way, he participated in the vigorous combat that 
William James [1842–1910] and Henri Bergson were waging against 
the determinism and materialism of their times and for the reestab-
lishment of the character of the actual as dynamic, free, and creative.
Péguy is well aware that the passion to exhaust the meaning 
and purpose of human existence in scientific laws is motivated by a 
peculiarly modern yearning for security, tranquility, definiteness. It 
means all this on the largest scale in all spheres of life: the security 
of the status quo in politics, the economic security of the limited 
family, the illusion that modernity is the ultimate revelation of the 
meaning of history. All these trends were a denial of the four great 
elements of the Eternal Presence, each of them representing a spe-
cific mode of creative adventure and spiritual heroism in the process 
of time. Péguy wonders what will be the destiny of a world whose 
sole aim is to attain a sense of security as against the unrest in God 
of past ages. He hates this state of mind, this cheap peace for which 
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we have relinquished that sense of immediacy without which life is, 
to Péguy, only a macabre ghost play.
The modernity that was the object of Charles Péguy’s relentless 
criticism was a state of intellectual inertia, a fatigue of the mind 
that does not dare to hold together the spiritual and the temporal in 
the intensity of human concreteness. Péguy was convinced that this 
state of mind is destined to spread to all spheres of human endeavor. 
Security will become the supreme purpose of all—of every class of 
society; for this security, a heavy price will be paid. In the economic 
sphere, the fertility of the race will be sacrificed to the security of 
the childless family; in the emotional and psychic sphere of an indi-
vidual’s life, the real completely absorbing present will be sacrificed 
to the synthetic “moment” composed of the particles of the past; in 
morals, immediate personal choice and responsibility will be sacri-
ficed to the social blueprint with its illusory promises of automatic 
bliss and virtue. 
It would be misleading to classify Péguy as a philosopher, unless 
we admit that the biblical Job and Dante Alighieri [1265–1321], John 
Donne [1572–1631] and John Milton [1608–1674], are genuine phi-
losophers. Péguy was a poet, a philosopher-poet, if poetry is under-
stood in its original meaning, as an evocation of the essence of being. 
The central category of his philosophy was the reality of the present; 
the leading theme of his poetry was the Eternal Presence, as it is 
embodied in the four fundamental attitudes of the Christian and 
the Jewish faiths and classical and French humanism, all of which 
proclaim the paradoxical truth that “life is more life and more than 
life.” In this flaming vision, the technical terminologies of philoso-
phy and the sciences melt away. What remains is the pure image of 
man transcending the arbitrary boundaries of the social world he 
and his fathers have created. Péguy’s voice is that of a modern intel-
lectual who has never ceased to be a peasant, of a rooted French-
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man who is ever aware of the distant and diverse strains that have 
gone into the making of his small world. His words are not those of 
a litterateur. He speaks the language of a living man, reminiscing, 
reproving, discussing, and arguing. His friends and his enemies, his 
God and anti-Christ, are always present in his thinking and writing. 
When he addresses his spiritual ancestors, we know that the speaker 
is one of their companions. And when he rises to praise the Hebrew 
prophets and seers, we hear a voice in which their plaint and their 
passion still ring with ancient and undiminished magic and power.
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1. Charles Péguy, Basic Verities, trans. Ann and Julian Green (New 
York: Pantheon, 1943).
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Methodological Reflections on the 
History of the German Jews in the 
Age of Emancipation 
Recently, I had a most stimulating talk with Dr. Max Kreutzberger 
[1900–1978], the first director of the Leo Baeck Institute in New York 
City. We discussed the possibility of research on Rudolf Borchardt 
[1877–1945], the great German poet who abjured his Jewish ances-
try;1 the Jews in the Stefan George [1868–1933] circle;2 Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal [1874–1929], the Austrian novelist, dramatist, poet, 
and librettist;3 and Jewish studies of Johann Wolfgang Goethe [1749–
1832].4 I had met Borchardt forty-five years ago. I was fascinated at 
the idea of contributing a piece on this strange and prophetic man, 
whose perspectives were so deeply true and false at the same time. 
During my analysis of the Borchardt theme and the other topics that 
Dr. Kreutzberger and I had discussed, certain methodological ques-
tions arose as to the scientific validity of the results of such projects. 
So here I outline my thoughts on this matter and make certain pro-
posals.
The emancipation of the Jews marked their entrance into the cul-
tural, social, and economic processes of the diverse national civiliza-
tions. Social change of this sort requires thorough sociological and 
Previously unpublished. Undated manuscript located in file on Albert Salomon, 
Leo Baeck Institute, New York, New York. Published by permission from Leo Baeck 
Institute.
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social-psychological investigation. Sociologists, in particular, have 
developed a number of categories in the field of minority relations 
that are applicable to an analysis of the emancipation. These include 
the wide areas of maladjustment, conformism, identification, dis-
tance, marginality, and the notion of the stranger. In the field of psy-
chology, however, it is more difficult to categorize the motivations 
of the emancipated Jews. Therefore, it is almost impossible to deter-
mine scientifically the influence of a Jewish heritage on individuals 
who have completely lost or abandoned their Jewish identification. 
Only in the case of intellectuals who express a Jewish consciousness 
can we make any correlation between their Jewishness and their 
contribution to German civilization. The thesis “once a Jew, always a 
Jew” has no scientific foundations whatsoever. 
While the emancipation legally offered all Jews equal citizenship, 
only the high ranks of Jewish society gained social acceptance by 
the Christian community. As a result, this tiny Jewish elite felt that 
the Jewish people who were completely integrated into the national 
civilization should convert to the religion that was cemented into the 
foundations of all European cultures. The first stage of the emanci-
pation is the movement away from the religious traditions and from 
the humble and joyful recollections of the ancestors. It is the age 
of submission to the so-called Christian civilizations by conversion. 
As a social phenomenon, the emancipation from the Jewish tradi-
tions to Protestant and Catholic Christianity means the will to total 
conformism. Throughout the last 150 years, this trend towards con-
formism remained one of the decisive manifestations of the emanci-
pation. To many Jews, this procedure was logically and emotionally 
intelligible. They felt it necessary to convert as a symbol of gratitude 
for what German Kultur had contributed to their own professional 
and cultural existence. 
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Among the Jews who converted after the emancipation, we find 
two distinct types. First, we have the individuals who subjectively 
believed that the Christianity in their country and age, for example, 
the romantic Protestantism of Friedrich Schleiermacher [1768–1834], 
was the true religion. At the other extreme were the secular Jews who 
converted only for the sake of competing on an equal basis with their 
Christian colleagues. Their attitude was characterized by complete 
contempt for both Christianity and Judaism.
The trend away from Judaism after the emancipation is a uni-
versal pattern when Jews meet with other civilizations. The Greek, 
Arab, and German civilizations fascinated wealthy and educated 
Jews because they offered ways of life and possibilities of self-real-
ization beyond the pale of a theocratic society. These cultures had 
philosophy and art, great tragedy and satirical comedy. They wor-
shipped the heroic and sublime in spite of a deep pessimism about 
the meaning of human life. The rabbis despised the Greeks because 
they felt that these people had no charity, mercy, or chastity. But, on 
the other hand, the intellectual, educated Jews were attracted by the 
diversity of human possibilities of secular states.
Emancipation as an alienation from Judaism and conversion to 
Christian and national civilizations is the negative pattern of the 
secularization of the Jewish world. The authors mentioned earlier 
certainly have no place in the history of the positive Jewish emanci-
pation. They would violently deny classifications as Jews, and rightly 
so. Men like Borchardt, Hofmannsthal, Friedrich Gundolf [1880–
1931], and Ernst Kantorowicz [1895–1963] had no consciousness of 
being Jews. Jewishness is not rooted in a racial identity, but, instead, 
in an adherence to a common religious heritage. Consequently, it is 
mere speculation to infer a correlation between Jewish origins and 
the attitudes expressed in the works of assimilated Jews. There is no 
methodological principle that would permit the inclusion of these 
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authors in the context of a history of the positive Jewish emancipa-
tion. However, there were many Jews whose religious origins were 
reflected in their contributions to German Kultur after the emanci-
pation.
Between these two extremes, there are various marginal cases 
that lie between the categories of negative and positive emancipa-
tion. One of the most impressive cases of the creative interaction 
between Jewishness and Germanness is that of Hermann Cohen 
[1842–1918]. This great scholar can truly be called the only genuine 
philosopher in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century. Cohen 
lived by the principle that there is a basic affinity between the spirits 
of the Jewish prophets and the German spirit as embodied in the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant [1724–1804]. He was never shaken 
in this conviction, in spite of the rapidly expanding anti-Semitism 
and the lowering moral standards in Germany, as it began to move 
toward a society dominated by the mob. His greatest Jewish book, 
Die Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums,5 presents 
his pioneering work in the philosophy of “I and Thou” in terms that 
still carry the halo of Kant’s categories. 
What Kant had meant to Cohen, Georg Hegel [1770–1831], and 
Friedrich  Hölderlin [1770–1843], Friedrich Nietzsche [1844–1900] 
meant to Franz Rosenzweig [1886–1929]. Rosenzweig differed sharply 
from Cohen in an important regard. For many years, he wrestled with 
the decision of converting to Christianity. His friend, Eugen Rosen-
stock-Huessy [1888–1973], a sociologist and social philosopher, was a 
Jewish convert to Protestant Christianity. Rosenstock-Huessy nearly 
succeeded in convincing Rosenzweig of the spiritual supremacy of 
the Christian religion. But Rosenzweig’s final decision to continue in 
the tradition of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob set a pattern for all forth-
coming Jewish generations. After the example of Franz Rosenzweig, 
all of us Jews have had to pass through the experience of Jesus of 
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Nazareth as part of our spiritual heritage. Rosenzweig was as much 
a German as a Jewish philosopher, as is demonstrated by both his 
thought and his language. It is molded by Hölderlin and the young 
Hegel, by Nietzsche and Arthur Schopenhauer [1788–1860], instead 
of by the Luther Bible. And some of his observations about Goethe’s 
religion are among the best interpretations of Goethe’s thought. 
Among the Zionist thinkers and scientists who were influenced 
by and made contributions to German learning, Ernst Akiba Simon 
[1899–1988] is perhaps the most moving and illuminating. No 
German Christian wrote interpretations as lucid, comprehensive, 
and true of the most German of Germans, the Brothers Grimm 
[Jacob (1785–1863) and Wilhelm (1786–1859)], as did Ernst Simon. 
Throughout his work, he demonstrated the constructive unity of 
Jewish and German learning and concerns.6 
One can say the same about Martin Buber [1878–1965] and Ger-
hard (later, Gershom) Scholem [1897–1982]. Both had been imbued 
with the spirit of Christian and German mysticism before they dis-
covered Kabbala and Chassidism and their relevance for a Jewish 
philosophy of religion.
In the field of poetry and literature, Franz Kafka [1883–1924], a 
Jewish poet whose main concern is the theological plight of human 
beings in the contemporary desert of remorseless bureaucracies and 
personal anonymity, became the voice of a suffering mankind. The 
passio humana is the leitmotiv of the great Jewish poets who are 
German writers. And, among the ideal images of the constructive 
unity of Jewish philosophy and German criticism, one must mention 
Walter Benjamin [1892–1940]. His work on Goethe is perhaps his 
most outstanding achievement since it is a critical appreciation of 
the greatest German poet.7
Being a Jew is an experience that refers to our total being. We 
cannot escape it by conversion in a secularized world. We are a tiny 
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part in the sequence of the generations of our dead who have suffered 
persecutions, offenses, and humiliations. These dead form the deep 
layers of our existence. The Jewish cemeteries all over the world are 
our true country. We are part of many civilizations, and we are at 
home in Greece and Persia, in Rome and Egypt, as much as we are at 
home in Germany and America. But we are always ready to depart 
for the sake of our destiny—the integrity of the passio humana. We 
exist as Jews in order to affirm the chain of our collective recollec-
tions and to remember piously our ancestors. It is our existence to 
know the suffering of man in life and to love it. 
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Eschatological Thinking in Western 
Civilization: Reflections on a Book 
I
A doctoral dissertation rarely attracts an audience larger than that 
of experts in the particular field. In the case of Jacob Taubes [1923–
1987], Abendländische Eschatologie,1 however, both the name of the 
author and the topic will kindle the interest of scholars in many 
fields: theology, philosophy, the history of ideas, and the social sci-
ences. Specifically, the philosopher who specializes in methodology 
and philosophy of history and the sociologist who is concerned with 
the problems of a sociology of knowledge and of religion will find the 
book rewarding in many respects.
The topic is a link in the chain of European self-interpretation. 
The self-interpretation of the West as a meaningful unity amid 
the variety of separate peoples is a persistent theme woven of his-
torical and philosophical considerations. It has two distinct phases: 
one is prior to the national interpretations of European societies 
and extends from Montesquieu [1689–1755] to Jacob Burckhardt 
[1818–1897]; the second is postnationalistic and stretches from Johan 
Huizinga [1872–1945] to Paul Valéry [1871–1945] and to the young 
author of the book under discussion. Taubes’s aim is to describe and 
to interpret the effect of eschatological thinking on all aspects of 
Published originally in a slightly different form in Social Research 16 (March 
1949), 90–98.  Republished by permission from Social Research.
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modern European thought and action. A learned and encyclopedic 
scholar, he is well aware that earlier thinkers have selected a variety 
of traits as constituting the European character in the process of his-
tory. He knows, of course, that for centuries the Catholic Church 
proclaimed that it had established the frontiers of Europe against 
the Mohammedan and Greek Orthodox religions. Within its con-
fines, the church did develop a specific type of rationalism, blended 
of the intellectualism of its theology and the pragmatic rationalism 
of Roman imperialism. Taubes faithfully remembers that European 
thinkers from Montesquieu to Burckhardt and Valéry have insisted 
on the principle of freedom as the unique feature of European civi-
lization in individual, social, political, and international relations. 
They stressed that the common attitude of the individual nations 
was a love of independence and a resistance to all kinds of social and 
political despotism.
There must, then, be special reasons that impelled the author to 
add a new perspective to the unceasing self-interpretation of Europe as 
a dynamic historical personality. The reasons are implicit in Taubes’s 
own words. He chooses the topic and constructs the perspective as 
a Jew to whom being Jewish and European are the natural compo-
nents of his existence—which distinguishes his work from the general 
contribution of Jews to European thinking. Most scientific and phil-
osophical accomplishments by Jews have been produced by assimi-
lated or assimilating persons and groups, who endeavored to identify 
themselves with liberal and radical movements in order to be com-
pletely absorbed in European civilization. Many assimilated Jews also 
joined revolutionary movements with which they identified their total 
existence. Uprooted French Jews turned to sociology as the philoso-
phy of total progress to which they could transfer their old messianic 
hopes. In the meeting of such intellectual and emotional powers, they 
attempted to accomplish the self-redemption of industrial society.
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In contrast to the assimilated Jews of Western civilizations, Taubes 
is sustained by the living spirit of Judaism. This existential attitude 
induced him to choose his theme. In dealing with eschatology, Taubes 
is able to demonstrate the historical productivity of a mode of think-
ing that was the legacy of his people to European civilization. The 
selection of the topic implies still another motive: a desire to bypass 
theological and ecclesiastical patterns of thinking. He is too well 
trained in sociological thinking not to see that all dogmatisms and 
systematized religious institutions, having compromised with intel-
lectual and social powers in the world, have limited the expanding 
power of the total spiritual vision. Finally, he clings to the topic for 
methodological reasons. In the methodology of history, the adher-
ents of idealism and realism have fought a rather sterile war. Taubes 
is conscious of the fact that the alternative between materialism and 
spiritualism is totally unsatisfactory. He rejects also the piecemeal 
relativism of Weber’s interpretations. He sees that only total interpre-
tation, which recognizes the lasting wholeness and interaction of the 
extremes of human thinking, will reconcile the conflicting methods.
For these reasons, Taubes deals with eschatological thinking. 
Eschatological thinking is radical. It goes to the roots of the whole; it 
is final and total. It is the first mode of thinking to offer the category 
of alienation. The God of Creation is alienated from the world that 
has liberated itself from its Creator and remains the sphere of evil 
under its demiurge. Only the ultimate and all-embracing actuality 
of God reunites the alienated world with His total being. Thus, the 
transcendent God remains alien and hidden from the world, which 
revolts and builds up the total power of negativity, a countercreation. 
It is the archetype of eschatological thinking that God will redeem 
the world in a final judgment of love and truth.
Taubes pursues the development, transformation, and renascences 
of eschatological thinking from the early Jewish and Gnostic sources to 
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Georg Hegel [1770–1831], Karl Marx [1818–1883], and Søren Kierkeg-
aard [1813–1855]. Theologians of Jewish and Christian faith will be 
interested in the analysis of eschatological thinking in the preaching 
of Jesus, previously hinted at by Hermann Samuel Reimarus [1694–
1768]. The historian of the church and the sociologist of knowledge 
will study attentively the description of the means employed by the 
Church Fathers and philosophers to reconcile the total and radical 
element of eschatological thinking with the relative and compromis-
ing theories of the church as established power. In this connection, 
Taubes stresses the authority of Saint Augustine of Hippo [354–430], 
who succeeded in integrating the totality of redemption with the 
church as civitas coelestis. The main part of the book deals with the 
renascences of eschatological thinking in the spiritual, philosophi-
cal, and social revolutions that thrust themselves in radical attitudes 
beyond the frontiers of academic and political institutions. Taubes 
sees the key positions in the development of modern history—the 
revolution of the Franciscan Spirituals (the Fratecelli), the unification 
of spiritual and social revolutions during the sixteenth century, the 
philosophical revolution of German idealism, and the total revolu-
tions of the industrial worlds, all of which he cites as elements of 
negative spirituality. He demonstrates that eschatological thinking 
reappears in the open abyss of such radical situations and makes pos-
sible total interpretation. Taubes notes that Hegel proclaimed the end 
of the classical-Christian-national worlds of past history, and that 
Kierkegaard and Marx disclosed the hubris of Hegel’s reconciliation 
in the contemplation of philosophy, reopening the perspective that 
might lead toward a new total interpretation of the whole. According 
to Taubes, their grandiose efforts might contribute to bringing into 
existence a new synthetic vision of the totality of life.
This investigation is carried on in a truly philosophical and his-
torical spirit. The author’s spirit is historical because he is concerned 
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with the ways of thinking that recognize the meaningful evolu-
tion of mankind as the central theme of human understanding. He 
describes this pattern of thinking as modern, distinguishing it from 
the cyclical thinking that identifies the process of nature with that of 
history. Since Jewish and Christian thinking have developed the idea 
of the progress in salvation, history has become the lens that reveals 
the grandeur and misery of the human condition. History alone is 
the comprehensive study of the totality of human beings. Again and 
again, thinkers have recognized the primal relevance of history as 
the dynamic progress in the human enterprise, in which the opposite 
poles—such as creation and salvation, evil and redemption, or slav-
ery and freedom—are intertwined and interact.
II
The thesis of the book is that the spiritual mode of thinking estab-
lished by the Jewish prophets and Gnostic philosophers has set the 
pattern for the various types of eschatological thinking in Western 
civilization. The attentive reader will discern that in this wide field 
of investigation the author has succeeded in gaining some valuable 
new scientific insights.
First, he makes evident to all sociologists of knowledge that his-
torical dialectics is in origin and structure eschatological thinking. 
This structure demonstrates the indivisible unity of monistic and 
dualistic principles. Eschatological thinking is the core of all types 
of historical dialectics that comprehend the philosophy of history 
as established by the Franciscan Spirituals, Hegel’s philosophy of 
End-Time, and Marx’s philosophy of total revolution. The varieties 
of spiritual experience can be explained as referring to the ambiguity 
of the term kingdom of God on earth, which permits the stressing 
of either secular or heavenly redemption. Taubes contends that the 
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Franciscan Spirituals put forth the idea that the final salvation is 
going to take place in the Here and Now, which suggests that spiritual 
and secular revolutions merge in the efforts of totally reconstructing 
the whole world.
Second, the author makes a thorough reexamination of the term 
secularization. He rejects the thesis that all atheistic and antireli-
gious movements are necessarily antispiritual. If we take the idea of 
total history seriously, there will be periods that are estranged from 
the divine. Alienation, however, is a dialectical category that makes 
it possible to speak of negative spirituality in times of total revolution 
during which the secular redemption is the presupposition for total 
redemption. In this historical way of thinking, Taubes comes close 
to a thesis advocated enthusiastically by Georg Lukács [1885–1971] 
before he joined the Communist party. Lukács declared that total 
socialist revolution is indispensable. Only the realization of social-
ism will induce men to rediscover the infinite suffering and forlorn-
ness of the human being in the perfection of the social fabric. Then 
and only then, Lukács assumed, would the new-old eschatological 
vision come true again and reconstruct mankind as a redeemed 
universe. For this reason, the term secularization can only mean the 
total absence of any reference to a final meaning of history. The radi-
cal, satanic, and antireligious theories may have their place in a spiri-
tual process of history.
Third, the author has rediscovered that the term progress is not 
limited to the intellectual and scientific movements. He articulates 
the spiritual connotation on the basis that the Franciscan Spiritu-
als turned the process of salvation into a history of salvation taking 
place in the Here and Now.
Fourth, the author has innovated in describing the identical 
structure of the historical and philosophical thinking of Peter John 
of Olivi [1248–1298] and of Hegel. Both start from the Gospel of St. 
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John; both deal with the evolution of divine love or with the modi-
fications of love, according to Hegel’s terminology; both stress the 
actuality of the mind as becoming in history; both stress its dialecti-
cal movement which appears in certain stages of transition (Olivi’s 
ecclesia spiritualis as the realization of the kingdom of God on earth 
is paralleled by Hegel’s intellectual realm in the history of philoso-
phy and by the kingdom of God in the philosophy of religion); both 
maintained the redeeming function of prophecy and of philosophy; 
both proclaimed themselves to be priests of the absolute and sub-
ject, respectively, to the Pope and the Prussian king; both practiced 
a relative conservatism in church and bourgeois society; both estab-
lished an absolute radicalism in developing the idea of history as the 
self-realization of the spirit, as the fulfillment of the eternal gospel. 
Taubes has opened a great historical perspective by describing the 
identity and continuity of the eschatological mode of thinking in 
the rise and end of modernity. He indicates that spiritual histori-
cal thinking remains intact and is the living requirement beyond all 
theological and philosophical systems so long as the process of his-
tory is considered to be the unfolding of the range of human powers. 
This thesis permits the inclusion of one aspect of German idealism 
which opens the windows of rationalism onto the larger view of an 
eternal peace and a world of human reconciliation.
Fifth, a point of scientific progress is implied in this last discov-
ery. Taubes has definitely settled the discussion on the origins of 
modernity in historical periodization. For almost fifty years, a con-
flict has raged between the students of Jacob Burckhardt [1818–1897] 
and those of Konrad Burdach [1859–1936] on this subject. Students 
of Burckhardt still assume that the Italian Renaissance—in all its 
aspects of emancipating rationalism, individualism, and secular-
ized collective power—is the articulate break with the Middle 
Ages. Burdach, on the contrary, maintained that the beginnings 
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of the modern time and of the true Renaissance lie in the rise of 
religious movements in the expanding urban centers, which led 
to the development of the mendicant orders. Taubes’s articulate 
interpretation of the Franciscan Spirituals and of their role in the 
history of Western thinking decides the question finally in favor 
of Burdach. Taubes stresses, minutely, the relevance of the radical 
eschatological mode of thinking of the Franciscan Spirituals for 
all spheres of religious, political, and social action and thought. 
They ended the dualistic medieval thinking that separated the 
worldly and super worldly spheres. These radical spiritual pioneers 
were the first to establish the crucial idea of modern European 
thinking—namely, the indivisible unity of the spirit and of the world 
in the process of history. They nevertheless experienced the perver-
sion, by others, of their spiritual radicalism into political propaganda 
against everything spiritual.
This phenomenon permits the author to derive a sixth thesis from 
the new and decisive stride toward the modern world. The spiritu-
alization of the historical process brings with it a new radicalism 
and extremism in working out conflicts and antagonisms. Taubes is 
correct in assuming that, with such a radical change in outlook and 
perspective, the spirit of revolution and the revolution of the spirit 
are intertwined. He sees the new radicalism and extremism in all 
fields of thought and action because rulers and ruled, elite and oppo-
sition, refer their ideas and deeds to a frame of reference that gives 
a spiritual connotation to every thought and action. He is not, how-
ever, the victim of his own generalizations. He carefully excepts the 
lasting pattern of premodern rationalism, as practiced and taught by 
the institutions of the Catholic Church and by all organizations and 
relationships under its control. Taubes is well aware that the thesis of 
his book does not extend to the Catholic orbit, and states explicitly 
that the Catholic Church has always been conscious of the fact that 
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all eschatological and spiritual movements question the very foun-
dations of its existence. It has persecuted and exterminated them 
with inexorable logic. From the Franciscan Spirituals to the Spanish 
Los Illuminados and to the movement of Quietism, the church has 
gone on record as being violently antagonistic to the free and inde-
pendent spirit. Indeed, secular revolutions in Catholic worlds still 
take on the pattern of the church and its hierarchy as the only image 
of total authority and control. Taubes is fully aware that the rational 
structure of power relations, as well as those of authority, superordi-
nation, obedience, gradation, and hierarchies is at the opposite pole 
of the leader-follower relations that arise from a communion united 
by the dedication to the spirit and its total requirements.
If this is so, Western eschatology is a marginal problem that 
comes into existence when authority, prestige, and the significance 
of established institutions—religious, political, social—are being 
questioned or exploded. In other words, eschatological thinking 
is by its very nature revolutionary: it has necessarily the perspec-
tive that reveals the deficiencies, corruptions, and degeneracies of 
all established regimes. It is not incidental that the author actually 
describes the eschatological element in German philosophical and 
social thinking. He gives an articulate presentation of the spiri-
tual and social upheaval that reaches to the ultimate and stretches 
beyond all political and philosophical frontiers, and indicates the 
profound lack of equilibrium and rational moderation in German 
thought. The author feels that this is a constitutive element in the 
German world. Though he is familiar with the spiritual revolts 
and uprisings all over Europe at one time or another, he dismisses 
them as irrelevant to his purpose. He recognizes that a deep sense 
of anarchy predisposes the Germans to a radical insight into the evil 
and demonic character of the world and into the spiritual powers of 
reconciliation and salvation. With keen insight, Taubes states that all 
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other nations brought up in the orbit of the Roman Empire (pagan 
or Christian) have established articulate structures of civilization 
within the frames of which individuals and groups feel secure and 
complete because they can always rely on the sober interference of 
reason. But for various historical reasons, the Germans never over-
came the tribal narrowness and the imperial spiritualism. They were 
never able to construct between these extremes a civilized society. 
They remained open to all temptations of radical and extreme think-
ing and action. In the tension between the tribal primitivism and the 
universal spiritualism, the most wicked and the most sublime efforts 
were possible. They were able to visualize the most horrifying acts 
of corruption and degradation, and to convey at the same time, the 
sense of sublime renunciation as a presupposition of total salvation. 
Implicitly, the author describes the conditions that enabled the Ger-
mans, throughout their history, continuously to take the thrust into 
the absolute beyond all theological and ecclesiastical institutions, 
to leap into the realm of freedom beyond all political institutions. 
These conditions can be summarized briefly as the lack of political 
civilization and of an educated and enlightened society.
III
Contemporary Jews may wonder that a Jewish scholar should con-
centrate today on an interpretation of the German contribution to 
Western thought that presents their great spiritual possibilities and 
achievements fairly and objectively. Whatever the validity of such 
a response, the problem merits reflection. Here is a young, unas-
similated Jewish scholar, completely secure and independent in his 
belonging to the flock of Israel, who writes a book that conveys to the 
reader the idea of the lasting adventure in spiritual thinking among 
the Germans. This effect does not imply any value judgment; it is the 
inevitable consequence of the author’s theme and perspective.
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Taubes deals with the structure of eschatological and apocalyptic 
thought and articulates the specific conditions under which it mate-
rializes. These conditions arise from prepolitical, loose, almost anar-
chical groups that fling their despair and fears, their insecurities and 
enthusiasms, into the lap of a divine ruler whom they declare their 
king. Such open societies cling to the idea of theocracy as prior to 
and beyond political institutions. This sociological statement, joined 
to the sociological reflections on the problematic character of Ger-
man thought and culture, makes it possible to venture a conjecture. 
Taubes is compelled to dwell mainly on German attitudes in philos-
ophy and action because the Germans were predestined to carry on 
the revolutionary and spiritual tradition founded by Jewish proph-
ets and Gnostic philosophers. This indicates that there is a deep and 
hidden affinity between Jews and Germans, a common precivilized 
and postcivilized state of mind, which permits both to transcend the 
realm of worldly organization and to expand into the eschatological 
homeland, despite and because of the radical and extreme corrup-
tion in a state unprotected by a frame of civilization. There was one 
German who was fully aware of such a structural affinity between 
Jews and Germans—and that was Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
[1749–1832]. It is indicative of Taubes’s keen and passionate thinking 
that he is not perturbed by the implications of his scientific thinking.
It is necessary to note briefly the author’s procedure and method. 
In such an adventure of ideas, a young scholar has to rely largely 
on interpretive studies. It is a characteristic feature of Taubes’s posi-
tion that he selects the most outstanding and progressive authors 
in the fields of Gnosis, Franciscan Spiritualism, Reformation, and 
Total Revolution with an unfailing sense of values. He is determined 
only by a burning desire for truth. For this reason, he praises the 
great scholarly achievements of the orthodox Lutheran, Karl Holl 
[1866–1926], as against the superficial and false imputations made 
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by Ernst Troeltsch [1865–1923], whose religious attitude would be 
closer to Taubes than that of Holl. But Taubes remains superior to 
the overwhelming material he had to work through. He never com-
mits himself to the conclusions of the authors whom he consults. 
He never loses his own perspective. He has his problem firmly in 
hand. This indicates the spontaneous and vital power of a superior 
and well-disciplined intelligence.
As to original sources, the author is well acquainted with the exe-
getical and historical literature on the respective parts of the Bible 
and of the Gospels. He knows Jewish and Christian mysticism. He is 
well versed in Hegel, Marx, and Kierkegaard.
It is desirable to state the scientific skills and the unwavering 
control of all methodological devices exhibited in this first book of 
a young scholar whose philosophical spontaneity is remarkable. But 
it would be unsatisfactory to end one’s reflections on the book with 
so routine a check of its scientific standards. To make the evalua-
tion complete, it must be added that the author has also a human 
sincerity and a humble dedication to that Jewish spiritual power that 
he made the theme of his investigation. There is a spark of the pro-
phetic and philosophical genius of Israel in this book that describes 
its impact on Western thought and action. This work demonstrates 
anew that in all fields of history of ideas and of philosophy the quality 
of the author counts. There will never be an outstanding historian or 
philosopher who is not, in the sense of William James [1842–1910], 
capable of the varieties of human experience.
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✴    ✴    ✴ 
Introduction
Sociology is the science of society. It is indicative for the situation 
of modern learning that nobody is able to define “society.” This is 
the reason why historians of sociology have no criteria for determin-
ing the discipline’s origins and currents. Some begin the history of 
sociology with Plato, some with Comte, some with Confucius, some 
with Montesquieu. However, scrutiny of our contemporary situation 
yields criteria that make it possible to determine objectively the plan, 
scope, and function of sociology.
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Contemporary trends are best illustrated by the work of Robert K. 
Merton [1910–2003]. He demonstrates the unification of sociological 
theory with techniques of social conduct that had been indicated and 
that ran in different directions for many decades. Merton, Robert 
M. MacIver [1882–1970], Robert Staughton Lynd [1892–1970], and 
Talcott Parsons [1902–1979] reunite the technical and theoretical 
problems of social studies. 
Apart from this general trend, sociology as philosophy of total 
evolution still exists—mainly in the form of Spencerianism [after 
Herbert Spencer (1820–1903)] and Marxism [after Karl Marx (1818–
1883)], often framed as Comtism [after Auguste Comte (1798–1857)] 
in Latin America. Sociology is taken for granted as method in all 
fields of history and the history of ideas. There are three common 
elements in these diverse manifestations of sociology.
First, there is the scientific principle that human conduct can be 
completely explained and understood from the analysis of its basic 
needs, desires, and goals. It is not necessary to take refuge in any 
transcendent or metaphysical principle. Second, there is the practi-
cal principle that human institutions could and should be improved. 
Third, there is the philosophical principle that these empirical stud-
ies offer to the student of human nature fundamental questions: 
What is man; what can he do; what can he accomplish? This stand 
makes it possible to see the unique situation in which sociology could 
come into existence.
The situation can, first, be determined negatively. It was the anti-
Christian revolt under the impact of naturalistic Aristotle and of the 
rising independence of political power in lay societies. This lay spirit, 
even when remaining true to Christianism, revolted against Scholas-
tic philosophies. 
In positive terms, the situation is that of Renaissance and Human-
ism Men striving for a natural explanation of their social conditions. 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N688
They began to renounce the dualistic world picture of the Middle 
Ages. They favored a monistic world—the world of man as social 
universe. The best expression of the modern attitude is in the Oratio 
De Hominis Dignitate of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola [1463–1494]: 
“God said to Adam: ‘I have put you into the center of the world so 
that you can easily look around you and inspect everything. I cre-
ated you as a being neither celestial nor earthly, neither mortal nor 
immortal, so that you may be your own free creator and conqueror. 
You can degenerate into a beast or elevate yourself into a God-like 
being.’”
This discovery of man and society as an independent real-
ity implied an experience and an attitude. The experience that 
united naturalistic and spiritualistic thinkers was the awareness of 
the increasing pressure of social institutions and of the precarious 
aspects of human freedom as emancipated from moral and spiritual 
values and subject to social and political requirements. The socio-
logical attitude can be described as the consciousness that society is 
the destiny of man, a constructive or destructive fate that educates or 
destroys the individual. Experience, attitude, and scientific methods 
of analysis and imputation merge to bring about the origins of soci-
ology and political science, economics, and social psychology. 
The social sciences start neither as discipline nor as a new liter-
ary pattern of learning. The social thinkers use many literary pat-
terns as developed by antiquity for social analyses and descriptions, 
such as dialogues, mock-eulogies, satires, essays, treatises on educa-
tion, memoirs, and discourses, as well as dictionaries, encyclopedias, 
maxims, portraits, and characters, which they invent as modern 
forms for establishing truth about the real motives and impulses that 
make men act.
We must be aware that, on this question of origins, the idea of 
scientific truth was not as narrow as it is today. Nicolas  Boileau-
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Despréaux [1636–1711], in writing his Satires,1 sincerely believed that 
he scientifically established truth about social behavior. Similarly, 
moralists like Jonathan Swift [1667–1745] or Samuel Richardson 
[1689–1761] were convinced that they recreated truth about men liv-
ing in society. 
The novel is the only literary form that resulted from the new 
sociological attitude. For this reason, no history of sociology could 
rightly neglect the relevance of the novel for knowledge of societal 
configurations under the conditions of the modern world. Social 
studies demonstrate from the beginning the inseparable unity of 
theory and of techniques for realizing and maintaining true prin-
ciples and for clarifying the conditions that promote or prevent 
their actualization. Social studies refer to a philosophical frame of 
reference—namely, the practical improvement of institutions and of 
situations. It must be emphasized that this trend is deeply connected 
with the new printing press and its influence on human thought. For 
this reason, social studies have their own specific place and function 
in the rise of modern learning. They are intermediate between phi-
losophy and politics. Philosophy is an eternal adventure in ideas that 
is carried on from philosopher to philosopher for enlarging the truth 
about the whole. Sociology and social studies strive for truth about 
the lasting changes of social process and conditions. Social think-
ers are educators who strive to identify the techniques of behavior 
that permit men to adjust to and to live up to the standards of their 
respective societies. 
For this reason, the historian of sociology must give ample atten-
tion to those writers who spread the gospel of good manners, from the 
Spanish Jesuit priest, Baltasar Gracián [1601–1658], to the mistress of 
etiquette, Emily Post [1872–1960]. The philosopher constructs ide-
als of the good life; the sociologist translates such abstract notions 
into the languages of social classes and ruling elites. The sociolo-
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gist’s notions come into existence where philosophical norms meet 
with the normative requirements of differently structured societies. 
Courtier, nobleman, and gentleman are sociological formulations 
of the philosophical notion of “the good.” This intermediate place 
of social studies illuminates their function in society: they develop 
scientific tools and measuring rods for remedying and improving 
social conditions. 
This indicates their historical origin from another angle. Such 
sciences of reform were needed in the political societies that could 
not rely any longer on patriarchal loyalties of a learned, rich, and 
powerful urban population. Such historical perspective makes it 
possible to shed light on the meaning of society in the origins of soci-
ology. It is the social process beyond its political frame. This process 
implies all spontaneous and creative activities of human freedom, 
such as philosophy, art, science, poetry, moral courage, and spiritual 
independence. This science of society is one aspect of rising liber-
alism. It remains the frame of the social studies for the period we 
are dealing with in this course. Between 1489 and 1789, humanists, 
jurists, statesmen, educators, professors, intellectuals, and courtiers, 
freelance writers, and scientists contribute from the most diverse 
angles to build up an independent area of knowledge of human con-
duct in societal relations. 
Sociology changes its character completely only after the French 
Revolution. It becomes a philosophy of total evolution; a science of 
industrial-technological progress and a philosophy of industrial 
revolution. The contemporary situation of sociology is closer to the 
period we are presenting here, at least in the Anglo-Saxon countries 
and in France. In Russia, revolutionary sociology is well established 
as social theology. 
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I.     Humanists and Educators
Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli [1469–1527] and Desiderius 
Erasmus [1466–1536] share in the common experiences of the inde-
pendent reality of social institutions. Both agree on the disastrous 
effect of ecclesiastical government on the religious and political 
reputation of the Church. The Holy Roman Empire is gone forever, 
and the national state is taken for granted. Machiavelli draws the 
conclusion that it is time to reconstruct the classical polis-state and 
to liberate the Italian states from the Church. Erasmus concludes 
that this is the last possibility for spiritualizing the secular world in 
order to remain true to Christian and classical social standards. 
Both are humanists. Humanists are scholars and scientists who 
rediscover the ideals and realities of social life in classical philoso-
phers, poets, and historians. They apply their scholarship, first, to 
editing these books scientifically; second, to establishing new-old 
standards of living and the educational techniques for their realiza-
tion. Machiavelli revitalizes the ideal of the political order and the 
techniques of maintaining established governments. 
Erasmus constructs the ideal of spiritual freedom—the ideal 
that harmonizes Christ and Epicurus. He uses a variety of former 
approaches for suggesting social reforms: 
1. Analysis of social institutions. All of his essays 
on political and social institutions and societal rela-
tions—state, marriage, schools, business, church, 
monastery—describe the conditions that explain 
why people deviate and are frustrated in their ideal 
ends, the so-called lex degenerandi. 
2. Scrutiny of the positive task of one individual 
versus institutions and illuminates the plight of the 
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individual under the growing pressure of rational 
organizations. See his treatment of the Christian 
knight, the pragmatic mystic, and the priority of 
love over knowledge. 
3.  See the complex and ambiguous character of con-
duct and the interdependence of conscious-uncon-
scious in The Praise of Folly.2 
But Machiavelli is the real political philosopher and the greater 
sociologist of the two. His political philosophy implies certain socio-
logical propositions without which there would be no philosophi-
cal politics. He explicitly stated that most of his theses are valid for 
the decisive social institutions: religion, state, and army. It can even 
be maintained that Machiavelli intended to establish sociology as 
a science that can predict the modes of social conduct by analyz-
ing certain typical situations and studying human behavior in such 
behaviors in such situations. If we understand the mechanism of 
passions as responses to certain stimuli, we are able to predict con-
duct as required by specific situations. This has been neglected in 
Christian times. Renascence of political and historical classics helps 
to construct such a science, which contains principles and tech-
niques of building a great state. It is the science of the statesman. 
Machiavelli’s contributions to sociology are fourfold: 
1. His theory of Challenge-Response is more philo-
sophical and scientific than that of Arnold Toynbee. 
The relations between Fortuna—Necessitas—Virtù 
teach us how to accommodate change when we 
study the requirements of historical situations. Virtù 
is being superior to the experienced and understood 
stream of Fortuna. Understood necessities provoke 
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human possibilities: industry, goodness, justice, 
virtù. The Law of Renascences in hardening situa-
tions. 
2.  His theory of social change. The human charac-
ter is identical all the time: man is never satisfied; 
he always desires new and more cupidity and ambi-
tion, which are his basic passions. The sequence of 
his desires is described as: power, health, security. 
These desires are expressions of insecurity and fear: 
interdependence between power—fear—external 
imperialism—domestic insecurity. Such desires 
determine the dynamics of social action. Desires 
can be manipulated by necessities, laws, and pun-
ishments. 
3.  Sociology of militarism (the art of war). Machi-
avelli set the patterns for all future discussions on 
this subject, including those by Adam Smith (on the 
sociological implications of mercenary or citizen 
armies). In addition, he elaborates technical prob-
lems of march-order, camping, tactics that are full 
of observations on the impact of the social struc-
ture of military bodies for the tactics to be applied. 
In spite of the negative criticism of Hans Delbrück 
[1848–1929],3 it remains a pioneering book in the 
sociology of militarism. 
4. Sociological theory of politics. The constituent 
elements of conspiracy and revolutions, complete 
with their technical aspects: size—scene—trust—
action. The social conditions necessary for diverse 
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types of government. The social and psychological 
requirements for maintaining a legitimate or an 
illegitimate government. The social presuppositions 
for social decomposition and the rise of tyranny. 
National character: products of different systems of 
education. 
Machiavelli influenced all spheres of thinking and all strata of 
society: his impact on Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza is 
well known. A sociological phenomenon is Machiavellianism as the 
theory and techniques of the Reason of State that became a popu-
lar topic for best sellers throughout the seventeenth century. Still 
more interesting is the fashion of Tacitismo, that is, to study the 
great Roman historian Cornelius Tacitus [56–120] as the textbook 
of Machiavellianism that contains all the weaknesses of human deg-
radation and humiliation. Tacitismo has remarkable importance for 
raising the consciousness of what it meant for the intellectual, moral, 
and psychological standards of the ruled to live under a despotic 
regime. 
[Here, Salomon included a draft of his essay, “Democracy and 
Religion in the Work of Erasmus,” that is nearly identical to that pre-
sented as a separate chapter in this volume. The editors have removed 
the essay from this outline in the interests of efficiency.—Eds.]
II.      Jurists and Statesmen: Science of Natural Law
Next to the humanistic educators who urged political independence 
and spiritual liberty, jurists and lawyers played a leading role in con-
tributing to the field of sociology. They transformed the Christian 
theory of Natural Law into a secular science of Natural Law. This is 
the first systematic effort to establish a theory of the constitution of 
society.
O R I G I N S  O F  S O C I O L O G Y  A N D  S O C I A L  P S YC H O L O G Y  (19 4 7) 695
Hugo Grotius [1583–1645] was a Dutch statesman, jurist, and 
historian. He nicely exemplifies the situation of transition between 
the spiritual and the secular Natural Law. God is the ultimate source 
of Natural Law. Holy Scripture and classical texts have the same 
validity for explaining universal legal norms. This definition of 
Natural Law is in harmony with that of the Spanish philosophers 
of Natural Law.4 It says: “Jus naturale est dictamen rectae rationis 
iudicans actui alicui, ex eius convenientia ant disconvenientia cum 
ipsa natura rationale ac sociali in esse turpitudinem ant necessitate 
morale, ac consequenter ab autore Deo talem actum ant praecipiant 
vetari.” (“Natural Law is the command of right reason that indicates 
the qualification of any action as degraded or necessary as in agree-
ment or in disagreement with rational and social nature. Hence such 
action is either prescribed or forbidden by the commandments of 
God.”)
In 1625, Grotius published De Jure Belli ac Pacis. This book 
stimulated the establishment of chairs of Natural Law and of the 
Law of Nations, where Natural Law was taught as a branch of Moral 
Philosophy. In 1661, Baron Samuel von Pufendorf held the first chair 
in the world in the Law of Nature and Nations at Heidelberg. Gro-
tius’s book was required reading. That treatise had suggested orga-
nizing the required courses in moral philosophy as follows: natural 
theology, natural law, ethics, and politics. In the reformed Scottish 
universities of the early eighteenth century, Adam Smith grate-
fully recognized his indebtedness to Grotius as setting the pattern 
for a science of the statesman. Grotius conceived of the book as Ars 
naturalis et perpetuae jurisprudentiae. It is a scientific discipline as 
evident in its demonstration as mathematics. It is Erasmian in spirit 
and purpose. It will reformulate the old Truth in terms of modern 
rationalistic-mathematical thinking. Like Erasmus, Grotius desires 
constructing Res Christiana in legal institutions. Grotius’s spiritual 
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position coincides with Neo-Stoicism. Modern Stoicism meant the 
immanence of divinity as creative reason in the universe of nature 
and society. Grotius supports all important theses with statements by 
Lucius Annaeus Seneca [4 BC–65 AD], Marcus Aurelius [121–180], 
and Marcus Tullius Cicero [106–43 BC] in order to demonstrate the 
universal validity of logos and caritas. This liberal and stoic spiritu-
alism merged with the traditions of legal thinking. Together, these 
created a first system of societal relationships:
1. The notion of Socius is a conception of Roman Law
2. The notion of reciprocity is a conception of 
Roman Law
3. The notion of Society as the sum total of mutual 
relationships springs from Roman Law
   a. Give and take 
   b. Superiority-subordination 
   c. Equality among business partners, friends,    
 members of groups, team workers 
   d. Sympathetic agape and need for protection 
   e. Kindness-sternness 
   f. Cooperatives and equals 
   g. Cooperatives as unequals
Natural Law to Grotius is the manifestation of human nature as 
innate right reason (qua recta ratio insita). This instinctive rational-
ity for utilitarian ends is the characteristic trait of the human animal. 
Man desires social life “not of any and every sort, but peaceful, and 
organized according to the measure of his intelligence, with those 
who are of his own kind.” The Stoics called this tendency sociable-
ness. This means that Peace is the telos of human nature. Peace 
O R I G I N S  O F  S O C I O L O G Y  A N D  S O C I A L  P S YC H O L O G Y  (19 4 7) 697
cannot be realized because of human corruption. Peace remains a 
lasting postulate of human social action.
Mutuality is composed of two elements: mutual needs and mutual 
sympathies. Maintenance of society (custodia societatis) is the one 
source of law and natural law. Natural Law’s general principle is to 
live according to reason (nature). Its evident principles are private 
property and marriage. And granted marriage, adultery is inadmis-
sible. A nonevident principle is that vengeance is bad. 
There are two branches of Natural Law:
Social. Self-preservation (of life-self-property); strict 
law enforced; security of individual in relations to 
socii. Pattern: contract. Social Natural Law in col-
lective bodies; social consensus—associations of 
equals, hierarchies of inferior—superior. Agree-
ments according to mutuality. 
Humane. Stratification of society, norms of justice 
that give every man what is due him, inherent in 
every man as a potential right. Established law v. 
Justice, legality v. morality. 
Grotius identified sources of civil law in terms of basic types of 
societal relationships that correspond to natural requirements and 
reappear in all social branches: parents-children, husband-wife, 
guardian-ward, master-servant. 
Grotius distinguishes between law proper and natural law, which 
includes a hierarchy of duties beyond the institutions of statutory 
law and customs. The dynamics of natural law comprehend the vari-
ous spheres of normative rules from legality to morality, from things 
permissible to things good and better. There is a law of charity in 
natural law that was the common property of the pagan world, as 
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manifested in Cicero and Seneca. Grotius intends to show the uni-
versality of human sympathies and of consensus as indicating the 
rational normativities of human nature. 
Thomas Hobbes [1588–1679] was the founder of a secular science 
of Natural Law as a systematic theory of the elements that constitute 
society. In 1640, handwritten copies of his Elements of Law, Natural 
and Politic were circulated. A pirated copy was later published in 
1650 without his permission. In the meantime, he wrote De Cive in 
1642, published in Latin in a limited edition. Both of these works 
were important in his Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, and Power of 
a Common-wealth, Ecclesiasticall and Civill, published in 1651.5 
Hobbes created a new and scientific method, one that separated 
social from moral principles, one focused on human impulses and 
on an analysis of social institutions from a social-psychological 
standpoint. He argued that private property did not derive from 
nature, but from human conventions. This led to the question: Why 
do men want such artifice? Given a community of goods, there is 
a war of all against all. “Thus I had formed two certain postulates 
of human nature: (1) that of striving for private ownership; and (2) 
that of natural reason according to which everybody is anxious to 
escape violent death as the greatest natural evil. Starting from these 
principles, I believe that I have foreseen the necessity of fulfilling 
agreements, of keeping promises, that is, the elements of social 
duties.” Thus, Hobbes disputes the hypothesis of the natural equality 
of men, pointing to the vanity, selfishness, and envy of individuals. 
In Hobbes’s work, there is a conspicuous dilemma: Do affections or 
reason induce men to construct social institutions? In De Cive, I,6 he 
argues that mutual fear of others is the real motive, a motive that is 
identified with reason. Only Leviathan clearly states that the State is 
a work of art. Its natural origins are agreement among citizens lead-
ing to an artificial patrimonial contract, a natural voluntary subjec-
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tion to the majority leading to the artifice of government required by 
contract, and a coercive rule by a conqueror leading to a government 
acquired by force. The natural social relations between parents and 
children, and husbands and wives are characteristic of voluntary 
subjection and exemplify the hope of free men. The relationship 
between masters and servants is characteristic of coercive subjection 
because obedience is expected of servants. And Hobbes’s Social Con-
tract Theory includes a theory of social interpretation. A multitude 
of persons becomes a personality when a natural individual person 
represents the multivariety of men. The artificial unity of the repre-
sentative creates the unity of the persons not represented. His view 
of the Social Contract is that men should subject themselves to an 
absolute sovereign power that represents them. 
Samuel von Pufendorf [1632–1694] succeeds in connecting the 
positive elements of Grotius’s Natural Law with Hobbes’s scientific 
theory of human nature and of its laws. His work had a still wider 
influence on the Protestant universities than did the work of Gro-
tius. His textbook for students was particularly important. This 
was De Officio Homini et Civis, Juxta Legem Naturalem (1682),7 two 
volumes, a considerably shortened edition of his magnum opus, 
De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1672), 8 volumes.8 In contrast to Gro-
tius’s work, Pufendorf ’s books are academic treatises, which should 
elaborate a science of the statesman and of the citizen. As academic 
treatises, they are much more theoretical than Grotius’s book, which 
is imbued with the political disillusionment of the statesman and 
with the training of the practicing lawyer. Pufendorf mentions as 
his forerunners: Grotius, Hobbes, and John Selden [1584-1654]. He 
postulates a strictly scientific reform of law as indispensable after the 
progress that medicine, physics, and mathematics had accomplished. 
His violent criticism of Scholasticism and of Spanish philosophies 
of law indicates (1) the anti-Catholic resentment of Protestants; 
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(2) his philosophical ignorance, which Gottfried Leibniz [1646–1716] 
sharply criticizes; and (3) the complete diminution of the Christian 
Natural Law thinking from Protestant religion—what Thomas More 
had already practiced as logically necessary. 
Most revealing is Pufendorf ’s preface to his De Officio hominis et 
civis juxta legem naturalem libri duo (1673). He distinguishes three 
sciences: (1) Natural Law common to all men, deriving its origin 
from reason alone; (2) Civil Law valid for the statutory law in the 
single states; and (3) Moral Theology, the dictates of which God has 
given in Holy Scriptures. The greatest difference between the first 
and third points lies in the fact that Natural Law is rooted only in this 
life and will make man a worthy member of society. Moral Theology 
trains the citizen of the Heavenly City. Hence, the precepts of Natu-
ral Law are directed to eternal conduct. Natural Law has to do with 
fallen man, an animal with many evil impulses and so commands 
aid for the poor, assistance to the unfortunate, care for widows and 
orphans, pardon for wrongs, and maintenance of peace. Hobbes 
founded his secular science of Natural Law on a naturalistic theory 
of man. Pufendorf adapted Hobbes’s theory as the hypothesis of his 
system of social rights and duties, as the constituent elements of soci-
ety. This system of Natural Law is interested in the independence of 
human rationality and in the dynamics of intelligent instincts. Both 
are moved by the impulse of Socialitas (the goal of society). This is 
the principle of Natural Law. It means that what serves Socialitas 
is lawful and what harms it is unlawful. For this reason, it is the 
lex fundamentalis of Natural Law that everyone should see to it that 
society’s welfare be maintained and secured. Universal sociability 
is the norm, and all laws are merely correlates. Reason is sufficient 
to discover these in our hearts. The social duties of men are either 
absolute or conditional. There are only three absolute duties: (1) 
Neminem laedere, or do no one harm and make good any damage; 
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(2) to consider all others as by nature entitled to the same right; (3) 
to promote the well-being of fellow-men. There are six conditional 
duties, derived from: (1) agreements or engagements; (2) the use of 
language; (3) taking the oath; (4) acquisition of ownership and bona 
fide; (5) contracts and obligations; and (6) interpretation of laws and 
agreements. In the description of the state of nature and of the ori-
gins of state, Pufendorf closely follows Hobbes—with one important 
difference. He postulates two compacts: (1) pactum societatis and 
(2) pactum mutuum between ruler and subjects. Only through both 
does the state become a moral person. Like Hobbes, Pufendorf estab-
lishes a first sociological theory—a theory of the elements consti-
tuting social institutions. Within this theory, he classifies types of 
control and homogenous cooperation according to Grotius’s scheme. 
He briefly touches on the problems of constitutional and interna-
tional law. 
Grotius’s and Pufendorf ’s treatises were required readings in the 
classes on moral philosophy in which Moral Theology, Natural Law, 
Ethics, and Politics were the subdivisions, as implied in Grotius’s 
work. 
It is the merit of the Scottish philosophers in the second half of 
the eighteenth century to have turned the theories of Natural Law 
into sociological theories of human constitution under the influence 
of the empiricism and psychologism of John Locke and Shaftesbury 
and under the impact of the empirical rationalism of Montesquieu. 
They asserted that the science of the Statesman can be effective only 
when the professors are able to explain and to understand motives of 
social action and social conduct beyond the pale of legal institutions. 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N702
III. Stoicism
Philosophical Relevance
Roman Stoicism, as evinced by Seneca, Cicero, Epictetus [55–135], 
and Marcus Aurelius, became important to modern philosophers 
because:
1. Stoicism stressed first among the classical phi-
losophies subjective consciousness.
2. It offers social and moral norms as essentials of 
natural law. 
3. It emphasizes the primacy of moral and social 
conduct.
4. It is strictly intellectualis and rational with mate-
rialistic elements.
5. It suggests education for wisdom as potentially to 
all, actually to a few.
6. It presents a theory of passions and techniques for 
extirpating them.
7. It makes possible to know and to understand the 
process of nature and to adjust to it and to live ac-
cording to nature.
8. It combines philosophy and religion. 
Francis Bacon [1561–1626] refers frequently to Seneca, Cicero, 
Epictetus, Diogenes of Babylon or Seleucia [230–c. 150 BC], and 
Chrysippus [c. 279–c. 206 BC]. In his Essays (1597),9 Bacon argues 
that all moral and social requirements are implied in the Law of 
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Nature. Naturale est intellectus instinctus, which includes the ulti-
mate truth that conditions perception, induction, and conclusion. 
The consciousness of Natural Law is innate in man. Although it may 
be obscured, social consensus is its external sign. He sees the rule of 
Natural Law as an intersecting play of passions and their control, and 
he notes that affections can only be controlled by stronger affections. 
He transcends the Stoics, and he anticipates Hobbes. He saw Natural 
Law as a social instinct, linking the well-being of the individual to the 
commonweal and, at the same time, fortifying an individual’s self-
preservation. Pierre Charron [1541–1603], a close friend and disciple 
of Michel de Montaigne [1533–1592], stresses the independence of 
ethics from religion following Marcus Aurelius. Religion does not 
create morality. Passions are controlled by passions and by strength 
and density of Soul v. Fortune. One must learn to suspend judgment, 
pursue universal learning, become cosmopolitan, and retain an in-
ner sense of superiority to the inevitable roles that one must play. The 
true Stoic is l’honnête homme.
Benedictus de Spinoza [1632–1677] believed that there exists 
a natural social impulse in man as well as a natural desire to have 
others rejoice in the good in which one rejoices. Here, he echoes 
Hobbes’s Leviathan up to a point. But where Hobbes insists that fear 
of others underlies the origin of the state, Spinoza sees mutual aid 
as the justification of social institutions and the means of realizing 
human happiness. In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670),10 he 
writes: 
The formation of society serves not only for defensive 
purpose, but is also very useful, and indeed, absolutely 
necessary, as rendering possible the division of labor. If 
men did not render mutual assistance to each other, no 
one would have either the skill or the time to provide 
for his own sustenance and preservation: for all men are 
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equally apt for all work, and no one would be capable of 
preparing all that he individually stood in need of.11 
And again, in the same treatise:
[T]he object of government is not to change men from 
rational beings into beasts or puppets, but to enable them 
to develop their minds and bodies in security, and to em-
ploy their reason unshackled; neither showing hatred, 
anger, deceit, nor watched with the eyes of jealousy and 
injustice. In fact, the true aim of government is liberty.12 
Spinoza was deeply influenced by Lucius Annaeus Seneca (the 
Younger) [4 BC–65 AD], especially by his De Beneficiis, Book IV. See 
for instance:
     (18.2) Taken one by one, what are we? The prey of 
animals, their victims, the choicest blood, and the easiest 
to come by. Other animals have enough strength to pro-
tect themselves, and those that were born to wander and 
lead isolated lives are armed. But man is covered with a 
delicate skin: he has neither powerful claws nor teeth to 
instill fear in others; naked and weak as he is, it is fel-
lowship that protects him. God has granted two things 
that make this vulnerable creature the strongest of all: 
reason and fellowship. So the being that on its own was 
no match for anything is now the master of all things.
      (18.3) Fellowship has given him power over all ani-
mals; fellowship has conferred on this terrestrial creature 
control of another’s sphere and ordered him to rule even 
by sea. It is this that has checked the incursions of dis-
ease, provided support for his old age, and given him 
comfort in his sufferings; it is this that makes us brave 
because we can call on it for help against Fortune.
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   (18.4) Remove fellowship and you will destroy the unity 
of mankind on which our life depends. But you will re-
move it if you make ingratitude something to be avoided 
not for its own sake, but because it has something to fear: 
for how many there are who can safely be ungrateful! In 
fact, I call ungrateful anyone whose gratitude is caused 
by fear.13
Spinoza also invokes Cicero’s De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, 
Book III (65–66): 
     And the fact that no one would choose to live in 
splendid isolation, however well supplied with pleasures, 
shows that we are born to join together and associate 
with one another and form natural communities. Indeed 
we are naturally driven to want to help as many people 
as possible, especially by teaching and handing on the 
principles of practical reason. It is hard to find anyone 
who does not pass on what they know to someone else. 
Thus we have a propensity for teaching as much as for 
learning.14
Spinoza postulates an organic conception of society with the 
analogy between the social organism and the individual, such as 
one finds in Marcus Aurelius, Meditationes, VII. Spinoza argued 
(Book IV, Proposition 54) that “Repentance is not a virtue, that is, 
it does not arise from reason; he who repents of his action is doubly 
unhappy or weak.” Echoing Seneca again (De Tranquillitate Animi, 
2, paragraph 8), he argues that fear and wavering of the mind come 
to men because they can neither rule nor obey their desires.
His Propositions 67–73 in Book IV of Ethics are written in the 
form of an apotheosis of the free man (homo liber) corresponding to 
the Stoics’ apotheosis of the wise man. The Propositions are:
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P67. A free man thinks of death least of all things, 
and his wisdom is a meditation of life, not of death.
P68. If men were born free, they would form no 
conception of good and evil so long as they were free.
P69. The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great 
in avoiding dangers as in overcoming them.
P70. The free man, who lives among the ignorant, 
strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favors 
from them.
P71. Only free men are truly grateful to one 
another.
P72. The free man never acts deceitfully, but always 
with good faith.
P73. The man who is guided by reason is more 
free in a state where he lives under a system of laws 
than in solitude where [he] obeys only himself.15
The use of “free” as a description of the man who lives according 
to the guidance of reason is explained by Spinoza’s use of the term 
servitude as a description of the “impotence of men to govern or 
restrain their emotions.” (Ethics, IV, preface.)
Note on Proposition 69 on courage. Courage is caution: a free man 
chooses flight by the same courage or presence of mind as that by 
which he chooses battle. Here, Spinoza echoes Seneca, Epistulae 
Morales, 85, paragraphs 26 and 28. 
Note on Proposition 70 on favors. Should favors be accepted from 
everybody? Here, Spinoza echoes Seneca De Beneficiis, II, 18, para-
graphs 4–7.
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Note on Proposition 71 on gratitude. Echoes Seneca De Beneficiis, 
II, 24.
Note on Proposition 72 on the virtues of honesty and good faith. 
These virtues are extolled in every copybook as fundamental ele-
ments of the free man. Is a man allowed to break faith in order to 
escape death? Spinoza’s negative answer again reflects Seneca. Fides 
is the holiest good that may be in a man’s heart. Epistulae Morales, 88, 
paragraph 29. Participation in the organized life of society (accord-
ing to Seneca) was considered one of the characteristic virtues of the 
Wise Man. De Otio, III, 2. 
Note on Proposition 73. A man who is guided by reason is freer 
in a state where he lives according to the common laws than he is 
in solitude where he obeys himself alone. One must seek remedies 
against emotions, which are diseases of the mind like desire (cupidi-
tas), pleasure (letitia), pain (tristitia), and fear (metum). 
René Descartes [1596–1650] is Stoic in his philosophical and 
moral attitude. His subjective intellectualism—his notions of innate 
ideas, superiority of mind, philosophical self-redemption by control 
of passions, and his theory of generosity—demonstrate his modern 
Stoicism. He is anti-Stoic because the Stoics do not develop scientific 
techniques needed to realize their principles. He evinces his posi-
tion in his diverse approaches toward moral problems in Discours de 
la méthode (1637),16 Les passions de l’âme (1649), and Lettres sur la 
morale (1643–1649), his 32 letters to Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia 
(he received 26 in exchange). 
Stoicism as Intellectual and Social Fashion
1. Anti-Christian 
• Montaigne, Charron, Spinoza, Descartes upheld the self-
redemption of the free and wise man
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2. Christian Stoicism 
• Guillaume du Vair [1556–1621], Justus Lipsius [1547–
1606], Bishop Joseph Hall [1574–1656], and Bishop Joseph 
Butler [1692–1752] 
• Aspects of Christian Stoicism: 
 • How virtuous were the pagans, how un-Christian are we 
 • Adjusting Christian ethics to modern rationalism  
  and Panentheism 
 • Reconciling the principles of Fortuna and Providence 
 • Practical usefulness of theory of control of passions
3. Stoicism as attitude 
• Stoic principles among the writers of Essays and 
Characters
4. Stoicism as style 
• The chronology of the publication of Stoic writings over 
a period of 200 years is indicative of Stoicism as an intellec-
tual and social fashion:
1471. Cicero. Philosophical works at Venice. Introduced 
classical Stoicism to Europe
1472. Diogenes Laërtius. The Lives and Opinions of 
Eminent Philosophers. Latin
1475. Seneca. Epistulae Morales
1493. Epictetus. Manual. Latin by Politian
1509. Plutarch. Moralia
1516. Pietro Pomponazzi [1462–1525]. De Immoralitate 
Animae (Stoicism—last stand of disillusioned intellec-
tual)
1528. Epictetus. Manual. Greek by Aldus
1533. Diogenes Laërtius. The Lives and Opinions of 
Eminent Philosophers. Greek
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1534. Cicero. Three Books of Tullyas Offyces, by Robert 
Whittington [1480–1553]
1544. Epictetus. Manual. French
1553. Cicero. Three Books of Duties. Translated by 
Nicolas Grimald [1519/20–1562] 
1558. Marcus Aurelius. Meditationes
1567. Epictetus. Manual. Translated into English by 
James Sanford (flourished 1567)
1567. Epictetus. Manual. Translated into French
1575. Tacitus. Edited by Justus Lipsius 
1578. Seneca. De Clementia. Translated into French
1581. Justus Lipsius. Commentary on Tacitus
1584. Justus Lipsius. De Constantia. More than 80 edi-
tions in 300 years 
1585. Seneca. De Ira. Translated into French
1585. Guillaume du Vair. Saincte Philosophie
1587–8. Justus Lipsius. Politicorum sive Civilis doctrinae 
libri sex 
1590. François de Malherbe [1555–1628]. Bouquet 
de fleurs à Sénèque
1592. Guillaume du Vair. De la Philosophie morale des 
Stoiques
1594. Guillaume du Vair. De La Constance Et 
Consolation és Calamites Publiques
1598. Seneca. Les Oeuvres morales et meslees de 
Senecque. Simon Goulart and Mathieu de Chalvet, edi-
tors
1598. Seneca. Oeuvres morales and Epictetus Manual. 
Translated into French 
1601. William Cornwallis [1579–1614]. Discourses upon 
Seneca the Tragedian
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1604. Justus Lipsius. Manuductio ad Stoicam 
Philosophiam and Physiologia Stoicorum  
1605. Justus Lipsius. Annaei Senecae Philosophi Opera, 
Quae Exstant Omnia, A Iusto Lipsio emendata, et 
Scholiis illustrate
1609. Epictetus. Manual. Translated into French by the 
General of the Congregation of the Feuillants
1610. Epictetus. Manual. Translated into English by 
John Healey [d. 1610]
1611. Epictetus. Bishop Joseph Hall. Epictetus in Six 
Decades
1614. Seneca. The Workes Of Lvcius Annaevs Seneca, 
Both Morall And Naturall. Translated By Thomas Lodge 
[1558–1625]
1619. Seneca. Works. Translated into French par 
Mathieu de Chalvet [1528–1607], Président de 
Parlement de Toulouse
1627. Seneca. Works. Translated into French
1634. Marcus Aurelius. Works. Edited by Mericus 
Casanbonus von Oxford [1599–1671]. Latin
1643. Sir Thomas Browne [1605–1682]. Religio Medici. 
1645. Edward Herbert of Cherbury [1583–1648]. De 
Causis errorum: una cum tractatu de religione laici, et 
appendice ad sacerdotes, nec non quibusdam poematibus
1646. Marin Le Roy Gomberville [1600–1674]. La 
doctrine des moeurs; tirée de la philosophie des stoiques 
représentée en cent tableaux et expliquée en cent 
discours qui vient de loin (for Louis XIV, then seven 
years old). Les Quinti Horatii Flacci emblemata (1607) 
du peintre anversois Otto Van Veen
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1649. Descartes. Discours de la méthode. Translated into 
English
1651. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. English
1652. Jean-Louis Guez de Balzac [1597–1654]. Le 
Socrate chrétien 
1653. Epictetus. Manual. Translated into French by 
mystic Desmants de Saint Sabin
1653. Justus Lipsius. De Constantia. 2nd edition.
1654. Justus Lipsius. De Constantia. 3rd edition. 
1660. La Sure. L’Esprit de Sénèque dédié a Touquet 
1663. Abbé d’Aubigny. Macarie en la Reyne des isles 
fortunier, histoire allégorique, continuant la philosophie 
des Stoiques sous la crile de plusieurs aventures agréables 
en forme de roman
1663. A. Legand. Les caractères de l’homme sans passions 
selon les sentiments de Sénèque
1663. George Mackenzie [1636/1638–1691]. Religio 
Stoici
IV. Francis Bacon: Statesman, Jurist, Philosopher
It is not enough to say that Francis Bacon takes up the naturalistic 
traditions as developed by Machiavelli and Hobbes. There are ele-
ments in his thinking and attitude toward life that do not occur in 
the past.
In all authors previously discussed, we find as hypotheses of their 
ideas some beliefs in the authority of the Classics or of Christianity, 
in the validity of a priori thinking, in the autonomy of theoretical 
and moral truth. All these thinkers were suspicious of the idea of 
progress or they admitted it only with strict reservations. 
But Bacon challenged all previous traditions and standards. In 
spite of his cautious praise of the genius of the Ancients, he takes his 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N712
stand on the side of the moderns. Advancement of learning is pos-
sible; that is, progress is possible. Progress implies optimism for the 
future. Learning is for Bacon knowledge about nature. He opposes 
nature to mind, matter to spirit, science to speculation, experiment 
to Aristotle, discoveries from the light of nature to the authority of 
the classics. Antiquitas saeculi—juventus mundus. New methods by 
Ancients untried and unknown. Bacon’s goal: new methods by mod-
erns will create a true universal natural philosophy. He proclaims 
knowledge for power and control of Nature, physical, human, and 
social. The goal of science is the utilitarian progress of conditions of 
living. He opposes the knowledge gained from senses, matter, and 
nature to the abstract deductions of mind and spirit. This radical 
criticism makes possible his contribution to a social-psychological 
theory of error and knowledge. There are four types of error:
1. Idols of Tribe. These mental characteristics are 
common to all. There is a proneness to suppose 
more regularity of order than actually exists; there 
is a tendency of mental presuppositions to bend all 
things into conformity with themselves. Influence 
of Will and Affections such as pride, hope, impa-
tience, desires upon the mind: dullness, deception, 
and incompetence of senses. 
2. Idols of Care. This refers to the bias that educa-
tion and environment impose on the variable spirit 
of man.
3. Idols of Theatre. Being conditioned by classical 
idealistic and deductive philosophical dogmatism. 
4. Idols of Market. This is the most troublesome form 
of error. This is the dispute over words—no faith in 
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definition. Language does not impart to the mind a 
true and accurate picture of material reality.  
Bacon’s new method points toward a natural experimental his-
tory that may serve as the foundation of a true philosophy. Such a 
history would be a comprehensive interpretation of nature based on 
a comprehensive collection of experiments and observations.
Bacon divides such a Natural History into search for causes and 
operative production of effects. He is primarily concerned with the 
last division. In this connection, he develops his idea on the induc-
tion method. This has three distinctive features: 
1. There are various intermediary stages of estab-
lishing general principles. His logic moves from par-
ticulars slowly and rises gradually to more abstract 
and more comprehensive generalizations. 
2. A key feature of induction is his conception of 
form. He bases sciences on a purely physical foun-
dation. The primary elements of nature: qualities of 
dense—rare; solid—fluid; hot—cold; heavy—light. 
Materialistic basis: bodies are not acted on but by 
other bodies (atomic theory, similar to Lucretius 
[99–55 BC] in De Rerum Natura). Matter rather than 
form draws his attention. Form—laws of movement 
of bodies—laws of absolute actuality. They govern 
and constitute any simple nature, such as heat, light, 
weight, in every kind of matter. Bacon believed that 
there are only a few forms of simple, or abstract, 
nature. 
3. Its individualization by a rigid conception of 
rejection and exclusion. Bacon has influenced all 
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ways of philosophical and practical thinking. His 
influence on Descartes’s scientific attitude is obvi-
ous. Implicitly, his work has the greatest relevance 
for sociology.
The hypothesis of the Essays is and remains relevant for all types 
of sociological research as to distinguish inner goodness and exter-
nal parading of goodness. What he calls Civil Knowledge would be 
a science in social institutions between socii. In his Essays, we have 
a variety of analyses of public attitudes that imply a theory of social 
conduct with a sequence of interest from security over prestige to 
power and wealth. Bacon calls himself anti-Ciceronian. Positively 
formulated, it means he feels himself closer to Machiavelli, Seneca, 
and Tacitus. In Bacon’s work, the “Essay” has a specific function. It 
is the literary expression of a reflection on social conduct liberated 
from theological or metaphysical values. It is a consideration that 
does not refer to any system of social values as criteria for their good 
or bad qualifications. It is an attempt to construct an ideal type of 
situational behavior or of passion and to present it in such form as to 
raise the impression of a fragment of life that contains the whole in 
its unsystematic openness. 
V.         Mystical and social experiences contribute to Social 
Psychology 
Bacon’s essays and those by Jeremy Taylor [1613–1667], Thomas Tra-
herne [1636–1674], and Henry Vaughan [1621–1695] have one ele-
ment in common. They are all inspired by Seneca, the psychologist 
who experiences his solitude in a world of routine and of manipu-
lated interests. Moderns understand such experiences. They under-
stand Seneca’s Epistles as the new literary pattern of the Essay. They 
define it as a form that permits them to regard and analyze from 
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all angles a social-psychological phenomenon, to construct its ideal 
type and grasp a fragment of the stream of experience alike. 
It is characteristic for the modern situation that Machiavelli 
joins Seneca all the time. However, mystical experiences deeply 
influenced introspection and psychological refinement. Ignatius of 
Loyola [1491–1556] and the modern Quietism contributed to creat-
ing new psychological insights. Loyola discovered the usefulness of 
mystical techniques for establishing complete control over Self and 
others by manipulating students who were striving for religious per-
fection. His technique should enable them to recognize their sins, 
to confess them, to begin a new life. His Spiritual Exercises were the 
first modern rule and regimentation of psychic training. In con-
trast to medieval usage, they required a relation between student 
and trainer, between soldier and officer. The military metaphors are 
valid because students were never informed about the sequence of 
the procedure or about the handbook of the Spiritual Exercises. No 
modern psychologist who wishes to train as elite has neglected to 
study the book and its new theory of asceticism, which neglects the 
physical asceticism of the past in favor of humiliating the mind and 
training total obedience. 
Quietism is relevant to the social scientist through Francis de 
Sales, Bishop of Geneva [1567–1622], who made it fashionable. There 
are psychological and aesthetic elements in the poetry and philoso-
phy of Saint Teresa of Ávila [1515–1582] and of Saint John of the 
Cross [1542–1591], founders of the Discalced Carmelites, that Saint 
Francis de Sales exploited for making religion attractive to the new 
society of an urban and learned court. He succeeded in cultivating 
a politeness and refinement of religious and societal relationships. 
The conscious enjoyment of such psychological processes induced 
the ladies in the salons to discover a new entertainment. This new 
game at parties was called “Portrait Writing.” 
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La Carte de Tendre by Mademoiselle Madeleine de Scudéry 
[1607–1701] and Les  Précieuses ridicules by Molière [Jean-Baptiste 
Poquelin, 1622–1673] describe the situation. La Carte de Tendre is as 
sophisticated an allegory of psychological types as Sales’s manipula-
tion of Calvary.17 
Francis de Sales attempts to connect the Spiritual Humanism 
of Erasmus with the Spiritual Militarism of the Jesuits. That is why 
he was liked by Jesuits and Jansenists alike. His Philotéa or Intro-
duction à La Vie Dévote was quickly translated into English and 
became a perennial best seller.18 It raised the continuous reflection 
on psychological processes in ourselves and in our fellow-socii. His 
influence is still conspicuous in Les Aventures De Télémaque Fran-
çois Fénelon [1651–1715], in his tender sociability. Another mystical 
discovery, that of the “beautiful soul,” influenced Shaftesbury and 
Francis Hutcheson. The notion derives from Saint Teresa; her mysti-
cal theology and poetry influenced social conduct and reflection on 
societal relations through various channels that made the mystical 
aloofness a fashionable psychological sensation. We should bear in 
mind that modern mysticism, in particular, Quietism, is different 
from medieval mysticism. Medieval mystics were speculative and 
philosophical in their procedure for attaining identification with the 
Divine. Modern Quietism applies new techniques for eliminating 
reason first and realizing the state of total love as complete emptiness 
and being open and ready for the appearance of the Divine in the 
vacuum. Such processes bring into existence what, finally, Fénelon 
called “paramour.”
The struggle between Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet [1627–1704] and 
Fénelon regarding this problem anticipates in mystical terms the 
modern combat between the adherents of moral disinterestedness 
and hedonists or utilitarians. It is not incidental that naturalistic and 
mystical analyses of men’s life in the world come to the same conclu-
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sion. The politician experiences the dynamics of interests in close 
combat for his own interests. The mystic experiences the dynamics 
of interests as temptation to be eradicated. Both come to the same 
conclusion as knowing and understanding human beings. Both are 
concerned with the “human condition,” which is both sociological 
and psychological. All are influenced by Montaigne, who is at the 
borderline of our analysis because his topic is the Self, not Society 
and Self interrelated. However, he set the pattern, the perfect case 
of which we will see in the work of Louis de Rouvroy, duc de Saint- 
Simon [1675–1755], the dynamic analysis of characters as moving 
and being moved. 
Blaise Pascal [1623–1662], who hated Montaigne and the mod-
ern fashion of Stoicism, repeats and recapitulates Montaigne in the 
passages that deal with the fallacies of social institutions as custom, 
procedure of law, social conventions, status, and prestige. The radi-
cal pessimism of Montaigne and Pascal is independent of mystical 
or political traditions—the awareness of the precarious situation of 
the thoughtful man in a world of rational institutions that spread 
uniformity and standardization. In many respects, François de La 
Rochefoucauld [1613–1680] is more pessimistic than Pascal. He 
elaborates in a variety of perspectives the thesis that our virtues are 
disguised vices and that self-love is the decisive passion that directs 
and fools men.
Les Caractères by Jean de La Bruyère [1645–1696] imitates Theo-
phrastus [d. 287 BC] only at the surface. It advances the grim analysis 
of Pascal and La Rochefoucauld into the sphere of social institutions. 
La Bruyère’s study is mainly concerned with the behavior patterns of 
a society that lives under a despotic regime. He studies the declining 
nobility’s conduct, the attitude of the Parvenu, the diverse ways of 
being Christian under such conditions, the courtier, and the banker, 
both successful and bankrupt. He takes the categories of Court and 
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Town seriously as sociological categories; he discovers the “common 
people” as the very class that remains true to standards of human 
decency. Throughout the book, he scrutinizes the interdependence 
of attitudes of domination and of submission, the unity of encroach-
ing on others and of being subservient. He comes to the conclusion 
that man is basically insecure in himself, a problem that Henri Berg-
son [1859–1941] took up in his last book.19
Memoirs became a source book of sociological and psychologi-
cal insights since the defeated aristocrats of the French had gained 
leisure and time for reflecting on the causes of their defeat and of the 
victory of the absolute monarchy. Such memoirs are written by par-
tisans, but they have scientific value. Jean François Paul de Gondi, 
Cardinal de Retz [1613–1679] and LaRochefoucauld have an intellec-
tual superiority that makes it possible to present the two perspectives 
of victors and conquered alike. 
The work of Saint-Simon is different and can claim scientific 
objectivity, although we know that his resentments have falsified his 
judgment in some rare cases of personal enemies. It was not a par-
tisan book. It was not written for publication. It was not intended to 
be art or politics. It was supposed to be the true and comprehensive 
report on the events and happenings at the court during the reign of 
Louis XIV [1638–1715] and through the death of the Regent [Philippe 
II, Duke of Orléans from the death of Louis XIV in 1715 until 1723 
when Louis XV ascended to the throne]. The Mémoirs became a 
great piece of sociological and psychological inquiry. Honoré de Bal-
zac [1799–1850] understood it as “Human Comedy” of a historical 
society that he desired to remake for the bourgeois society of his own 
time. Valentin Louis Georges Eugène Marcel Proust [1871–1922] was 
thrilled by the psychological method that Saint-Simon had practiced 
prior to scientific psychology. 
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Saint-Simon’s Mémoirs is one of the early cases of sociological-
historical writings that demonstrate the scientific effectiveness of 
conservative thinkers for making accurate and correct sociological 
predictions. Conservative authors have the advantage over radical 
authors because they are able to consider all elements of social situ-
ations, including the positive sides of human conduct that never fail 
completely. In modern times, Edmund Burke [1729–1797], Alexis 
de Tocqueville [1805–1859], Prince Klemens von Metternich [1773–
1859], and Jacob Burckhardt [1818–1897] succeeded in predicting 
the most shocking developments because their historical perspective 
permitted them to check the accounts of historical situations and 
make a balance sheet.
Saint-Simon was such a conservative thinker. He remained true 
to a romantic picture of the feudal monarchy that, he believed, had 
still existed in the early years of Louis XIII—a type of government 
where the king is the first among his peers and the feudal families 
are in charge of the administration of the country. The hypothesis 
for his analysis is the conviction that this feudal monarchy is gone. 
This historical insight with its normative implications made possible 
a comprehensive sociological description and analysis of an entire 
social world.
Saint-Simon states as his thesis that the Court is a social world of 
its own. It is not any longer the patriarchal home of the feudal ruler 
whose manorial lords are friends and fellows. The modern court is 
an abstract institution, a tremendous mechanism subject to its own 
laws. He emphasizes the thesis by presenting the exploited and des-
perate people of Paris and of the Provinces in revolt against taxation, 
starvation, and religious oppression at the fringes of his topic. Fran-
çois Fénelon and his loyal friends, Ambroise Chevreux [1728–1792] 
and Paul de Beauvilliers [1648–1714], appear at the borderline of the 
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world of the Court as examples of sincere devotion to a sublime and 
universal cause. That world also portrays some libertines and adven-
turers as marginal cases of outlaws and of pathology. 
The Court of modern absolute monarchy is a marketplace and 
exchange for bargaining positions for status and prestige. The King 
is supposed to be absolute. This remains a legal claim, not a social 
reality. Actually, the ministers decide the great issues, and they are 
shrewd enough to make the King believe that they only execute his 
sovereign will, while they keep him busy with details, such as design 
of uniforms, the organization of parades, and so on. Saint-Simon 
practices a true sociological method. He scrutinizes what the legal 
and constitutional institutions betray when seen in their social func-
tioning. This approach, with the presupposition of his romantic and 
liberal conservatism, produces one of the most striking sociological 
analyses and predictions in prescientific times. Pursuing his ideas on 
the relative power of the absolute monarch, he investigates thoroughly 
the people who keep the wheels of government and administration 
moving. This is a genuinely sociological study on the rise of political 
bureaucracies. Ministers, intendants, and governors are described 
and scrutinized in their rise, service, and accomplishments. Such 
case studies, accumulated throughout the book, lead the author to 
definite conclusions. In sociological terms, this is not a monarchy 
any longer, supported by and claiming the cooperation of feudal 
lords. This is instead the rule of the “vile bourgeoisie.” For ministers, 
governors, and even generals rise from the wealthy or poor middle 
classes because they have competence, skill, money, and moral stam-
ina. In particular, the class of the “Nobility of Law” (noblesse de la 
robe) invades court and administration. The legal professionals have 
economic power, required training, and the will to attain the respon-
sibility of political power. It is indicative for Saint-Simon’s scientific 
objectivity that he never presents such cases in abstract generaliza-
O R I G I N S  O F  S O C I O L O G Y  A N D  S O C I A L  P S YC H O L O G Y  (19 4 7) 721
tions. These men are “bourgeois.” Among them are rascals, men of 
unscrupulous ambition, but there are also others qualified morally 
and technically who are devoted to the state and who subordinate 
their own interests to those of the body politic. They present moral 
qualifications and discipline that make their work irreproachable. 
Saint-Simon curses and praises at the same time. 
He painted such background on purpose, to show the uprooted 
aristocracy of the Court. He describes them as a class of insecure 
actors. They parade prestige and power, but they betray economic 
poverty and social insecurity. They live off the arbitrary grace of the 
monarch, of his ministers, of the ruling pressure groups. They are 
chasing for jobs, for rents, for positions in order to gain security for 
all members of their class. Saint-Simon sees the external splendor 
and recognizes its lie. He analyzes the Fair of Vanity and Despair.
It is indicative of Saint-Simon that he understands the economic 
reasons for the plight of feudal society. He devotes some impor-
tant analyses to cases of intermarriage between feudal and banker 
families. It is a characteristic of his superior humaneness that he is 
shocked by the moral cynicism of the feudal class and impressed by 
the dignified objections of the “bourgeois.” 
Saint-Simon analyses the Court as a social world of organized 
competition, a field of competitive intrigues and conspiracies. All 
these brilliant people are moving and moved by their interests. 
Interests can be reduced to two fundamental desires: power and 
wealth. They are interrelated with each other in a postfeudal world. 
Saint-Simon inaugurated a scientific procedure that we can label as 
a sociology of social structures and social institutions. From his pio-
neering clearing, we see the road to Balzac, Marx, Robert Staughton 
Lynd [1892–1970], and Thorstein Bunde Veblen [1857–1929]. The 
new method implies a sociological theory of revolution. Being a 
conservative radical, he is aware that revolutions do not result from 
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a class alignment and the antagonisms between two classes. Revolu-
tions arise when a status quo is attacked by the joint opposition of 
the oppressed and the deprived. Every regime establishes itself by 
depriving some groups of their status. They will be as revolution-
ary as are the exploited and oppressed. When the two antagonistic 
groups meet and merge, revolution will be possible. 
There is still a third merit to Saint-Simon’s work. He elaborated 
the pattern of portraits created in the salons under the inspiration 
of Mlle. de Scudéry to a social-psychological method. He refused 
to reduce characters of human persons to formulas or abstract 
conceptions. His characters are dynamic and moving. They move 
with the social process, which is moving and moved. Education, 
status, and prestige, social pressure, and a variety of changing 
conditions determine the moving kaleidoscope of human characters. 
There is the Duke of Anjou, educated as a playboy in order to thwart 
his developing political ambitions. Unexpectedly, he becomes king of 
Spain. His adjustment to the new situation is an element of his char-
acter. There are plenty of portraits that demonstrate the coexistence 
of most antagonistic traits on various levels of social contacts. There 
is Madame, both rude and tender, proud and helpless, of superior 
intelligence and of ridiculous naïveté. There is the in-depth analy-
sis of the various reactions to the death of Monseigneur, a detailed 
description of what courtiers parade and betray, and an unforgetta-
ble description of the required masks of society. Proust was thrilled 
by such methods and praised them as those of an artist, a state-
ment that needs correction. It is instead an effort toward descriptive 
psychology in the sense that Wilhelm Dilthey [1833–1911] used the 
term. 
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VI. Variable Mores and Invariable Human Nature
The Cartesian School exerted an indirect influence on social studies. 
They were suspicious of the scientific character of historical research, 
and they admitted only mathematical truth as evident and valid. 
However, they were able to state objectively the nature of human 
beings as dynamics of needs, desires, and passions. They assumed 
that the heart is in control of reason and directs it according to its 
wishes. This description of human nature is based on the analysis 
of societal relationships and of social conduct. The social nature of 
man remains identical although there are changes of mores, atti-
tudes, conventions, and patterns of social ideals in the history of 
civilization. Among Cartesians, the theory of social variables and 
invariables led to scientific studies relevant for the rise of sociology. 
    Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle [1657–1757] takes the first 
strides toward scientific history that can establish objective truth 
when conscious of methodological tools such as selection according 
to interests, defining the structures of epochs and civilizations, and 
analyzing the minutest details that might have influenced the motives 
of agents. He was suspicious of general trends and of providential 
(final) causes. For him, history is not told but instead is explained and 
understood. It is history and sociology alike: sociology, because we 
can predict social conduct being aware of the sameness of the human 
heart and of its responses to certain conditions; history, because rea-
son makes progress and changes institutions, mores, and standards. 
     Fontenelle lays the foundations for a sociology of knowledge by 
examining error in analyzing the causes that bring fables and myths 
into existence. His analysis of the origins of fables interprets the 
rise of myths and fables as efforts to explain the works of nature by 
prescientific tools. Here, he anticipates Comte’s Law of Three Stages. 
[The Law of Three Stages proposes that society in general and each 
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science goes through three stages: the theological stage, the meta-
physical stage, and the positive stage.—Eds.]
In a more articulate and experienced analysis, Fontenelle lays the 
foundations for the sociology of primitive religions, developed in 
his Histoire des Oracles,20 generally recognized as relevant for nine-
teenth-century anthropologists. Finally, his Nouveaux Dialogues des 
Morts [1683]21 implicitly present a sequence of interests that deter-
mine the life and action of human beings in history. 
Pierre Bayle [1647–1706] contributed to the development of a 
positive sociology by opposing the all-embracing thirst for “facts” 
and all speculation and a priori thinking. He insisted on the use of 
the comparative method. 
First, Bayle analyzes the structure of prejudice and superstition as 
mass phenomena. He sees their roots in human inertia, the desire for 
intellectual security in traditions and established authorities, in respect 
for taken-for-granted notions and, finally, in simple human credulity.
Second, Bayle looks at the structure of “miracles.” His analysis 
here has a superficial affinity to that of Machiavelli, but it is differ-
ent in method. He advises that one should not admit something as 
a miracle unless the facts of an incident are inexplicable by natural 
reason. He argues that “miracles” frequently result from desires and 
imagination. 
Third, he analyzes the practice and theory of religion. He consid-
ers Christian society to be as wicked as pagan society. Atheist societ-
ies are capable of virtue, as seen in the work of Epicurus and, indeed, 
in the society of Libertins because of Bayle’s own skepticism and 
advocacy of hétérodoxie.22 Bayle applies methods of historical criti-
cism carefully. He believed that objectivity was possible when the 
mind is liberated from personal animosities and particular partisan 
perspectives and subjective interests. He argued that political inter-
ests, not religious connections, caused civil wars. And so he advised 
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religious toleration in a secular state, anticipating Montesquieu’s 
Lettres Persanes [1721].23
Bayle analyzes the conditions of human nature, the construc-
tive and destructive sides of the passions, and the idea of Original 
Sin and the Fall as both theological symbols and natural facts. He 
concludes that inner and moral theory is independent of theological-
metaphysical speculations.
Bayle also concludes that there is unanimous recognition of 
the chief moral rules among civilized nations, established by his 
methods of observation and comparison. There is an autonomy of 
morals beyond theological doctrines, established by this historical/
sociological method. Sociology reveals a regular sequence of human 
motives: interests, passions, ambitions, and lust for power. Passions 
themselves can be both good and bad and can lead to refinement and 
sensibility or to vices. 
Bayle’s most important works are: 
• Dictionnaire historique et critique (Rotterdam: Leers, 
1697; 2nd edition, 1702)
• Pensées diverses sur la comète de 1680 (1681; Amster-
dam, 1749), 4 volumes
• Critique generale de l’histoire du Calvinisme du P. Maim-
bourg (1682) (A Ville-Franche, Chez Pierre le Blanc, 1683), 
2nd edition
Note: Lucien Lévy-Bruhl [1857–1939], a philosopher and anthro-
pologist who specialized in the “primitive mind,” takes over Fon-
tenelle and Bayle for sociology in an article entitled “Les tendances 
générales de Bayle et de Fontenelle,” that appeared in the Revue 
d’Histoire de la Philosophie, Volume 1, in both the January and 
March editions, 1927, 49–68.
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François-Marie Arouet, nom de plume Voltaire [1694–1778] 
unified the special approaches developed by Fontenelle and Bayle 
and created a genuinely sociological history in his Le Siècle de Louis 
XIV [1751] and his Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations [1756]. 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing [1729–1781] said of Voltaire’s Le Siècle de 
Louis XIV: “No author has dared to make such a subject the topic of 
his research so far. For this reason the author of the book is entitled 
to boast: I first pioneered into virgin soil.” Voltaire’s work took a 
stride forward in detailed analysis of the social process. The motives 
and passions in the political sphere remain invariable. Only under 
certain circumstances do rulers arise who establish the security 
that makes possible the flowering of civilization, mores, and refine-
ment. He avoids the grim reality of blood, tears, and despair that are 
embedded in the foundations of such security. His main intention is 
to describe the constructive faculties of societies beyond the pale of 
political institutions. Arts and crafts, science, philosophy, religion, 
sentimental refinement, and the high standards of societal relation-
ships are his subject. He sees society as the very dynamics of history 
even as he sees the state, somewhat precariously, as indispensable 
for peace and security, even though it always misuses its power. He 
is interested as well in cultural cross-fertilization between civiliza-
tions, in the role of minorities in societies, in the influence of classes 
and of economic institutions, and in the place of ideas in the prog-
ress of history. 
VII. Universality of conditions, history, natural law
The most important works of Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron 
de La Brède et de Montesquieu [1689–1755] are Lettres Persanes 
(1721), Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et 
de leur decadence (1734), and De l’esprit des lois (1758). The latter 
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book is basic for sociology and for several of its different branches. 
All French sociologists, including Comte, Émile Durkheim [1858–
1917], and Georges Gurvitch [1894–1965], have called Montesquieu 
the founder of French sociology. Among his contemporaries, Jean 
Le Rond d’Alembert [1717–1783] recognized the novelty of a purely 
empirical method for establishing the truth about the context of 
social institutions. Montesquieu takes for granted that there is jus-
tice prior to the positive law, that divine and natural laws pervade 
the whole. For his scientific and empirical method, he refrains from 
all speculation and understands the spiritual and moral ideas as 
elements of the human constitution in social action. This makes it 
possible to investigate social change, the dynamic context of social 
structures, and the general laws; that is, the tendencies coherent and 
necessary in themselves as ideal types that appear only in historical 
articulations. He does this empirically and objectively by explaining 
their developments in terms of the interaction of physical and moral 
causes. The invisible context is that man modifies nature; nature 
modifies man. Physical laws are invariable. Moral laws are flexible 
and dynamic and, ultimately, decisive. Moral laws create a general 
spirit of a society that leads to a specific ethos; that is, a prerational 
system of preferences and values that determine individual and 
social conduct. The term ethos was coined by Max Ferdinand Scheler 
[1874–1928], but Montesquieu discovered its decisive importance.
Montesquieu led the way to: 
1. Social morphology (ecology). The study of the size, 
volume, and stratification of groups as well as the 
density of population as a function of the physical 
conditions of the soil, of the nature of the area, and 
of the climate and of all physical elements of envi-
ronments. 
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2. Structural sociology (historical sociology). Montes-
quieu discovers the interdependence of all spheres 
of social action and of individual behavior. In the 
preface of the first edition of De l’esprit des lois 
(Geneve: Chez Barrillot & fils, 1748), he defines 
the book’s title as indicating the interrelationships 
between the positive laws and the political forms 
of government, the mores, the climate, the popula-
tion, the religion, commerce, and industrial forces. 
They create the context or structure within which 
the various societies develop according to the con-
ditions established by the context. This is always a 
historical context. However, Montesquieu is still far 
away from recognizing history as a necessary evolu-
tion. It is the life of men in time. But the concatena-
tions of conditions differ in each moment, and there 
is no general denominator for the whole process of 
history. Nor is there any general theory of progress. 
In these efforts toward a historical sociology, Mon-
tesquieu transforms the science of the Law of Nature 
into the empirical analysis of the varieties of social 
structures and of social attitudes. He opens the way 
for sociology as an empirical science that deals with 
the nature of man in time and space. 
3. Sociology of Religion. Montesquieu anticipates the 
methodological devices of Max Weber [1864–1920] 
and Durkheim. First, he takes religion as a datum of 
social life. Second, he investigates its repercussions 
on mores and conduct. 
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4. Sociology of Commerce. Montesquieu establishes 
a general sociology of economic institutions in their 
interaction with all intellectual, moral, political, 
and legal institutions. 
5. Sociology of Mores. Note Montesquieu’s impor-
tant suggestion to investigate the interrelationships 
between mores and the established civil, penal, and 
political laws. Frequently, laws are soft where the 
mores are strict, and vice versa. 
6. Sociology of Law. Montesquieu examines the 
interaction between the constitutions and diverse 
types of civil, penal, and taxation laws, correspond-
ing to the fundamental types of government. The 
analyses of these basic types of government are at 
the center of the book. They present the integrating 
power of three types of human rationality in shap-
ing the organizations under which men can live 
in continuity and in order. Montesquieu is aware 
that his concepts are ideal types (in the sense that 
Max Weber developed them). He also sees that 
these fundamental institutions must be analyzed 
according to the elements that constitute their 
specific character. He calls it “nature.” The second 
element of their existence is what makes them work 
and continuously function—that is, their “prin-
ciple,” or spirit. For example, in a republic—where 
people are both rulers and ruled, where judges and 
magistrates are elected, where laws are frugal and 
simple, and where penal laws are typically soft and 
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lean toward rehabilitation—creative freedom is the 
kind of rationality that is extolled and the ethos of 
a republic is centered on virtue, a love of equality, 
the spirit of sacrifice, cooperation, and teamwork. 
In a monarchy, there is a ruler under a constitution, 
with intermediate powers possessed by courts, and 
checks and balances provided by the king’s princes 
and lords who possess the “clemency of princes.” 
The type of rationality in a monarchy is freedom 
under law, with an ethos focused on honor, urbani-
tas, and humanitas. In a despotic regime, one finds 
arbitrary domination, police, and widespread inse-
curity, accompanied by hypocrisy. Despotism is 
irrational, and its ethos is fear, terrorism, and the 
destruction of subjects’ independence.
VIII. Unity of Science: comparative method, historical relativ-
ism, political sociology, rise of positivism
Between Montesquieu and the thinkers who established sociol-
ogy proper in France—that is, Nicolas de Condorcet [1743–1794], 
Saint Simon, and Comte—the  Encyclopedists present the univer-
sal spreading of a sociological spirit in many fields of research and 
among scholars of different philosophical convictions. 
The Encyclopédie (1751–1765) was a summary of the state of posi-
tive knowledge in all fields with the intention of showing the growth 
of positive and empirical knowledge as over and against the theo-
logical and metaphysical dogmatisms. However, it was not revolu-
tionary in a political or social sense, although it was resented and 
persecuted by the Jesuits, the Jansenists, the Court, and the Parlia-
ment. Its contributors came from all social strata, except the ruling 
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elite. We find men who belong to the nobility of office and to the 
lower ranks of the clergy, professors, jurists, physicians, engineers, 
businessmen, industrialists, and intellectuals. They approach the 
problems of anthropology and of the origins of sociology with the 
instruments of a critical method in history and with the new tools of 
the sensualistic psychology of John Locke [1632–1704] and Étienne 
Bonnot de Condillac [1714–1780]. The readers were the general pub-
lic, but especially the enlightened middle classes and the educated 
and urban elements of the nobility.
The Encyclopedists vigorously attacked the problems of the 
primitive societies in order to investigate the principle of the state of 
nature and the concept of the noble savage. They discarded the lat-
ter notion as incompatible with many facts, although they admitted 
that some reports pointed out that the primitive societies can share 
in the working of the Law of Nature and in its rational rules in inter-
tribal relationships. They debunked the moral praise of the original 
goodness and excellence of the state of nature as proclaimed by Jean-
Jacques Rousseau [1712–1778] as a political ideology. They used the 
comparative method successfully and made valuable suggestions in 
establishing conceptions of the universality of religious and moral 
attitudes. They reduced the varieties and differences of the universal 
tendencies to physical and historical conditions. 
They introduced a sociological approach toward political institu-
tions and clarified the issue of the best kind of government. In partic-
ular, they analyzed the different conditions of the political contract 
in the rise of the constitutional monarchy in France. In analyzing 
political and social institutions, they compared the institutions with 
their social meaning and the harmony or disharmony between them. 
They made the first scientific analyses of the problematic character 
of a military elite in a society that is no longer feudal. They hinted 
at the political function of urban industrial societies in the modern 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N732
rational state. In all of these investigations, they established a socio-
logical approach when postulating and questioning the functional 
character of institutions in a specific social structure. Their socio-
logical approach focused on men’s actual experiences in society, seen 
as a dynamic process over and against the hardening institutions of 
the state.
They found still another approach toward sociology in their 
psychological hypotheses. They took for granted that man consists 
of sensations and basic tendencies. For this reason, they eliminated 
the notion of the state of nature and postulated, as scientists, to 
start with investigating primitive societies because men never exist 
without some form of organization. They explained higher human 
activities such as philosophy and moral or political principles as 
the result of the basic needs of reason in society. They assumed that 
the group, the collectivity, is indispensable for the actualization of 
the intellectual and spiritual faculties that are inherent in human 
nature in potentialities. This thesis made possible the first strides 
toward a sociology of knowledge based on the process of learning, 
the traditions of reflection, and the progress of scientific thinking; 
the existence of institutions, philosophical schools, or monopolistic 
and esoteric organizations of sacred knowledge, such as the organi-
zations in which priests educated their successors, appear as relevant 
for the life of reason. This approach made possible the first attempt 
at a sociological history of philosophy.
The interconnected effort to explain and understand human 
nature in action by historical, social, and psychological investiga-
tions ultimately made meaningless the traditional science of the Law 
of Nature. In the past, thinkers understood the science of the Law 
of Nature as describing the state of society in terms of reflex or of 
participation in a whole. Whether they called it universe or creation 
did not matter. New scientific methods, the study of external and 
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internal conditions made it possible to explain human conduct and 
the varieties of behavioral patterns in terms of societal relationships 
in the development of the historical process. Empirical sociology, 
composed of social-psychological and historical methods, substi-
tutes for the past science of social action. It carries on the same spirit 
of liberalism with the new means of scientific and positive methods. 
• René Hubert, Article on Encyclopédie in the 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, editor-in-chief, Edwin 
R. A. Seligman, associate editor, Alvin Johnson (New York: 
Macmillan, c. 1930–35) 
• René Hubert, D’Holbach et ses amis (Paris: A. Delpeuch, 
1928) 
• René Hubert, Les Sciences Sociales Dans l’Encyclopédie: 
La philosophie de l’histoire et le problème des origines (Paris: 
F. Alcan, 1923) 
• John Morley, Diderot and the Encyclopaedists, 2 volumes 
(London: Chapman and Hall, 1878) 
• Daniel Mornet, La pensée française au XVIIIe siècle 
(Paris: A. Colvin, 1926) 
• Marius Roustan, The Pioneers of the French Revolution 
(London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1926). Translated by Frederic 
Whyte. Original title: Philosophes et la société française au 
XVIIIe siècle (Lyon: A. Rey, imprimeur-éditeur: Librairie A. 
Picard et fils, 1926)
The diverse approaches in the Encyclopédie to find a substitute 
for the science of Natural Law in a psychological analysis of human 
incentives, in the investigations in social causation, and in the dis-
covery of the historical process have finally created distinct socio-
logical efforts, one of which is:
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Paul-Henry Thiry, Baron d’Holbach, Système  social, ou 
principes naturels de la morale et de la politique avec 
un examen de l’influence du gouvernement sur les 
moeurs (Paris: Fayard, 1773).
Baron d’Holbach [1723–1789] wrote three hundred articles for 
the Encyclopédie on technology and sciences. His main work, Sys-
tème de la Nature; ou lois du monde physique & du monde moral 
(A Londres, i.e. Amsterdam, 1777), was the most radical effort to 
reestablish a thorough materialistic system of absolute determin-
ism. This philosophical position did not prevent his militant social 
liberalism. He was convinced that human happiness could only be 
established by cooperation in societal relationships. He attacked 
religion as disastrous to social ethics. The influence of religion was 
easily explained by two principles of psychology: (1) Sensation and 
Association—the beliefs that govern conduct are the product of edu-
cation confirmed by habit, and (2) Utility. Man seeks his happiness, 
tries to avoid misfortune and, finding himself subject to the forces of 
nature, pictures nature as a divinity liable to human emotions. Sci-
ence shows nature differently and provides the rational means to get 
rid of fear and to find happiness. The social system is based on the 
principle that the main human interest is social, that nature imposes 
on man social norms—that is, a social contract. Teaching the true 
social system will enlighten men about their true interests and make 
them cooperate for the common good. The Social Contract must 
become a political institution in order to transform the innate social 
norms into established laws that can be enforced. The rule of law 
restricts ruler and the people. The advantages of society—liberty, 
property, security—can be enjoyed only under the protection of 
laws. Civil laws reflect the social laws of nature and present the unity 
and the interdependent drives of liberty and self-restraint. Religious 
liberty is the natural result of the freedom of thinking. Political free-
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dom can be established in all forms of government that are ruled 
by laws and a constitution. That means that despotism and revolu-
tion are both situations of anarchy and chaos for Baron d’Holbach. 
He suggested a science that would enlighten men on their utilitar-
ian happiness in society. He called it the “Science de Moeurs.” It is 
valid for princes and subjects, rich and poor, because it describes 
and analyzes the empirical reality of human behavior patterns as 
located in a specific frame of reference. This science will establish 
the invariables and variables of societal relationships without taking 
refuge in any dogmatism or metaphysical system. This suggestion 
anticipates Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s La morale et la science des moeurs 
(Paris: F. Alcan, 1903), in which the great anthropologist postulates 
an empirical sociological study of the diverse moral attitudes in their 
relationships to social structures.
IX. Genesis of Mind and Moral Sense
John Locke [1632–1704]. Locke did not contribute to social studies. 
But, indirectly, his empiricism and psychologism had tremendous 
repercussions in the rising social sciences. See, in particular, his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Some Thoughts Concern-
ing Education (1693), and Reasonableness of Christianity (1695). His 
theoretical philosophy should lay the foundations to certain ethics. 
Since his work, all social studies are necessarily interconnected with 
epistemology, the basis of philosophy. Epistemology constructs the 
presuppositions for all social branches of action. It opens a road 
toward sociological investigations on the conditions of what men 
know or think they know—what we call today the sociology of 
knowledge. Locke’s approach toward the genesis of our perceptions 
(psychological or rather psychogenetic) makes possible an analysis 
of our thinking processes. Locke’s revolt against metaphysics and, 
in particular, against Descartes’s innate ideas resulted in the most 
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careful and cautious empiricism. This became the hallmark of the 
Scottish social sciences and most French studies from the Encyclo-
pédie on. In particular, Locke’s first stride toward psychology, his 
distinction between kinds of experience—sensation and reflection—
and his analysis of the external and inner senses directed and deter-
mined Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and David Hume. In Locke’s 
moral and educational writings, sociology as method prevails. Social 
conditions determine the articulate character of educational values, 
not different from Erasmus and Montaigne. In Locke’s statements 
on morals and philosophy, he clearly conceives of the individual as 
socius whose personal well-being can be merely second to the stan-
dards and requirements of society. 
Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury [1671–1713]. 
Characteristicks of men, manners, opinions, times. 3 volumes (Lon-
don: John Derby, 1711). As a friend of Pierre Bayle, Shaftesbury 
continued and elaborated the idea of the complete independence of 
social and moral philosophies. He rejects theological efforts to hold 
ethics dependent on revelation, and he rejects Hobbes’s efforts to find 
foundations of ethics in physiology or physics. Right, Virtue, and 
Goodness are valid in themselves. To know and realize them makes 
for human dignity and happiness. This is social eudaemonism—
striving for and accomplishing the Good—is the highest pleasure 
and happiness. It is happiness because men fulfill the requirements 
of all embracing Nature. In striving for Right, Virtue, and Happi-
ness, men adjust to the laws of nature. This is subordination under 
an understood context of Nature. Shaftesbury was influenced by the 
Stoics, by Spinoza, and by Giordano Bruno [1548–1600]. He believed 
in the harmony of the university, in the harmony and equilibrium of 
society, and in the pulchritude of the virtuous man. By harmony, he 
meant a unity of variety and a reconciliation of opposites. In present-
ing his philosophy in psychological terms, he appears as a student of 
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Locke’s philosophy and psychology. By contrast, Hobbes had stated 
the original selfishness of human instincts. 
Shaftesbury was partly influenced by Richard Cumberland 
[1632–1718] and his De legibus naturæ disquisitio philosophica, in 
qua earum forma, summa capita, ordo, promulgatio, & obligatio è 
rerum natura investigantur; quinetiam elementa philosophiæ Hob-
bianæ, cum moralis tum civilis, considerantur & refutantur (Lon-
don: E. Flesher, 1672). Cumberland opposed Hobbes and made the 
benevolent, altruistic inclinations the foundations of social conduct. 
He considered these to be the counterweight to selfish passions 
and attempted to explain social process as a struggle between two 
complexes of drives. He agreed with Hobbes that man is egotistical 
by nature, but he insisted that man is also social. And he accepted 
Bacon’s notion of psychological rules that guide inductive reasoning 
based on careful observation. But Cumberland thought that good-
ness was divinely created, whereas Shaftesbury saw it as original and 
substantive. Moreover, the two men disagreed about how men arrive 
at knowledge of the moral. Cumberland saw it as rational and intel-
lectual, while Shaftesbury argued that men recognize the good by 
intuiting it.24
Shaftesbury saw man’s selfish and social instincts as reconcilable, 
a harmony not based on prudence or on humility or subservience. 
Instead, he saw the reconciliation based on the constructive enthu-
siasm of human nature to achieve an identity of social and aesthetic 
perfection, a “moral taste.” Shaftesbury made strides forward in psy-
chological observations and intuitions. He laid the foundation for the 
sociology of sympathy and of intuition as practiced by the Scottish 
philosophers. He continued Locke’s progress in the psychological 
analysis of passions. His analysis of the constructive and destructive 
types of enthusiasm and his description of the criteria for genuine 
enthusiasm are still valid and deserve a translation into modern psy-
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chological terminology. Further, he made remarkable progress when 
he coined the term Moral Taste for Moral Sense, a synthesis of Locke 
and of Stoic notions. It refers to the teleological character of our senses 
or instincts that lead us toward a well-balanced social and individual 
harmony as reflecting our being parts of a harmonious nature and 
universe. This universe is moving again and again for reestablishing 
its order and beauty. Man alone carries the responsibility for real-
izing the pattern of kosmos in self and society. In this frame of refer-
ence, Shaftesbury created the socio-psychological notions that led to 
the sociological doctrines that flourished in Scotland. In connection 
with his philosophy, the idea of “form” gains relevance for social 
studies as indicating a variety of societal relationships as variables 
or invariables in constituting the duration of societies. In particular, 
his conceptions of “Inner Form” and “Form of Truth” are relevant to 
sociological and psychological depth analysis of social institutions. 
They are important for all sociological analyses of poetry and of the 
arts. They make possible, at least, the question of what “form” means 
for and in the history of philosophy.
Bernard Mandeville [1670–1733]. Fable of the Bees or Private 
Vices, Publick Benefits (London: J. Roberts, 1714). Mandeville was a 
satirist who sharply opposed Shaftesbury’s social optimism. In fact, 
he thought that social reality is exactly opposite from Shaftesbury’s 
view of it. The invariable nature of man, he argued, is selfish, com-
petitive, ambitious, and proud. Moreover, only these characteristics 
and attitudes make society move, make it prosperous and lasting. 
Mandeville used debunking psychology for explaining economic 
prosperity. His work influenced Adam Smith and, later, Friedrich 
Hayek [1899–1992].
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X. Unity of Sociology and Social Psychology
The Scottish School made a synthetic effort to connect the methods 
of the modern sciences of physics and psychology with the tradi-
tions of the past science of the Law of Nature in order to establish 
a doctrine of liberalism based on the analysis and description of 
social man in action. 
Historical Circumstances. In Scotland, the religious contests of 
the seventeenth century created a spirit of political and intellectual 
vigilance and alertness that made Glasgow and Edinburgh the intel-
lectual centers of civilization. The power of the Presbyterian Church 
was exerted on behalf of the people against foreign domination. The 
educated classes were in continuous struggle against the reaction-
ary Highlanders and conservative British of the Anglican Church. 
This intermediate position created a liberality of sentiment and a 
moderate and open-minded way of thinking that made possible the 
pioneering efforts and advances in creating a science of society. The 
Scottish Kirk had the highest appreciation for learning and created 
an unparalleled level of scholarship and intellectual curiosity.
Scientific Circumstances. Since the seventeenth century, all prob-
lems concerned with moral obligations were slowly shifted to the 
scientific investigations of psychology and of the conduct of man 
in his life situations. The general trend of British thought can be 
described as a struggle against two alignments. The first front was 
against the religious traditions. The scientific ethos did not accept 
principles and values imposed from an outer authority; the mod-
erns tried to understand and explain social norms as inherent in 
social action. The second front was the revolt against Hobbes who 
had transformed the philosophy of the Law of Nature into a natu-
ralistic philosophy of society. The first thinkers who revolted against 
Hobbes were the Cambridge Platonists who assumed original moral 
intentions in man. They advocated the Stoic conception of innate 
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ideas and established the primacy of moral principles as the law 
of nature in the consensus of the peoples (lex naturae in consensu 
gentium). Most important were Henry More [1614–1687] and Ralph 
Cudworth [1617–1688], both fellows of Christ’s College at Cambridge 
University. Others were Benjamin Whichcote [1609–1683], Peter 
Sterry [1613–1672], John Smith [1618–1652], Nathaniel Culverwell 
[1619–1651], and John Worthington [1618–1671], all of whom were 
fellows of Emmanuel College at Cambridge. 
Richard Cumberland called benevolent inclinations the natural 
basis of moral conduct. He connected the modern scientific laws of 
association and of the mechanism of motivation with the idea of the 
antagonistic drives and the principle of the victory of the benevolent 
and good impulses. He opened the way for transforming the science 
of the Law of Nature into a science that explained the immanent 
morality of man as a requirement of his being a member of society.
Shaftesbury first assumed that moral values and judgments can-
not be ascribed to rational reflection alone. He declared the positive 
and illuminating contribution of enthusiasm and sentiment to acts 
and judgments of moral and social character. Genuine virtue is the 
reconciliation of selfish and social drives in the constructive effort to 
realize a harmonious and complete personality in the social world. 
Man is capable of creative sociability because of his value sentiments. 
Francis Hutcheson [1694–1746], professor of moral philosophy 
at the University of Glasgow, established the first system of moral 
philosophy on the basis of the moral sense. He coined the term and 
defined it as our determination to be pleased with the happiness of 
others. This moral sense works like a focusing conscience or the 
Stoic ἡγεμονικόν (hêgemonikon) to which all things are subjected. 
Hutcheson distinguished the natural good as connected with the 
approval of the moral sense. The moral sense refers human action to 
the specific functions that they have in the requirements of a given 
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situation. It makes it possible to function as an impartial observer 
in the middle of one’s action. It is the objective conscience in each 
human being. The moral good constitutes the existence of man as 
a social being. The distinction between natural and moral good is 
confused by the way in which Hutcheson identifies “moral sense” 
with benevolence.
David Hume [1711–1776] succeeded in clarifying the issue of the 
moral sense scientifically. He believed that the social scientist should 
proceed from experience and from the simple to the complex, from 
self-evident principles to demonstrated conclusions. He violently 
rejected the rationalism and naturalism of the past. His radical theo-
retical skepticism opened the avenues for the understanding and 
the intelligible character of human feeling that constitute societal 
relationships and the continuity of society. He started from a posi-
tive and critical analysis of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Both had 
insisted that the “other-regarding” impulses are a constitutive part 
of human nature. Both accepted the idea that the universality, the 
immediacy, and obligation of the moral judgment indicate the uni-
versality of a feeling of values. But they failed when they dissolved 
the interdependent and indivisible character of impulses and feel-
ings and separated selfish and benevolent impulses. Hume argued 
that all impulses as such are value-neutral and can have positive and 
negative significances in different situations. In quest of an objective 
basis of morals and moral judgment, Hume looked for something 
common to all men in a “universal principle of the human frame.” 
He called this principle “utility” or “sympathy.” He defined it as the 
communication of sentiments from man to man and the openness 
to all impressions of agreeable and disagreeable human attitudes. 
This intersubjectivity between communicating individuals makes 
possible the objectivity of moral judgments and furnishes the logical 
solution of the problems of the “moral sense.” The moral judgment 
F R O M  A L B E R T  S A L O M O N742
preserves its basis in the feelings and thus remains in immediate 
contact with all the varieties of moral experience. At the same time, 
it is able to transcend subjectivity because it is not based merely on 
the isolated feelings of a particular individual, but on his feelings as 
they actually develop through his interaction with his fellow men. 
When a man makes a moral judgment, he must “depart from his 
private and particular situation and must choose a point of view 
common to him with others. He must move some universal prin-
ciple of the human frame and touch a string to which all mankind 
has an accord.” Neither self-love nor benevolence can be the basis 
of moral virtues and judgments. Sympathy and humanity alone are 
concerned with the universal utility of all humankind. All acts of 
approval or blame are based on the objective and universal principle 
of the welfare and utility of society. This means that there is an objec-
tive basis for the mutuality and intersubjectivity of human beings 
in social action. Man is by nature social, developing through and 
cooperating with society. He encroaches on others, but he practices 
self-restraint. Hume’s idea of society as continuous intersubjectiv-
ity has historical continuity and becomes the object of a science of 
society that describes the reciprocity and the manifestations of the 
mutual relationships in all intellectual and social accomplishments 
on the basis of empirical methods of social causation. Hume sug-
gested many sociological topics in his essays.
Adam Smith [1723–1790] started from Hume’s principle of sym-
pathy as establishing an objective basis for understanding social 
action. He developed Hume’s suggestions systematically and elabo-
rated a science of society that dealt with a variety of social experi-
ences. Beginning in 1737, he attended the University of Glasgow 
where Francis Hutcheson was his teacher. He studied at Oxford 
University from 1740 to 1746 and then became a professor of logic 
at the University of Glasgow in 1750. In 1752, he was appointed to 
O R I G I N S  O F  S O C I O L O G Y  A N D  S O C I A L  P S YC H O L O G Y  (19 4 7) 743
a chair in moral philosophy and began a friendship with Hume. He 
published The Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: A. Millar, 1759), 
an essay analyzing the principles by which men naturally judge the 
conduct and character of their neighbors and afterwards of them-
selves. The sixth edition of this book appeared in 1777 (Dublin: J. 
Beatty and C. Jackson, No. 32, Skinner-Row). And he published An 
Inquiry into the nature and causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: 
William Strahan and Thomas Cadell, 1776).
As professor of moral philosophy, he was required to lecture on 
natural theology, ethics, jurisprudence, and politics. The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments covers the lectures on ethics. The Lectures on 
Jurisprudence, originally titled Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue 
and Arms, ed. E. Canaan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), covers 
the course on the Law of Nature. The Wealth of Nations covers the 
course on politics. All of these books are sociological insofar as they 
present moral, legal, and economic relationships as diverse aspects 
of the self-realization of man as a member of society. They indi-
cate that the empirical investigation of social causation substitutes 
for the science of the Law of Nature. Societal relationships are the 
primary datum of human history. They are actually and logically 
prior to the artificial institutions of the political and legal estab-
lishments. There is a natural liberty, a natural justice, and natural 
common sense that would establish harmony and equilibrium as 
long as men do not violate the laws of justice and are left perfectly 
free to pursue their own interests their own way and to bring both 
their industry and capital into competition with those of any other 
man. Hence, all systems of accumulated power and of monopolies 
should be completely taken away. Between the world of absolutis-
tic planning and the free economic system, the Scottish sociology 
comes into existence as the liberal eschatology of universal world 
citizenship of independent natural societies. The ideal of the nature 
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of society as a dynamic harmony of competition and cooperation is 
the measuring rod for explaining and interpreting the social pro-
cess as a deviation from the normative being of society. Utilitarian 
and teleological elements are intertwined in the foundations of the 
sociology of Adam Smith. The condition of moral merit is the pro-
motion of the common good. Each human being strives for this end 
because every man desires praise and finally succeeds in evaluat-
ing the ends as meanings in themselves and to be loveable, not only 
be loved. In the third part of this ethics, Smith describes the rise 
of moral autonomy, the slow emancipation from social bonds and 
obligations of primitive societies to the individual conscience of the 
objective knowledge of moral values. He anticipates the research of 
Edvard Alexander Westermarck [1862–1939] on the origins of mor-
als. See, in particular, The Origin and Development of the Moral 
Ideas, 2 volumes (London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 
1906–08).
The Theory of Moral Sentiments deals with types of conduct in a 
variety of situations such as establishing societal relationships and 
maintaining the continuity of social organizations. Smith was par-
ticularly concerned about how the moral feelings of the ruled ele-
ments of a society affect the foundations of the social order. In all 
three of his books under discussion here, he focuses on this problem 
of consensus, precedence, and authority as a moral problem and his 
analysis is thoroughly sociological. Smith transformed the traditions 
of moral philosophy into an analysis of human conduct in social 
action so that the underlying moral issues appear as problems of atti-
tudes in social relationships. It is a terrible social truth that the sub-
jects of political control justify their situations by morally evaluating 
the qualities and attitudes of their rulers. Smith carefully analyzed 
this confusion of sentiments as a sociologist. Furthermore, he made 
the first sociological study of the social/moral ethos of different 
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social groups. In particular, he analyzed the specific virtues, merits, 
and limitations of the urban middle classes and the respective quali-
ties, both positive and negative, of the aristocratic societies of the 
courts. His analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the divi-
sion of labor is a model case of objective sociological research. In this 
context, he investigated the conditions of labor and the political and 
legal weaknesses of their situations. In all his efforts, he pointed out 
that the sociologist investigates the depth-situation of social spheres 
in all details and all strata. His analyses of the progress of the urban 
classes and the decline of rural structures make him the founder of 
rural and urban sociology. His analyses of militarism have the high-
est value for sociologists. 
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Adam Ferguson [1723–1816] came from a family of ministers 
and took holy orders himself. He was chaplain in the army from 1745 
to 1754. He was appointed to a chair in natural philosophy at the 
University of Edinburgh in 1759 and to a chair in moral philosophy 
there in 1764. He published An Essay on the History of Civil Society 
(London: Andrew Millar and Thomas Cadell, 1767); Institutes of 
Moral Philosophy: For the Use of Students in the College of Edinburgh 
(Edinburgh: Alexander Kinkaid & J. Bell, 1769), a book that went 
through many editions and was translated into many languages; 
The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Repub-
lic, 3 volumes (London: William Strahan & Thomas Cadell, 1783); 
and Principles of Moral and Political Science (Edinburgh: William 
Creech, 1792). 
In contrast to Adam Smith, Ferguson was less optimistic about 
the workings of civil society as emancipated from power. So his con-
tribution to sociology was more realistic in a comprehensive way:
1. He anticipated Max Weber’s discussion of the 
methodological problems of social science. He stud-
ied the subjective elements in the use of documents 
and foreshadowed the critical method of Karl Paul 
Reinhold Niebuhr [1892–1971] in dealing with the 
mythological and religious foundations of primitive 
societies. He discovered the specific character of 
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sociological generalizations as presenting a rational 
construction of social reality in abstractions. 
2. He used the suggestion of Thucydides and inves-
tigated the early history of the Greeks and Romans 
in light of anthropological discoveries. He described 
primitive society before the origin of property as a 
matriarchal group with free human relationships 
and evaluated the older men, the military youth, and 
the communion of the adult male members of the 
tribe. He gave the most comprehensive analysis of 
the character type of the warrior who, when outside 
the sphere of military action, was lazy and devoted 
to inertia, drinking, and gambling. He was the first 
to state that this was a sociological, not historical, 
condition. In dealing with primitive societies once 
the institution of property had emerged, he stressed 
the interdependence between types of government 
and legal structures. 
3. He anticipated the problems of formal sociology 
with repeated efforts to emphasize the relevance of 
size (population, territory) for the character of social 
groupings. He was aware that the optimum of social 
organizations might depend on marginal situations. 
4. He anticipated Arnold Toynbee [1889–1975] and 
his category of “challenge and response” with thor-
ough investigations of the conditions of great social 
accomplishments. Virtues are indispensable for 
establishing and maintaining wealth, power, and 
continuous improvements. And virtues come into 
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existence only under conditions of danger, pressure, 
and conflict. 
5. He developed the problems of the division of labor 
as interdependent with those of social stratification. 
6. He discarded the organic theory of history as 
cycle and suggested a spiral theory that makes it 
possible to combine the unending continuity and 
interpenetration of civilizations with the categories 
of corruption and decay as sociological generaliza-
tions. 
7. He prepared the way for the sociological analysis 
and description of historical processes and situa-
tions as the empirical science that made it possible to 
present the most comprehensive typology of human 
behavior patterns in social action as the self-realiza-
tion of man. For this reason, he was eager to give 
an account of the advantages and disadvantages of 
progress in the diverse spheres of man as far as the 
completeness and happiness of man and society are 
concerned. In this respect, he anticipated the work 
of Burckhardt that connected sociology, history, 
and a doctrine of man. 
8. He vigorously described the relevance of military 
virtues for perfect civil societies as the only guaran-
tees for the maintenance and survival of progress in 
societies. He assumed that human perfection and 
social happiness were possible only if the political-
philosophical and military-pragmatic virtues were 
not separated from each other. 
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9. He traced the first outline for a doctrine of man on 
the basis of empirical investigations and the elabora-
tion of types of social behavior that are recurrent in 
different situations and show the identity of human 
nature in its dynamic adjustment to a variety of con-
ditions. The inclinations of human nature remain 
the same. However, they look different in different 
situations such as those that call for courage or the 
adherence to honor, or to situations where luxury, 
corruption, or artificiality prevails. Ferguson’s work 
points out more clearly than that of Adam Smith the 
transformation of the science of the Law of Nature 
into a sociology of the social and historical process 
with the philosophical intent to reestablish a scien-
tific knowledge of man. This is because of his more 
violent temper in attacking the interdependence of 
the various strata of human beings in social action.
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Among Scottish scholars who established a science of society, 
Adam Smith strongly emphasized the economic aspects of societal 
relationships; Ferguson, the political and military foundations; and 
John Millar [1735–1801], the legal structures of the social constitu-
tions. Together, they accomplished the complete transformation of 
the past science of the Law of Nature, which referred the life of man 
to a religious or cosmological frame of reference, into an empirical 
science of society that referred to the social and historical processes 
of man to an ideal society of independent and just human competi-
tors. This science is an empirical science because it recognizes moral, 
political, and legal norms and values merely as impulses and inten-
tions inherent in the human constitution and challenged by specific 
circumstances.
Millar attended Glasgow College and enjoyed the friendship and 
expectations of Adam Smith, David Hume, and Henry Home (Lord 
Kames) whose research on the history of manners and law largely 
determined Millar’s own interests and investigations. Adam Smith 
and Lord Kames highly recommended Millar to become professor 
of law at Glasgow in 1761. His books on sociological problems are 
The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks, or an inquiry into the cir-
cumstances which give rise to influence and authority in the differ-
ent members of society, 3rd edition (London: sold by J. Murray, Fleet 
Street, 1779, originally published in 1771) and An Historical View of 
the English Government: from the settlement of the Saxons in Britain 
to the Accession of the house of Stewart (London: A. Strahan and T. 
Cadell, 1787). 
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These books examine the functions of legal institutions in society 
and explain changes as enforced by processes in the development 
and progress of society. Millar analyzed not only the political insti-
tutions. He also described the fundamental changes in the legal sta-
tus of women, servants, and children, because of the rise of urban 
and civilized societies. He applied the results of his findings in his 
militant struggle against the slave trade, in which he was joined by 
Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, James Beattie, and 
Adam Ferguson.25 The analyses in parts four and five of the Origin 
regarding the development of the urbanized patricians in Greece, 
Rome, America, and in all situations of colonization has become a 
model case of sociological description and explanation, followed by 
Guglielmo Ferrero [1871–1942] and Max Weber. The same praise can 
be extended to his analysis of the rise of the absolutistic regime that 
is correctly described as the result of the universal necessity for ratio-
nalizing the context of domestic and foreign policies. Here again, we 
find striking anticipation of Max Weber’s famous presentation of the 
trends toward rationalization. 
In his doctrine of man, he leaned heavily on Adam Smith’s The-
ory of Moral Sentiments and suggested only slight corrections. He 
described the highest moral values as the effort toward establishing 
such self-control as to reduce our feelings to the level of the disin-
terested spectator. This complete self-objectification seems to him 
more valuable than utility or rectitude. 
Conclusions. The Scottish School established the first science of 
society on the basis of psychology, moral philosophy, and the proud 
self-consciousness of an enlightened and urbanized middle-class 
society. They described the interdependent political, legal, economic, 
and biological strata in the causal context as referring to basic and 
constitutive impulses and intentions of man. They were aware that 
there is no blind historical necessity or evolution; there is instead 
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acting and being acted upon, independence and dependence at the 
same time. They stated that progress and corruption could exist on 
all levels of the social process. They were eager to emphasize that 
they were mainly interested in one problem: the interpretation and 
the explanation of the dynamic kaleidoscope that we call “human 
being” that remains identical in a variety of situations. Happiness, 
striving for perfection, valor, honor, thoughtfulness, ambition, van-
ity, appear in all situations as many disguises, but they remain the 
same all the time. All the authors, however different their approaches 
may be, have this in common: they understand institutions in terms 
of societal relationships and societal relationships in terms of human 
desire and meaningful intentions.
For this reason, we may call this school a humanistic school of 
sociology because society is not imposed on the individuals as was 
suggested later on by Durkheim, but society is the free cooperation 
and competition of independent individuals under the protection and 
guidance of natural justice and natural common sense. Therefore, we 
may call this humanistic school of sociology a liberal and optimistic 
one. It has its analogy in the German School that was also a humanis-
tic and liberal school, too, but in despair and pessimism. The Scottish 
School opened the way for an unbiased analysis of the social process 
as the interpenetration of human constellations rather than of insti-
tutions. It established an ideal of society as a frame of reference that is 
closest to the social implications of Gestalt psychology. It presents the 
sociology of moral sentiments as the sociological approach toward a 
theory of attitudes. This made possible and opened the road for soci-
ologists like the radical empiricist M. Raul Frédéric Rauh [1861–1909] 
and Max Scheler [1874–1928], who promoted and developed the soci-
ology of emotional attitudes. Finally, it used the historical processes 
as the material for a science of human behavior patterns and sug-
gested and, in many respects, surpassed future historical sociology.
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An Introduction to Sociology for Students  
of the Social Sciences and of the Humanities: 
Balzac as Sociologist (1949–50) 
 I. Balzac’s Thesis: The Human Comedy is a Historical-
Sociological Treatise
  A. His description implies the social function and the 
scientific significance of the social novel in a world of 
total revolution. 
  B. The Prefaces—Human Comedy, Girl with Golden 
Eyes, Ferragus, Facino Cane, Cousine Bette—indicate 
the specific place of his sociology between Bonald and 
Comte. In our historical perspective we recognize its 
affinity to Marx. We discover his influence on Max 
Weber, his anticipation of Simmel’s microsociologi-
cal method, of Lynd’s analyses of Middletown and of 
Veblen’s analysis of the dynamism of the technological 
and industrial society. The Human Comedy is a genu-
ine piece of literature of sociology.
Previously unpublished.  Manuscript located in New School faculty vertical files col-
lection, NS.08.02.02, unprocessed collection, The New School Archives and Special 
Collections, The New School, New York, New York. Published by permission from 
Frank Salomon.
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  C. On the other hand, he states the scientific possibilities 
of a sociology of literature which explains and under-
stands the changes in literary forms as resulting from 
social changes.
 II. The Scientific Method
  A. The microsociological analysis
   1. Milieu: Father Goriot, The Old Girl, The Vicar of 
Tours
   2. Environment: Marriage Contract, La Muse du  
Département
   3. Worlds: Peasants, Government Clerks, Gobseck, 
Birotteau
  B.  The analysis of social structures
   1. The structured world of the countryside: The Coun-
try Doctor
   2. The structure of the intelligentsia: Treatises and 
Scènes de la vie parisienne
   3. The structure of economic rackets: Gobseck, House 
Nucingen
   4. The structure of bureaucracies: Government Clerks, 
Petty Bourgeois
  C. The conception of ideal types
    Balzac’s character types are mainly cases of ex-
treme and radical passions. This implies the meth-
odological unification and generalization, which 
we call ideal types: Gaudissart, Deputy of Arcas, 
Z. Marcas, Princess of Cadignan, Esther, Vautrin, 
Nucingen, Gobseck, Goriot, Birotteau.
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  D. Phenomenological descriptions
   1. Gossip in a provincial town: The Old Girl, Grandet, 
Mirouet
   2. Social Control in Middletown: La Rabouilleuse
   3. Solitude in society: La Muse du Département
 III. The Depth Strata of Society: Man within and without 
Society
  A. The meaning of Balzac’s classification of the Human 
Comedy
  B. Society: the world of belonging to: Birotteau, Govern-
ment Clerks
  C. Society: the dynamics of advancement
   1. The ideals of social careers in the classes: Prefaces
   2. Economic progress: 
     work: Birotteau, Gaudissaret, Séchard 
     speculation: the bankers 
     professional skills: Derville
   3. Social progress: 
     push and pulls: Rastignac
     sex: Rubempre
  D. Society: the matter of control: Rastignac, Gobseck, 
Vautrin
  E. Society: the mutuality of controls and escapes: 
Rabouilleuse, Old Girl, Vicar of Tours, La Muse du  
Département
  F. Society: the world to be escaped: La Peau de Chagrin
  G. Society: the world to be renounced: Seamy Side of His-
tory
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 IV. Social Pathology
  Anomie and Alienation:
  A. The confusion of means-end relations: Nucingen, Gob-
seck, Goriot
  B. The destructive effects of misplaced charity: Cousine 
Bette
  C. The social perversions of marital relations: Treatise
  D. The confusion between sex, love, passion: Cadignan, 
La Duchesse de Langeais
  E. The outlaw: Vautrin
    Should appear here and in the next chapter. He is 
alienated to the functional whole of a true society 
because he follows the same pattern of acquiring 
power for the sake of power which is cherished by 
the insiders of society who manipulate violence 
through the loopholes of law and conventions.
 V. Marginality
  A. The outlaw: Vautrin
  B. The stranger: Gobseck, Marriage Contract
  C. The strange outsider: La Muse du Département, Old 
Girl, Grandet, Cadignan, Splendeurs . . . etc.
  D. The homecomer: Chabert, Bridau, Gilet, the officers of 
Napoleon
  E. The adventurer: Rubempre
  F. The gamblers: Young and Old Elite, Splendeurs . . . 
  G. The ballet: “Rate” and “Marcheuses,” Splendeurs . . .
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  H. The police: secret, political, counterintelligence, crim-
inal, commercial: Splendeurs . . . all volumes
 VI. Social Change and Theory of History
  A. Finance as the total determinism of the modern world
  B. Merging of the economic and political revolution: total  
revolution
  C. The transfer of the Napoleonic charismatism to all 
spheres of economic, social, personal conduct
    A–C throughout the Human Comedy
  D. The technological elements in the processes of revolu-
tion
   1. Inventions: Gaudissart, Birotteau, Séchard
   2. Rational administration: Government Clerks, of-
fices of men of law
   3. The new industrialism splits society into two 
classes, capital and labor, their conflict. The rise 
of the revolutionary proletariat as the revolt of the 
new barbarians: On the Workers, On Modern Gov-
ernment, Social Catechism . . .
 VII. Social Control
  A. The total control by money powers: all books
  B. Technology in the distribution of social power
   1. Administration as actual rulers: Physiology of Em-
ployee, Government Clerks
   2. Public opinion and the manipulation of social val-
ues: mutual interdependence of intellectuals and 
elite: all books
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   3. Pressure groups: 
     Camarilla: its analysis
     The law of the small numbers: on Modern Gov-
ernment, House Nucingen, Gobseck, Petty 
Bourgeois, Government Clerks
   4.  Traditions:
    a) Social conduct as ritual: La Muse du Département
    b) Stereotypes of duties, pleasures, hobbies: La Muse  
du Département, Old Girl, Vicar of Tours, Gran-
det, Miroust, La Rabouilleuse
    c) Gossip: same
   5. Fashions:
    a) La vie élégante
    b) La femme comme il faut
    c) Matrimonial Requirements in bourgeoisie: 
three different treatises
 VIII. Leisure Class
  A. Leisure class and unleisurely wealth: all books Provin-
cial and Parisian Life
  B. Political monopolies and economic monopolies: Nu-
cingen, Goriot, Gobseck
  C.  Leisure, sex, love: Cadignan, Women of Thirty, Goriot, 
La Duchesse de Langeais
  D. Leisure, thought, poetry: Cadignan, Splendeurs . . .
  E. Societal relations in a leisure class society: same
  F. The vanishing of a true leisure class and the limita-
tions of Veblen’s approach: same
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 IX. Social Stratification
  A. The principle of classification: independence, security.
  B. Three classes: workers, thinkers, leisure
  C. Laborless income: leisure class truly independent
  D. Income through labor: dependencies and insecurity, 
from manual labor to the highest ranks of the profes-
sions and of the civil service. Detailed analyses in the 
Prefaces, in the Treatises on Rentiers and on La vie 
élégante.
 X. Sex, Love, Marriage in various classes of Society
  A. The rural traditions of sex and love: Peasants, Country 
Doctor
  B. The petty bourgeoisie and the travelling salesman: 
Gaudissart
  C. The respectable bourgeoisie in Paris and in the prov-
ince: Birotteau, The Sufferings of the Inventor
  D. The intellectuals and the game of love: La Muse du 
Département, Splendeurs
  E. The traditionalistic groups: Antiques, Old Girl, Mir-
ouet
  F. The aristocratic elite: Cadignan, Woman of Thirty, 
Goriot, Splendeurs, La Duchesse de Langeais
 XI. Intellectuals and Bohemians
  A. Journalists as element in social control: Treatises on 
Elegance, Fashion, Government
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  B. Journalists as victims of the bourgeois spirit: Splen-
deurs . . .
  C. Artists drawn into business: advertising: Gaudissart, 
Birotteau
  D. Poets and writers, their dilemma: Cousine Bette, 
Cousin Pons, Splendeurs . . .
 XII. The Rise of Bureaucracies and the Phenomenology of 
Offices
  A. The social relations in the working of an administra-
tive office
   1.  The office boy
   2. The supernumeraries
   3. The cashier
   4. The clerk with tenure
   5. The lowest chief of bureau
  B. The social relations in the administration
   1. Friends and enemies
   2. Gangs, competitive rackets
   3. Intrigues, advancement, careers
   4. Social role of wives of colleagues and of superiors
   5. Social role of the confessors for the ambitious
   6. Intermarriage as a problem of the career
   7. The part-time jobs and their repercussions for the 
career
   8. Grandeur and misery of the white collar worker
    For the whole chapter: Government Clerks, Petty 
Bourgeois, and Physiologie de l’employe
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 XIII. Urban Sociology
  A. Middletown
   1. The market town: Grandet, Mirouet
   2. The administrative town: Old Girl
   3. The rentier town: La Rabouilleuse
  B. Metropolitan area:
   1. The meeting between political and economic powers
   2. Relativity of open and closed groups
   3. Pride and prejudices
   4. Cynicism and fanaticism
     For B 1–4: Scènes de la vie parisienne
 XIV. Rural Sociology
  A. The country life as potential ideal
  B. The peasants as revolutionary group
  C. The military inventions: Peasants and Indians
    For A–C: Chouans, Peasants, Country Doctor
 XV. Charity and Social Work
  A. New devices: rehabilitation vs. charity
  B. Renunciation and the elite: The Seamy Side of History
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Albert Salomon (1891-1966) was an eminent German-Jewish 
sociologist. He studied art history, religious history, and philosophy 
at Humboldt University in Berlin; philosophy at the University of 
Freiburg; and sociology at the University of Heidelberg. At Heidelberg, 
he studied under Max Weber, Georg Lukács, and Karl Mannheim. His 
fellow students included, among other great social thinkers, Hannah 
Arendt and Hans Speier. After obtaining his doctorate in sociology 
under Mannheim, he taught at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik,
but lost his job there when the Nazis came to power in January 1933.
He received an offer from Alvin Johnson to teach at the University 
in Exile at the New School for Social Research and, with his family, 
migrated to New York City in early 1935.
Over the years, Salomon taught many courses in the Graduate Faculty 
of Political and Social Science at the New School, including seminars 
on Weber, Durkheim, the history of social thought, and Balzac as a 
sociologist. His students revered him for his breadth and depth of 
learning and his exacting standards. Later scholars, including the 
editors of From Albert Salomon: Essays on Social Thinkers, regard 
him as one of the most important interpreters of Western thought
and as an exemplar of the great Jewish intellectual tradition.
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